State v. . Norman

Sep 21, 1910
Versions:
Walker, J.,

after stating the case. We think the court should have given the instruction requested by the defendant. We have decided in several cases that the action and conduct of a blood- *593 bound in trailing a person from the place where a crime bas been committed is competent eyidence under certain circumstances. Tbe conditions which must exist in order to render such evidence competent are stated in the case of Pedego v. Com., 103 Ky., 41 (44 S. W. Rep., 143). It is there said: “That in order to make such testimony (the trailing of a track by a dog) competent, even whore it is shown that the dog is of pure blood, and of a stock characterized by acuteness of scent and power of discrimination, it must also be 'established that the dog in question is possessed of these qualities, and has been trained or tested in their exercise in the tracking of human beings, and that these facts must appear from the testimony of some person who has personal knowledge thereof. We think it must also appear that the dog so trained and tested was laid on the trail, whether visible or not, concerning which testimony has been admitted at a point where the circumstances tend clearly to show that the guilty party has been, or upon a track which such circumstances indicated to have been made by him. When so indicated, testimony as to trailing by the bloodhound may be permitted to go to the jury for what it is worth, as one of the circumstances which may tend to connect the defendant with the crime of which he is accused.- When not so indicated, the trial court should exclude the entire testimony in that regard from the jury.” This Court, in the case of State v. Moore, 129 N. C., 494, adopted the rule of eyidence as stated in that case, and when applying it to the facts of the Moore case, said: “In this case, there is no evidence to connect the circumstance of the baying of the two defendants, or either of them, with the making of the tracks at the time the larceny was committed; nor is there any evidence that the dog scented any that were then made by either of the defendants; nor is there any way to ascertain that fact. The evidence admitted failing to become a circumstance to connect the defendants with the crime, and failing to become a circumstance in corroboration of Rountree’s testimony, there was error in admitting it.” Evidence as to the conduct of the bloodhound in pursuing the track of a human being was admitted in the case of S. v. Hunter, 143 N. C., 607, and S. v. *594 Freeman, 146 N. C., 615, but it will be found on an examination of those two cases, that there were facts and circumstances wbicb made the evidence reliable and therefore competent. Where such facts and circumstances do not exist, as in our case, the evidence is conjectural in its nature, and barely raises a well-grounded suspicion as to the guilt of the party. In this case, there were no tracks at the store, and as stated by the prosecutor in his testimony, there was nothing about the premises which tended to connect the prisoner with the commission of the crime. There were no tracks between the store and the railroad crossing, and there was none in the field between the public road and the house where the defendant was found. How can it be said, with any degree of certainty, that he committed the offense ? It is true that the pistol was missing from the money drawer, but it was not found in the possession of the defendant, and the mere fact that he owned the pistol was not evidence of his guilt, as any other person who may have entered the store could have taken it as well as he. While the dog ran from the store to the house where the defendant was found, it is stated in the case that he did not “recognize” the defendant, nor’ did he give any indication by his conduct, which is usual in such cases, that the defendant was the man whose trail he had been pursuing. The rule is that if there be no evidence, or if it be so slight as not reasonably to warrant an inference of the fact in issue, or if it furnish no more than material for mere conjecture, the court will not submit the issue to the jury. Brown v. Kinsey, 81 N. C., 245. In S. v. Vinson, 63 N. C., 335, it was held that evidence which “merely shows it possible for the fact in issue to be as alleged, or which raises a mere conjecture that it is so, is an insufficient foundation for a verdict and should not be left to the jury.” So in Byrd v. Express Company, it was said: “It all comes to this, that there must be legal evidence of the fact in issue and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to it. The plaintiff-must do more than show the possible liability of the defendant for the injury. He must go further and- offer, at least, some evidence which reasonably tends to prove every fact essential to his success.” There is nothing in this case to indicate that the defendant committed the crime *595 of breaking and entering the store bouse, except the conduct of the dog, and wbat be did is so uncertain and unreliable in its character as to be insufficient of itself to legally establish the defendant's guilt. It was not shown that the defendant was at the store on Saturday night, or that bis tracks were seen at or near the store, or that be was in possession of any property which was stolen, or, as we have said, that the dog indicated by bis conduct that be was the thief. It is impossible to understand bow the dog could háve trailed the defendant across the field when it appears that no tracks were found there. A careful analysis and consideration of the evidence convinces us that there was no proof of the defendant’s guilt, and be was, therefore, entitled to the instruction which was requested by bis counsel.

In bis argument before us, tbe Attorney-General, with bis usual frankness, stated that tbe evidence in tbe case does not “create a just suspicion against tbe defendant and tbe jury should have been instructed to return a verdict of not guilty.”

In this view of the facts, we have concurred with him.

New trial.