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State v. Nesbit
978 S.W.2d 872
Tenn.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 Tennessee, Appellee, STATE of NESBIT, Appellant.

Clarence C. Tennessee,

Supreme Court of

at Jackson.

Sept. 1998.

Rehearing Denied Nov. *4 Defender, Wharton, District Public

A.C. Ward, Assistant Public Memphis, W. Mark Johnson, (Appeal only), S. Ronald Defender Thomas, Betty Public Defender *5 Assistant J. (Trial Appellant. Only), Memphis, for Attorney Walkup, General John Knox Moore, Reporter, E. Solicitor Gen- Michael eral, Attorney Cauley, P. Assistant John Gibbons, General, Nashville, District William Henderson, General, Attorney D. Thomas Nichols, District Attor- Assistant Jennifer General, neys Memphis, Appellee. for OPINION DROWOTA, Justice. defendant, capital Clar- this Nesbit, premeditat-

ence was convicted C. sentencing degree At the ed murder. first aggravating cir- hearing, jury found one (1) especially was murder “[t]he cumstance: heinous, that it involved cruel in atrocious or beyond that physical abuse torture or serious produce Tenn.Code necessary to death.” 13—204(i)(5)(1991 Finding Repl.). §Ann. 39— out- aggravating circumstance beyond a weighed mitigating circumstances doubt, the de- sentenced reasonable to death electrocution. fendant appeal to the Criminal On Court direct challenged his both Appeals, the defendant sentence, raising eleven claims conviction subparts. Af- error, numerous some with claims, considering the fully ter defendant’s affirmed Appeals Criminal the Court of Thereafter, pursuant judgment. trial court’s (1997 39-13-206(a)(l) approximately for § known the defendant to Tenn.Code Ann. killing. The victim’s prior one month to her Repl.),1 the ease docketed in Court. this Cannon, sister, testified Constance The defendant raised numerous issues murder, day p.m. on the of the around 1:00 Court, examining carefully but after stopped by the victim’s she and a friend law, including entire record and the the thor- grocery apartment to drive the victim to ough opinion Ap- of the Court of Criminal at the door Although Cannon knocked store. peals briefs of the defendant and the minutes, As no one answered. several Court, 30, 1997, September they leaving, friend noticed were Cannon’s limiting argument entered Order oral looking out the one of the victim’s children issues, setting five the cause for oral By window. the time Cannon returned argument April at the term of Court in Jack- door, opened it. The the victim had son.2 See Tenn. S.Ct. R. 12.3 ready to that she was not told Cannon hearing carefully argument After oral p.m. go to return at 3:00 and asked Cannon record, reviewing the we have determined Contrary practice, to her usual the victim did assignments require none of the of error ask to come inside. Nonethe- Cannon Moreover, supports reversal. the evidence less, door, saw the from the back Cannon jury’s findings aggravating as to the sitting living room couch on the circumstances, mitigating and the sentence of with one of the victim’s children. Cannon arbitrary disproportionate death is not day had seen the defendant once before the cases, imposed the sentence in similar consid- murder, only by knew him but ering the nature of the crime and the defen- nickname recalled that “Red.” Cannon Accordingly, judgment dant. day victim had been barefoot on the Appeals upholding Court of Criminal the de- murder, fully although otherwise clothed. fendant’s degree conviction for first murder *6 seeing a horizontal Cannon also recalled by and sentence of death electrocution is mark neck that on the victim’s she had affirmed. day seen the before the murder. Cannon left, requested, as the victim but later tele- FACTUAL BACKGROUND phoned p.m. the victim around 3:00 to con- undisputed nineteen-year-old It is answer, plans. Upon receiving firm them no defendant, Nesbit, Clarence killed the twen- Cannon assumed the victim had made other victim, ty-year-old Cannon, by Miriam shoot- arrangements and did not return to her sis- ing her once in the on head the afternoon of apartment. ter’s May 1993. While Nesbit admitted that Shaw, boyfriend a James of the defen- victim, he shot the he claimed that the shoot- aunt, apartment dant’s in the lived victim’s ing an had been accident. complex. Shaw testified that he had been guilt phase sitting apartment

The at introduced of outside his on the after- gunshot this trial established that the victim of a lived noon the murder when heard young Pershing nearby apartment Shortly her in with five children4 at the unit. after- ward, Apartments Memphis, area Tennessee. She Shaw saw the defendant leave the nessee, (Su- penalty imposed part 1. "Whenever the death for of this Court’s S.C.A.L.E.S. degree judgment preme Advancing Legal first murder when the has Court Education for Stu- court, dents) become final in the trial the defendant project. right appeal shall have the of direct from the trial Appeals. court to the Court of Criminal Supreme provides 3. Tennessee Court Rule 12 affirmance of the conviction and the sentence of pertinent part setting as follows: "Prior to the of automatically by death shall be reviewed argument, the Court shall review the oral record Supreme Upon Tennessee Court. the affirmance assigned. and briefs and consider all errors Appeals, clerk the Court of Criminal shall designating Court enter an order those is- Supreme docket the case in the Court and the argument.” at sues it wishes addressed oral proceed in accordance with the Ten- case shall Appellate of Procedure.” nessee Rules ages 4. At the time of the trial in of the ranged arguments victim’s children from three to seven heard in this case on 2. Oral were 4, 1998, years. Dyersburg, Dyer County, March Ten- sounded, brain, right her ear gunshot had exited behind from which the casual- Oldsmobile, car, height According of ly 4’11”above the floor. walk to his a blue Smith, complex gunshot wound would have away apartment from at a Dr. drive instantly incapacitated speed. the victim. normal rate of Shaw described normal, except behavior as defendant’s on Dr. Smith also had observed burns “funny had in the look” Shaw observed neck, abdomen, chin, and forearm. victim’s Shortly eyes. defendant’s after defen- at various The burns had been inflicted departed, Shaw saw the victim’s chil- dant points in from hours mere min- time six parking complex. in the crying dren lot of Dr. utes before the victim had died. Smith mother, inquired one When Shaw about their side described the burn on left responded, “She’s dead.” children shape the numeral victim’s neck as (“1”). Davis, viewing photographs Tracy Upon the victim’s one close friend Cannon testified neighbor, day body, testified that on the victim’s Constance base crying in the at the murder she had heard children horizontal bar had seen appeared the mark she apartment victim’s and had seen three of the burn to be the afternoon walking apart- her on her neck victim’s children toward sister’s soot and testified that ment. The told Davis their murder. Dr. Smith children triangular asleep blistering burn under and could not be woken. another mother was on been result, apart- chin indicated that As a Davis went to the victim’s the victim’s Although the pool open oth- lying in a caused flame. ment found the victim origin, Dr. thermal in front of the door. The er burns had also been blood kitchen precise identify the cause youngest victim’s child was on the floor be- Smith could not trying side her mother to wake her. Davis those burns. her apartment

returned to and called bruising scraping Dr. found Smith also police. during the of the victim’s feet on the soles arrived, injuries had they spoke autopsy. opined first that these police He When feet by striking the victim’s them that with the victim’s children who told been caused rod hard, object such as a long, “Red” thin “Red” had shot their mother. hanger. no defensive Dr. Smith found one of defendant’s nicknames. When the coat body. they victim’s police apartment, the victim’s wounds entered *7 clothed, fully body lying up, her face found actions on respect to the defendant’s With body her sandals on her feet. Next to with murder, day proof the showed the of the butt, match, cigarette police found a a a book that, left the shooting, after Nesbit matches, and a hair barrette. Four car- Royal to the Pershing and drove Apartments refrigerator tridges top found of the were on Nesbit, Ashley Motel, uncle where his Oaks fragment a bullet on kitchen and lead there, privately he spoke had a room. Once living room. A hot at the door to the floor uncle, weapon, a murder his and hid the with lay on A curling iron the kitchen counter. revolver, Magnum the bathroom .357 was mark made a bullet found ricochet body had the victim’s the motel room. After ground 4’8” on the approximately above to the returned the defendant been found behind the stove. wall green Pershing in his cousin’s Apartments Smith, encountered pickup The defendant examiner truck. Dr. O.C. assistant medical had him that the victim Shelby County, autopsy on James Shaw and told performed the Roulette. playing Russian that the vic- shot herself while victim. Dr. Smith testified truth, Nesbit gunshot Upon advice to tell the single from wound to Shaw’s tim had died victim, but he shot the opined gun admitted to Shaw that head. Dr. Smith her it The defendant approximately claimed was accident. inflicting had been the wound gun left at the told Shaw he thirty-six inches from the victim’s also twelve pre- were and the defendant entered motel. Shaw when it was fired. The bullet head ear, apartment complex paring body through to drive out her left about the victim’s stopped their gun police when floor, retrieve the traveled in a downward to 5’0” above the A apprehended defendant. through skull and vehicle and trajectory the victim’s inflicting the burn person a The defendant denied search of the defendant’s revealed injuries upon the victim. police per- bruise beeper and cash. With $602 motel, proceeded to the re- mission Shaw cross-examination, attempted the State On gun, police. it trieved the surrendered between emphasize the inconsistencies meantime, pretrial statements and his In the the defendant was inter- Nesbit’s several rogated by police spent testimony. also elicited an and stated that he trial The State had been night killing victim’s from Nesbit that he before at the admission first, apartment. police and her children on the At Nesbit told alone with the victim “playing” gun day been of the murder. Based the victim had above, Later, discharged found the defen- when it and killed her. summarized mur- accidentally premeditated degree first guilty related that he dant the defendant victim, sentencing proceeded to the claiming pulled shot the that he had der. The trial believing phase. trigger gun to be unloaded. pre- upon the evidence At trial Nesbit testified that he had been The State relied and, visiting night during guilt phase his uncle’s of the trial motel room on the sented addition, testify killing police when Dr. before officers arrived recalled Smith began at found on the motel and a search of the about the burns and bruises dresser, premises. Observing gun body. again Dr. stated that victim’s Smith injuries long Nesbit removed it from the room before the these were inflicted as as six hours, placed search and it under the car. little mere minutes before the seat of his or as receiving message After from the victim on victim’s death. He said the burns on degree beeper, apartment, body ranged from severe first Nesbit went to her victim’s arriving approximately degree 3:00 a.m. Nesbit second and were to moderate burns inside, bullets, gun comparable carried the to a severe sunburn or scald removed the placed top refrigerator. by touching something them on hot. burns caused opined He and the victim have talked for awhile before he Dr. Smith that the victim would asleep living pain fell on the room sofa. Nesbit from the individual suffered “moderate” day awoke at 10:00 a.m. on the of the murder burns. and talked to the victim until her sister ar- Smith, According scrapes to Dr. p.m.

rived at 1:00 Nesbit heard the victim tell con- bruises found on the victim’s feet were p.m. her sister to come back at 3:00 relatively type sistent with a rare of torture preparing anticipation to leave in of Cannon’s forcefully “falanga,” called which involves shooting arrival when the occurred. striking person’s the soles of a feet with Nesbit, instrument,

