State v. OgdenState v. Ogden
Lead Opinion
Dеfendant appeals his conviction for burglary in the second degree, ORS 164.215.
The sequence of events concerning the supplemental instruction was as follows:
Approximately two hours after the jury began deliberations, it submitted a request for clarification of the instructions on criminal trespass and the defense of intoxication. The court reinstructed the jury on these items and it returned to deliberate for another hour. At that time it submitted the following question:
" 'The jury would like to know if we must vote two to ten against burglary No. 2 before we can vote on criminal trespass No. 2.’ ”
"You have to start with the charge contained in the indictment, the burglary, and you consider the charge of criminal trespass in the second degree only if you should find the Defendant not guilty of the charge of burglary in the second degree.
* * * *
"Do you have another question that you want to write out?
"JUROR NO. 7: Yes.
"THE COURT: The question that has been submitted by Juror — by the juror in Seat No. 7 is: 'Does the verdict not guilty have to be determined by a vote of ten to two?’
"Any verdict in this case — well, at least ten of you must agree on any verdict.”
Defendant excepted to the instruction at issue here on appeal.
Approximately an hour later the court received a message from the jury that " '[t]hey’ve been nine to three for the last two hours and don’t see how they are ever going to agree.’ ” Over defendant’s objection, the trial court gave the modified "Allen charge” approved by the Supreme Court in State v. Marsh,
The import of the supplemental instruction was that before the jury could consider the lesser included offense, it had to reach a verdict with respect to the burglary charge, and that if the jury was deadlocked as to the burglary charge, the court must order a mistrial. This raises two questions of first impression. First, was the giving of the supplemental instruction error? Second, if the instruction was error, was it likely to have had a coercive effect on the jury constituting reversible error? We answer both questions in the affirmative.
Courts in other jurisdictions have generally held, either directly or by implication, that it is error to instruct the jury that it must reach a verdict with respect to the offense charged before considering the lesser included offеnse. See People v. Hurst,
The rationale of these decisions is expressed by the Michigan court in People v. Harmon, supra:
"The rationale of the Ray decision [.People v. Ray, supra\ is, however, somewhat broader than that suggested by the parties. Ray seeks to prevent those jurors opposed to a defendant’s conviction on a higher charge from being coerced into voting for conviction by an instruction requiring acquittal of that higher charge before lesser offenses can even be considered. For example, if the jury is considering the charge of assault with intent to commit rape, and juror A is opposed to conviction, he may be coerced into changing his vote to guilty by the prospect that the lesser included offenses of assault and battery and simple assault will not even be considered unless all the remaining 11 jurors agrеe to acquit the defendant of assault with intent to commit rape.”54 Mich App at 395-96 .
The
ORS 136.460 provides:
"Upon a charge for a crime consisting of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged in the accusatory instrument and guilty of any degree inferior thereto or of an attempt to commit the crime or any such inferior degree thereof.”
ORS 136.465 provides:
"In all cases, the defendant may be found guilty of any crime the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the accusatory instrument or of an attempt to commit such crime.”
These statutes do not concern the route by which a jury arrives at its verdict, they merely set forth the rules to judge the legality of the verdiсt when compared against the charge in the accusatory instrument. These statutes form the basis of the court’s authority to present to the jury lesser degrees, lesser included offenses and attempts. See State v. Washington,
The state also relies on State v. Steeves,
The doctrine of lesser included offenses allows the jury some latitude in considering the offenses about which they have been instructed. The supplemental instruction given by the court invaded this province of the jury and was error. It effectively inhibited the right of the jury to consider the lesser offense of trespass.
Under the circumstances of this case we conclude the error was prejudicial and requires reversal. There was substantial evidence that defendant was intoxicated, thus negating his intent to commit burglary. The reasonable inference is that the jury was divided on this issue. Had the jury been properly instructed there is a reasonable possibility it would have embraced the lesser offense and arrived at a different verdict.
This opinion should not be read as foreclosing instructions that, in some measure, seek to control the method of jury deliberation. It is the province of the jury to decide questions of fact and to arrive at a verdict based on the law and the evidence. In arriving at a verdict the jury is to considеr all the evidence and the law including all of the various offenses submitted by the court. Because of the confidential nature of jury deliberations, courts are not apprised of the methods juries use in deciding on a verdict. We recognize the reality of our jury system that juries often arrive at compromise verdicts, or acquit an obviously guilty defendant by a simple jury pardon. Thе deliberations may be orderly, chaotic or controlled by one or two jurors. As a practical matter there is little opportunity for the court to control or police jury deliberations other than by instructions on the law.
Recognition of the procedure by which juries sometimes arrive at their decision does not mean we must adopt a system of jury instructions which fosters it.. It is proper for a court to bring some measure of
As indicated, the court can rarely be aware whether the jury considered the greater charge before arriving at a verdict of guilty on the lesser offense. The court may poll the jury to determine if the verdict was agreed upon by the requisite number of jurors, but beyond that the deliberations remain confidential. The fact thаt there is no practical method of enforcing compliance with the instructions does not foreclose the duty to give them.
