28 Nev. 186 | Nev. | 1905
By the Court,
(after stating the facts):
In order that a clearer understanding may be had of the essential facts, we have detailed important parts of the testimony relating to the main issue in the case — the true cash value of the road in 1901. It not being shown or contended that the prospective is greater than the present value, it depends largely upon the amount of earnings and expenses of operation. Following decisions in other states, this court long ago laid down the rule that the cash value of a railroad for the purposes of taxation — which means the amount at which the property would be appraised if taken in payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor — must be determined mainly by its net earnings, capitalized at the current rate of
The error in allowing the answer of Mr. Maestretti giving his result regarding the net earnings to stand after he -stated that he included such items as he deemed proper and rejected others which he thought improper is well illustrated by his failure to include the taxes as part of the operating expenses. It was equivalent to permitting the witness to tell the jury that the taxes ought not to be allowed as a part of the charges of operation for the year — a matter of law for the trial judge, and one previously determined by this court contrary to the opinion of the witness. The objection on the ground that it was a matter of law was promptly and properly sustained to the question put to Mr. Hiskey as to whether the company was liable for the taxes that the jury might assess for the year 1901. This witness was not permitted to testify for the defendant that the company was liable for its taxes, arid, inferentially, that they were a necessary part of its expenses; but the witness for the state was permitted to give a result which, in effect, said to the jury that the taxes could not be allowed as part of the charges of operation. He included as a part of the receipts which the company ought to have earned the amount in fares that would cover the distances traveled on passes. Although these amounts should be included in determining what the earnings of the company ought to be unless the defendant showed that the passes were used by its
As to what other items the witness included or rejected in arriving at his result we are not informed, nor were the district court or the jury further enlightened. No doubt many of the transactions shown by the books were properly placed in his estimate; but whether others were improperly so, whether he allowed items for expenses that ought to have been rejected, or rejected others that ought to have been allowed, as he did the payment by the company of the taxes on its personal property, and whether he classed as receipts anything that cannot be legally considered such, cannot be ascertained from his testimony or the record, because the items on which his result is based are not specified.
' In this regard the testimony of Mr. Hiskey for the company is hardly more satisfactory. It is evident that his answer that the loss from operation that year was $634.99 was based either upon his judgment as to the items allowable or upon the way they had been classified in the books, neither of which, as we have said, should control the province of the court in determining which are for the consideration of the jury when objection is made. Notwithstanding the wide discrepancy in their respective results, the estimate of a loss by the witness for the defendant and that the company ought to have netted over $10,000 that year by the witness for the plaintiff, both may have been entirely correct in their additions, subtractions, and balances for which they had been called as expert accountants. So far as appears, they differed only in the items which they considered, and which were selected in the exercise of their judgment, instead of that of the court. If they had disagreed regarding the result or bal
The books were not placed in evidence on the trial in the district court, but, as each party sought to prove a result from them through the examination and opinion of an expert, and each objected to the opinion of the opposing witness without making any objection to the books themselves, it is apparent that their introduction was waived. Without consent or waiver, it would have been necessary to lay the usual foundation for their introduction by proving that they contained correct and original entries of the transactions made at the time they took'plaee, or from permissive memoranda, before they, or evidence of their contents, could be received. To have secured their introduction, it would not have been necessary to prove that the various items scattered through daybooks or others of original entry had been carried to and properly classified in the expense or other accounts in the ledger, and such classification made by the defendant in its own behalf was not supported by any testimony as to its correctness, and was inadmissible, except so
Judge Campbell, in Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 35, said: "It is an elementary rule that, where the court or jury can make their own deductions, they shall not be made by those testifying.” Lord Mansfield, in Carter v. Boehm, 3 Burr. 1905: "It is an opinion which, if rightly formed, could only be drawn from the same premises from which the court and jury were to determine the cause, and therefore it is improper and irrelevant in the mouth of a witness.” "It is a good general rule that a witness is not to give his impressions, but to state the facts from which he received them, and thus leave the jury to draw their own conclusions; and wherever the' facts can be stated it is not to be departed from.” (Cornell v. Green, 10 Serg. & R. 16.) In Campbell v. Rusch, 9 Iowa, 337, it was said: "In answering this question the witness was not communicating facts, but his own conclusions, drawn
The exception to the rule as provided by the statute and the decision .lies in allowing the accountant to state the result of arithmetical calculations that could be made by the court. When accounts are numerous, the convenience and expedition of trials demand the admission of the testimony of competent witnesses who have perused the entire mass and will state summarily the net result. Regarding this there is a collation of decisions in 2 Wig. Ev. sec. 1230. In Adams v. Board, 37 Fla. 283, 20 South. 271, it was said: "The witness in answer to the question detailed at length divers facts that he asserted to be shown by the records examined by him. There was no error in excluding this evidence. The contents of records cannot be shown by parol where the record itself is extant and accessible.” In State v. Brady, 100 Iowa, 191, 69 N. W. 290, 36 L. R. A. 693, 62 Am. St. Rep. 560, a tabulated statement prepared by an agent of railroad companies from the records showing the sales of tickets at a station during the year was held to have been properly admitted.
It was shown on the trial that an offer of $200,000 for the road had been made to the general manager in 1900 by residents of Austin, or that he was asked whether the company would sell it for that amount. The witnesses who testified that they made the offer did not have that amount of money, and did not make it with any ability or expectation of buying the road for themselves, but pursuant to a statement made by a man named J. F. Mitchell, who was not present
The district court erred in refusing defendant’s instruction
Exception was taken to the evidence introduced on behalf of the state that the articles of incorporation of the Nevada Central Railroad Company provided for 7,500 shares of stock of a par value of $100 a share, and that the company
Defendant further contends that the levy of $1.57 for county purposes on each $100 of valuation made the whole levy void under the following provision of the revenue act: " The board of county commissioners in each county of this state are hereby authorized and empowered to levy annually, on or before the first Monday in March, an ad valorem tax for county purposes not exceeding the sum of two dollars on each one hundred dollars i value of taxable property in the county and such special taxes as may be authorized and required by law; provided, the total tax levy in any one year for'all purposes shall not exceed five dollars on each one hundred dollars value of taxable property in any county or part thereof; provided, no levy in excess of one dollar and fifty cents on each one hundred dollars value of taxable property therein shall be so levied in any county of this state for county purposes unless the county is indebted for liabilities contracted prior to January 1st next preceding the making thereof and not bonded or.funded.” It was not shown that the county was not indebted for liabilities contracted prior to 1901, and the presumption is in favor of official action and the levy. This makes it unnecessary to
The defendant sought to have their witness Hiskey state the amount of the receipts and earnings of the road for the previous ten years, as shown by the balances standing on the books. The testimony was properly excluded, because the witness had not made the computations, and did not know whether they were correct, nor what items they included, and did not bring them under the rule we have hereinbefore stated.
When the case is tried again, the court can determine whether there is evidence to cover or warrant the modification to instruction No. 5. We have examined the other specifications treated in the elaborate and interesting briefs, but find no error in regard to them.
The cause is remanded for a new trial.