205 P. 337 | Utah | 1922
The defendant H. L. Olson, respondent here, and one Lafe Newbold were charged in an information filed in the district court of Salt Lake county with a felony.- At the close of the state’s evidence the court granted a motion to dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The state appeals from that judgment.
The prosecution is under Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 3974x7, as amended by chapter 81, Laws Utah 1921. The section as amended is as follows:
“Any person who shall willfully deprive the owner of any vehicle, either temporarily or permanently hy taking possession of, or driving, or taking away said vehicle, or any person who shall assist in or he a-party to such taking possession of, or driving, or taking away of any vehicle belonging to another and standing in any street, road, garage or other building or place, or whoever receives, buys or conceals any vehicle knowing or having reason to believe the same to have been stolen, shall he deemed guilty of a felony.”
It appears from the testimony that one Hertwig, on the 6th day of August, 1921, was the owner of a Hudson automobile, and that he left the same on Main street, in Salt Lake City, on the evening of that day. Upon leaving the car he. removed the rotary arm from the ignition system. After leaving the car he attended a theater. During the time he was in the theater the defendants climbed into the car, and the respondent seated himself at the steering wheel, and apparently attempted to start the car. Thereupon his companion climbed out and raised the right side of the hood over
Counsel for respondent argued in the district court, and argues here, that the facts do not show the commission of any public offense as defined in the statute quoted. It is further contended by respondent that there must be a union of act and intent to constitute an offense, and that the testimony does not show any act in furtherance of the commission of the offense. In other words, that some asportation of the automobile was necessary before the crime was consummated. The district court adopted that theory, and ordered the information dismissed and the respondent’s bondsmen discharged. The ruling of the court is assigned as error.
In considering the question presented and argued we do not find it necessary to determine whether the facts shown by the state’s evidence authorized submitting to the jury whether respondent was guilty of the principal crime charged in the information and enumerated in the statute.
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 9025, is as follows:
“The jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to commit the offense.”
Under the facts shown, if the court was of the opinion that there was no proof of the crime charged, and, there being proof of an attempt to commit the offense charged, that question should have been left to the jury. The court, in its discretion, under Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 8527,
The respondent further contends that the statute under which the prosecution was instituted is unconstitutional in this: That chapter 81, Laws Utah 1921, includes more than one subject. Section 23 of article 6 of our state Constitution provides:
“Except general appropriation bills, and bills for the codification and general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.”
The title of chapter 81, so far as material, is as follows:
“An act to regulate the placing of identification numbers on vehicles; * * * to provide for the registration, transfer of ownership, inspection and issuing of number plates for vehicles; * * * to prevent the theft of vehicles and parts thereof,” etc.
Removing or depriving the owner of a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner is of necessity included within the general act to prevent the theft of vehicles and parts thereof. The general purpose of the act is to regulate the means of identifying vehicles, and to prevent the obliteration or removal of the evidence of identification, and to provide against the theft of such vehicles or any parts
It follows from the foregoing that the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the information and discharge the respondent. Such order is therefore reversed.