In summary we conclude it is proper for a court to instruct a jury they are first to consider the charge in the accusatory instrument and if they cannot agree upon a verdict in that charge they are to consider the lesser included offenses. The instruction given by the court was in error and the coercive potential of the instruction requires reversal.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Notes
ORS 164.215 provides:
"(1) A person commits the crime of burglary in the second degree if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.
"(2) Burglary in the second degree is a Class C felony.”
ORS 164.245 provides:
"(1) A person commits the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree if he enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises.
"(2) Criminal trеspass in the second degree is a Class C misdemeanor.”
Concurrence Opinion
specially concurring.
An appellate court’s responsibility in a case of first impression such as this is not merely to decide that the instruction to the jury was erroneous, but to explain our reasoning and in so explaining to provide some guidance to the trial court in this and future cases as to how to frame a proper instruction. The mаjority opinion does not explain our reasoning. Rather, it engages in an exercise of illustrating how the statutes and cases relied on by the state are irrelevant to the issues presented. It also cites, but does not discuss, cases from other jurisdictions which hold to be erroneous instructions substantially similar to that at issue here. The majority then concludes that the instruction herе was error because it invades the province of the jury. The majority makes no attempt to explain how it reached this conclusion. Equally without analysis, the majority goes on to suggest an alternate instruction which is erroneous.
The Rationale
The reasons for invalidating the instruction at issue here are embedded in the policy considerations of the lesser-included offense doсtrine. There are two possible rationales for that doctrine. The doctrine originated to assist the prosecution in obtaining a conviction. State v. Washington,
"It has been repeatedly written that if, upon any view of the facts, a defendant could properly be found guilty of a lesser degree or an included crime, the trial judge must submit such lower offense. * * * And it does not matter how strongly the evidence points to guilt of the crime charged in the indictment, or how unreаsonable it would be, as a court may appraise the weight of the evidence, to acquit of that crime and convict of the less serious. * * * Consequently, although originally 'intended merely to prevent the prosecution from failing where some element of the crime charged was not made out’, People v. Murch,263 N.Y. 285 , 291,189 N.E. 220 , 222; see, also, People v. Miller, supra,143 App. Div. 251 ,128 N.Y.S. 549 , affirmed202 N.Y. 618 ,96 N.E. 1125 , the doctrine, given expression in sections 444 and 445, redоunds to the benefit of defendants as well, since its effect actually is to empower the jury 'to extend mercy to an accused by finding a lesser degree of crime than is established by the evidence’. * * *308 NY at 561-62 .
It follows that if one of the purposes of the lesser-included offense doctrine is to allow the jury latitude in selecting whether to convict of the offense charged or a lesser offense, then it is the province of the jury to determine when and how it makes that selection. The instruction here directing that the jury reach a verdict before considering the lesser-included offense invaded that province. The majority impliedly adopts this view, but is unwilling to say so.
Guidelines as to the Proper Instruction
In this case the jury, after deliberating for two hours and finding itself divided seven to five, asked the trial court whеther it must reach a verdict on the burglary charge before it considered the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. The trial court responded by erroneously instructing the jury that it must first reach a verdict before it could consider the lesser offense. Considering the rationale for the lesser-included offense doctrine, the proper supplemental instruction would have been to advise the jury that the manner and order in which it considers the offenses is wholly within its province, provided it considers all of the offenses about which it was instructed.
The majority opinion, however, suggests that the proper instruction would have been to tell the jury "first to consider the charge in the accusatory instrument and if they cannot agree upon a verdict on that charge they are to consider the lesser-included offenses.”
The premise underlying the lesser-included offense doctrine is that the jury will reach a verdict on one of the offenses submitted and that the selection of the appropriate offense is wholly within its province. The manner and order in which the offenses аre considered by the jury is for it to decide. The majority’s concern that the highest offense will not be considered is alleviated if the jury is carefully instructed that it must consider all the offenses charged. The majority concedes that as a practical matter the jury will in any event exercise its pardon power by convicting of a lesser offense, if that is in fact its desire, even though the evidence of the offense charged is overwhelming. Thus, there is no justification for the majority’s suggested instruction the only effect of which will be to confuse and which has no basis in law.
"* * * An inherent feature of the common law trial by jury accorded by the Constitution of the United States to all defendants in criminal cases * * * comprizes the power of the jury to find the defendant not guilty, even if the evidence is overwhelming or conclusive. * * *” United States v. Fielding, 148 P Supp 46, 56 (1957).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
This is an issue of first impression in Oregon.
In my view the challenged instructions were a correct statement of the law in this state and are completely consistent with ORS 136.460, 136.465, 131.515 and 136.450.
As our Supreme Court held in State v. Steeves,
As the Attorney General argues, requiring a 10 to 2 vote of the jury before proceeding to consider a lesser included offense is no more coercive or restrictive than requiring the same number to find defendant guilty of the lesser offense. I agree.
Contrary to the majority, I am unwilling to invalidate our long accepted practice in this regard and embrace the rule adopted in those cases from other jurisdictions cited and relied upon in the majority opinion.
I believe that an analysis of those decisions would show that in most, if not all, the statutory background and procedures in those jurisdictions are at variance with the statutes in this state covering such matters.
For the above reasons I respectfully dissent.