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State v. Olinghouse
605 S.W.2d 58
Mo.
1980
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*1 Missouri, Respondent, STATE of OLINGHOUSE,

Walter Richard

Appellant.

No. 61216. Missouri,

Supreme Court

En Banc.

May 1980.

Rehearing Denied June 1980. *3 Lebanon, Wilhite, appellant.

David E. Ashcroft, Gen., Atty. up John M. Mor- and the other two men drove John ris, III, Gen., Atty. City, Asst. Jefferson entered. Demands of Frazier house and respondent. were a blow to the head with accented rifle and kicks to the the butt of a M-16 WELBORN, Special Judge.

ROBERT R. body by all four men. Appeal judgment from of conviction of thoroughly ransacked dur- The house was murder, with a sentence of life im- ing or so that the intruders the two hours prisonment without possibility money they They were there. took years, upon jury entered verdict. found, silverware, jewelry, gun collection 15, 1977, Sunday evening, On May four and other items. men, appellant Olinghouse, Walter Richard one the four foray Near the end of the Thomas, Danny David Dewaine Thomas Wickie, at “Hey, called: come and look *4 driving and Richard Johnson were around Olinghouse was known the nick- this.” in Hickory County. All four were armed. made name “Wickie” and the remark was A robbery of the Fraziers was discussed. lying near where Mr. Frazier was on years, For Olinghouse par- several and his floor. adjoining ents had lived aon farm rec- Appellant feared that Frazier would farm, Frazier between Stockton and Hu- his nickname. ognize him from the use of mansville. Olinghouses The had moved anything Frazier said that he hadn’t heard years from their farm several previously, but the men were not convinced and con- appellant but had been at the Frazier house cluded would be killed. on numerous that Frazier they occasions before moved. companions He told his the Fraziers Frazier, The and bound loot was removed kept money lots of at their house. blindfolded, and was shoved into the rear of vicinity men drove to the automobile, parked near the house. Frazier farm. Johnson and Dewaine Thom- appellant got Dewaine and in the Frazier house, as carrying plastic walked to the got into the Danny auto and and Johnson jug. milk When Frazier Mr. answered their they Johnson in which had driven Chevrolet door, pounding they at the they said were farm. gasoline out of and asked whether he could The two automobiles were driven to the supply them with some. Frazier went out- River, Caplinger Bottoms of the Sac in the side plastic and filled the container vicinity Caplinger Mills. Frazier was gasoline from a tank. As the re- three placed carried from the car and in an area house, turned toward the Thomas and John- camp gasoline of an old fire. The he had pulled son guns their and announced a hold- De- given poured the men was on him. up. Frazier asked his wife to let them back twice with a waine shot Frazier in the back house, in the saying guns. that the men had 20-gauge shotgun. Johnson shot sawed off opened She the door and the men came in pistol Oling- and Frazier with a .32 caliber and threw Mr. Frazier to the kitchen floor. Danny with a Thomas house shot him .38. Mrs. Frazier had a pistol .22 in her hands Danny fired three to five shots at Frazier. she but did not know how to use it and it then threw a match toward Frazier and was taken from her. gasoline ignited. bound, gagged Mrs. Frazier was and Dewaine’s Johnson and Dewaine drove to blindfolded. The men demanded to know Olinghouse Danny house in Gerster. money where the was and were told of joined shortly the loot from them there places, amounting small caches in various was removed from the automo- robbery gave a few hundred Frazier dollars. Mr. biles. them his billfold. He too was bound and

blindfolded. left, Mrs. Sometime after the robbers blindfolded, neigh- and went to a

After Mr. Frazier had been Frazier freed herself He porch light signal the back the sheriff was called. flashed bor’s and reached the Frazier house at around 4:00 informant.” He “confidential com- plains A.M. A search for Mr. Frazier and the the failure to disclose the identi- begun. ty Frazier auto was around 4:00 informant deprived At the confidential P.M., May hearing, Frazier was him of a preliminary automobile fair viola- vicinity requirements in the process discovered Gerster. tion due constitutions, and federal and state that the Johnson, appellant Danny had en- restriction of his cross-examination of the Floyd early tered Weaver’s house in Gerster right witness denied him on this matter Weaver, morning May on the 16. John- against guar- him as confront witnesses cousin, Entry son’s at home. anteed and federal constitutions. by state gained through a window. Sergeant hearing, At the preliminary Sel- Johnson left the area at around 11:00 vey Highway Patrol the Missouri State A.M., accompany May his mother on a that, working he was May testified on thereafter, trip Kentucky. Shortly a rel- on the Frazier case and that “confidential ative of Johnson’s told officers that some of Johnson, Thomas informant” told him persons robbery involved in the Frazier were involved in the Frazier were at the Weaver house. around 2:00 At case, shot that Frazier had been and that P.M., a number of officers surrounded the in the the three could be found Weaver men occupants house and called for the to come objected house in Defense counsel Gerster. so, gas they out. failed do tear When *5 testimony to what the “confidential about Danny emerged was used and object- witness and informant” had told the were under placed arrest. prevented ed he was from further when called The FBI had been into the case. regarding the witness cross-examining to in- Appellant Springfield was taken identity “confidential informant.” terrogated by agents troop- FBI and state statement, eventually ers. He made a ad- deciding, Assuming, without in mitting participation his the crime and would invalidate this such a matter as leading discovery officers to of Frazier’s was hearing, appellant entitled preliminary body. ground. to no Under the rule relief on this Wandix, 590 laid down in State S.W.2d charging Olinghouse An information 82, 1979), (Mo. the informant in banc capital 85[3] was filed in murder the Cedar Coun- position this case in a to offer was not ty The case taken on Circuit Court. was to testimony and crucial the de relevant jury change County. of venue to Laclede A with fense and therefore the state could in guilty trial there resulted a verdict of of hold her identity. capital murder. It was may that the informer be noted