According to which had retrieved the rod or some similar context, gun refrigerator typically military from the in a holding and was is inflicted and, extent, through as he looked outside the blinds cov- to a lesser child abuse cases. *8 injuries ering the window next to were severe the kitchen door. While none of these 'window, away hospitalization, enough require As he turned from the he held to Dr. Smith gun pointed necessary the in it to cause both hands and side- said the amount of force ways bruising person’s to his left. he the of a feet would As “fumbled” with on the soles Nesbit, any gun, discharged. According “great pain,” applied it and if to to the cause victim, left, standing part body, who was to his was hit other such force would be by pistol accidentally respect the break the skin. to the bullet when sufficient to With bruises, Dr. discharged. pan- The defendant said that he both the burns and the Smith have suffered apartment. icked and left the Nesbit admit- testified that the would inju- departure through great anticipating the ted that his route of the a deal of distress past they had been inflicted over an front door had taken him the victim’s ries since Although Dr. period of time. body dead and allowed him to retrieve his extended body cap for found no marks on the victim’s from the sofa. Nesbit did not call Smith restrained, he though indicating that she had been emergency assistance even he knew ligatures have left no leaving young opined four in an that soft would that he was children body. Additionally, he stated that the vie- apartment them mother’s dead marks. might by explained that the cash tim have been restrained mental but he found $602 he person intimidation. Dr. found no defensive his when had been arrested con- Smith body signs money the he had wounds on victim’s and no sisted of had saved or been activity. Finally, given. sexual assault the doctor opined not ordinarily that torture is inflicted proof, jury the found that Based the produce

to death. proven State had existence only aggravating beyond a other witness for the circumstance reason- (1) impact especially “[t]he the victim’s mother who described the able doubt: murder was heinous, atrocious, family, in including victim’s death on her or cruel involved parents siblings physical beyond particularly her and torture or serious abuse necessary produce victim’s children. to death.” Tenn.Code 13—204(i)(5)(1991 Repl.). Finding §Ann. 39— mitigation, presented aggravating out- circumstance in participated Shelby that he had weighed beyond mitigating circumstances County Jail choir. Nesbit’s brother and sis- doubt, jury reasonable sentenced the de- spare ter asked the defendant’s The trial fendant death electrocution. nice, life and he testified that is a kind broth- judgment in accordance with court entered a given previously good er who had them ad- jury’s of Criminal verdict and the Court helped vice them to correct mistakes reviewing the Appeals affirmed. After rec- they made. The defendant’s had mother and considering assigned by ord and the errors grandmother testified Nesbit had been defendant, judgment of affirm the kind, good, person. They and well-behaved judgment trial court of the Court him described as an honest and sincere Appeals. Criminal young always who told truth man right path. and followed the Nesbit had WAIVER dropped grade tenth out school Appeals, grand- moved to Nashville to care for his As the Court of Criminal experiencing argues health first mother who had been this Court there, timely his problems. file motion While he had obtained sev- defendant’s failure jobs grandmother appellate review of all precludes eral his in meet- for trial assist new sufficiency except to the ing obligations. her financial Both the defen- those related issues sentencing. disagree. grandmother We dant’s mother and asked the the evidence or jury to spare defendant’s life. this case correct The State is Nesbit, beyond behalf,

Testifying in for trial was filed his own nine- motion new 33(b), teen-years thirty-day period provided Rule old when the offense had been committed, indeed late plans told his to im- The motion was Tenn.R.Crim.P. and, expressed non-capital appellate review prove himself and remorse for 3(e); P. happened. While the defendant would be limited. See Tenn. RApp. what had Givhan, 613-614 State v. juvenile having admitted to record tres- However, license, both the driving on pass, (Tenn.Crim.App.1980). a revoked as- sault, this Court explained Appeals of Court of Criminal circumstances obligation statutory minimized criminal have a under Tenn.Code those convictions and (1997 Repl.) review the culpability §Ann. for each one. The defendant had 39-13-206 *9 degree murder of first no adult criminal record. Nesbit also related defendant’s conviction Moreover, our statu- dropped he had out of school and sentence of death. tory duty of death grade grandmother to the sentence tenth to care for his who review appeal by of had in the absence an lived in Nashville. Nesbit not been exists even light this clear statuto- steadily employed killing, of time defendant.5 punishment relating and the same to 5. "If the defendant has been convicted first record degree by to but murder and sentenced death does clerk the trial court shall be transmitted murder, degree appeal the conviction of first Appeals....” Tenn. to Court of Criminal certify, ninety trial shall within then the court (1997 Repl.) § Code Ann. 39-13-206 final, (90) days judgment after the has become anomalous, s directive, the character witness ry in our tions which test it would be view, precluded knowledge specific instances to hold that review is be of “relevant timely by such purposes cause the motion for new trial was not served conduct.”6 The any By holding, inquiries explained filed. so we do not been as follows: has suggest attorneys in approve means or permissi- are Specific instances of conduct capital practice filing make a of late eases rea- ble on cross-examination several defendant’s motion for a new trial. To First, credibility they sons. test contrary, attorneys representing capital de by providing information character witness diligently comply with all fendants should upon underlying data which on the Indeed, filing the failure to do so deadlines. If an reputation was formed. opinion or support a claim some circumstances could witness, opinion who testifies that the de- of ineffective assistance of counsel. sim We criti- person an honest at the fendant was ply light statutory duty to hold that our time, that the defendant cal did not know cases, capital jurisdic review this Court has conviction, prior had a embezzlement appeal tion to review the issues raised in this opinion may have formed on the basis been despite timely failure file the defendant’s inadequate information or a careless Bigbee, his motion for new trial. Cf. (and suspect) approach to assess- therefore (Tenn.1994); 885 S.W.2d State v. Second, ing person’s reputation. Martin, (Tenn.1985); 702 S.W.2d help fact assess specific acts the trier of Duncan, (Tenn. State v. 67-68 by the character wit- the standards used Strouth, 1985); 467, 471 State v. example, gave ness. For if a witness who (Tenn.1981). honest opinion that the defendant is an person also knew the defendant IMPEACHMENT OF CHARACTER convictions, trier of fact shoplifting ten WITNESS—RULE 405 opinion may choose to discount the evi- next tri- The defendant contends that the dence because of the character witness’s erroneously permitted al court the State to measuring honesty. low standards for examine a character witness about Paine, Cohen, Sheppeard, Tennessee Law of knowledge alleged of the defendant’s satanic (3rd Evidence, 405.3, p. § ed. 1995 & practices. Specifically, beliefs and the de- (hereinafter “Evidence, —, p. § Supp.1997) fendant asserts that no reasonable factual —”)- for the instance of specific basis conduct alleged existed because the rumor surfaced Though inquiries specific in into killing, questioning after the did not impeachment valid stances of conduct serve properly credibility address the of the wit- hearing purposes, prevent from testimony, probative ness’s and the value of potentially prejudicial alle inadmissible and inquiry outweigh prejudicial did not its character, gations about defendant’s responds inquiry effect. The procedural prereq certain Rule 405 includes proper applicable evidentiary under be satisfied before such uisites which must standards. First, attorney an inquiries permissible. are 405(a), Evid., application to the court before Pursuant to Rule Tenn. R. a must make offering testimony utilizing specific instance of conduct witness about the defen- witness. Since the rule may impeached by ques- impeach character a character dant’s be (1) 405(a) request a hear- provides The court must hold 6. Rule as follows: ing jury’s presence, outside the or a In all cases in which evidence of character admissible, (2) person determine that a reason- character The court must trait of proof and, by testimony reputation inquiry, for the able factual basis exists (3) testimony opinion. After in the form of proba- determine that the The court must court, inquiry application on cross-ex- specific of conduct on tive value of a instance specific amination is allowable into relevant credibility outweighs the character witness’s conduct. The conditions which instances of prejudicial effect on substantive issues. its *10 allowing inquiry must be satisfied before on specific of cross-examination about instances are: conduct provides limit, application may evaluating no time factu- be whether a “reasonable immediately established, the question made before is al the basis” has been trial court asked, opposing but if counsel is unable to purpose this should be mindful that the of respond surprise, of a because recess requirement, by as noted the Court of Crimi- Evidence, 405.3, § appropriate. p. 197. nal in Appeals this is to ensure that faith, questions proposed good such are in Second, Rule 405 mandates that the in place rather than an effort to before the court, upon request, hearing trial a conduct jury unfairly prejudicial sup- information jury’s presence outside the to determine ported only Though rumors. unreliable inquiries specific whether instances into of previously we have not addressed the “rea- permissible. jury- are During conduct this requirement factual Rule sonable basis” of hearing, out the trial court must determine Court, ago, long decided re- that specific whether the instance of conduct ports of a defendant’s bad character which do inquiry proposed which is relevant about is to not arise until after the crime for which he or the character trait which the about witness being inherently suspect. she tried are is example, has testified. For this Court held Sims, (Tenn.1988), example, For Powers v. 117 Tenn. questions pri- (1906), regarding the defendant’s during S.W. the or shoplifting arrests for bad checks and degree trial for first murder for defendant’s permissible impeach death, to stabbing were the character his to a wit- school teacher who prosecution witness had testified the defendant ness for the testified on cross- good reputation truthfulness in good had for the the examination character However, community. impermissi we held Purporting test the witness’s defendant. redirect, questions prior regarding credibility, prosecution, ble the defendant’s battery they arrests for assault and because if he heard that the asked witness trait about stepfather were relevant the character “run his home defendant had from knife, which witness had testified —the defen kill an- with a and had threatened to school-teacher, Though weight dant’s truthfulness. the decision other and had lain in adoption shotgun.” Sims was rendered before of him [sic] for with a The witness responded reports the Tennessee Rules of Evidence it that he had heard these interpretation language is of killing an accurate after had occurred. Powers convicted, permits inquiries of into argued Rule which “rel before Court (Em specific conduct.” reports alleged evant instances of of a defendant’s misconduct added.) phasis of crime which arise after the commission the prosecution to should not be used satisfied, relevancy If the standard is impeach a character witness. This Court trial court must determine whether next defendant, stating: agreed with factual for the “reasonable basis” exists has reputation which a defendant pro specific instance of Rule 405 conduct. subject upon quietness and made of specific guidance respect no vides with good citizenship against for or available showing required nature of evidence or the puts him in a criminal cause when “reasonable establish existence at which he character issue bore Nonetheless, agree basis.” factual taking place of act for and before the Appeals Criminal that whenever Court trial, reputation he is not a which possible, extrinsic should be offered at subsequently acquired or created jury-out hearing to establish the “reason against put a him. A different view would factual If the realities of trial able basis.” manufacturing premium on of evi- so, attorney impossible to do make dence. should, at proposing question to ask the Powers, minimum, clearly the record the 97 S.W. at 817. This Court reversed state on “matter testified origin underly information the conviction because the source knowledge specific to came to witnesses ing the instance conduct about Evidence, homicide which inquiry proposed. after the commission which and, subject there- investigation,” § p. was the 405.3 *11 probative if value and precluded subject char- Rule 405 are not a which the fore was if Id.; weight, or equal are of impeached. prejudicial see effect acter could be witness specific instance State, of the prejudicial 257 S.W. effect also Tucker v. 149 Tenn. Wakefield, (1924); merely “out- Anno- issues E. of conduct on substantive Wanda tation, impeachment value. weighs” probative of Character its “Cross-Examination 404(b) (same (1982 weigh- Witness,” 796, § A.L.R.4th & Tenn. R. Evid. See also of proof of ing governs admission (citing limiting cases cross-exami- standard Supp.1997) acts). specific prior of conduct which bad nation to instances commission of the crime occurred before determines when a trial court Even

