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State v. Newton
110 S.E.2d 810
N.C.
1959
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Bobbitt, J.

Whilе the record shows four assignments of error, only two are discussed in defendant’s brief. Assignments of error, under our Rules land decisions, are deemed abandoned when defendant’s brief states no reason or argument and cites no authority in support thereof. S. v. Perry, 250 N.C. 119, 132, 108 S.E. 2d 447.

Defendant assigns as error: “That the trial Court erred in that in his Charge to the Jury, he failed to declare and explain the law aris *154 ing on the evidence in the ease and failed to apply the law to the evidence.” This ‍‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍assignment, and the exception on which it is basedi, is broadside and ineffectual. S. v. Corl, 250 N.C. 262, 265, 108 S.E. 2d 613. It contains no suggestion as to what instruction is deemed objectionable or as to what instruction or instructions defendant contends should have been (but were not) given.

Defendant’s remaining assignment of error is directed to the italicized portion of the following excerpt from the court’s instruсtions to the jury, vis.: “So, Members of the Jury, as to Case Number 3490, I 'instruct you that if you find from the ‍‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden being on the State to so satisfy you, that the defendant Johnnie E. Newton, did on the BBnd dаy of May, 1959, ■point a rifle in the direction of the prosecuting witness, Clyde E. DeBow and shoot the rifle in the direсtion of the prosecuting witness, Clyde E. DeBow, and that he then 'and there shot said rifle at said prosecuting witnеss with the intent to do him bodily harm, then the defendant Johnnie E. Newton would be guilty of an assault with a deadly weapоn as charged in the Bill of Indictment and if you so find and beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty as charged in case Number 3490 in the bill of indictment.”

The evidence is positive and precise that, when the Guardsmen returned, defendant pointed his loaded rifle directly at them. G.S. 14-34 provides: “If any person shall рoint any gun. or pistol at any person, either in fun or otherwise, whether such gun or pistol be loaded or nоt loaded, he shall be guilty of an assault, and upon conviction of the same shall be fined, ‍‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the court.” True, the quoted instruction shows the case was submitted in relation to the shot fired when the jeep was proceeding north on Roberson Street. Even so, the circumstancеs as to defendant’s conduct when the Guardsmen returned are relevant as to defendant’s attitude and intent with references to the prior incident.

The ground upon which defendant challenges the italicized рortion of the quoted instruction is that the court used the expression, “in the direction of,” sometimes used by DеBow, when DeBow also used the expression, “in the general direction of,” asseited to be a broader expression. As to this point, it would seem that the court, by requiring as a prerequisite to conviction thаt the jury find that defendant shot “in the direction of” the prosecuting witness, adopted the view more favorable to defendant.

When considered in the light most favorable to the State, we think the testimony that defendаnt pointed and fired his rifle “in the di *155 rection of” and “in the general direction of” the prosecuting witness is sufficient, taking all circumstances into consideration, to support the ‍‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍finding that defendant pointed and fired his rifle .toward the jeep and its occupants or toward the area in which the jeep was proceeding.

It is noted that the jeep was approximately 50 feet from defendant when defendant pointed and fired his rifle. It is further noted that defendant pointed and* fired his rifle in such manner that DeBow, who observed defendant’s conduct, was placed in apprehension of the safety of himself and of Deatherаge; and that, by i’eason of defendant’s conduct, these Guardsmen left the scene and did not return until (1) they had аlerted all patrol cars in the area to come to their aid, 'amd (2) they had loaded their pistоls for possible use in their own protection. It is further noted that when they did return they found defendant with his loaded riflе raised and pointed directly at them.

Defendant’s guilt does not depend upon whether, before firing his rifle, hе took precise aim at the jeep or .any occupant thereof. “It is an assault, without regаrd to the aggressor’s intention, to fire a gun at another or in the direction in which he is standing.” Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 1, § 332. “The law will not tolerate such a reckless disregard for human life.” 4 Am. Jur., Assault and Battery § 6. In S. v. Baker, 20 R.I. 275, 38 A. 653, 78 Am. St. Rep. 863, this instruction was approved: “Firing a pistol in the direction of another with the intention ‍‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍of frightening him, or with the intention of wounding him, аre equally assaults.” In Edwards v. State, 62 S.E. 565, the Court of Appeals of Georgia approved this instruction: “. . . If you find the defendаnt, without justification, shot a pistol in the direction of the witness, within carrying distance of the pistol, not intending to hit him, but intеnding to scare him, he would be guilty of an assault.” If any portion of the quoted instruction is incorrect, it would seеm to be the portion, to which defendant did not except, which imposed upon the State the burden оf establishing defendant’s intent to do bodily harm to the prosecuting witness.

“The principle is well established that nоt only is a person who offers or attempts by violence to injure the person of .another guilty of :аn assault, but no one by the show of violence has the right to put another in fear and thereby force him to leave a place where he has the right to be. S. v. Hampton, 63 N.C. 13; S. v. Church, 63 N.C. 15; S. v. Rawles, 65 N.C. 334; S. v. Shipman, 81 N.C. 513; S. v. Martin, 85 N.C. 508, 39 Am. Rep. 711; S. v. Jeffreys, 117 N.C. 743.” S. v. Daniel, 136 N.C. 571, 575, 48 S.E. 544. As succinctly stated by Ruffin, J. in S. v. Marsteller, 84 N.C. 726; “No man has a right by a show *156 of force to put another and an unoffending person in an immediate fear of bodily harm.”

Defendant has failed to .show prejudicial error.

No error.

Higgins, J., not sitting.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Newton
Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Date Published: Nov 4, 1959
Citation: 110 S.E.2d 810
Docket Number: 372
Court Abbreviation: N.C.
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