I of identified the trial the case well before identity her protecting and no of Motions to Dismiss Information arose then. assigns as the trial Appellant error Appellant’s dismiss the infor- overruling court’s of several motions seek- motion to he was arrested upon grounds which mation ing dismissal of the information on the by was overruled he tried. He moved dismiss the without a was to warrant assigned grounds ruling is as er- information on the that he was trial court. That am- Appellant argues a fair hear- ror. that there was right preliminary denied the to a warrant for his magistrate ple conducted time obtained ing because the who to have of .require wit- were informed hearing refused to state’s arrest the officers after his identity his and that warrantless divulge person nesses to whereabouts violated his which led to arrest circumstances provided who information such Amendment to the appellant. Appel- rights arrest of the Fourth the location and under He also complains permit- that he not Constitution of the United States. lant also was proba- was without regarding contends that his arrest ted to cross-examine witnesses Missouri, III, of upon cause in informa- of Article Constitution ble that it based upon parole in the event that the limitation supplied by a informant tion confidential murder had the capital life of a sentence reliability whose was unknown to ar- 549.261, amending RSMo effect of Section resting officers. Board Pro pertaining to the of argument points on these section, Parole, but that that bation and illegal overlooks the rule that arrest “[a]n amended, in the bill. was not set forth jurisdiction not does divest the trial court of subject implication are by Amendments State, try case. Watson v. here in limitation constitutional Moore, (Mo.1972).” S.W.2d Stussie, McNary ex rel. voked. State 1979). 747, 749[1, (Mo. banc 580 S.W.2d 2] 1974). (Mo. banc 635[2] below, any event, In trial as noted court appel of all of Finally, dispose appellant’s arrest found valid. on 559.- lant’s constitutional attacks Section Appellant’s dismiss the in motion to mandatory sen he contends going formation of because matters possibili imprisonment of without tence life 559.011, validity of Section RSMo 1975 cruel ty years for 50 constitutes Supp., punishment fixing the crime violation fed unusual murder, by overruled guaranties and eral and state constitutional complaints trial court. He renews those process requirements and because the due here, contending first that S.C.S.H.C.S.H.B. right have the court statute denies the Regular 150 of the First of the 78th Session or grant probation under circumstances 1975-1976, (Laws Mo., Assembly General jury have exercise their discretion as 408) p. which included Section 559.011 was warrants such whether or not crime enacted in 23 of Article violation Section harsh treatment. III, Missouri, that the Constitution of bill way little in the of au- offers subject. related to more than one The sub He re- thority supporting contentions. bill, title, ject of the as disclosed Judge views quests consideration of the “ * * * *6 punish certain the crimes and Motley, v. in his dissent in State McMillian * * ment therefor The bill con 435, (Mo.App.1976), as- 546 S.W.2d 439-441 appellant’s tained sections thirteen authority serting court inherent that a has complaint in is directed at the inclusion the a whether incarceration in to determine an 549.060, bill of an amendment to Section punish- particular appropriate case is an 1969, relating judicial to parole RSMo v. Woodson Appellant ment. also cites probation. The effect of amendment of Carolina, 280, 2978, 96 North 428 S.Ct. U.S. judicial that section was to exclude from (1976), pronouncement a 49 L.Ed.2d 944 as parole persons sentenced under the in by Supreme States Court United provisions murder life impris bill to jury on the of favor of discretion onment, parole without for 50 eligibility sentencing. years. appel If there were merit contention A answer to the well-reasoned complaint, acceptance lant’s would its mere Farrow, v. of is found in State ly nullify of purported amendment Sec 296, (1978). In that 118 386 A.2d 808 N.H. subject tion for failure of there 549.061 case, court stated: to ex by be disclosed title. State rel. life “The defendants also claim that Wade, 895, Taylor v. 360 231 S.W.2d Mo. pa imprisonment possibility without 179, (banc 1950); ex rel. 184[13-15] punishment. role cruel and unusual is Small, Normandy Dist. v. 356 S.W.2d School con Supreme Court has Although 864, (Mo. 1962). banc Such re 867-871[1] ‘cruel un meaning of sidered the validity would sult not affect occasions, yet it has usual’ numerous on information. test that promulgate one all-inclusive have sanc majority also a Justices contends How measuring penalties. all above enactment was violative of Section 28 tioned for 64