trial). pre inquiry permissible under the that an our decisions Powers While safeguards of viously procedural delineated predate adoption Tucker of the Tennes requires the trial Rule Tennessee law Evidence, logic and ratio see Rules of specific court to instruct with, are nale of those decisions consistent for the limited acts of conduct were admitted by, factual ba and reflected the “reasonable credibility of the purpose evaluating the requirement of Rule Because of sis” Sims, supra. witness. character manufacturing, potential for evidence person and because a accused of a crime is Having governing legal set out the likely subject more to be the of rumor apply principles, we must now these rules innuendo, reports specific Here, instances alleged the facts of this case. conduct which do not arise until after a trial during guilt phase error arose inherently counsel, crime has been committed are at the end of his cross- when defense suspect in Shaw, not form the basis for a witness for the examination James addition, quiry Rule 405. In trial under asked if he was familiar with Shaw permitting court should exercise caution community for reputation in the defendant’s inquiry if Shaw, under Rule 405 the character wit peacefulness and violence. who subject impeachment ness first heard re aunt and known the dated the defendant’s ports specific instance of conduct after years, responded, for twelve the crime circum know, occurred. Under those nobody. “Yeah. He didn’t bother You stances, to establish a factual ba could, reasonable help you if but he never did— he’d he sis, prosecution must offer some nobody. He seemed like he never did bother jury-out hearing specific in from, away you always stay to me he tried to reported stance of conduct had been before know, trouble.”

the crime occurred. redirect, beginning prosecu- At the tor, conference, specific during

If a advised the instance of conduct is bench knowl- supported by relevant and a reasonable fac trial court that to test Shaw’s basis of basis, edge proposed to ask Shaw wheth- tual the trial court must next deter probative “spe claimed mine whether the value of a er he had heard that the defendant peo- kill worshiped and had to two cific instance of conduct on the character Satan credibility ple get power. requested The defense outweighs prejudicial witness’s its recogni jury-out hearing, In at which Shaw admitted effect on the substantive issues.” allegations uniquely prejudicial impact of that he had heard these after the tion of the conduct, the defendant’s allegations the murder was committed from of instances bad them,” again trial evidentiary place tighter restraint on “auntie and before rules prosecuting attorney. prosecu- permissibility inquiries about relevant from the placed then remarked that he had heard specific instances of conduct than is on tor people “from or three admissibility evidence. information two of other relevant that, Evid., having Indeed, argued provides R. well” and Shaw’s Rule Tenn. it, only if its also heard a “factual basis” existed that relevant evidence is excluded outweighed” asking question. prosecutor ex- probative “substantially value contrast, inqui plained to the trial court that “Ms. Cannon prejudicial effect. its told several of victim] under is the one who specific [the ries into instances of conduct *12 you. I them that the defendant told her that.” Prosecutor: understand. Thank questions, No that further Your Honor. Shaw then indicated defendant’s allegations aunt heard of satanic had gentlemen, Ladies JUDGE: and the Court worship family after you from victim’s if charges jury that find that concerning specific murder. No other evidence this instances of bad character of the allegation worship brought have in of satanic was offered. been out trial, information, you only then can consider it for Based this the trial court accuracy purpose testing exchange and inquiry. following allowed the The witness, credibility of the character and presence jury: occurred in the developed that evidence is not sub- thus your forming opinion In Prosecutor: his good stantive evidence of the defendant’s reputation in community in which he right. may, All bad character. You peacefulness works and lives for you if have recross-examination. quietude, you had heard that the defen- opinion your peace- of his Defense: What worshiped told dant had others he quietude your fulness and now? What is people kill Satan and needed to two opinion of him? get power? order to some Well, in my opinion, Shaw: he’s a nice No, I had Shaw: not heard that. said, know, you young man. I Like Prosecutor: You had not heard that? know, my you he bother opinion, didn’t not Shaw: I had heard that. said, always helped he nobody. Like I him, him I him go me. I to tell need to just you testify Prosecutor: Didn’t a few me; it, you do work for he do ago hearing some moments out of the didn’t, just type you He he Cyn- know. you heard from had know, respected he his aunties and thia Nesbit? else, know, you everybody things and Oh, you yeah,' thought I Shaw: but was elders. talking I heard from him. about had it you opinion heard never Defense: So No, talking I’m not about Prosecutor: no. mean, you directly anybody? I from Let me careful. heard that. You’ve your knowledge personal don’t know of Nesbit; Cynthia it from from— least that; anything about that correct? is that correct? No, No, I don’t. I Shaw: don’t. Right. Shaw: charge The final in this case said; Prosecutor: is that That’s what “specific in- repeated the admonition that correct? stances of bad character the defendant” No, I that’s she Shaw: heard that what only accuracy used are to be to test heard. credibility the character witness not as substantive evidence of defendant’s you And Prosecutor: did take into good or bad character. your forming opinion of his account reputation quie- for peacefulness and view, case indi- our record tude? of Rule 405 requirements were cates that the the trial prosecutor sought satisfied. The you do mean that? Shaw: What questioning the permission court’s before peaceful Does that sound Prosecutor: al- the defendant’s character witness about quiet you? leged At defense counsel’s worship. satanic Well, I still don’t’ understand what Shaw: hearing request, trial court held outside you saying. are jury’s the issue. presence to consider somebody they If Prosecutor: said that specific which of conduct about instance power, people get kill two needed inquiry to the proposed was relevant quiet peaceful would that sound issue had testified— about which the witness you? community reputation defendant’s No, wouldn’t, A reasonable peacefulness quietude. but I ain’t heard Shaw: prosecu- that. factual basis was established. nothing from him like proof in case was origin Appeals also held tor identified the source and physical torture specific on the record at sufficient to establish instance conduct that the indi- jury-out hearing. Though the character Dr. had testified because Smith *13 only allegations “moder- said he had not heard the caused the witness vidual burns murder, “severe,” pain. worship ate,” physical until after the of satanic than rather prosecutor’s identifying Nonetheless, statement the victim court found the intermediate report torture, of the murder as the source of the to sufficient proof showed mental obviously proof had is some that the incident circumstance be- support aggravating reported been before the murder occurred. had testified that the victim cause Dr. Smith A the record not demonstrate review of does antici- “great degree of distress” suffered specific in prejudicial that the effect of the repeated infliction of the burns pating the stance of conduct on the substantive issues and bruises. outweighed probative impeachment value. its court, agrees with In this the defendant inquiry directly The was relevant to the char Appeals of the Court of Criminal the decision peacefulness quietude acter traits of physical and serious physical as to torture Im about which witness testified. abuse, that the intermediate but asserts mediately following inquiry again in cir- upholding aggravating court erred in properly in charge, its final the trial court of mental torture cumstance on the basis limit permissible structed the as to the testimony that the vic- Dr. because Smith’s pre of the evidence. The ed use “great degree of distress” tim suffered a to instructions. sumed have followed those speculative. Walker, (Tenn.

State v. 910 S.W.2d contrast, in- agrees with the In the State 1995); Lawson, v. respect to termediate court’s decision with (Tenn.Crim.App.1985). The defendant’s torture, mental but avers that the Court allowing claim that the trial court erred finding the evi- Appeals erred Criminal inquiry is without merit. physical to establish tor- dence insufficient (i)(5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE physical abuse since the ture and serious “moderately” painful evidence of numerous Sufficiency A. of the Evidence injuries cumulatively is sufficient considered jury imposed In this the death support findings physical torture and to penalty upon finding7 its “[t]he that murder physical serious abuse. heinous, atrocious, especially was or cruel stated, has previously torture physical that it involved torture or serious As phys beyond necessary produce abuse that defined as “the infliction of severe been 13—204(i)(5) he pain upon § Ann. or mental the victim while death.” Tenn.Code ical 39— (1991). challenged alive and conscious.” appeal, On the defendant she remains Williams, proof sufficiency support this 690 S.W.2d at 529. aggravating clearly is sufficient to show circumstance. The Court this case inju when the Appeals victim was alive and conscious Criminal held that because vic- Dr. testified that instantaneously single gun- tim ries were inflicted. Smith died from head, re proof of the burns and bruises shot wound to the examination they that had been inflicted before sufficient to show that the murder involved vealed necessary sister testified physical beyond that victim’s death. victim’s serious abuse con seen the victim alive and produce Relying upon death. decisions of that she had day of the murder. p.m. at 1:00 on the defining as “the infliction scious this Court torture testimony. confirmed that pain upon the The defendant physical of severe or mental said that she had ob and The victim’s sister he or she remains alive victim while Williams, at mark on the victim’s neck conscious,” served a burn (Tenn.1985), previ- there the time had not been of Criminal that which Court form, necessary beyond jury specifi- physical According serious abuse to the verdict heinous, cally (Emphasis supplied.) produce found that murder was atro- ‘‘[t]he death.” that it involved torture and cious and cruel in day. Obviously, testimony logically reasonably ous reveals fact is deducible or the victim was conscious least when from the evidence. inferred injuries some of were inflicted. The finding the record consistently maintained that finding support insufficient “severe victim had been conscious until shot her. pain” physical had been inflicted in conjunction Considered Dr. Smith’s victim, alive and conscious the Court of testimony that the burns and bruises were portion Appeals only Criminal cited death, inflicted before testi- defendant’s testimony indicating that vic Dr. Smith’s mony indicates that the victim was alive and pain tim had suffered “moderate” from *14 during conscious the infliction of and each ap individual The intermediate court burns. every view, burn bruise. In our the and parently jury by the bound that considered proof in this is support record sufficient to a testimony. sufficiency evaluating the of finding that the was alive and con- proof, appellate an must consider the court injuries scious when the were inflicted. light body in the most the entire of evidence proof We must next consider whether the Applying favorable to the that stan State. is support finding sufficient to a the that to the in this we conclude dard facts injuries of infliction these caused the alive support proof the the is sufficient to physical and conscious victim “severe or beyond jury’s finding physical a of torture pain.” sufficiency mental In evaluating the reasonable doubt. issue, proof on this we are of mindful the Beginning hours victim’s six before First, longstanding two rules in this State. up before she lasting death and until minutes jury may their [t]he use common knowl- died, and actually inflicted first the defendant experience edge deciding and whether a body in degree on her six second burns logically fact is from the deducible circum- places. compared to Dr. these burns Smith evidence, making stances or in reason- a One burn a sunburn or scald burn. severe evidence, may the able inferences from and an the held had resulted when weight test the truth and of the evidence chin. the open flame the victim’s On under by knowledge judg- general their own and neck, of the defendant left side the victim’s observation, experience, ment derived from (“1”). carefully The the numeral one burned and reflection.... the of victim’s defendant also beat soles State, 210, v. Trousdale 168 Tenn. bruising, force to cause feet with sufficient (1934); 646 v. Fairbanks Smith, “great pain.” Dr. according to (Tenn.1974); Meeks, 69 State v. 876 these description, both of Given detailed (Tenn.Crim.App.1993). S.W.2d Sec they injuries were and the methods which ond, expert may testimony while embrace an inflicted, using their certainly jurors, ultimate issue to be of decided trier experience, could knowledge and common (Tenn. Shuck, fact, State v. S.W.2d resulting degree pain of have assessed 1997); jury Tenn. R. Evid. is not injuries. from these accept testimony expert. bound to of an Indeed, expert weight “the and value of testi Moreover, agree while we mony jury” is for the to determine. v. re court’s conclusion with the intermediate (Tenn.1995). Sparks, 891 sufficiency proof sup gard to pain exception port jury finding that mental

