STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT LEE NICHOLS
(AC 46989)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
August 19, 2025
Alvord, Suarez and Westbrook, Js.
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Syllabus
Convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying his postverdict motion for a new trial, in which he claimed that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Held:
Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury‘s verdict finding him guilty of the crimes with which he was charged and that his abuse of the minor victim, an infant, occurred within the applicable statute of limitations (
The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying the defendant‘s motion for a new trial to the extent that the court‘s statement that it could not reject the jury‘s findings and substitute its own view of the evidence applied the legal standard used to adjudicate sufficiency of the evidence claims, as the proper inquiry in adjudicating a motion for a new trial required the court to determine if there was a substantial question regarding the reliability of the verdict and to make its own credibility determinations, and the court‘s summary statement that it agreed with the jury‘s findings based on the evidence did not alter this court‘s conclusion that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard; accordingly, the trial court‘s denial of the motion for a new trial was reversed and the case was remanded to the trial judge who presided over the trial to make his own assessment of the jury‘s credibility determinations.
Argued May 19—officially released August 19, 2025
Substitute information charging the defendant with two counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child and one count of the crime of assault in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury before K. Doyle, J.; verdict of guilty; thereafter, the court denied the defendant‘s motions for a judgment of acquittal, in arrest of the judgment and for a new trial, and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Corinne A. Burlingham, with whom were Michael S. Taylor and Brendon P. Levesque, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state‘s attorney, and Michael W. Riley, senior assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
ALVORD, J. The defendant, Robert Lee Nichols, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of one count of assault in the first degree in violation of
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the defendant‘s claims. The defendant and his wife (collectively, Nichols) were pastors of a small congregation and operated a day care out of their house. The minor victim1 was born in October, 2012. The victim‘s parents, R and D, attended services at the defendant‘s congregation and enrolled the
During August, 2013, R and D fell ill, which led to the victim, who was approximately nine or ten months old at the time, having an extended stay of about ten days (extended stay) at the Nichols’ house.3 At the beginning of the victim‘s extended stay, the defendant
placed the victim, several times, in a sink filled with cold water and ice cubes. The defendant used the sink faucet sprayer to spray water over the victim‘s head, causing the victim to flail and gasp for air.4 On one of these occasions, the victim flailed, fell backward, and hit his head on a granite countertop.
Other incidents occurred during the victim‘s extended stay. The defendant slapped and hit the victim, causing the victim to have bruises on his legs. Also, the defendant very roughly put the victim into a playpen, making a “thud” sound, and placed pillows on either side of the victim in order to force him to sit upright. In addition, the defendant tightly swaddled the victim. One time, the defendant tightly wrapped the victim, took him by the legs, flipped him over, and dragged him along a carpeted floor. While the victim was still wrapped, the defendant hit the victim on the floor about three to four times.5 After those incidents, the victim had marks on his head and bruises.
After R and D recovered from their illnesses, they attended a service at the defendant‘s church. The defendant did not allow R and D to see the victim at that time because, according to the defendant, the victim was rebellious.6 The victim was returned to R and D
after being with the Nichols for about ten days.7 When
In September, 2013, R, D and the victim left the apartment in which they had been living and moved into the defendant‘s basement. D‘s sister helped R and D move out of the apartment. At the time, D‘s sister did not see any bruises or cuts on the victim, but the victim appeared cross-eyed9 and would put his head down and keep it down when he was on the floor.
On October 9, 2013, a pediatrician examined the victim during a routine wellness visit. During this twelve month wellness visit, the pediatrician observed that the
victim had experienced abnormal head growth. At the victim‘s nine month wellness visit, his head had normal measurements; there had been an abrupt and abnormal acceleration in the victim‘s head growth in the three month interval between the two wellness visits. As a result, the pediatrician ordered an ultrasound for the victim. The ultrasound was done on October 14, 2013, and the victim was sent home following the procedure. Upon receiving the radiology results, which showed fluid in the victim‘s head, the pediatrician notified authorities of suspected child abuse and called R and D to schedule an MRI scan for the victim. R and D decided against scheduling an MRI.10 However, the victim was transported to a hospital by ambulance that night, where he later underwent an MRI scan.