ever, opinions out reading acceptable a of these is a fortiori these discloses testing any some criteria for sentence. cases. The could also conclude that Punishment must not be disproportionate person in the pro- who acts manner which imposed. to the crime for incapable scribed the statute is of re- Georgia, 584, Coker v. 433 97 S.Ct. U.S. be habilitation and must isolated from 2861, 2865, (1977); Gregg 53 L.Ed.2d 982 society for the remainder his life. Georgia, 153, 187, v. 428 U.S. 96 S.Ct. argue strongly “The most defendants 2909, [2931,] (1976). 49 L.Ed.2d 859 It paroleless if life sentences even acceptable according must be to contem satisfy contemporary penolo- standards of porary comport standards and with basic gy, they comport with no- do not basic Gregg dignity. notions of human tions That dignity. argument of human 182, Georgia, supra at 96 2909 S.Ct. [at Trop supra, derives v. Dulles from Dulles, 86, 2929]; Trop v. 356 100- U.S. Supreme which Court struck down (1958). 2 78 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 630 punishment of denationalization “Finally, at least with to death regard crime be though treason even could sentences, punishment must be punished by death. The defendants char- imposed arbitrarily and must be adminis- reducing punishment acterize their statistically significant tered in a number ‘without ‘caged purpose them animals’ Gregg v. Georgia, supra, of similar cases. reform,’ lowest level exist- to ‘the 2932,]; 428 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. 2909 [at ence,’ spectre to ‘the dismal doomed Carolina, supra, see Woodson v. North sentences, gradual annihilation.’ Their at U.S. S.Ct. 2978 [at 2990]. argue, the defendants are ‘ultimate objec- given The finder of fact must be degradation unsurpassed enormity.’ imposing tive standards for a death sen- less “Admittedly punishment severe tence but must retain some discretion than unconstitutional under death can be par- choose lesser on based However, eighth an we amendment test. facts. ticularized Roberts v. Louisiana Trop requires do not the blan- think that Carolina, supra; supra. North Woodson v. paroleless ket invalidation of life sen- applicability However the of the arbitrar- Supreme tences. Court itself con- The test, in part, iness in whole or to crimes im- upheld sidered such sentence pres- other than those for which death is posed presidential com- as a condition cribable is uncertain. See Woodson sentence. mutation of a death Carolina, 302-05, supra North at 96 S.Ct. no-parole condition attached 2990-2991]; Gregg Georgia, [at of his death sentence the commutation 188-89, supra, at 428 U.S. 96 S.Ct. imposed by legis- *7 is similar to sanctions 2932], [at mandatory minimum latures such as “Measuring impris- the sentence of life pre- statutes otherwise sentences or parole against pur- onment without the the cluding parole; it does offend crime, poses society punishing has in we Constitution. nothing per se in disproportionate find 267, Reed, 256, Schick v. 419 U.S. 95 S.Ct. first-degree these sentences murder. (footnote 379, 385, (1974) 430 42 L.Ed.2d (Supp.1977) requires 630:l-a II that RSA presiden omitted). with the deals Schick deliberately consciously, the defendant might tial be sui pardoning power; premeditatively cause the death of generis. However since unconstitutional his victim in order for the to exact imposed on cannot be even conditions punishment. Surely such a under Verner, v. rationale, 374 grace, matters of Sherbert which remains a so- retribution 1790, 398, 10 965 U.S. 83 L.Ed.2d goal, Gregg supra at S.Ct. Georgia, cietal (1963); The Demise of 183-84, Alstyne, see Van 2929-2930], 2909 96 S.Ct. [at in Distinction Consti Right-Privilege exact the penalty State could death 1439, Law, 1445- Thus Harv.L.Rev. regard such a crime. Id. sole- tutional 81 Supreme that proportionality, (1968), a life with- 49 we believe ly to sentence

65 592 S.W.2d 156- d sentence case. upheld paroleless Court would not have Judge Higgins rejects the view pardoning life sentence even under 157[5]. dissenting opinion Mot- McMillian in his val- power unless the itself were sentence by appellant upon ley, authority relied id. in this connection. constitution- Appellant’s upon the attack “Assuming arguendo arbitrary that an here statute in- ality punishment amendment, eighth