There no to this rale for a severe is victim, again we do capital prosecution upon is re inflicted eases. The solely upon Dr. quired expert testimony as our conclusion to offer to the not base testimony that victim would have precise pain level of a Smith’s inflicted victim. offered, degree antici testimony great if “a of distress” previ Even such suffered stated, jurors injuries. of various accept pating are ously not bound the infliction Indeed, knowledge expe testimony expert Utilizing witnesses. their common race, the jurors human are free to use their common knowl rience as members evaluating proof judgment experience, jurors edge capable were derived from observation, the victim suffered determining whether and reflection to decide whether beyond when, physical pain torture or serious abuse severe mental over the course of produce body necessary to death.” Without period, six hour her was burned time instruction, home, contends clarifying the defendant beaten in her own with four of her present. sufficiency aggravating circumstance fails young children jury’s support jury’s finding sufficiently discretion and the evidence to channel eligi- depend upon meaningfully narrow the class of death torture does not whether an magical Specifically, the defendant expert witness utters the “se- ble defendants. words physical pain.” phrase relevant contends that the “in that” misleads vere or mental whether, any appellate of torture or question court to believe that act reviewing light beyond necessary physical after the evidence in abuse most serious heinous, State, any produce “especially favorable trier atro- rational death is cious, cruel,” fact could have that without found the existence contends two-step analy- beyond setting out aggravating circumstance a reason- an instruction Cazes, sis, inappropriately find the cir- able doubt. State S.W.2d 253 (Tenn.1994). standard, only proof Applying based of torture or cumstance sup- physical conclude that the is sufficient to serious abuse. *15 jury finding port physical a that both severe disagree. We The in this ease was upon pain and mental was inflicted the victim properly in accordance with the instructed she

while remained alive and conscious. language of the statute and the definitions Williams, supra. provided in have re- We view, Moreover, in our evidence recently upheld peatedly and the constitu- finding to support is also sufficient a of “seri tionality aggravating of this circumstance. physical necessary beyond ous abuse that to Odom, e.g. According- See 928 S.W.2d at 18. produce though death” even the cause of the ly, issue is without merit. single gunshot a victim’s death was wound to requirement the head. There is that no VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE cause or be cause mode death also or hearing, in its sentencing at the beyond mode of physical the “serious abuse mother, chief, through the case in victim’s necessary produce that death.” In this presented evidence of the victim’s character case, burns bruises were inflicted “very devastating” impact vic- and the period the victim a six “[S]er over hours. imposed upon family. her tim’s death physical necessary beyond ious abuse that objected testimony to this just says; produce death” it means what inflammatory. highly ap- On irrelevant mental, physical, there must be serious peal, argues the defendant that admission of abuse, i.e., act “an that is ‘excessive’or which impact the victim evidence violates ‘improper makes use a thing,’ or which Eighth of the and Fourteenth Amendments contrary ‘in thing uses a a manner to the I, and Article United States Constitution legal natural or rules for its State v. use.” In 16 of the Tennessee Section Constitution. Odom, (Tenn.1996). Cer addition, that argues the defendant victim tainly, the abuse of the victim in this case impact is immaterial and irrelevant evidence qualifies. The defendant burned the victim’s statute, capital sentencing under Tennessee’s body places in various and beat the soles of relevant, prejudicial if effect of even feet her in the her before shot head. substantially outweighs pro- this evidence its proof, that Considering this we conclude a bative value. mur rational could have found that this beyond physical der involved serious abuse hand, argues that On the other necessary produce

that death. both this Court and the United States Su- preme recognized that victim im- Court have Jury B. Instruction punishment pact evidence relevant as con under both the federal state The defendant also attacks admissible pun- it fusing language aggravating cir constitutions. Because is relevant to ishment, argues impact especially the State that victim “[t]he murder was cumstance — heinous, atrocious, evidence is admissible under Tennessee cruel involved impact victim argument regarding statutory provides which that evi- dence and scheme may presented any matter While acknowl- dence be “as to violated Booth and Gathers. punishment.” the court deems relevant of victim irrelevance edging the technical argues probative Booth, The State also this Court held impact under evidence value of the evidence this case was not Payne argument the evidence and substantially outweighed by prejudicial its constitutionally unaccepta- “did not create effect. imposition arbitrary ble risk of an beyond a harmless penalty, death and was govern The constitutional standards Id., at 18. reasonable doubt.” ing impact argument evidence and at a arguments respect prosecutor’s With to the capital sentencing proceeding have varied held, are Payne, “[w]e this Court greatly past years. over the In Booth eleven argument opinion prosecutor’s 496, 504, Maryland, 482 U.S. S.Ct. personal respon- relevant to this defendant’s 2529, 2534, (1987), 96 L.Ed.2d 440 the Su Id., sibility guilt.” and moral preme Court held that introduction of victim stated, concluding, In so impact penalty phase evidence at the capital Eighth trial violates a defendant’s members the civilized It is an affront to rights Amendment because say sentencing that at the human race to “may wholly unrelated to blameworthi parade of witnesses capital in a defendant,” particular may ness background, character and may praise the capital divert the sentencer’s attention from (as was done good Defendant deeds of relevant information crime and the about the case), relevan- limitation as to without background and record. defendant’s that bears nothing be said cy, but *16 Gathers, 805, South Carolina v. 490 U.S. of, im- harm or the upon the character 811-12, 109 2207, 2211, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 S.Ct. posed, upon the victims. (1989), Supreme the Court reaffirmed Booth Id. preclude by the and extended it to comments granted prosecution, argument, in final about the vic Supreme Court The United States Booth, impact. in in tim and victim As the our decision appeal the from defendant’s prosecution majority in held that the Gathers and Gathers Payne, and overruled Booth had focused considerations which were held the the extent that those decisions “personal re not relevant the defendant’s precludes admission Eight Amendment sponsibility guilt.” and moral ar prosecutorial impact victim evidence Payne v. Tennes gument on the evidence.8 Against jurisprudential background, this 2597, 115 see, 808, L.Ed.2d 111 S.Ct. 501 U.S. in v. this Court rendered our decision State that, (1991). Court, First, explained 720 (Tenn.1990). Payne, In that 791 S.W.2d 10 any in suggested “it held or even was never of the the defendant had been convicted defen preceding Booth of our cases twenty-eight-year-old stabbing murder of a dant, to individualized as he was entitled year mother and her two- and one-half old consideration, that consider to receive daughter. The victim’s three-and-one-half crime which wholly apart from the ation injured year severely old son also had been 822, 111 at Payne, 501 U.S. had committed.” assault, At managed to survive. but According to the Court at 2607. S.Ct. sentencing phase Payne’s trial by Booth Payne, the rule announced the deceased grandmother mother and Gathers, in a the scales “unfairly weighted briefly impact victims testified about virtually no limits by placing capital trial” surviving grandson. The the murders on her capital evidence mitigating relevant impact evi- utilized the victim prosecutor introduce, barring may while closing argument. dence offering glimpse Court, argued that the evi- State from “either the defendant 2611, 830, 2, However, at n. Payne Payne, n. 111 S.Ct. U.S. at was the 501 left undisturbed 8. 832, at Payne, at 111 S.Ct. holding 501 U.S. of a victim’s 2. See also that admission rule of Booth J., (O’Connor, concurring); Payne, 501 U.S. opinions family 2612 members' characterizations J., (Souter, 2614, 835, 1, defendant, crime, n. 1 appro- at at n. 111 S.Ct. and the about the concurring). Eighth priate Amendment. sentence violates the

889 unfair, fundamentally extinguish the trial which a defendant chose to renders life Fourteenth family Due Clause demonstrating the to the victim’s Process loss for re- provides a mechanism society which have from the resulted Amendment 825, 111 at at S.Ct. Payne, Payne, at 501 U.S. defendant’s homicide.” 501 U.S. lief.” (internal 822, 111 at S.Ct. citations and omitted). Payne reit- quotations The Court Therefore, Payne proposi- stands for that, “justice, though to the ac- erated due not Eighth does tion that Amendment cused, is The con- due to accuser also. impact evi- of victim preclude the admission cept must till it of fairness not be strained is argument about the prosecutorial dence or keep naiTOwedto filament. We are to Moreover, Court decisions evidence. Payne, 501 U.S. at balance true.” also Payne, have subsequent rendered Snyder (quoting v. Massachu- S.Ct. prose- impact evidence held that victim 330, 338, setts, 97, 122, 54 S.Ct. U.S. precluded by argument is cutorial (1934)). L.Ed. 674 Shepherd, State v. Tennessee Constitution. Therefore, overruling decisions (Tenn.1995); State Gathers, Payne stat-

Booth the Court (Tenn.1994). Brimmer, 876 ed: contention that Accordingly, the defendant’s now of the that a argument

