763 S.W.2d 716 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1989
Defendant was convicted by the court for driving while intoxicated, § 577.010, RSMo 1986, and fined $350. He appeals; we affirm.
In his principal point on appeal defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he “operated” his motor vehicle while intoxicated. In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of guilt, we view all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the state and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Hoeber, 737 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Mo.App.1987).
The offense occurred on December 25, 1987. At 7:25 p.m. a state highway trooper received a call that a vehicle had run off U.S. Highway 24 near the Randolph-Monroe County line. He had just entered his home in Paris, Missouri after traveling on U.S. Highway 24 from Moberly when the call came. He drove back toward Moberly to the scene which was about one mile east of the county line. He
We believe this evidence is sufficient to support the conviction of defendant for driving while intoxicated on either of two grounds: first, for being intoxicated while operating the truck on the traveled portion of the highway prior to going in the ditch and, second, for operating the truck while intoxicated when the trooper found him in the ditch.
The physical facts, the degree of defendant’s intoxication and his statement are sufficient to support a finding that he was driving on the traveled portion of the highway while intoxicated. See, e.g., State v. Davison, 668 S.W.2d 252 (Mo.App.1984).
For purposes of the offense of driving while intoxicated, § 577.010, RSMo 1986, a person “operates” a motor vehicle when he is “in actual physical control” of the vehicle. § 577.001.1, RSMo 1986. “Actual physical control occurs when, ‘even though the machine merely stands motionless, ... a person keeps the vehicle m restraint or in a position to regulate its movements.’ ” State v. O’Toole, 673 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. banc 1984) (quoting City of Kansas City v. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo.App.1976)). One can be “operating” a vehicle although he is passed out or asleep in the passenger compartment and the vehicle is running, O’Toole, 673 S.W.2d at 25, Taylor v. McNeill, 714 S.W.2d 947 (Mo.App.1986), or the vehicle is stuck, State v. Parr, 754 S.W.2d 921 (Mo.App.1988).
Here as in State v. Taylor, 203 Mont. 284, 661 P.2d 33 (1983) (conviction for being “in actual physical control” of motor vehicle while intoxicated upheld), defendant was intoxicated and asleep or passed out in the driver’s seat of his vehicle which was running, but stuck. In Taylor, the court used the same definition of “in actual physical control” our courts have adopted. These facts are sufficient to support a conviction for driving while intoxicated.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.