sentence violates the the trial court merit and volved is without components not all of the the test of overruling his motions to err did not review arbitrariness used to grounds. on such dismiss evaluating apply in sentences crimes Woodson v. North noncapital crimes. See II Carolina, 304, 428 at 96 supra, U.S. S.Ct. Suppress Motions Georgia, 2991]; Gregg supra, 2978 [at 188-89, 96 at S.Ct. 2909 U.S. upon [at are based appellant’s points Two of unique among punish Death is 2932]. statement which he the contention that the ments; it is different in kind rather than following his arrest was gave to officers Carolina, degree. North su Woodson v. product involuntary because it was 303-04, pra, arrest; 428 U.S. at S.Ct. 2978 made illegal it was with- [at an because We therefore hold rights that RSA of his as a intelligent out an waiver 2990-2991]. (Supp.1977) 630:1-a III is valid exhaustion at physical under result of and mental statement; Federal Constitution. and because it the time of the and harassment pressure was the result of telephone call- by anonymous of his mother important goals “The State’s in confin- basis, appellant this contends that ers. On ing life are well someone for served suppress motion his statements his parole; withholding possibility also have He con- should been sustained. is not a ex- sentence of suppress items of tends that his motion prisoner termination because the has under search physical evidence obtained many life, opportunities improve his been sustained because warrant should have culminating pardon with a if he can dem- involuntary upon the officer relied onstrate to the Governor and Council his application basis for the statement society being fitness to return to without for the search warrant. say a threat to it. We cannot the statements suppress Motions legislature make powerless judg- the use evi suppress and to ment that certain heinous crimes merit of a search warrant products dence imprisonment without parole.” for life hearing held on the mo were filed and a 386 A.2d at 812-814. hearing, tions. At the conclusion Other cases to the same effect include Be court both motions. trial overruled Hall, 650, People v. 396 Mich. 242 N.W.2d not demonstrate un cause the record did 377, Parle, (1976); 110 Ariz. 380[9] mistakably court had found the trial (1974), 521 P.2d cert. den. 608[7] appellant had been the statements of 419 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 279 *8 required by Jackson v. voluntarily, made Forrester, (1974); Wash.App. 21 State Denno, 12 378 84 U.S. S.Ct. 179, 188-189[16, (1978). 587 P.2d 17] court, following (1964), the L.Ed.2d 908 this Argument guaranties Glenn, constitutional that procedure approved in State require part jury 1968), the of (Mo. discretion on the ordered the banc S.W.2d fixing punishment court, answered by upon appel are notice and trial due (Mo. Higgins, 592 the evidence and present, lant to consider 155-156[4] 1979). finding on the voluntari Higgins express banc also answers the con- make an proce That appellant’s must the of statements. judiciary tention that retain ness trial court made right to was and the appropriateness review the of dure followed express finding appellant’s officers, resulting an that discovery state ments voluntarily were made. body. Rasmussen concluded his interview with appellant at 9:10 P.M. Court,

In appellant’s argument this that his voluntary statements were not is based Appellant was taken then to Greene exclusively upon almost his version of the County P.M., jail. At 9:30 approximately surrounding making. circumstances their Trooper High- Missouri Woods of the However, the in this review Court is direct- way appellant Patrol saw the Greene ed at adequacy to sup- evidence rights County jail, read Miranda to him and port finding. the trial court’s appellant asked would talk to him and if appellant agreed do so and told him of to Viewing light, evidence the Frazier The interview murder. appellant showed that was arrested at Ger- Woods to an hour and lasted minutes P.M., ster May around 3:00 At 17. when he appellant terminated said was arrest, scene Sergeant Selvey of the tired. threats Woods testified that no or Patrol, Highway Missouri State read Mi- ap- promises appellant were and that made rights randa statement to appellant and peared normal. asked appellant he whether understood his rights. Appellant replied affirmatively. appellant The at day next Woods saw sergeant appellant The asked if he would Hickory County office at Hermi- sheriff’s talk replied negatively. to them and he P.M., tage. began At about he an 3:30 sergeant The where Mr. Frazier asked was which recorded on a cas- interrogation was and appellant nothing said he knew about subsequently sette recorder and transcribed. it. Woods the Miranda warn- reminded him of ings. Appellant said that he had made

Appellant was taken to an FBI office in attempts three to in touch with an There, get Springfield. presence in the of two had unsuccessful. He Commissioner, attorney but been agents FBI and a U.S. he one, I get said: “I hold of but feel requested call can’t attorney. to an He called an you’uns just need information. It attorney attorney but the come this could not see Appellant get attorney.” him. then his can’t for me an called mother wait and her of told his arrest. interrogation proceeded, lasting about two 58-page producing eventually hours and 5:32, Special At Agent Rasmussen typed appellant latter statement which FBI began interrogation appellant. He read, making each and correc- signing page produced first a Miranda statement card tions he deemed for. No threats or called which appellant permitted he read to and appellant at promises were and no made appellant presence to read. In the of Ras- interrogation time cease. requested that the agent, signed appellant mussen and another card, acknowledging that he had been upon Appellant’s here based contention rights advised of his and understood them suppression hearing testimony his at the consenting interrogation. slept he one hour in the 48 to only had tes- arrest. He also preceding 52 hours his Rasmussen testified that he conducted that, tified when was taken to the FBI he the interrogation. He testified that no permitted he was Springfield, office in promises threats leniency or were made. if he call his mother and she told him that He appellant unkempt stated that knew Frazier to “tell some- anything about tired, appeared responded but was alert and threatening body getting she was because questioning. complaint He made no According appellant, he phone being calls.” interroga- tired. In the course tion, extremely close and mother were hungry he said that was her he received from gave food information for him. obtained He the FBI concerning very upsetting to him. told Rasmussen the information with his escapade agents and his in it. about conversation He told where *9 they get him would body they Frazier’s be found the mother and told could and infor- County sheriff and conveyed mation was to law enforcement touch with the Polk him, rights he He the Miranda were read to get have him in touch with his mother. permitted to them and then he acting wasn’t the FBI was was read satisfied that them, his signed acknowledgment “I of under- quickly enough and he told am an rights. you you to do waiver of those going give standing a statement and and something protect my mom.” to the effect of Appellant would avoid According to appellant, when Woods grounds on the that his lack of such waiver given questioning started him after he had sleep knowing and fatigue precluded and FBI, appellant a statement asked his None of intelligent rights. waiver of get sleep. trooper him to let him some appellant’s was at testimony directed said he in a while “hours would little and of rights of his understanding claim of lack of questioning” Appellant followed. also tes- of such consequences or of of waiver the that, interroga- original tified after Woods’ not Ras rights. Appellant did controvert ceased, sleep tion he obtained little in the the testimony rights that Miranda mussen’s jail County persons Greene other because him, read appellant were to that the read “kept asking confined there me all these rights thereafter statement of his and * * * questions. I was pretty famous signed the waiver. the assent to by then.” He said he that was “still tired” complaint for the that his state As interrogation Hickory County at the it was in involuntary ment was because responded interrogation that he there to “to mother, injury fear of to his that duced get it over with.” is not sort of inducement which renders the appellant Rasmussen that stated denied involuntary eyes the the statement himto that he make a would statement if Mullens, 586 F.2d law. United States v. his protected. mother would be Cir., 1976); (2d States v. 997,1000[2] United Cir., McShane, (9th 1972). 462 F.2d 6-8[3] record, this the conclusion On Appellant’s simply version was that FBI judge trial that appellant’s statements to agents to local offered call authorities voluntary Rasmussen and were Woods However, report harassing calls. be fully supported by the evidence. The proceeding cause was agent he felt not state’s evidence that appellant showed was going “I quickly enough, appellant am said: rights, informed of his constitutional that give protect my you you statement capable understanding he was these Certainly threat or mom.” there was no rights force, threats, no physical and that officers, even if coercion on the promises or coercive tactics were used to accepted. appellant’s version is obtain the v. Crowley, statements. 464[9, (Mo.App.1978). 10] upon Appellant dwells the duration However, the interrogation. state’s Although appellant argues question- interrogation by the was that evidence ing by persisted the officers after he had FBI at 5:30 P.M. Evidence at began about requested right consult attorney, an officers, the trial was that law enforcement that, the state’s evidence was when he was acting upon information office, FBI taken he was first accord- of Frazi gave FBI of the whereabouts telephone attorney. ed a call an Accord- er’s were at the scene at around 6:00 body, ing attorney he call an appellant, did but the es Obviously, appellant P.M. disclosed attorney Springfield. could come shortly after the sential facts the offense questioning testified that contin- interrogation began and confession phone attorney. ued call to after interroga protracted product not the of a However, “right he also testified that af- tion. attorney, ter” he called he called his harassing mother told of calls attacks the volun- Appellant also which she had received. grounds of his statements on tariness that, illegal an ap- they product The state’s after were the evidence calls, pellant on this score is telephone argument had made the two His arrest. *10 68 to, permit- proposition that his ar intended and should have been