We are view is impact victim evidence and properly conclude that for to as- by the and state constitutions barred federal meaningfully sess the defendant’s moral merit. without blameworthiness, culpability and it should next contends that The defendant sentencing phase it at have before impact is inadmissible under evidence specific harm evidence caused capital sentencing statute. Tennessee’s a legitimate defendant. State has in- permits responds the statute all counteracting mitigating terest in evi- punishment and victim relevant to evidence dence which defendant is entitled to impact is admissible because it in, put by reminding the sentencer punishment. relevant to

just as the should murderer be considered *17 individual, as an so too the victim is an of this issue begin We our consideration represents unique individual whose death language Tenn.Code with the of statute. society particular to to loss and his 39-13-204(c) (1997 provides as Repl.) §Ann. family. By turning the victim into a face- follows: stranger penalty phase less at the of a sentencing proceeding, evidence trial, capital deprives Booth of may any to matter that presented as be may full force and moral of its evidence punish- relevant to the the court deems having prevent from before all include, may be limited but not ment and necessary information determine the to, nature and circumstances of proper first-degree punishment for a mur- character, crime; back- the defendant’s der. condition; ground history, physical and 825, Payne, 501 at 111 at 2608 U.S. S.Ct. any tending to rebut evidence establish omitted). (internal quotations citations and enumerated aggravating circumstances Therefore, if a the Court held that (i); any tending evidence subsection of victim permit chooses to the admission mitigating fac- any or rebut establish argument, impact prosecutorial evidence the court Any which tors. such evidence Eighth per Amendment erects no se “the on the issue probative to have value deems at 111 at Payne, 501 U.S. S.Ct. bar.” regardless may punishment be received admissibility rules of evi- under the of its dence; ac- is However, provided that Payne not admis- did authorize any to rebut opportunity a fair impact all corded any evidence sion Howev- so Indeed, hearsay statements admitted. argument. noted that Court er, construed shall not be this subsection impact is intro- in the event victim any evi- the introduction unduly prejudicial that it to authorize is so duced “that 890 cases). Indeed, (Tenn.l994)(citing

dence secured violation of the constitu- tion of the United States or the constitu- recognized carefully have that evidence limit tion of Tennessee. sentencing ed to allow “individualized de upon the defendant’s language termination” based of the statute is its broad. On appears face the statute the circumstances of the crime authorize character and any Nichols, admission of reliable evidence that constitutionally required. punishment, only relevant with the re- opined at have also S.W.2d 731. We quirement being that the defendant be ac- capital sentencing jury once a finds that opportunity hearsay corded a fair to rebut legislatively defendant falls within the de statute, statements. The consistent with category persons eligible fined for the mandate, permits constitutional admission of penalty, death is free to consider a evidence, mitigating all relevant whether or myriad of factors to determine whether category mitigation not the in the is listed appropriate punishment to the death is the Cazes, statutory scheme. State v. 875 offense and the individual defendant. Nich (Tenn.1994) S.W.2d (discussing cases). ols, (citing at 731 In our Carolina, McKoy 433, 442, v. North 494 U.S. view, impact of the crime on the victim’s (1990) 1227, 1233, 110 S.Ct. 108 L.Ed.2d 369 family myriad fac immediate is one of those 367, 375, Maryland, and Mills v. 486 U.S. statutory encompassed within the lan tors 1860, 1865-66, 108 S.Ct. 100 L.Ed.2d 384 guage nature and circumstances (1988)). However, repeatedly this Court has To conclude otherwise would be crime. rely upon held that the State non- divorcing equivalent to the defendant from statutory aggravating sup- circumstances the crime he or she has committed. As the port imposition penalty, of the death but is recognized, Supreme Court United States aggravating limited to circumstances those entitled to individualized consid defendant is Thompson, listed the statute. State v. eration, but that consideration is not to occur (Tenn.1989); Cozzolino v. “wholly apart” from the crime for which he (Tenn.1979). In- Payne, convicted. 501 U.S. or she has been deed, we stated in Cozzolino “evidence 822, 111 at 2607. S.Ct. punishment, to the thus ad- is relevant missible, only aggrava- if it is relevant to an proce- delineates a The Tennessee statute circumstance, ting mitigating or to a factor sentencing jury to dure which enables raised the defendant.” Id. at 768. statutory presence ag- about the informed Nonetheless, statement, general circumstances, presence gravating of mit- relies to which the defendant this case circumstances, the nature and igating impact support contention that victim evi al- of the crime. The statute circumstances *18 admissible, literally dence is not has not been sentencing jury reminded lows the to be a applied of evidence at to limit admission just be consid- “that as the murderer should capital sentencing hearing. Even Cozzoli- individual, is an an so too the ered as victim announced, no, the case in which the rule was unique represents a individual whose death sentencing jurors proof at the heard fami- society particular to his loss to hearing how the crime had been com about 825, at 111 S.Ct. at ly.” Payne, 501 U.S. necessarily to not relevant mitted which was (internal quotations omit- citations and 2608 Moreover, in aggravating circumstance. ted). emphasized in its deci- this Court As we have ex subsequent decisions several Payne, it be “an affront to the would sion sentencing pressly recognized that human race” civilized members permitted to hear evidence about must be mitigation proof at sentenc- unlimited allow the crime even circumstances nature and preclude capital completely ing in a but necessarily related to not though the is resulting specific harm from the proof of the State statutory aggravating circumstance. claim Accordingly, the defendant’s homicide. (Tenn.1996); 323, Harris, 331 v. 919 S.W.2d impact is not admissible (Tenn. victim evidence 248, 251 Teague, v. 897 S.W.2d State sentencing stat- capital 722, the Tennessee Nichols, under 1995); 731 v. 877 S.W.2d State 797, merit. ute is without (Tenn.1994); Bighee, v. State

891 2607; 822, however, 111 at at S.Ct. Payne, not 501 U.S. emphasize, We 830, 2611 111 at 501 at S.Ct. any impact prose Payne, U.S. and all victim evidence State, (O’Connor, J., Cargle sentencing concurring); v. capital at a cution wishes offer 806, (Ok.Ct.Crim.App.1995). hearing Although such evi P.2d 826 is admissible. 909 by Eighth regarding entirely precluded proof, not evidence types dence is Of these Amendment,9 may impact be on the impact victim evidence of the murder the emotional unduly prejudicial closely “that so introduced most scruti family should be victim’s unfair,” fundamentally it greatest renders trial threat to poses nized because Due implicating thus Process Clause prejudice, undue process and risk of due Payne, Amendment. 501 Fourteenth particularly proof is if no offered 825, Moreover, 111 U.S. at S.Ct. 909 types impact. Cargle, of victim other any sought other to be admit Parks, evidence 830; 494 U.S. P.2d at v. cf. Saffle ted, may impact the trial court exclude victim 1257, 484, 493, 415 108 L.Ed.2d 110 S.Ct. probative substantially proof if its value is (1990) (“It very recon be difficult to would by outweighed prejudicial its effect. Tenn. allowing a rule the fate of defendant cile Therefore, impact R. 403.10 victim evi Evid. jurors’ vagaries particular turn on the threatens to render the trial dence which longstanding our sensitivities with emotional fundamentally poses unfair or which a dan all, that, capital sentencing recognition above prejudice ger appropriate of unfair is not reliable, accurate, nonarbi be must judge. should be excluded the trial However, bright-line no trary.”) there is 836, Payne, 501 U.S. at 111 at 2614 S.Ct. test, admissibility specific types of and the J., (Souter, concurring). To enable the trial impact must be victim determined adequately supervise court to the admission case-by-case on a basis. impact proof, of victim we conclude that the notify State must the trial court of its intent argu Similarly, impact while victim produce impact Upon evidence. prosecution about the evidence ment notification, the receiving trial court must be permissible, restraint should exercised. hearing presence hold a outside consistently has cautioned This Court admissibility to determine argu against engaging impact in victim State impact evidence. The victim evidence should appeal to little more than an ment which is court be admitted until trial deter jurors argument as such the emotions of aggrava mines that evidence of one more Shep may unduly prejudicial. State v. ting already present in the circumstances is (“We (Tenn.1995) herd, 902 S.W.2d State, record. v. Windom So.2d arguments such to utilize caution State (Fla.1995); Cargle v. P.2d advisedly.”); Bigbee, v. (Ok.Ct.Crim.App.1995). (“[T]he (Tenn.1994) rever risk appeals argument which by engaging sal impact Generally, victim evi jury.”) sympathies of the to the emotions be limited to information de dence should Indeed, attorneys prosecuting must remem signed unique characteristics to show those jurors are their decision to base ber glimpse into the life of provide which brief response the evi moral killed,11 upon a reasoned the con who has been individual Brown, 479 U.S. dence. See temporaneous prospective circumstances California *19 839-40, 837, 542-43, death, 107 S.Ct. how surrounding the individual’s (1987). not be jury should emotionally, L.Ed.2d financially, those circumstances may reign emotion given impression impacted upon physically psychologically or ease, the court In each trial family. reason. over of the victim’s immediate members time, presentation cumu- of or needless supra. waste 9. See Footnote evidence." lative relevant, "[although provides 10. Rule impact evidence that victim probative 11.We reiterate may if value be excluded its evidence substantially homicide, by the committed danger even one outweighed by another of unfair trial, Bigbee, 885 issues, misleading admissible. defendant on or prejudice, of the confusion delay, at 812. by undue jury, or considerations Argument must strike a careful balance. on also Turner v. 268 Ga. 486 S.E.2d emotional, cases). relevant, though (1997)(citing Having considerations is other permissible, inflammatory but rhetoric that impact that victim is admissible at concluded jury’s proper diverts the attention from its phase capital sentencing of a trial in irrational, purely role or invites an emotional evidentiary process accordance with due response permissible to the evidence is not constraints, we must next determine whether by and should not be tolerated the trial in the evidence admitted this case exceeded court. either of those restrictions. Finally, properly to assist the in sentencing, prosecution At called evidence, utilizing impact hereby victim mother, Cannon, May the victim’s Laura instruction, suggest following to be used testify daughter’s impact about the of her capital in all future murder eases which family, particularly on her the victim’s death impact evidence is admitted: daughter children. Cannon related that her prosecution has introduced what is kind, person. warmhearted Can had been impact known as victim evidence. This very family had de non said that the been evidence has been introduced to show the pressed as a result of the victim’s death and financial, emotional, psychological, phys- very had missed her much. Cannon obtained ical victim’s death effects legal custody of the victim’s child of four family. members of the victim’s immediate employ resigned ren.12 had her Cannon may You consider this evidence in deter- ment to care for the children. Cannon said mining appropriate punishment. an How- custody four in her children ever, your consideration must be limited to therapy receiving psychological been de inquiry culpability a rational into the signed help cope with their loss. them defendant, response not an emotional expe the children had She also testified that the evidence. nightmares sleep in their rienced and talked impact Victim evidence is not same murder, play since did not well and often aggravating an an circumstance. Proof of together. had reenacted The children also impact family adverse on the victim’s is not play. the murder while at aggravating In- circumstance. impact

troduction of this victim evidence transcript, approximately pages five way no relieves the of its burden to concisely the fi- clearly and related Cannon prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least nancial, emotional, physi- psychological, aggravating one circumstance which has the victim’s impact cal of this murder on alleged. vic- been You consider this family. Although mentioned the emo- she impact determining tim murder, impact focused tional Cannon appropriateness penalty only of the death financial, physi- psychological, you if first existence of one or find impact the defen- cal of the crime. Because aggravating more circumstances has been acquainted with dant this case had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt evi- month, he knew that the victim for about a independent impact the victim dence from young chil- single of five she was mother evidence, aggravating find that also knew that four dren. The defendant circumstance(s) outweigh finding found apartment in the were the victim’s children mitigating of one or more circumstances of the murder. at the time beyond a reasonable doubt. required prove is not in substance The State This instruction should be used knowledge specific has capital trials where vic- that a defendant all future murder admissibility family to secure impact introduced and about a victim’s tim evidence has been impact As stated Jus decision is of victim evidence. is effective from the date this *20 Payne: 828; concurring opinion in in a Cargle, 909 P.2d at see tice Souter released. See youngest living child had been trial. 12. The victim’s paternal grandmother at the time of with his danger outweighed far proof in this case consequences.

