2007 Ohio 5383 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2007
Lead Opinion
Consequently, he was indicted on one count of escape in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} On August 29, 2005, Appellant pled guilty to escape. Appellant was sentenced to one year in prison by the trial court. In its entry, the trial court neglected to inform Appellant of post-release control. Accordingly, on October 20, 2006, the trial court conducted a new sentencing hearing in order to properly inform Appellant of post-release control. During that hearing, Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court heard Appellant's arguments and then orally denied the motion. The trial court then sentenced Appellant to one year in prison and informed him of post-release control. Appellant has timely appealed from the trial court's judgment, raising two assignments of error for review. *3
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MR. NORTH'S PRESENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA.* * *"
{¶ 4} In his first assignment of error, Appellant has argued that the trial court erred in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We agree.
{¶ 5} This Court reviews a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Xie (1992),
{¶ 6} During his hearing, Appellant introduced evidence that he was released from prison on March 18, 2005 for his initial escape conviction. Appellant's evidence indicated that he was not placed on the optional post-release *4 control that can accompany that offense. Appellant also introduced the judgment entry from his 1997 convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. In that entry, the trial court did not impose post-release control on Appellant. Specifically, the trial court drew a line through the provision in its sentencing entry which discussed the imposition of post-release control.
{¶ 7} Based upon that evidence, Appellant argued to the trial court that he was actually innocent of the charge of escape because he was not legally under detention at the time the escape offense was committed. Specifically, Appellant asserted that Hernandez v. Kelly,
{¶ 8} Additionally, R.C.
"Irregularity in bringing about or maintaining detention, or lack of jurisdiction of the committing or detaining authority, is not a defense to a charge under this section if the detention is pursuant to judicial order or in a detention facility. In the case of any other detention, irregularity or lack of jurisdiction is an affirmative defense[.]"
Accordingly, the statute under which Appellant was indicted specified the defense he sought to raise in the trial court. Specifically, Appellant asserted that the APA lacked jurisdiction to impose post-release control on him because it was not contained in his 1997 sentencing entry. Based on Hernandez, Appellant's argument is legally correct. Moreover, without a valid form of detention, Appellant cannot be convicted of escape. As the trial court did not recognize the import of Hernandez, it abused its discretion. See State v. Ross, 9th Dist. No. 20980, 2002-Ohio-7317, at ¶ 27 (noting that "a mistake of law is equivalent to an abuse of discretion.").
{¶ 9} Appellant's first assignment of error, therefore, has merit.
"MR. NORTH WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THESIXTH ANDFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION."
{¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, Appellant has argued that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon this Court's resolution *6 of Appellant's first assignment of error, his second assignment of error is moot and we decline to address it. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. *7 Costs taxed to Appellee.
CARR, J. CONCURS
Dissenting Opinion
DISSENTS, SAYING:
{¶ 12} The majority assumes that a line drawn through the post-release control provision of a form sentencing entry evidences the trial court's intentional deletion of that provision. As it is not clear from the record that this was the court's intention, I respectfully dissent.
{¶ 13} At the outset, I would note the difficulty reviewing courts encounter based on some form journal entries. Clearly the volume of cases makes it impossible for trial judges to individually draft each sentencing entry. However, lines drawn through certain provisions, and circling or underlining of other provisions, without the initials or signature of the court, present challenges for the reviewing court to determine what the trial court actually ordered. A line on a page drawn through a provision certainly can mean that the document's drafter intended to strike the provision. Here, it is not clear whether the trial court struck the provision or whether the line was drawn before or after the trial court's signature. More troubling, the journal entry at issue has numerous subheadings. The paragraph containing the notice of post-release control does not have a *8 subheading. Rather, it is contained within the subheading, "Repeat Violent Offender or Major Drug Offender." Immediately following the post-release control paragraph is the subheading, "Drug Offenses."
{¶ 14} On appeal, we have not been presented with a transcript of the sentencing hearing which led to the issuance of this journal entry. The transcript of that hearing might well have shed light on the trial court's intent regarding Appellant's original sentence. To illustrate this fact, we need only examine our recent decision in State v.Battle, 9th Dist. No. 23404,
{¶ 15} Moreover, as Appellant's offenses were wholly unrelated to the two subheadings which surrounded the paragraph giving notice of post-release control, it is possible that any striking through of that paragraph was entirely inadvertent. Consequently, it is troubling that we do not have a sentencing hearing transcript that would demonstrate the trial court's intent regarding post-release control. More troubling is that we are left with an insufficient record despite the fact that Appellant waited more than fourteen months to withdraw his plea. As it was Appellant's burden to demonstrate the validity of his request to withdraw his plea, I would find that the scant evidence he presented after such a substantial delay was not sufficient to justify granting his motion.
{¶ 16} The following facts compel a critical review of the relief sought by Appellant. Appellant filed no formal motion to withdraw his plea. Rather, after waiting fourteen months after pleading guilty, he orally moved to withdraw his plea at the inception of his sentencing hearing. See State v. Van Dyke, 9th Dist. No. 02CA008204, 2003-Ohio-4788, at ¶ 18 (finding that the length of delay is a relevant consideration when determining whether to permit withdrawal of a plea). This lengthy delay existed despite the fact that the statute under which Appellant was indicted specifically mentions the defense Appellant raised in his motion. See R.C.
{¶ 17} The unique facts of this case raise some suspicion over Appellant's tactical decision to supply only the initial journal entry. Appellant conceded that he had previously pled guilty to escape charges based on the same post-release control he now claims has always been void and in fact served time in prison for that conviction. While I agree with the majority that motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be generally treated with liberality, I question whether this case merits such liberal treatment. Appellant waited more than a year to seek the withdrawal of his plea and even then sought only orally to do so. In support, he submitted an inconclusive journal entry. I cannot agree that the trial court was unreasonable or arbitrary in determining that evidence was insufficient to support Appellant's motion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion to withdraw his plea. *1