premised upon the tip to, which the inquire persons preju- rest was occasioned ted of such about Highway Patrol received concern against parole system, FBI and dice order found ing prejudice his whereabouts. The trial court ascertain the existence of such was an out the arrest valid because there find the might juror which cause a de- arrest for standing appellant’s warrant for capital murder rather guilty fendant of jail County. escape Hickory from Ser possibili- which the than a lesser offense for geant Selvey Highway Patrol who ty parole of existed. tip concerning appellant’s received the inquiry, appellant ar- As for the second in his participated whereabouts and who ruling precluded dis- gues that the court’s he was arrest testified that at that time panel knew the covery of members who for aware that a warrant had been issued which of the Thomases results of trials breaking jail. appellant’s arrest for The convictions, thereby preventing resulted court, therefore, found that properly trial or challenging from for cause trial counsel Brad appellant’s arrest was valid. State v. remove preemptory challenges to using his ley, 515 S.W.2d 826, (Mo.App.1974). 828[3] judgment whose panel persons from the States, Albright v. United 329 F.2d 70 See persons by the fact that might be affected 907, (10th Cir., 1964); 85 cert. den. 379 U.S. allegedly had act- with whom the defendant 201, (1964); S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d 179 already ed had been convicted. Everett, 301, 429, 520 P.2d Ariz. 303[1- “ * * * necessarily and trial court [A] (banc 1974); den. 419 cert. U.S. 3] discretion in con- properly has considerable (1974). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d of voir dire examination trol and conduct of objection to the appellant’s Inasmuch as veniremen; will dif- appellate court and an procured by a use in evidence of items of that the exercise fer or interfere with upon the contention search warrant is based shows a only the record discretion when appellant, that the statements of above con- and a real discretion manifest abuse of sidered, the basis for the provided which complaining to the probability injury of warrant, issuance of the search were invol- Scott, 515 S.W.2d party.” State v. untary, disposition question of that also an- Yowell, (Mo.1974). also See 527[1] complaints directed at the use of

swers 1974). (Mo. banc 513 S.W.2d 403[4-6] the seized evidence. inquiry, respect to the second With