Murder has foreseeable impact happens, always prejudice. victim When it it is to distinct of unfair its individuals, vic- happens and after it other violated nei- admitted in this case Every are left tims behind. defendant process, nor the ther the constraints of due knows, compe- if endowed with the mental evidentiary Tenn. R. strictures of Rule responsibility, for criminal that the tence Evid. by he will take behavior life homicidal However, argument prosecutor’s himself, unique person, is that of a like and of purpose and function about probably has person to be killed pertinent impact evidence was erroneous. associates, “survivors,” suf- who will close part argument was as follows: deprivations from the vic- fer harms and that tim’s death. Just as defendants know in front of proof no he did it There’s ciphers, they they are not faceless human bleeding, just her left there them. He their victims are not valueless know that knowing young those four babies were just fungibles appreciate as defendants house a mother. He didn’t with dead relationships dependencies the web of know, they try guess, going I to that were live, they they their in which know that mommy try to shake her out wake to islands, victims are not human but individ- No, maybe of and the the blood brains. children, spouses parents uals with or testimony. you But saw his didn’t know. Thus, dependents. a de- friends or when care. didn’t care either. He didn’t He kill, or risk fendant chooses to to raise the Well, you weigh do this? have you How death, necessarily this of a victim’s choice impact That’s to at the crime. look of being to a whole human and threat- relates people testify here to about why the are others, may of who ens association Cannon, life, [w]e her Miriam because distinctly hurt. defen- The fact that the that, while forget in these trials sometimes may dant not know the details of a victim’s here to take care we’re of defendant characteristics, or life and the exact identi- him, justice provide there is some- may ties and needs of those who survive just this it is not one else in any way further should not obscure the babies, There those Miriam Cannon. are ‘unique’ always that death to a facts is orphan are children. There the rest those individual, group and harm to some society family. is the rest her There consequence survivors is successful deprived that has been Miriam Cannon. so homicidal act foreseeable as be virtu- particular are in this There lots victims ally inevitable. case. Payne, at 501 U.S. S.Ct. family like would Now the defendant’s complete agreement we are in While right. against, him. All Balance that see analysis, opinion we are also of the little everybody understand that doesn’t consider the defendant’s trial court would the children Térrica and rest of knowledge family specific about the victim’s mother, Sure that like to their too? see evaluating probative value of victim when They Eveiybody knows that. balances. impact proof appropriateness on the like them as well. would to be able see determining pro- if penalty death and when person who is And the relatives by substantially outweighed bative value you will facing death electrocution tell view, prejudicial probative In our effect. it please spare his life. Wouldn’t have particularly great, where the value [of nice if Ms. and the rest been Cannon ease, shows, did beg family could have been there the] specific knowledge about victim’s They life? could have looked for Miriam’s family when the crime was committed. Ac- said, “Please, my kill at him don’t holding cordingly, have no hesitation her, but daughter. and torture Go ahead impact probative of the victim value kill don’t her.” substantially proof in case out- the chance to. We prejudice. they get But didn’t danger of unfair weighed chance, get give but doesn’t him that she contrary, probative value To the *21 (4) you go that chance. So when to balance improper cumulative effect of the aggravating against any circumstances conduct and other errors the rec- mitigation, ord; that remember it had been if possible they beg- would have been there (5) strength the relative and weakness of ging daughter’s their Those chil- for the case. life. begged dren would have their mother’s Though prosecutor’s argument they given opportunity. been that life miseharaeterized the function of victim im you against So mitiga- balance that evidence, pact argument based tion. proof properly evidence, into admitted says Defense counsel he shows re- prosecutor there is no indication that morse- He has no remorse. There is Moreover, jurors acted in bad faith. no mitigating circumstance of remorse. were instructed the trial court the final only There aggravating is factor of charge sentencing hearing at the apply ours, pain agony torture and provided by law as the court. trial court family. this had on the effect jurors they also instructed the could not impose penalty a death without a unanimous added). (Emphasis finding statutory aggravating cir Dissenting in Ap- Court Criminal beyond proven cumstance had been a reason peals, Judge recognized Wade argu- that this outweighed mitigating able doubt and beyond ment crossed permissible the line proof beyond Again, a reasonable doubt. latitude in closing afforded counsel when the presumed to follow the instructions of prosecutor impact characterized the victim Walker, the trial court. S.W.2d aggravating evidence as an circumstance and Considering complained in light the error urged weigh and balance the of the including, previously entire impact victim against mitigating evidence discussed, strength to estab proof. is, Although impact victim circumstance, statutory aggravating lish the said, previously as we have one of those opinion improper we are of the myriad jury may factors which the consider prosecutorial appear argument does not in determining appro- whether death is the have affected the verdict to the defendant’s priate punishment, carry it does not the force Therefore, prejudice. the error does not re aggravating and effect of an circumstance quire reversal. sentencing prosecutor’s calculation. The argument erroneously in this case character- PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW ized the impact aggra- evidence as an next We must consider whether vating weigh against mitiga- circumstance to dispro the defendant’s sentence of death is proof. tion portionate penalty imposed to the in similar cases, considering the nature of the crime

To determine this errone whether § and the defendant. Tenn.Code Ann. 39- argument grounds ous constitutes for rever 13-206(c)(4) (1997 Repl.). If this case is sal, improprie we must consider whether the “plainly lacking in circumstances consistent ty prejudice “affected the verdict to the with those in similar cases in which the death Bigbee, the defendant.” at 809 penalty previously imposed,” the has been (quoting Harrington v. Tenn. disproportionate. sentence of death is (1965)). Factors rele (Tenn.1997). Bland, vant to that determination include: However, dispro a sentence of death is not (1) complained the conduct of viewed in portionate merely because the circumstances light of the facts and circumstances of the offense are similar to those another ease; offense for which the defendant has received (2) the curative measures undertaken role, in a life sentence. Id. at 665. Our prosecution; the court and the conducting proportionality review not (3)the prosecutor in making intent of the assure that a sentence “less than death was arguments; improper imposed never in a case with similar charac- *22 knowledge that obviously Instead, duty had Id. our to assure the defendant teristies.” “is Though helpless. not exten- victim was no death sentence affirmed.” the aberrant sive, nineteen-year-old a defendant had the Id. The record juvenile record. prior criminal comparing simi choosing In and cooperated with that the defendant reflects variables, cases, many some lar we consider expressed apprehension, and police after his (2) (1) death; include, which the means of of trial. With re- for the murder at remorse (3) death; the manner of the motivation for rehabilitation, the spect capacity for (5) (4) death; killing; place the of the the jury planned he told the defendant circumstances, similarity in of the victim’s if high sen- complete his school education conditions, cluding age, physical and mental Considering imprisonment. tenced to life during killing; treatment and the victims’ defendant, of crime the nature (6) presence premeditation; the absence or of imposition of the death we conclude that (7) presence provocation; or of the absence senseless, torturous, and cru- penalty for the (8) justification; presence the absence or twenty-year-old woman is murder this el (9) injury to and effects on nondece- imposed the penalty disproportionate not reviewing victims. Id. at 667. dent When cases, places and that murder in similar this defendant, the characteristics of the we con- for whom Nesbit into the class of defendants (1) prior sider: the defendant’s record or punish- penalty appropriate the death (2) prior activity; criminal the defendant’s review, upon ment. Based our we conclude (3) race, age, gender; defendant’s following in the death that the eases which (4) condition; mental, physical or emotional imposed many similar- penalty has been have or in the defendant’s involvement role this ities with case. (5) murder; cooperation the defendant’s with (6) (7) authorities; remorse; (Tenn. the defendant’s Bland, In State v. 958 S.W.2d 651 knowledge helpless- the defendant’s defendant, 1997), nineteen-year-old with victim; (8) ness of the the defendant’s unre provocation explanation, or shot an out capacity Comparative for rehabilitation. Id. victim, sisting, retreating chased him some proportionality objec- rigid, review is not a more, helpless yards or and shot the tive employ test. Id. 668. We do not times more after had taken victim several techniques. mathematical or scientific In refuge pickup underneath a truck. Like evaluating comparative proportionality of Nesbit, only years old Bland was nineteen light the sentence in of the factors delineated was and had no when the crime committed above, rely experienced we also criminal sentenced adult record. judgment and intuition of the members upon finding as this to death defendant this Court. Id. heinous, especially case that the murder was or cruel that it involved torture atrocious factors, Applying these note that physical beyond that neces or serious abuse proof in this case reflects the victim Ann. sary produce Tenn.Code death. single gunshot a to her died from wound (1991 13—204(i)(5) Repl.). § 39— head. was in her own She killed home after Tran, a v. undergoing six hour torturous In Van ordeal dur (Tenn.1993), Court affirmed the death ing which she was burned and beaten this nineteen-year-old young defendant defendant. Pour the victim’s five sentence woman present apartment seventy-four-year-old killed a children were dur who robbery. during The victim ing time and also when the course she was tortured already lying on apparent been shot once and was she was shot. There was no motive floor, provocation expla- or premeditated The defen when without for this murder. nation, Tran, like the defendant shooting was accidental Van dant’s claim case, jury. As did the obviously shot the victim in head. believed case, cooperated Tran certainly provoca no Van Thei’e is also Having expressed remorse justification with the authorities tion for offense. killing. As in this having known the victim for month and her, upon finding a penalty night day imposed the death spent portion single circumstance, (Tenn. aggravating Cooper, 718 S.W.2d 256 *23 heinous, especially murder was 1986), thirty-three-year-old atrocious or in cruel that it depravity involved or estranged torture wife she shot his four times while 2—203(i)(5) of mind. § Tenn.Code Ann. glass trapped was inside a and brick cashier’s 39— (1982). Nesbit, did un Cooper booth. As shot an armed, helpless victim provocation. without (Tenn. In State v. Hurley, 876 57 S.W.2d Cooper did shoot his wife four in times 1993), the defendant killed the victim once, rapid Cooper succession. shot walked shooting Thereafter, him in once the head. away, firing turned back then and resumed robbed he the victim body. and burned his Cooper at her. The victim in had time case, inAs entirely this the assault was contemplate experience her fate and severe unprovoked unexplained. jury pain, mental as did the victim in case this guilty premeditated found the defendant of during six hours she was tortured. imposed murder and the sentence of death jury imposed penalty, the death this as in upon finding that the murder was committed case, upon finding espe that the murder was while the in engaged defendant was commit heinous, atrocious, cially or it cruel that ting a felony robbery. Tenn.Code Ann. — depravity or involved torture mind. Tenn. 39-2-203(0(7) (1982). § 39-2-2-3(i)(5) (1982). § Code Ann. Barber, (Tenn. In State v. 659 753 S.W.2d identical, 1988), No two cases are but above provocation, defendant without many In eases have similarities with elderly struck the Nesbit. victim five times in the cases, all the murders ex- with a six were without mitigation, head crescent As wrench. Barber, provocation. Nesbit, planation Four of five or upon capaci did his relied cases, physi- involved the infliction of severe ty youth. for rehabilitation and in As in his case, pain upon cal or mental the victim while he jury found murder was alive four heinous, atrocious, or she remained and conscious. In especially cruel in that or eases, by gunshot death was caused involved depravity torture or of mind. cases, 39-2-203(0(5) (1982). In four of the wound. the victims §Ann. Tenn.Code In addition, were murdered either their home or mur determined Nesbit, employment. place their Like two during was der committed the course of a years were felony. the defendants nineteen old See Barber v. 889 S.W.2d Also, (Tenn.1994) when the murders were committed. (concluding 189-90 defendants, Nesbit, like no three had jury’s felony-murder ag consideration of the prior error). substantial criminal least record. At gravating circumstance was harmless upon capaci- one of the defendants relied (Tenn. McNish, In v. 727 490 S.W.2d rehabilitation, ty for as did Nesbit. In five of 1987), the defendant beat the about cases, the six returned a sentence of face glass her and head with a flower vase. single aggravating the basis of a death found, The victim was but died a alive when reviewing circumstance. After dis- the cases later, short time so she suffered after the herein, cussed and other cases not herein by McNish much victim in this attack as the detailed,13 are of opinion suffered before she Nesbit. case was shot penalty imposed by jury in this case is case, Unlike the defendant in this McNish disproportionate pen- or not excessive to the prior no though criminal record even alty imposed for similar crimes. twenty-nine years in this old. As jury imposed penalty upon the death CONCLUSION finding single aggravating circumstance— heinous, especially with the of Tenn. murder was atro accordance mandate 39-13-206(e)(l) (1997 cious, Repl.), § or cruel that it involved torture Code Ann. § depravity principles adopted prior of mind. Ann. 39-2- decisions Tenn.Code 203(i)(5)(1982). Court, we have considered the entire (Tenn. (Tenn. 1991); Payne, Caughron, State v. 526 State v. 791 S.W.2d 10 Smith, West, (Tenn. 1993); (Tenn. 1990); State v. 767 S.W.2d 387 1993); Bates, (Tenn. 1989). State v. and find that sen- record this cause any imposed in arbi- was not