R gave two statements to Detective Kerri Rosa of the Manchester Police Department during the victim‘s hospitalization.11 D was present each time R was interviewed by Rosa, and R was not allowed to meet with Rosa outside the presence of D.
hitting the victim while they were in Florida, and an incident in which the victim hit his head after R fell backward when taking the victim out of a car. Although the defendant was not present when R gave her statements to Rosa, the defendant had prompted R to respond to the detective‘s questions with those examples.12
H also gave a statement to Rosa on October 15, 2013. H had spoken to and was instructed by the defendant before she gave the statement.13 In that statement, she recounted that she did not notice any abnоrmal behavior by or injuries to the victim and that she did not see the victim act in a way to make her believe that he had been abused.
The victim‘s MRI results showed that he had subdural hematomas around his brain and blood in another layer of tissues near his brain. On October 17, 2013, the victim underwent surgery to relieve pressure on his brain. The treatment providers conducted a six month long
assessment of the victim. Subdural hematomas are commonly caused by trauma but can result from rare medical causes. The treatment providers believed it was more likely than not that the injuries were the result of abusive head trauma because the injuries were unexplained.14
Because of the victim‘s injuries, R and D lost custody of the victim. The victim was placed in foster care by the Department of Children and Families while R and D continued living in the Nichols’ house. R, however, eventually left the defendant‘s church, moved out of the Nichols’ house, and separated from her husband. The victim was returned “full-time [to her] care” in June, 2014. H left the Nichols’ house in December, 2016.
Thereafter, the dеfendant was arrested and charged by way of a substitute long form information with one count of assault in the first degree in violation of
When the state rested its case, defense counsel orally moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that there was “not enough evidence that would reasonably permit a finding of guilty on all the charges.” Specifically, although defense counsel did not dispute that someone had injured the victim, he argued that there was insufficient evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. In addition, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the state had not commenced this case within the five year statute of limitations; see part I of this opinion; arguing that there was conflicting evidence from H regarding the start date of the victim‘s extended stay.17 The trial court denied the motion, concluding that there was sufficient evidence “to find the defendant guilty and to avoid the statute of limitations claim.”
The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. On June 30, 2023, the defendant filed three motions. The defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal on all counts on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to permit a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction because the prosecution did not commence within the statute of limitations. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial on all counts on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Following argument, the trial court denied all three motions in an oral decision. On August 16, 2023, the court sentenced the
defendant to a total effective term of twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended after ten years, followed by five years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed the alleged conduct or, in the alternative, that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the conduct occurred within the statute of limitations because “the only evidence of the defendant‘s involvement in the injuries sustained by [the victim] came from a single, highly incredulous witness—[H].” We are not persuaded.
“While the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted
to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidencе proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury‘s verdict of guilty. . . .
“Furthermore, we are mindful that [w]e do not sit as a [seventh] juror who may cast a vote against the verdict based upon our feeling that some doubt of guilt is shown by the cold printed record.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Douglas C., 195 Conn. App. 728, 735–36, 227 A.3d 532 (2020), aff‘d, 345 Conn. 421, 285 A.3d 1067 (2022).
Next, we set forth the relevant statutory language.
which the punishment is or mаy be imprisonment in excess of one year, except within five years next after the offense has been committed.”18
The defendant‘s insufficiency of the evidence claim is premised on his contention that the jury could not reasonably have relied on the testimony of the sole eyewitness, H. Specifically, the defendant argues that “[n]o reasonable fact finder could have
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have found that the victim had been injured by the defendant during his extended stay with the defendant in his home in the days following August 10, 2013. From H‘s testimony, in conjunction with evidence that the victim had acted differently after his
extended stay and sustained life-threatening head injuries requiring surgery in October, 2013, the jury was permitted to infer that the defendant had wilfully caused seriоus physical injuries to the victim. See, e.g., State v. Franklin, 162 Conn. App. 78, 89, 129 A.3d 770 (2015) (“[t]he credited testimony of even a single witness may be sufficient to sustain a defendant‘s conviction” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 905, 138 A.3d 281 (2016).
