OPINION
¶ 1 Dаle E. Newland appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of child pornography that police found on his laptop computer after he had ostensibly consented to the search. Newland asserts that the evidence should have been suppressed because his consent was tainted by a prior illegal search of the computer. The State argues that the motion was properly denied because Newland's consent was not obtained through exploitation of the initial illegal search. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
12 Search and seizure cases are highly fact dependent, so we recite the pertinent facts, none of which аre disputed, in some detail. See State v. Brake,
¶3 While awaiting Newland's arrival at the station, Officer Jeffries decided to take another look at the text document to determine if it contained any evidence of the juveniles' activities. Although he did not recall closing the document prior to the laptop's transport to the police station, the text document was no longer on the sereen when he reopened the computer's lid. For that reason, he began searching through the file folders appearing on the computer's desktop, the first screen that he saw. In the course of his search for the document, he opened a folder titled "My Pictures," in which he saw thumbnail images 1 of naked females who appeared *73 to him to be under the age of eighteen. He immediately discontinued his search.
114 Officer Jeffries then approached New-land, who had since arrived at the police station, and requested consent to search the computer for evidence that the juveniles may have placed on the computer. The officer did not inform Newland of his previous search or the nature of the evidence he was seeking. Newland gave his consent to the search.
15 Officer Jeffries returned to his office, opened the files, and confirmed that they did contain photographs of naked females who appeared to be under eighteen years of age. He then informed Newland that he had found evidence (which he did not describe) on the computer and that he was going to send the laptop to the state forensic laboratory for further examination. Newland made no protest and thanked the officer. At some point after he obtained Newland's consent to search the computer, Officer Jeffries also asked another police officer to assist him in locating the date and time thаt the photographs had been saved on the computer. Their investigation indicated that the photographs had been placed on the computer prior to the date that Newland had reported the laptop stolen. Officer Jeffries obtained a search warrant and sent the computer to the forensic laboratory where an investigator in the Internet Crimes Against Children Unit determined that twenty-one photographs saved on the computer prior to its theft appeared to be child pornography. The crime laboratory also determined that the photographs were stored in the "My Pictures" folder that was linked to Newlands computer profile, the only one of the four user profiles set up on the laptop that was not password-protected.
T6 Newland was charged by information with three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, each a second degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-52a-8(1)(a), (2) (Supp.2010) 2 Newland moved to suppress the child pornography found on his laptop as the fruit of an illegal search. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, holding that although the initial search was illegal, New-land's consent cured the illegality because the consent was voluntary and was not obtained through exploitation of the prior illegality. Newland was later convicted on all three cоunts. He now challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
17 We review the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence based on undisputed facts for correctness. See State v. Tripp,
ANALYSIS
18 The State does not contest the trial court's determination that the initial search of Newland's computer without a warrant or consent constituted an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. IV (protecting citizens from unreasonable searches оf personal effects) 3 For purposes of this appeal, therefore, we assume, without deciding, that the initial search violated Newland's constitutional - rights. Thus, the only issue presented for appeal is whether the child pornography evidence discovered during the course of the ensuing consent search should have been suppressed as a fruit of the initial illegality.
19 An illegal search does not inevitably result in the suppression of all evidence that would not have been discovered had the wrongful search not happened:
*74 We need not hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made. has been come at by exploitation of the illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
Wong Sun v. United States,
110 "Two factors determine whether consent to a search is lawfully obtained following initial police misconduct[:] ... whether the consent was voluntary and whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Arroyo,
111 Our inquiry therefore focuses on whether Newland's consent was obtained through exploitation of the illegal initial search or if his consent was sufficiently separate from the initial search to remove any resulting taint. The primary purpose of the exploitation analysis is to identify situations where, even given a defendant's voluntary consent, the only way " 'to compеl respect for the constitutional guaranty [against unlawful searches and seizures is to] ... remov[e] the incentive to disregard it'" State v. Hansen,
112 In this case, the trial court determined that Newland gave his consent soon after the initial search and the events were therefore temporally proximate. With respect to intervening cireumstances between the illegal search and the consensual one, the court found none. But, it also decided that Officer Jeffries's conduct was not purposeful or flagrant. After weighing and balancing these three Arroyo factors, the trial court concluded that Newlands consent was not the result of exploitation of the prior illegal search and that " 'whatever deterrent value may result from suppression in this case is greatly outweighed by sociеty's interest in placing all relevant evidence before the jury." (Quoting State v. Thurman,
I. Temporal Proximity
13 The trial court found that Officer Jeffries sought Newland's consent immediately after he conducted the illegal search. Although the State concedes that there was close temporal proximity, it also raises New-land's lack of knowledge of the initial illegal search as a separate factor for our consideration.