tence death Ave., Poplar Suite fashion, supports, as trary that the evidence Memphis, TN 38103-1947 discussed, jury’s finding previously Mark Ward W. circumstance, statutory and the aggravating aggravating circum- jury’s finding that Ronald S. Johnson outweighed mitigating circumstances stance Betty J. Thomas beyond Ann. a reasonable doubt. Tenn.Code *24 Public Defenders Assistant (1997 13—206(c)(1)(A)—(C) Repl.). § We 39— Jefferson, 147 Suite 900 assignments the defendant’s have considered Memphis, TN 38103 have mer- of determined that none error and Appellee For respect specifically not it. to issues With herein, affirm the decision of Walkup addressed John Knox by Appeals, Criminal authored the Court of Attorney Reporter General fully by Judge Hayes, joined in David G. Cauley John P. joined par- Judge M. Barker and William Attorney Asst. General tially by Judge Gary por- R. Wade Relevant Pkwy. Robertson 450 James opinion published are hereafter tions of that Nashville, TN 37243-0493 of appendix. as The defendant’s sentence William Gibbons by is affirmed. sen- death electrocution Attorney General District provided out as law tence shall carried day the 29th January, 1999 unless of D. Henderson Thomas or other otherwise ordered this Court Nichols Jennifer proper authorities. Attorneys Asst. District General Poplar Ave. 201 ANDERSON, HOLDER, J., C.J., and Memphis, TN 38103 concur. 22,1997 April FILED: OPINION BIRCH, J., separate dissenting see CONVIC- FIRST DEGREE MURDER opinion. AF- DEATH TION AND SENTENCE FIRMED APPENDIX Haynes David G.

(Excerpts from the Court Criminal Judge Decision) Appeals’ IN THE CRIM- TENNESSEE COURT OF OPINION INAL APPEALS ANALYSIS

AT JACKSON 1996 SESSION NOVEMBER OF THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENCY issue, appellant contends his first Tennessee, Appellee, at trial is insuffi- that the evidence adduced of law sustain cient a matter guilt penal- in both the returned verdicts Nesbit, Clarence C. appel- Specifically, ty phases of trial. NO. 02c01-9510-CR-00293 C.C.A. presented the evidence argues lant establish, beyond a reasonable failed to County Shelby doubt, premedita- requisite elements Bennett, Judge T. Honorable Arthur Additionally, ap- and deliberation. tion gunshot single wound pellant argues that the Murder) Degree (Capital First support head does to the victim’s Appellant: For the atrocious, “heinous, application of the Ann. Tenn.Code aggravating factor. cruel” AC. Wharton 13—204(i)(5). § District Public Defender 39— 898 challenge

When there is a establishing the sufficien the State has the burden of first evidence, cy convicting Brown, degree this court must murder. 836 S.W.2d light review the degree evidence in the most favor First murder not committed prosecution able perpetration statutorily and determine designated crime “any “intentional, whether requires premeditated rational trier fact have could found the essential elements of killing the crime deliberate of another.” Tenn.Code beyond 39-13-202(a)(l) (1991). Thus, § doubt.” reasonable Jackson v. Ann. 307, Virginia, 319, 2781, 443 prove premeditation U.S. 99 S.Ct. State must and delibera 2789, (1979); Cazes, 61 degree L.Ed.2d 560 State v. tion to offense to murder. raise the first (Tenn.1994), own, Br S.W.2d at 543. cert. de Premedita nied, previously design U.S. tion “a S.Ct. necessitates formed (1995); 13(e). kill,” West, L.Ed.2d 644 R.App. Tenn. P. intent to State v. (Tenn.1992), do not reweigh We or reevaluate the evi and “the exercise *25 dence; these by are issues resolved judgment,” the trier reflection and Ann. Tenn.Code (1991). 39-13-201(b)(2) Cabbage, 832, § of fact. State v. 571 S.W.2d re Deliberation (Tenn.1978). Furthermore, guilty quires 835 ... purpose ver a “cool formed the Brown, testimony dict accredits passion provocation.” the of absence witnesses for of State, (citations presumption the and a guilt of 836 internal re S.W.2d at 538 and omitted); places § the presumption quotations of innocence. Tenn.Code Ann. 39- State Grace, 474, (Tenn.1973). 201(b)(1); v. 493 Sentencing S.W.2d 476 Com Commission 13— appeal, ments, § On the Ann. Delib State entitled to the 39-13-201. Tenn.Code strongest legitimate reflec requires period view of the eration “some of evidence and also the may during all reasonable inferences that be tion the mind is free from drawn which Harris, 54, Brown, therefrom. State v. 839 S.W.2d influence of 836 S.W.2d excitement.” (Tenn.1992). appellant 538; § 75 The bears Ann. 39-13- the see Tenn.Code also 201(b)(2). proving burden of the evidence was support to insufficient the verdict in his jury may engage Again, although the not 913, Tuggle, case. State v. 639 S.W.2d 914 Bordis, speculation, v. 905 S.W.2d State (Tenn.1982). 214, appeal (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm, 222 to denied, (Tenn.1995), jury may pre These applicable findings rules are to the infer predicated guilt upon evidence, direct from the circum cir meditation and deliberation evidence, surrounding killing. cumstantial or a v. combination of stances the 1, (Tenn.Crim.App.1993), direct Gentry, both and circumstantial 3 evidence. 881 S.W.2d (Tenn. denied, (Tenn.1994); 93, pe Carey, appeal State v. 914 S.W.2d 95 to rm. (Tenn. Brown, State, 175, Crim.App.1995). Taylor See also State v. S.W.2d 178 v. 506 (“the 530, (Tenn.1992) supreme 836 S.W.2d 541 has de Crim.App.1973). Our court cases long may recognized necessary have be ele lineated several circumstances deliberation, first-degree may murder and premeditation ments be shown indicative of evidence”). deadly by weight including weapon upon circumstantial The of a the use “ given victim, killing evidence fact that the was circumstantial and unarmed ‘[t]he cruel, evidence, particularly by defen inferences to be from such declarations drawn victim, kill the extent to dant of his which circumstances intent killing making for guilt preparations are consistent with and inconsistent before the Brown, innocence, questions primarily purpose concealing are the crime. ” State, jury.’ also Marable v. 203 Tenn. 836 S.W.2d at This court has 541-542. (citation (1958) omitted). recently 457 noted several factors from which elements, jury may including In this both infer two direct circumstantial by jury’s planning activity was for the before evidence available consid killing, concerning the defendant’s eration. evidence

motive, Bor killing. and the nature of the dis, 222 2 PHASE (quoting 905 W. LaFave GUILT S.W.2d at Scott, Jr., proven, Law a homicide been it is and A. Substantive Criminal Once has (1986)). murder, degree § presumed to 7.7 be second apartment. signifi- prior his visit to the victim’s argues only appellant The that the separate distinct appellant The inflicted premeditation delibera- cant evidence of over a six i.e., injuries upon an unarmed victim presented, tion circumstantial evidence appel period preceding hour her death. victim, relating alleged to the torture of the one of calmness follow lant’s demeanor elements. is not sufficient establish those immediately after ing the murder. Calmness that, assuming that evidence He asserts even cool, dispas of a killing be evidence a motive for the mur- of torture establishes West, sionate, premeditated murder. der, standing alone is not sufficient to motive Browning, v. (citing S.W.2d at premeditation or delibera- establish either (Tenn.Crim.App.1983); Sneed Moreover, factors, applying the tion. Bordis (Tenn.Crim. injuries that the to the victim contends Moreover, App.1976)). shows inflicted torture not to the are relevant weapon appellant hid the murder clearly killing. nature torture scene in a different and returned victim. The occurred before death The fact that the concealment oc vehicle. expert testimony appellant also relies killing “sup immediately after the curred suggesting usually inflict- that torture is ports theory appellant commit Additionally, ined to cause death. order passion].” killing [in ted the the absence appellant clearly contends that the evidence Id. planning appellant, reflects lack of *26 because, although brought appellant record, entire we con- Having reviewed the gun him to im- apartment, the victim’s a rational trier of fact could have clude that arrival, following mediately his he unloaded premeditated found the essential elements of gun placed top on beyond it and bullets degree first a reasonable murder 13(e). issue, refrigerator. P. This R.App. doubt. Tenn. therefore, merit. is without appellant