III interrogate the venire did defense counsel knowledge length men at as to Jury Selection against them might prejudice case which involving points raises several would have inquiry That appellant. complains He jury. selection of the disposition of knowledge as to the reached prevented trial ruling trial court’s which the event. involved in against cases others inquiring panel members counsel’s refusal say that This cannot Court they they thought whether or not knew or might well which inquiry, permit the direct capital murder. He penalty knew the dispo what question of have introduced the per- complains also of the court’s refusal to cases into in the other was made sition disposi- inquiries knowledge mit as to minds, proba a “real involved veniremen’s persons in- tion of the cases of the other appellant. bility injury” respect With volved in the Frazier death. be inquiry will ruling the first appellant argues that on inquiry, to the first objection based a related pre- considered with permit questions such refusal advise the failure to upon trial court’s panel members who discovery cluded the capital punishment mur- veniremen that that the knew included imprisonment of life against probation murder prohibition der included a probation. or parole 50-year prohibition asserts years. Appellant for 50 prosecutor, when knowledge, he This arose had he discovered such *11 69 Well, up grew we “MR. THOMPSON: the state panel, said that questioning together. went to school together and the maximum would seek childhood murder, You were imprisonment,” “life “MR. DOUGLAS: applicable. penalty was not chums then? that the death jury be request that Defense counsel’s Right. “MR. THOMPSON: parole the limitation on informed of it a-without Was “MR. DOUGLAS: denied, a mistrial. request as was his detail, did it great facts in going into erred that the trial court He now contends firearms, stabbing? involve jury pun- failing to inform the Firearms. “MR. THOMPSON: upon parole ishment included the restriction do believe Okay-you “MR. DOUGLAS: probation. or putting time might have a hard you consider- mind as far as your out of instances, appel In each of these instant case? ing the facts of this endeavoring place question lant was Well, I can’t tell THOMPSON: “MR. In probation jury. or before the sure, know, tell it is hard to you you 585, Rollins, (Mo. v. State S.W.2d 591[5] now, know. right you 1970), it the court said: “We now hold that me come back Let “MR. DOUGLAS: fail or is not error for the trial court for a minute that, about that you think parole, jury refuse to inform the that no two. or sentences, suspended any or oth probation, judicial clemency would be exer er form of * * * cised in the event of conviction. Thompson, do Mr. “MR. DOUGLAS: is extrane question clemency of future thoughts? you have further proper ous to a determination of issues No. “MR. THOMPSON: It guilt punishment by jury. put want to I don’t “MR. DOUGLAS: them.” Inas should be of no concern to you spot. on the proposed as the and the re inquiry much No, sir, no other “MR. THOMPSON: by instruction the court quest for further thoughts. related to matters “of no concern” try but would “MR. You DOUGLAS: jury, the trial not abuse its discre court did could, is that you know whether you don’t rulings. Sempsrott, tion in its v. See State fair conclusion? (Mo.App.1979); 587 S.W.2d 634-635[10] I is what That “MR. THOMPSON: Hanson, 900- S.W.2d do, try. would (Mo.App.1979). 902[4]-[7] searching “MR. DOUGLAS: But the trial court Appellant contends that you whether are not sure your you mind failing panel to strike member Ed- erred in not? could or could Thompson for cause. The voir dire die correct. That is “MR. THOMPSON: upon contention rests is as fol- which this to be I want those “MR. DOUGLAS: lows: words, mine. your Thompson, response Panel Member right. That “MR. THOMPSON: by counsel as to whether defense feel com- Okay, you “MR. DOUGLAS: killed a friend or relative had “been I said? with what fortable means,” stated that a friend of criminal Yes.” “MR. THOMPSON: in 1973. was shot at Fort Leonard Wood the venire The determination (Mr. Douglas) asked: counsel Defense for the was a matter qualifications man’s of events you “Let me ask if that series judicial of sound in the exercise trial court thinking here your would tend to color determination court’s discretion. The trial is a murder trial. today? little bit This showing a clear rejected only upon will be Yes, sir, might. DeClue, “MR. THOMPSON: of discretion. State of abuse “All doubt (Mo.1966). close of a “MR. How DOUGLAS: 57[12] finding of in favor of be resolved should friend was this? the trial court because he is in a far for a better mistrial was denied. Counsel also position permitted moved to be challenge determine a for cause withdraw and Court, that motion was denied. In this appellate than an court.” Tread trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial and way, 649[1, (Mo. 558 S.W.2d banc 2] overruling the motion to withdraw is as- 1977) (overruled as to another issue in Sours *12 error, signed appellant contending that State, (Mo. v. 593 1980)). S.W.2d 208 banc prejudiced the jury against incident so the case, In this a friend of the venireman him that he could not thereafter receive a had agreed been murdered. He that such trial, destroyed fair and the credibility and might fact thinking “tend to color here [his] effectiveness of defense counsel in the * * a little bit say He could not minds the jury, depriving appellant of a “for sure” put that he could that event out fair trial. of his mind in considering the facts of the grant The failure to a mistrial case to be tried. try He could to do so but was not error. The trial court was not was not sure whether he could or not. obliged appellant to reward for his out responses Were the of the venire McGinnis, 715, burst. v. 441 State S.W.2d man such that the trial court could not Martin, (Mo.1969); State v. 525 717[1] properly conclude that he would be a fair 804, 810-811[4, (Mo.App.1975). S.W.2d 5] impartial juror? The venireman did The request of counsel to withdraw was not state or infer that he would be unable likewise trial court’s dis addressed to the judge the fairly case on the evidence timing cretion. of the re In view of the which might he hear. At the best his an quest, abuse of has not been dem discretion feeling against murder, swers indicated a Williams, v. 594 onstrated. United States feeling not a against 1979). the defendant (9th who Cir. F.2d 1260-1261[4] was charged appel with previously murder. The of The trial court had heard pro change whether or not lant’s se motion for of counsel experience “put the could be and had had out of concluded his mind” is not determinative of the “justifiable shown with no dissatisfaction qualifications ques of the venireman. The appointed his v. counsel.” United States tion properly is whether or experi not that Hart, 1977). 162,163 (8th 557 F.2d Cir. ence produce would prejudice bias or fact of demon prior the motion does not against the defendant on trial and that ruling strate an abuse of discretion in the question simply put not as it was in the upon the withdraw made at the request to case Thompson, State S.W.2d 16 trial. (Mo.App.1976), upon by appellant. relied record, On this failure of the Appellant complains it cannot be said that grant mistrial because ruling trial court’s trial court to a was an abuse of discre inability weeping temporary Green, “continual tion. See State v. 511 S.W.2d Vonetta testify of witness on the (Mo.1974); Pride, 876-877[15] * * Frazier, *.” Phillip Frazier widow of (Mo.App.1978). S.W.2d 432-433[9]-[14] her conduct Appellant asserts that inflammatory at- prejudicial and created an IV mosphere jury was concerned as far as the Trial Incidents precluded of a fair trial. possibility After the jury had been sworn and the witness called Mrs. Frazier was the first preliminary court, instructions read of her testimo- by the state. In the course prosecuting attorney began opening cry- witness is ny, reporter noted “The interrupted statement. The statement was Twice ing through testimony.” all of her appellant pushed recess taken when proceedings stopped because were him, conferring his counsel who was occa- display. On the first her emotional causing against him to fall Ap- the bench. occa- On both sion a recess was declared. voice, pellant, sions, in a mis- loud called his counsel a moved for a appellant’s counsel son of a bitch. Defense counsel’s motion were denied. trial and motions ness, noting that the trial court nature the court the oft-noted drastic