7
We agrеe that a defendant's lack of awareness of a prior search when he gives consent is relevant to the exploitation analysis, though we believe it should be considered within the existing three-factor analysis established by Arroyo. The Utah appellate courts have not yet had an opportunity to consider under which prong of the analysis this factor fits. Other jurisdictions, however, have addressed the issue and reached divergent conclusions. For example, some courts have held that a defendant's lack of awareness of a prior illegal search amounts to an intervening circumstance. See, eg., United States v. Furrow,
¶14 It is generally the case that "[a] brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation and consent ... indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to dissipate." Shoulderblade,
IL. Intervening Circumstances
115 Intervening cireumstances are events that create a "clean break in the chain of events between the misconduct and the ... consent." Hansen,
16 The trial court held that there were no intervening cireumstances in the present case, and the State does not dispute this conclusion on appeal. Based on this concession, which we consider appropriate under the circumstances, we accept that this factor weighs in favor of suрpression without further review.
III. Purpose and Flagrancy
17 The Utah Supreme Court has treated "purpose and flagrancy" as the most significant factor in a suppression analysis because it "directly relates to the deterrent value of suppression." State v. Thurman,
*77
¶18 "All Fourth Amendment violations are, by constitutional definition, 'unreasonable.". There аre, however, significant practical differences that distinguish among violations, differences that measurably assist in identifying the kinds of cases in which disqualifying the evidence is likely to serve the deterrent purposes of the exelusionary rule." Brown,
T19 "Between these extremes lies a wide range of situations that defy ready categorization...." Brown,
120 That his actions were unreasonable, however, is not the determinative factor; all Fourth Amendment violations are by definition unlawful and therefore unreasonable. Rather, the officer's actions had to rise to the level of purposeful or flagrant to invoke the еxclusionary rule. See Brown,
121 The record demonstrates that Officer Jeffries did not initially search the computer with the purpose of obtaining Newland's consent or as a pretext for investigating any crimes suspected to have been committed by Newland. Thus, to the extent that the search was investigatory in design, it was aimed not at Newland, but at the two juveniles in whose possession the computer was recovered. Further, those juveniles had no privacy interest subject to Fourth Amendment protection in the contents of a stolen computer that they did not lawfully possess. Sеe generally State v. Constantino,
122 The evidence likewise does not indicate that Officer Jeffries was aware that his initial search of the laptop was improper; rather, he acted under a misapprehension. See generally Herrera-Gongalez,
23 Furthermore, the computer profile on which the pornographic photographs were found-Newland's-had none of the usual indicators of privacy that might be expected under the cireumstances. Despite the portability of the laptop and its multiple users, Newland's profile, unlike the other user accounts, was not password-protected. Moreover, the pornographic photographs were stored in a folder appearing on the desktop, ie., the first screen that would be visible upon accessing the computer. Nor does the folder's label, "My Pictures," communicate any intent to keep private the documents and images stored in it.