The jury could have reasonably found the following facts on the basis of H‘s testimony. In the days after August 10, 2013, the victim had an extended stay at the Nichols’ house. During the extended stay, H saw the defendant place the victim in an ice bath in the kitchen sink and spray the victim with cold water, causing the victim to flail and hit his head on a granite countertop. At that time, the defendant stated that he believed the victim was being “rebellious” because the victim was not following his commands. Also during the extended stay, as H testified, the defendant, “wrapped [the victim] very tightly and tоok [the victim] by his legs and flipped him over and dragged him. So, he had a rug burn on his head, and [the defendant] slammed him on the floor like three or four times with, like, a loud thud sound.” Following these incidents, the victim had marks on his head and bruises on his legs, which the defendant concealed from R by keeping the victim for about ten days.
Although the defendant presented evidence to impeach H‘s credibility,21 “it is the function of the jury to consider the evidence and [to] judge the credibility of witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 350 Conn. 363, 374, 324 A.3d 760 (2024); see State v. A. M., 156 Conn. App. 138, 145, 111 A.3d 974 (2015) (“[Q]uestions of whether to believe or to
disbelieve a competent witness are beyond our review. . . . Our review of factual determinations is limited to whether those findings are clearly erroneous. . . . We must defer to the [finder] of fact‘s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses that is made on the basis of its
II
The defendant also claims that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying his motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence. We agree with the defendant.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review applicable to the defendant‘s claim. Because the defendant‘s claim challenges the legal standard applied by the trial court, it is subject to plenary review. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 341 Conn. 387, 414, 267 A.3d 81 (2021) (“[i]nsofar as the defendant‘s claims [challenging the court‘s ruling on thе motion for new trial] bear on the proper legal standard, they are subject to plenary review“).
Our analysis is guided by the following principles. “[A] challenge to the weight of the evidence is not the same as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. A sufficiency claim dispute[s] that the state presented sufficient evidence, if found credible by the jury, to sustain [the defendant‘s] conviction. . . . In contrast, a weight claim does not contend that the state‘s evidence . . . was insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Rather, [it] asserts that the state‘s case . . . was so flimsy as to raise a substantial question regarding the reliability of the verdict [and that there
was a] sеrious danger that [the defendant] was wrongly convicted. . . .
“Given that these two types of claims raise fundamentally different issues, the inquiry appropriately undertaken by a court ruling on a sufficiency of the evidence claim differs substantially from that of a court ruling on a weight of the evidence claim. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, a court considers whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a guilty verdict. . . . In doing so, the court does not sit as a [seventh] juror who may cast a vote against the verdict based upon our feeling that some doubt of guilt is shown by the cold printed record. . . . [It] cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s verdict. . . . Thus, a court will not reweigh the evidence or resolve questions of credibility in determining whether the evidence was sufficient. . . .