Given mistrial, objection to the promptly had sustained the remedy of a trial court’s complains that here so in instances was not remark. refusal to do these act on his motion at the time of trial court did not error. The court’s remarks took no further ac- objections strike the answer and of defense counsel showed However, court it. the trial regarding witness’s but tion he aware behavior nothing short request here regard seriously did not it as as did defense had counsel’s and the claim error objection, of mistrial counsel. At the time of the first Again, considering relief. refusal of that had “sporadically he noted that the witness * * the trial remedy, such nature of drastic although audibly He cried of discre- was not an abuse court’s action emphasize prosecutor directed Jackson, tion. every witness that she should make effort (Mo.1974). display Upon to avoid of emotion. 427—428[4] *13 occasion, disagreed second the trial court Buel, analyst forensic for a Tom that defense counsel’s statement Patrol, Highway testi the Missouri State crying.” court witness “broke down The laboratory performed tests regarding fied only crying.” noted “some The trial court’s guns the scene and on bullets found at conclusion that a mistrial was not warrant appellant having by been used identified ed has have not been shown to amounted to In in the affair. participant and another Swindell, an abuse of discretion. State v. bullets, of the Buel testimony regarding one (Mo.1954). 271 S.W.2d Cer 536[6-9] the item was where he had seen asked tainly did the conduct of the witness in replied: “Previously Court before. He approach “stage performance” involv _” counsel’s my and also in Defense ing the prosecutor sobbing parents and reference motion a mistrial because of for deceased, in condemned Con prior Shortly af to a trial was overruled. nor, (Mo.1923), 252 S.W. cited 722[13] a terward, witness was asked similar upon by and appellant. relied again he question about two bullets and “Previously during also replied in court and The above-mentioned second inter again my Defense counsel examination.” ruption testimony of the witness’s was ac request and the was moved for a mistrial companied statement, by response her in denied. recog as whether or not she appellant’s evening nized voice on the that the appellant In this contends Court robbery. you “I can’t that tell I did-it was called attention of answers of the witness night a hell and the end-.” code- prior appellant’s toward De trials jury of one immediately fense counsel that which resulted in conviction moved fendants then, for first capital answer be stricken and out of the for murder and another prejudi- degree were therefore presence jury, told the court that an murder and the rule that evi- Appellant cial. invokes disregard instruction the statement a disposition of codefendant’s possible only would dence of the good do no and that a McCarthy, improper. case request mistrial would be effective. The However, (Mo.App.1978). S.W.2d 722 for a Appellant mistrial denied. con here involved did not refer testimony tends that the statement was so inflamma any against disposition charge codefend- tory prejudicial prevented and that it him Therefore, upon is ants. the rule relied receiving from a trial fair and that a grant mis- inapplicable and the failure to refusal of a mistrial was error. trial not error. error, appel- As authority claim Mullen, complains that Appellant lant also cites State admitting into evi (Mo.App.1975), in which the trial court erred 523-524[17]-[21] 6, a there no Exhibit .38 Smith court concluded that error dence State’s revolver, 7, portion Exhibit a refusing to declare a mistrial because of Wesson a con- prejudicial, voluntary spent a statement of wit- a .38 caliber bullet. tends that Exhibit 6 was irrelevant and sion is evident from the fact that had this 22, 1977, May that no sufficient foundation was laid for homicide occurred after having penalty, the introduction of Exhibit 7 as been the waived the death the jury state part spent a of a .38 caliber bullet. There would have been instructed as it was in this weap- capital was evidence that Exhibit 6 was the case. “If murder is submitted to the appellant jury, on had used in the for that offense and affair. testimony any of Buel was sufficient to lesser included offense submitted omitted, identify portion though a therewith be even Exhibit 7 as of a .38 must penalty caliber bullet fired from a Smith and Wes- death murder has been 2d, fact, weapon. acknowledge son The witness did waived.” 15.009. a. In MAI-CR 1.160, good there view possibility was a remote of Section RSMo procedure Exhibit 7 been fol- may had of a .32 caliber case be made for event, In no opinion bullet but he was of the lowed the trial court. calling came from a .38 caliber and Wesson. error for reversal occurred. Smith Appellant’s claims of error are without mer- Judgment affirmed. it. WELLIVER, RENDLEN, MORGANand