9
Cf. State v. Guillen,
24 The trial court found that under the totality of the facts, Officer Jeffries's cоnduct was "not flagrant misconduct," but "was instead caused by negligence." Newland does not challenge those findings. Even though we do not defer to the trial court's conclu-gions in this regard, but review them for correctness, we too conclude, based on all the cireumstances, that Officer Jeffries's initial search of Newlands laptop was neither a purposeful nor flagrant derogation of New-land's rights. The purpose and flagrancy factor therefore balances against suppression of the evidence recovered in the subsequent consensual search.
125 In summary, we accept the State's concession that the intervening cireum-stances factor weighs in favor of suppression, determine that Newland's lack of knowledge about the initial illegal search neutralizes the temporal proximity factor, and conclude that the purpose and flagrancy factor weighs against suppression.
126 We must now decide whether the trial court correctly concluded that the consent was not obtained through exploitation of the initial illegality.
[The exploitation analysis requires a balancing of the relative egregiousness of the misconduct against the time and cireum-stances that intervene before the consent is given. [Thus, tlhe nature and degree of the illegality will usually be inversely related to the effectiveness of time and intervening evеnts to dissipate the presumed taint.
State v. Thurman,
*80 CONCLUSION
27 Newland voluntarily consented to the search of his laрtop computer. Though the consent was granted almost immediately after the illegal search concluded, Newlands lack of awareness of the initial search reduced the significance of temporal proximity. There were no mitigating intervening circumstances, but Officer Jeffries's conduct involved a negligent rather than a purposeful or flagrant violation of Newlands Fourth Amendment rights. The officer's acts, therefore, do not rise to the level where the need for deterrence requires suppression of the evidence uncovered in the subsequent consensual search. The trial court correctly concluded that the evidence obtained from Newland's сomputer was not obtained by exploitation of the initial illegal search because his consent was sufficiently separate from that search to purge any resulting taint. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.
Notes
. Thumbnails, or "miniature computer graph-icfs]" of the files within a computer folder, are an organizational format that allows the user to quickly view the folder's contents. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1305 (11th ed. 2004). A thumbnail of a photograph file is a miniature version of the saved image.
. For the convenience of the reader, we cite to the current version of the code because the 2009 amendments have no effect on our analysis. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3 (Supp.2010) (amend. notes).
. - State officers are bound by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See State v. Perkins,
. The State points out that Newland's appellate brief focuses on demonstrating that neither the inevitable discovery or independent source exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply to the facts of this case rather than analyzing whether the police exploited the prior illegal search. We agree with the State that the trial court denied the motion to suppress because it determined that Newland's consent was not obtained through exploitation of the initial illegal search and not on the inevitable discovery or independent source exceptions. Nevertheless, because Newland challenges the substance of the trial court's ruling-that the pornographic photographs were admissible despite the illegal search-we will review the merits of Newland's claim.
. The State has invited us to overrule this two-pronged approach adopted in State v. Arroyo,
First, the Utah Supreme Court has carefully considered and expressly rejected the Carson approach in Arroyo. See Arroyo,
Moreover, Carson is of questionable authority. In United States v. Melendez-Garcia,
. Brown v. Illinois,
. The trial court rejected the State's contention that Newland's lack of knowledge that Officer Jeffries had already searched the laptop when he gave consent weighed against exclusion, reasoning that Newland's knowledge of the prior search related to the voluntariness analysis, not the exploitation inquiry. It did, however, find that Newland was not present when the initial search occurred.
. Notably, in the case where the supreme court affirmed the admission of the evidence, it also determined both that there was temporal distance because the consent was given five hours after the illegal entry and initial search and that there were intervening circumstances where the officer informed the defendant of his constitutional right to refuse to consent to the search as well as his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
. Although the label suggests the folder would contain images rather than text documents like Officer Jeffries was seeking, the label alone neither precludes the presence of text documents nor makes searching the folder flagrant or purposeful.
. - In affirming here, to the extent that the initial search may have been illegal, we are not condoning an officer's violation of Newland's constitutional right to freedom from unreasonable searches of his personal effects. The United States Supreme Court, however, has "never suggеsted that the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence." Herring v. United States,
The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it. But [dlespite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.
Brown,