“In contrast, a court determining if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence does precisely what a court ruling on a sufficiency claim ought not to do. That is, the court must do just what every juror ought to do in arriving at a verdict. The juror must use all his experience, his knowledge of human nature, his knowledge of human events, past and present, his knowledge of the motives which influence and control human action, and test the evidence in the case according to such knowledge and render his verdict accordingly. . . . The trial judge in considering the verdict must do the same . . . and if, in the exercise of all his knowledge from this source, he finds the verdict to be so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, then it is his duty to set aside that verdict and to grant a new trial. . . . In other words, the court
specifically is required to act as a [seventh] juror because it must independently assess [the] credibility [of witnesses] and determine
“Thus, because a court is required to independently assess credibility and assign weight to evidence, a weight of the evidence claim necessarily raises the issue of which courts are competent to perform those tasks. It is well settled that only the judge who presided over the trial where a challenged verdict was returned is legally competent to decide if that verdict was against the weight of the evidence . . . . Consequently, a judge in a later proceeding, such as a direct appeal or a habeas corpus proceeding, is not legally competent to decide such a claim on the basis of the cold printed record before it. . . . The rationale behind this rule is sound: [T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. . . . [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Capasso, 203 Conn. App. 333, 345–47, 248 A.3d 58 (2021), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 939, 249 A.3d 352 (2021); see also State v. Soto, 175 Conn. App. 739, 745–48, 168 A.3d 605 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 970, 173 A.3d 953 (2017).
The following procedural history is relevant to our review of the defendant‘s claim. As set forth previously, the defendant filed three postverdict motions: a motion for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, a motion in arrest of judgment, and a motion for a new trial on all counts. In an oral decision, the trial court denied the
motions, concluding that, “[i]n all three of the motions, defense essentially are arguing that this court should sit as a ninth juror and reject the jury‘s factual findings. This court cannot reject the jury‘s findings and substitute its own view of the evidence. The jury‘s verdicts are supported by the evidence, and the jury found [H] credible and that she lacked any motive to falsely accuse the defendant, who, at one point, acted as her father and spiritual leader. The jury rejected the inference raised by the defense that [H] would come forward and lie and expose herself to being charged almost five years after the incident. This court agrees with the jury‘s findings that were based on the evidence presented in this matter and, therefore, denies all of the defendant‘s motions.”
We conclude that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard relative to the motion for a new trial. First, we note that nowhere in the court‘s oral decision did it expressly state the legal standard applicable to the defendant‘s motion for a new trial. Cf. In re Xavier H., 201 Conn. App. 81, 100, 240 A.3d 1087 (2020) (when court correctly set forth legal standard elsewhere in its memorandum of decision, imprecision in conclusory statement did not reflect application of incorrect legal standard), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 981, 241 A.3d 705 (2020), and cert. denied, 335 Conn. 982, 241 A.3d 705 (2020). To the contrary, the legal standard set forth by the court at the beginning of its analysis to apply to all three motions stated that “[t]his court cannot reject the jury‘s findings and substitute its own view of the evidence.” To the extent the court applied the standard used for sufficiency of the evidence claims to the defendant‘s claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, such an application was improper. See State v. Capasso, supra, 203 Conn. App. 345 (“[T]he inquiry appropriately undertaken by a court ruling on a sufficiency
that of a court ruling on a weight of the evidence claim. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence . . . the court does not sit as a [seventh] juror who may cast a vote against the verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). In contrast, “[a] weight claim predicated on a challenge to the jury‘s credibility determinations . . . requires the trial court to make its own assessment of the jury‘s credibility determinations.” State v. Soto, supra, 175 Conn. App. 755.
Although the trial court сoncluded its oral decision by noting its “agree[ment] with the jury‘s findings that were based on the evidence presented in this matter,” that summary statement alone does not alter our conclusion that the court applied an incorrect legal standard. Accordingly, we must reverse the court‘s determination on this issue and remand the case to the judge who presided over the trial22 to “make [his] own assessment of the jury‘s credibility determinations.” State v. Soto, supra, 175 Conn. App. 755.
The denial of the motion for a new trial is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court, K. Doyle, J., for a determination, on the existing record, of the motion for a new trial; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see
Initially, R testified that the Nichols watched the victim in August, 2013. Although R and D testified that the stay could have been in July, 2013, and H initially testified that she did not remember the exact dates of the extended stay and that it might have been in the fall of 2013, H later testified that the stay began on August 10, 2013, because she had a photo with that date and recalled that the photo was taken the first day of the extended stay.