OPINION
delivered the opinion of the court,
In April of 1999, the Robertson County-grand jury indicted the defendant for hindering a secured creditor and for failure to appear in court on charges related to a third offense. Thereafter, the trial court appointed the defendant counsel, and this attorney filed a motion to dismiss
Factual Background
During the spring of 1999, the defendant stood chаrged in a two count indictment with hindering a secured creditor and failing to appear in court.
That during the month of September, 1998, and in the State and County aforesaid, JASON R. NORTON unlawfully and knowingly did, while claiming an ownership interest in proрerty, to wit: 1990 Deville Cadillac, valued at $7995.99, which said property was the subject to a security interest, to wit: a lien payable to B & F. [sic] Motors, with intent to hinder enforcement оf said interest, did wreck the aforementioned automobile and purchased a new car with the insurance proceeds instead of paying off the note on the аforementioned automobile, in violation of TCA 39-14-116 and against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee.
After obtaining appointed counsel, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the hindering a secured creditor count. Through this motion he listed certain alleged facts surrounding the offense. These included:
A. The defendant purchased a vehicle which became secuirty [sic] for a note executed by the defendant at the time of the purchase.
B. The defendant made payments on the note.
C. The defendant had a wreck which was not his fault.
D. The at fault driver’s insurance company issuеd a check payable only to the defendant for the damages to the car.
E. The defendant cashed this check and applied the proceeds on thе purchase of a different car.
F. The wrecked car was driveable and was subsequently repossessed by the secured party, repaired and sold.
He then framed what he considers the central question to be answered in deciding this matter as: “Is cashing of the insurance check without repairing the vehicle hindering a secured creditor?”
These facts just don’t support the gravamen of this crime, which is to intentionally do one of these acts for the express purpose of defeating the secured party. It is a good effort by the State to make all this fit, but it just doesn’t in the Court’s view.4
From this decision the State appeals claiming that the trial cоurt erred in dismissing count one of the indictment.
Motion to Dismiss
Through his petition the defendant clearly contends “that this is a civil matter and not a criminal matter;” however, his supporting rationale for this conclusion is not as plainly asserted. In attempting to discern the defendant’s basis for seeking a dismissal, we find that his motion suggests two potential theories. Under one interрretation the defendant avers that the facts involved in this particular event will not sustain a conviction. Read in a different manner, the motion essentially avers that the indictment fails to state a claim.
Turning first to the contention that the facts alleged in the motion would not support a conviction, we note that a “[djefendant cannot, by mоving to dismiss the indictment, force the trial court to conduct a ‘mini-trial’ in which the State must present its proof on the merits of the charge ... or be cut short in its attempt to prosecute.” State v. Drew V. Saunders, No. 01C01-9712-CR-00584,
We, therefore, proceed to consider the facial validity of the hindering a secured creditor charge against the defendant. It is well established in this state that:
an indictment is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional guarantees of notice to the accused if the indictment contains allegations that: (1) enable the accused to know the accusation to which answer is required, (2) furnish the trial court an*583 adequate basis for entry of a proper judgment, and (3) protect the accused from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
State v. Hammonds,
The defendant’s motion asserts that the allegations in the indictment do not make out the offense of hindering a secured creditor. In evaluating this argument it is useful to compare the language of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-14-116 with the allegations contained in the challenged count of the defendant’s indictment. According to the aforementioned statute,
A person who claims ownership of or interest in any property which is the subject of a security interest, security agreement, deed of trust, mortgage, attachment, judgment or оther statutory or equitable lien commits an offense who, with intent to hinder enforcement of that interest or lien, destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise harms or reduces the value of the property.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-14-116(a).
Upon examining the allegations in the hindering a secured creditor count, we find each of the required elements is alleged. This count alleges that (1) the defendant claimed an ownership interest in a particular 1990 Cadillac; (2) this vehicle was subject to a security interest, that being a lien payable to B. & E. Motors; and (3) intending to hinder the enforcement of this security interest, the defendant did harm or reduce the value of the property by wrecking the automobile.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the issue raised merits relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Counsel actually styled this document "MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY;” however, only the motion to dismiss portion is relevant to this appeal.
. This latter chargе is unrelated to any matters in the appeal presently before this court.
. The prosecution did, however, include as exhibits to the hearing the sales contract for, the title to, and the repair estimate concerning the car.
. In addition, the trial court indicated that this situation presented issues for resolution in a civil not criminal court.
. While the motion and evidentiary hearing provided additional information regarding the defendant's alleged lack of intent to wreck the vehicle, such was not propеr for consideration at that time as above-explained. Should the State again seek to pursue the charge against this defendant, the defendant, of course, may choose to move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s proof or challenge the sufficiency of the evidence if convicted.