The statute of this state makes it unlawful for any person to drive an automobile upon a public street while (1) “in an intoxicated condition,” or (2) “under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” Unlike some statutes where only the second phrase is included, ours makes it unlawful to drive an automobile upon a public street, if either the driver is in an intoxicated condition, or under the influence of intoxicating liquor. A person, when drunk, is in an intoxicated condition, and of necessity is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but a person may be under the influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of this statute, and not be drunk. For this reason, we do not think that the legislature intended by the use of both phrases, to mean the same thing, or in using both phrases, to convey but one idea. The requested instructions were drawn upon the theory that the two phrases were synonymous in meaning, and therefore the defendant *678 was entitled to an instruction that he could not be convicted unless there was evidence of his being drunk while driving his automobile upon the public streets. The state was not bound to prove, that the defendant was drunk or intoxicated, but only to show that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to some perceptible degree.
It is a matter of common knowledge, that the drinking of intoxicating liquors, even in small quantities, has some effect upon the person drinking it, and that this effect continues for a longer or shorter period according to the amount drunk, and the individual drinking it. Probably the same may be said of anything else taken into the human stomach. For that reason, if for no other, proof of the drinking of intoxicating liquor is not, in itself alone, sufficient to sustain a conviction under this statute, and such has been the ruling of the courts under similar statutes :
Commonwealth
v.
Lyseth,
The effects resulting from the drinking of intoxicating liquors, are manifested in various ways, and before anyone can be shown to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor, it is necessary for some witness to prove that some one or more of these effects were perceptible to him. In the instant case, the defendant stopped, got out of his car, and was seen to stagger, and when accosted by the officers, had a flushed face and talked incoherently, and his breath smelled of the liquors which he admitted having drunk but a short time before. Evidence of these facts was clearly sufficient to justify the verdict.
As said in
State
v.
Rodgers,
91 N. J. Law, 212 (
*679 “It will be noticed that it is not essential to the existence of the statutory offense that the driver of the automobile should be so intoxicated that he cannot safely drive a car. The expression ‘under the influence of intoxicating liquor’ covers not only all the well-known and easily recognized conditions and degrees of intoxication, but any abnormal mental or physical condition which is the result of indulging in any degree of intoxicating liquors and which tends to deprive him of that clearness of intellect and control of himself which he would otherwise possess.”
We think, that the denial of defendant’s offer of proof was erroneous, and that the testimony offered was proper, as it tended to prove the credibility and interest of the witness. But in view of defendant’s own admissions and the testimony of a large number of other witnesses showing the condition of the defendant, we think that the ruling of the court was not prejudicial. Other objections are urged, but we can find none that possess any merit. For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.