State v. One 1977 Buick AutomobileState v. One 1977 Buick Automobile
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Shea
This is an appeal from a judgment declaring a 1977 Buick automobile to be a nuisance and ordering the automobile forfeited to the state. The appellants are the owner of the automobile, Joyce DeLorenzo, and the person whose alleged criminal use of the automobile led to its adjudication as a nuisance, William McNellis. The appellants claim that the judgment of
The trial court could reasonably have found the following facts from the conflicting evidence. As a result of a prior investigation, a warrant was issued on January 29, 1982, for the arrest of William McNellis on charges of gambling activity. On February 24, 1982, Trooper Jules Lloyd, a member of the state police then assigned to the Statewide Organized Crime Investigative Task Force, recognized McNellis as the driver of a 1977 Buick automobile traveling on Springdale Street in Meriden. There was a female passenger in the automobile with McNellis. The trooper was aware of the outstanding warrant for the arrest of McNellis and caused the Buick to be pulled over to the side of the road. Lloyd radioed his location and situation to headquarters in Meriden, and other troopers were dispatched with a copy of the arrest warrant for McNellis. Meanwhile, Lloyd approached the Buick, noticing as he did so that McNellis was partially turned away from the driver’s side window of the vehicle, concealing his activities from the trooper. Lloyd informed McNellis that he had a warrant for McNellis’ arrest and requested that McNellis step out of the Buick. McNellis asked to see the warrant. Lloyd repeated that he had a warrant and again asked McNellis to get out of the vehicle. At this point, McNellis, while still in the automobile, ripped up a piece of white paper and put the
Lloyd then prepared an application for a warrant to search the Buick for gambling records. The warrant was issued, and the trooper retrieved the torn pieces of paper, and also a bank book and an address book, from the Buick’s glove compartment. While a summons to the in rem proceeding was served upon both DeLorenzo and McNellis, only DeLorenzo, the owner of the car, was made a party defendant in the forfeiture action. At the trial, Trooper John Drescher testified that the torn pieces of paper found in the glove compartment constituted “a tally sheet, a record of amounts) of money owed in connection with previously placed wagers.” The trial court concluded that the Buick had been used “to store or conceal gambling records” as defined in
I
We first address the appellants’ claim that the forfeiture order was erroneous because a statutory prerequisite to forfeiture under
The case law of this state provides some support for the appellants’ contention. In State v. Sabia, 1 Conn. App. 315, 471 A.2d 673 (1984), the court concluded that
This does not end our inquiry, however. It would make little sense if property lawfully seized without a warrant3 could never be forfeited simply because some
II
The appellants also claim that the trial court erred in refusing to make McNellis, the driver of the 1977 Buick at the time of its seizure, a party to the forfeiture action and in excluding him from the courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses. It is claimed that these actions violated
The appellants have failed to file a transcript of the proceedings before the trial court, Ramsey, J., in which the question of McNellis’ status was resolved.5 At the subsequent hearings, the court, Glass, J., specifically stated that it would not go behind the previous ruling, and the issue was not discussed during those hearings. The appellants have placed before us only the transcripts of the later hearings. Thus we do not know what issues were presented to Judge Ramsey or the basis for his ruling. “The significant gap in the record . . . limits our review and presents obstacles to reviewing the [appellants’] claim of error on this appeal. See Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 713-14, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983); H. B. Sanson, Inc. v. Tax Commissioner, 187 Conn. 581, 586, 447 A.2d 12 (1982). It is the appellants’] burden to ensure that we are provided with an adequate appellate record to support [their] claims of error. See DeMilo v. West Haven, 189 Conn. 671, 681, 458 A.2d 362 (1983). It is important to recognize that a claim of error cannot be predicated on an assumption that the trial court acted incorrectly. Long v. Loughlin, 171 Conn. 291, 292-93, 370 A.2d 925 (1976); Giamattei v. DiCerbo, 135 Conn. 159, 162, 62 A.2d 519 (1948); Maltbie, [Conn. App. Proc.] § 311.