V HIGGINS, JJ., concur. Instruction Error BARDGETT, J., separate C. concurs By his reply brief has raised *14 concurring opinion filed. new claim of error which was not called to J., SEILER, dissent- separate dissents in the trial in court’s attention at the trial or ing opinion filed. Despite irreg- the motion for new the trial. ularities in presentation question, the of the J., DONNELLY, sitting. not plain it will be considered under the error Justice, BARDGETT, concurring. Chief 29.12(b). rule. Rule I do opinion. principal I concur in the capital The trial court instructed on for it was correct agree not however that murder, degree, murder in the first murder counsel’s deny the trial court to defense degree manslaughter. in the second request jury the be informed that punishment any The was not stated in of murder capital for statutory full sentence verdict-directing the instructions. The was not penalty in this case. The death jury guilty capital returned a verdict of attorney ad- applicable. prosecuting The jury murder. The court then the instructed seeking be the jury vised the that he would only applicable punishment that the was in this case punishment maximum available imprisonment eligibility life without for for The court imprisonment”. “which is life parole years for 50 and the foreman was informed jury the to be permit refused to sign fixing the directed to a verdict so “im- punishment was that the maximum punishment. ap so and The foreman did natural life and prisonment during ... pellant accordingly. was sentenced parole or eligible probation shall not be for December, This case was tried in 1978. fifty until he has served a minimum b., promulgated By MAI-CR 2d 15.00 2. the first Murder in years of his sentence.” 12, 1978, April instructions should have by impris- life degree punishable was is in prescribed by been the form the 6.00 onment, in that statutory the sentence but (first), Septem- series of MAI-CR effective that the first not mandate instance does pun- ber 1975. form included the Such prison. years actually be served fifty verdict-directing ishment in the instruction punishable is degree in the second Murder grade for each of homicide. to life by years a sentence of from ten However, im- should life procedure imprisonment. followed the trial court injustice imposed upon conviction prisonment did not result manifest or de- be statutory the prive degree, of a trial. This conclu- in the second fair murder that, importantly were. require fifty years not the first to ever More than law does prison. my opinion, however, if the parties be served In are entitled have the to jury punish- is be informed about the correctly if to be jury they informed are case, then be ment available in a it should about all. informed it at correctly informed and not misinformed. Certainly no one has doubt about SEILER, Judge, dissenting. the penalty imprisonment whether of life Bardgett that agree I Chief Justice probation years for parole fifty without or error, prosecutor per- it was after the is impris- a more severe than life sentence punishment jury mitted to tell the pre- without is onment the limitation. That not imprisonment, murder life it cisely why legislature enacted it and counsel inform permit defendant’s part parcel punish- of the statutory punishment was life without jury that prosecutor per- ment. In this case the probation parole fifty years. If the or impanel jury pun- mitted to reference as to the jury is to be informed de- imprisonment”, ishment-“life but the assessed, might be it must be informed right fendant was so. In refused do Bevins, 1046, 43 correctly, 328 Mo. State v. However, my this I opinion, was error. do 432,435 (banc 1931). my opinion, In preju- not believe that the defendant was prejudicial this error was defendant’s by it in diced this case and I therefore jury permitted It right to a fair trial. concur. offense available select most serious involving Earlier cases (which did) it the false belief that it under jury whether a be concern- should informed penalty severe than would result a less ing possibility probation or are proved gave prose- This to be case. apposite to In not this case. those cases advantage unfair and made cution an prohibition against peni- release from the easier to obtain the maximum conviction. fifty tentiary years was not jury system. also belittles the It treats It the particular sentence for crime. In this important jury as though it is prohibition against case the type *15 given be correct information. part release was of the sentence and did possibility clemency. refer to the of future prohibited any clemency by

The statute

way probation parole for specified or

period. Any as to doubt whether or not

prohibition against by way proba- release parole

tion fifty years, or for the first

where defendant is convicted of imprisonment,

murder and sentenced to life CRIM, Respondent, part of the sentence itself is laid to rest R. James principal opinion discussion in the concerning the allegation that the mandato- LIFE AND The NATIONAL ACCIDENT ry imprisonment sentence life without COMPANY, Appellant. INSURANCE possibility parole fifty years for consti- punishment.

tutes cruel and It is unusual No. 61899. regarded pro- clear that all courts have Missouri, Supreme Court against pe- specified hibition En Banc. fifty years riod of sentence punishment. Sept. 1980. my opinion, attorneys In the state Rehearing Denied Oct. 1980. and the defense are entitled to against backdrop the panel members of possible statutory punishment they much particular

this crime as now as

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Olinghouse
Court Name: Supreme Court of Missouri
Date Published: May 13, 1980
Citation: 605 S.W.2d 58
Docket Number: 61216
Court Abbreviation: Mo.
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