State v. OdomState v. Odom
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- McMillan, Cobb, Baschab, Shaw, Wise
Thе appellee, Leslie Jean Odom, was indicted on a charge of unlawfully possessing a controlled substance. He entered a plea of not guilty and moved to suppress evidence of methamphetamine that had been found in his possession. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion.
The State appeals from the trial cоurt‘s order granting the motion to suppress.
At the suppression hearing, narcotics agent Dorteen Williams testified that police sergeant Steve Anderson had contacted her on June 21, 2001, about a possible controlled-substance violation. She reported to the parking lot of a Wal-Mart discount department store, and the officers at the scene gave her the following information: police investigator J.B. Mason had been working at his off-duty job at the Wal-Mart store when he saw the defendant purchase certain items that Mason had been trained to recognize as ingredients commonly used in manufacturing methamphetamine. Odom‘s purchases included 2 bottles of propane fuel, a set of stainless steel cоokware, 4 packages of lithium batteries, 3 boxes of Equate brand cold and allergy medication, 4 boxes of Sudafed cold and allergy medication, and 12 bottles of antifreeze. Wal-Mart has the policy of notifying the police when customers purchase more thаn three boxes of cold medications. Mason telephoned Sgt. Anderson and advised him of Odom‘s purchases, and Sgt. Anderson sent Officer David Martin to the Wal-Mart store to investigate. Martin and Mason stopped Odom as he was placing his purchases into the toolbox of his pickup truck. In the bed of the truck, the officers saw several jars that contained the clear liquid and white and reddish residues commonly found where methamphetamine is being manufactured. The officers informed Odom of his Miranda1 rights, and he refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. Sgt. Andеrson then contacted Agent Williams. Williams reported to the Wal-Mart store and obtained the information needed to request a search warrant. In addition to the information she had obtained from the other officers, Williams knew that Leslie Odom had a reputation of being involved in the distribution of illegal narcotics and that he had been arrested for trafficking in methamphetamine on April 19, 2001. Williams had personal knowledge of the process of methamphetamine manufacture, the defendant‘s reputation, and the defendant‘s previous arrest because she was a trained, experienced member of the West Alabama Narcotics Task Force, the agency that made the arrest. Williams submitted her affidavit to the Tuscaloosa District Court, and the court issued a warrant to search Odom‘s truck and person. In the pocket of the driver‘s side door, the officers found a plastic bottle wrapped in black tape.2 Inside the bottle, they found
In reviewing a trial court‘s decision on a motion to suppress evidence when the facts are not in dispute, this court applies a de novo standard of review. State v. Otwell, 733 So.2d 950 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999). Here, the facts are uncontested; the only issue is the trial court‘s application of the law. Although the court‘s finding of reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop is not challenged, the concept of reasonable suspicion is addressed because it includes many of the factors upon which a subsequent determination of probable cause should be based.
I. Reasonable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government extends to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). The reasonableness of such searchеs and seizures depends upon “a balance between the public interest and the individual‘s right to personal security.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). A police officer may conduct an investigatory stop if there is “a reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is engaged in some type of criminal activity.” Webb v. State, 500 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986).
In reviewing reasonable suspicion determinations, courts must look at the “`totality of the circumstances‘” to see whether the detaining officer had a “`particularized and objective basis‘” for suspecting wrongdoing. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quotingUnited States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981)). “This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that `might well elude an untrained person.‘” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). A determination of probable cause should not be basеd on a “divide-and-conquer analysis” but should consider a series of acts, each of which is “perhaps innocent in itself,” together in determining whether they warrant further investigation. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22.
Here, an off-duty police officer saw the defendant go through the checkout line “several” timеs to purchase items the officer had been trained to recognize as materials commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine. The items included a large quantity of cold medications containing pseudoephedrine, a “precursor chemical” listеd in
In State v. Bulington, 783 N.E.2d 338 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), a store employee told
II. Probable Cause
“[P]robable cause requires information that is superior in both quantum (content) and quality (reliability) to that required for reasonable suspicion.” Jones v. State, 631 So.2d 285, 287 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993). Probablе cause to search a vehicle exists when all the facts and circumstances within the officer‘s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been or is being committed and the vehicle сontains contraband. Stallworth v.State, 645 So.2d 323 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994). In determining whether probable cause exists, the totality of the circumstances test must be applied. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Following Officer Mason‘s observations inside the Wal-Mart store, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Odom was involved in manufacturing methamphetamine. They then saw the jars of liquid and residues in his truck. Agent Williams knew that these materials were common by-products of methamphetamine manufacture, and she knew that Odom had previously been arrested for manufacturing methamphetamine. Based on the totality of the this evidence, the officers’ reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause to believe that methamphetamine could be found in Odom‘s truck. The officers would have been justified in conducting a warrantless search.4 However, they chose to seek a warrant before they searched the defendant‘s truck.
III. The Warrant
When a search warrant is requested, “[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
“[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a `substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.‘”
In an affidavit for a warrant, the affiant may rely upon information obtained from fellow officers. Marks v. State, 575 So.2d 611, 614-15 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990). However, the agent must state in the affidavit that he is relying upon another officer. Id.
In her affidavit, Agent Williams set out the circumstances and purchases that had led to Odom‘s stop. She also described the methamphetamine by-products that were observed in his truck. However, Williams did not indicate that the purchases and by-products had been observed by other officers and then reported to her. Her affidavit therefore was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. However, even though the affidavit was deficient, the trial court should not have granted Odom‘s motion to suppress.
The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule provides that, when officers аct in “objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral, detached magistrate, conduct a search and the warrant is found to be invalid, the evidence need not be excluded.” Rivers v. State, 695 So.2d 260, 262 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The Court has recognized only four circumstances in which the good-faith exception does not apply: (1) when the magistrate or judge relies on information that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for reckless disregard for the truth; (2) when the magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant is based on an affidavit that is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that belief in its existence is unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officer cannot reasonably presume its vаlidity. Straughn v. State, [Ms. CR-01-1378, May 30, 2003] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2003), citing United States v. Leon, supra. None of those circumstances were present in this case.
The information in Agent Williams‘s affidavit was accurate and undisputed, and there is no indication that the issuing magistrate was not neutral and detached. Even though Williams‘s affidavit was incomplete, it did contain substantial indicia of probable cause. The warrant issued by thе district court was not facially deficient, and the officers could reasonably rely on its validity. Therefore, the trial court erred in excluding the evidence seized by the officers.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in granting Odom‘s motion to suppress the methamphеtamine seized during the officers’ search. The judgment of the trial court hereby is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
COBB, BASCHAB, SHAW, and WISE, JJ., concur.