Our decision to uphold the refusal of the trial court to make McNellis a party in the in rem action also disposes of the appellants’ claim of unlawful sequestration. McNellis, not being a party, has no standing to raise this claim.6 And DeLorenzo, the owner of the vehicle, is likewise barred by her attorney’s failure to object to the sequestration order. Indeed, the order was prompted by DeLorenzo’s attorney’s request that all state’s witnesses be sequestered, which elicited a counter request of the same nature from the state’s attor
III
The appellants also contend that the torn papers recovered from the 1977 Buick’s glove compartment were seized pursuant to a defective warrant, rendering them inadmissible in the in rem proceeding. The appellants made no motion to suppress the evidence in this case, nor did they take exception when their objection to its admission was overruled. “Since the [appellants] took no exception to the ruling, as required by
IV
The appellants further argue that the evidence presented in the in rem proceeding was insufficient to support the judgment. Citing two federal cases, the appellants assert that a “substantial connection” must exist between the criminal activity and the property to be forfeited when the property is only “derivative contraband.” Our forfeiture statute contains no such requirement.7
The adequacy of the expert testimony relating to that issue is the second point of attack by the appellants. Without questioning the qualifications of Trooper Drescher as an expert, the appellants contend that there was an insufficient factual foundation for his conclusion that the torn pieces of paper represented “a tally sheet.” We agree that the facts upon which an expert opinion is based are important in considering the relevance, and hence the weight, as well as the admissibility of the testimony. See Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 34, 372 A.2d 516 (1976). Nevertheless, we do not find the foundation inadequate in this case. Drescher based his testimony on his direct observation of the slip of paper, together with his expertise, which is not challenged, and certain information he had previously obtained from a wiretap investigation of illegal gambling in the Waterbury area. The appellants claim that because the wiretap information had been obtained two months before the seizure of the Buick and did not permit the trooper to decipher fully the writing on the paper, the trooper’s testimony had an insufficient factual basis. We do not agree. We conclude that the two month delay did not require a finding of changed circumstances such as to render the wiretap information too attenuated from the events of the day of the seizure to have probative value. Thus we do not agree “that the uncertainties in the essential facts on which the witness’ opinion was predicated were such as to make an opinion based on them without substantial value.” Going v. Pagani, supra, 35. We therefore find the testimony adequate to support the trial court’s conclusion.
The appellants’ brief also refers to several alleged misstatements of the evidence in the trial court’s mem
V
The appellants argue in addition that the Buick should not be forfeited because forfeiture would unduly punish the innocent owner of the vehicle. This argument misapprehends the function of our forfeiture laws. “This statute is not a criminal statute, but provides for a civil action in rem for the condemnation and forfeiture of the car which was used in violation of the law. Pickett, Pros. Atty. v. Marcucci’s Liquors, [112 Conn. 169, 151 A. 526 (1930)]. In such an action the guilt or innocence of the owner of the vehicle is not in issue. The only issue is whether the vehicle was used in violation of law. This follows from the nature of the action which is one against the res, an action in rem .... The effective enforcement of the law may require legislation making property used for illegal purposes subject to forfeiture. When the statute provides for such forfeiture in unequivocal language, making no exceptions in favor of the claims of innocent owners . . . it must be assumed that the legislature deemed that such enactment was necessary effectively to curb violation of the law, and we cannot impute to it an intent to make the statute less drastic and effective by adopting a strained construction of the language used, and reading into it an exception which does not there appear. The forfeiture is the owner’s misfortune much as if the property had been destroyed, and he is remitted to his remedy against the person to whom he entrusted the property.” Alcorn, State‘s Attorney v. Alexandrovicz, 112 Conn. 618, 623-24, 153 A. 786
Nevertheless, as we noted in State v. Connelly, supra, there may be some instances in which forfeiture would violate the due process rights of an innocent owner. Quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689, 94 S. Ct. 2080, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1974), we noted that “it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or consent. . . . Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property. . . .” State v. Connelly, supra, 593 n.4. In this case, the trial court specifically concluded that no evidence was presented that McNellis had the automobile without the owner’s consent or knowledge, and found that he had used the Buick on other occasions. In addition, no evidence was presented by the owner that she was unaware of McNellis’ criminal activities involving the use of her car. Thus the record does not support the contention that the innocence of the owner should bar the forfeiture of the automobile.
VI
The appellants’ final claim is somewhat difficult to follow. As we understand it, the appellants claim that the acquittal of McNellis of the gambling charges recited in the arrest warrant relating to his criminal activities prior to February 24,1982, the day on which the seizure of the Buick took place, should somehow prevent the forfeiture of the vehicle at issue here. The
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
When the forfeiture proceeding was instituted,
“(b) If the owner of such property or any person claiming any interest in the same appears, he shall be made a party defendant in such case. Any state’s attorney or assistant state’s attorney may appear and prosecute such complaint.
“(c) If the judge or court finds the allegations made in such complaint to be true and that the property has been possessed, controlled or designed for use, or is or has been or is intended to be used, with intent to violate or in violation of any of the criminal laws of this state, he shall render judgment that such property is a nuisance and order the same to be destroyed or disposed of to a charitable or educational institution or to a governmental agency or institution provided, if any such property is subject to a bona fide mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest, such property shall not be so destroyed or disposed of in violation of the rights of the holder of such interest. When any money or valuable prize has been seized upon such warrant and condemned under the provisions of this section, such money or valuable prize shall become the property of the state, provided any such property, which at the time of such order is subject to a bona fide mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest shall remain subject to such mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest. When any property or valuable prize has been declared a nuisance and condemned under this section, the court may also order that such property be sold by sale at public auction in which case the proceeds shall become the property of the state; provided, any person who has a bona fide mortgage, assignment of lease or rent, lien or security interest shall have the same right to the proceeds as he had in the property prior to sale. Final destruction or disposal of such property shall not be made until any criminal trial in which such property might be used as evidence has been completed.
“(d) If the judge or court finds the allegations not to be true or that the property has not been kept with intent to violate or in violation of the criminal laws of this state or that it is the property of a person not a defendant, he shall order the property returned to the owner forthwith and the party in possession of such property pending such determination shall be responsible and personally liable for such property from the time of seizure and shall immediately comply with such order.
“(e) Failure of the state to proceed against such property in accordance with the provisions of this section shall not prevent the use of such property as evidence in any criminal trial.”
When the forfeiture proceeding was instituted,
“Upon complaint on oath of any state’s attorney or assistant state’s attorney or by any two credible persons, to any judge of the superior court, that he or they have probable cause to believe that any property (1) possessed, controlled, designed or intended for use or which is or has been used or which may be used as the means of committing any criminal offense . . . is within or upon any place, thing or person, such judge . . . may issue a warrant commanding a proper officer to enter into or upon such place or thing, search the same or the person and take into his custody all such property named in the warrant.”
The appellants have made no challenge to the legality of the arrest, or the ensuing search, on any grounds; nor would the fact that the officer who arrested McNellis did not have on his person a copy of the arrest warrant support such a challenge. See State v. Delgado, 161 Conn. 536, 543-46, 290 A.2d 388, remanded for resentencing, 408 U.S. 940, 92 S. Ct. 2879, 33 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1971).
Our conclusion that the statutes authorize the forfeiture in this instance is further fortified by
The in rem action was initially filed in the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden because the arrest of McNellis and seizure of the 1977 Buick took place there. On March 12,1982, counsel appeared in response to the summons at geographical area number seven in Meriden before Ramsey, J., who determined that the proper venue was Waterbury, the site of McNellis’ alleged gambling activities and the source of the arrest warrant executed in Meriden. See
The continued reference to the “appellants” in the plural throughout this opinion is employed only for the sake of continuity and is not meant to indicate in any manner that McNellis, who was not properly a party to this proceeding, had any standing to contest anything but the determination of his party status.
Indeed, even an extremely broad reading of the federal cases cited by the appellants hardly supports the proposition for which the cases are cited. In United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1977), the court upheld the forfeiture of an automobile that had been used to transport two drug dealers to a location where they negotiated a sale of drugs that did not even take place at that time. The court specifically stated that it was looking for either a “direct or indirect relationship” (emphasis added) between the drug charges and the vehicle, a relationship that could be satisfied by “facilitation in any manner” (emphasis in original) of the drug deal by the automobile. The second case, United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado, 575 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1978), relied heavily on the first, and the forfeiture was overturned only because there was literally no credible connection between the drug sale and the automobile, which appeared momentarily at the site of the sale with the dealer’s family inside. Neither court made reference to “derivative contraband” in either case, nor was the term “substantial connection” employed.
We note that the United States Supreme Court has recently held that even an acquittal of criminal charges upon which the government relies in a forfeiture action would not bar the forfeiture of the property in a subsequent civil proceeding. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361-62, 104 S. Ct. 1099, 79 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1984).