The case law to cites California evidence, argument support his PHASE PENALTY motive, i.e., arguably which could establish a torture, by is insufficient to sustain itself OF APPELLANT’S INTRODUCTION degree People a first murder conviction. See BEEPER AND MONEY 1210, Cal.Rptr. Pensinger, v. 52 Cal.3d 278 Next, appellant contends that the trial 640, (1991); People P.2d v. 805 899 erroneously introduction permitted court Anderson, 15, 550, Cal.Rptr. 70 Cal.2d 73 447 beeper in into of his and $602.00 evidence (Cal.1968). P.2d 942 The forth in factors set cash, person were on at the which found his Bordis, however, merely provide guidelines Specifically, argues time his arrest. reviewing ques- The court. ultimate of these items was irrele- the admission evidence, tion remains whether the circum- unduly sug- prejudicial, vant because direct, support stantial or can a rational appellant gested to the that the was jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt. drug activity. illegal in Tenn. involved Banks, 403; v. see also State R.Evid. response appellant’s argument, to the (Tenn.1978). S.W.2d the State asserts that the evidence does in prove beyond fact a reasonable doubt that initially sought The to introduce State appellant planned the murder killed “simply to what show was contested plan. in with his The the victim accordance any appellant] found on and discount [the contrary appellant’s argues, State robbery appellant The made con- motive.” claim, part killing of a “torture that the was objection, was temporaneous which over- period sequence long ruled, over a that occurred was claiming that the evidence irrele- jury, when premeditation. time.” The evidence before Under vant to the issue light in the most favorable the Rule “all evidence is admissible viewed relevant beyond except ... which supports guilty provided verdict Evidence 401 defines not admissible.” Rule The establishes that relevant is reasonable doubt. having any “evidence gun immediately relevant evidence as appellant obtained a tendency any in make the existence of fact turned a different vehicle and was about to consequence again appre- that is leave the scene when he was to the determination find no error in the probable probable hended. We submission action more or less jury. of this instruction to the than it would without the evidence.” argues appeal The State also that the CLOSING ARGUMENT DURING GUILT PHASE appellant’s testimony adequately justified his appellant prose- also contends that the possession beeper currency. Both by cutor committed reversible error inter- question items in were introduced jecting opinions personal during closing during appellant its case-in-chief. The argument. The that the ar- State contends subsequently testified that he went to the or, alternative, gument proper, in the was apartment night victim’s before the mur- merely harmless error. response “beep” der in to a he received from Closing arguments important are tool cash, Regarding the victim. the $602.00 parties during process. for both the trial appellant testified that he had been sav- Consequently, attorneys usually given are ing money he had earned from several odd scope argu wide latitude of their jobs. ments, Bigbee, see 885 S.W.2d at agree We the introduction of the courts, turn, trial are accorded wide dis beeper and in cash was not relevant $602.00 arguments. cretion their control of those any to the existence of issue that the Zirkle, See State v. and, thus, required was im- to decide denied, (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm, app. conclude, however, properly admitted. We (Tenn.1995). Moreover, a trial court’s find appellant unfairly preju- was not reversed, ing absent an abuse of will not be Nothing diced their admission. Payton, that discretion. suggests appellant record before us (citations (Tenn.Crim.App.1989) illegal drug activity. was involved in omitted). discretion, scope Such howev appellant’s testimony sufficiently explained *27 er, completely is not unfettered. To deter possession his of the contested evidence. Ac- prosecutor mine whether the committed re any cordingly, admitting we find that error in during closing argument, versible misconduct currency beeper the and was harmless. reviewing the court must ascertain “whether 36(b); R.App. Tenn. P. Tenn. P. R.Crim. improper the conduct could have affected the 52(a). prejudice verdict to the of the defendant.” State, 338,

Harrington v. 215 Tenn. 385 758, (1965); Judge INSTRUCTION ON FLIGHT 759 see also v. S.W.2d State, 340, (Tenn.Crim.App. appellant The contends that the trial court 539 343 S.W.2d 1976). in incorrectly provided jury Five factors should be considered the with an instruc- 1) making the conduct this determination: flight. Specifically, argues tion on he of, complained light viewed facts negat- to crime his ultimate return the scene 2) case; the cura and circumstances of the any to flee. ed inference that he intended by the court and tive measures undertaken asserts that the instruction was The State 3) prosecu the prosecutor; the the intent of properly given, noting that the instruction statement; 4) making improper tor the itself, provides flight, in not and of improper con the cumulative effect of the guilt. evidence of one’s The trial court’s record; any other errors the duct flight on mirrors the instruction instruction 5) strength relative or weakness of the § found in T.P.I. —Crim. 37.16. The court Buck, v. 609 ease. State S.W.2d appel- instructed the that whether the (Tenn.1984); Judge, 539 at 344. S.W.2d solely question lant fled was a for their deci- argument, they flight, During closing sion that need not infer the State’s colloquy prove guilt. following occurred: flight insufficient to alone was case, hope In the evidence demonstrated that I the end of this MR. HENDERSON: at trials, my guess, I appellant indeed leave the scene of all of this trial and other did that, say Apostle I Paul wrote— weapon. He re- can as the murder and hide the appel- unless Honor, error put- constitute reversible Your MR. JOHNSON: they had some clearly lant can establish that closing personal into ting his observation Stephenson, 878 on the verdict. effect argument. Kirkendoll, 541; at S.W.2d my personal It’s not MR. HENDERSON: religious no to 254. reference feelings, Your Honor. was We this isolated law made. conclude This it [sic] THE COURT: Overruled. in this upon no affect the verdict remark had may argument. proceed, Mr. You Moreover, comparison by no case. find Henderson. Apostle Paul. prosecutor of himself to I done what can MR. HENDERSON: I’ve This issue is without merit. you, as much of it present the truth possible long as is after offense OF PHOTOGRAPH INTRODUCTION given nature the crime that the introduc- appellant The contends you say I that I can evidence. submit family photograph of a of the victim with tion fought good fight, I that I have have guilt during phase two of her children course, my kept I have the faith. I run solely was introduced trial irrelevant was you say able 12 to be same want jury. inflaming the purpose for the Addi- you. it is Thank when over. tionally, photograph had he contends that the Closing temperate, arguments must be jury’s on prejudicial a effect determina- upon introduced dur- must based during sentencing phase of the trial. tion trial, pertinent ing and must be to the issues policy Tennessee courts have followed being tried. Coker v. 911 S.W.2d liberality photographs the admission denied, (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm, app. Banks, criminal v. both civil and cases. State (Tenn.1995); Tyson, (citations (Tenn.1978) (Tenn.Crim.App.1980). prosecutor omitted). policy into rule This translates opinion, express personal must belief lies admissibility photographs “the qualifies a misconduct but whether that Id. of the trial court.” within the discretion specific depends upon terminology often respect, “ruling, in this will The trial court’s Coker, appel- used. 911 S.W.2d at 368. except appeal not be overturned per- prosecutor expressed lant claims the showing of an of discretion.” Id. clear abuse opinion by stating presented sonal he had (citations omitted); Stephenson, 878 see also However, jury. “truth” to 542; Bordis, 905 S.W.2d at S.W.2d at possessed duty ultimate instructed that However, photograph be admit before *28 Moreover, deciding the “truth.” noted evidence, into it relevant to ted must be Coker, if argument the court in the con- jury pro decide and the issue that the must submit,” phrases “I “I tains such as think” or out photograph must bative value unlikely adjudged personal opin- it is to be may have weigh any that prejudicial effect ion. Id. Braden, upon of fact. v. 867 the trier 750, perm. (Tenn.Crim.App.), S.W.2d 758 appellant that The further contends the (citation (Tenn.1993) omitted); denied, appeal himself prosecutor improperly compared R. Evid. 401 and see also Tenn. law in Apostle Paul. It is settled passages that references to biblical trial, state challenged photograph was At during inap- are religious testimony law a criminal trial through of the vic- introduced Stephenson, v. 878 propriate. See State The indicates that tim’s sister.1 record 530, (Tenn.1994); Kirkendoll v. the State to es- photograph 541 was offered S.W.2d 243, State, 497, in identity as a “creature 198 281 S.W.2d 254 tablish the victim’s Tenn. State, 118, references, however, Tenn. (1955). being.”2 Bolden v. 140 do Such code, issue, pre-1989 was criminal murder the State 2. Under the 1. At the bench conference on this killing "any reason- unlawful defined as the photograph depicting advised the court that being.” Ann. See Tenn.Code however, able creature § preferred, none was victim alone was Thus, 1989). (repealed prose- 39-2-201 available. homicide, any that deceased cution of is, being,” that was a creature in "reasonable 902 (1918), showing prejudice, supreme

203 755 our court held at 608. Absent S.W. necessary generally error benefits the defendant that the evidence “to establish Cazes, require 875 does not reversal. S.W.2d corpus delicti in homicide show [a case] must Smith, 1, 267; at 15 at State v. 857 S.W.2d being a human the life of has been (Tenn.1993). appellant con- taken, Although the question which involves the subor harmless, has held cedes this issue been inquiry identity per dinate as to the supreme disagrees with our court Thus, charged son to have been killed....” Specifi- to him. this error is one “beneficial” case, present required in the cally, this “serves to appellant claims case-in-chief, prove, person that the its mitigation, empha- undermine actual [his] person killed was the same named in the jury mitigating number of sizes for the indictment. Homicide See also C.J.S. missing from the circumstances (1991); Annotation, § 170 identi Homicide: distinction between highlights further person victim as named in indict fication of non-statutory mitigating fac- statutory and 722, information, ment or 86 A.L.R.2d tors.” (1962). Thus, employing espoused the test Banks, 949, we ñnd no error in previous supreme court’s In view of our during photograph the admission of the any showing prejudice, rulings, and absent See, guilt phase e.g., of the trial.3 State v. is without merit. conclude this issue we Scott, (Tenn.Crim.App. Dicks, 1981); THEDEATH But see OF CONSTITUTIONALITY denied, (Tenn.), PENALTYSTATUTE cert. U.S. (1981) (pictures 102 S.Ct. 70 L.Ed.2d 240 acknowledges that the con- appellant of homicide victim while alive should not be stitutionality penalty has been of the death Court, admitted at trial unless relevant to a material upheld by Supreme but the Tennessee issue, although such an error not be pre- in order to following raises the issues outcome). prejudicial Finally, ap subsequent proceedings. to the for serve them pellant speculate asks this court to about the (1) appellant contends that the death during photograph upon effect of the meaningfully narrow penalty statute fails to Having sentencing phase of the trial. (2) defendants; pros- eligible the class of photograph was admissi concluded seeking discretion ecution has unlimited trial, during guilt phase find no ble (3) penalty is penalty; the death the death sentencing prejudicial impact during the discriminatory manner based imposed in a phase. is without merit. This issue sex; economics, race, geography, and (4) uniform standards there are no ONMITIGATINGEVIDENCE INSTRUCTIONS (5) prone selection; juries tend to

Next, (6) appellant verdicts; contends that the trial returning guilty the defendant by charg- judge committed reversible error opportunity to address is denied the factors, parole ing statutory mitigating misconceptions all of the about jury’s popular incarceration, deterrence, relying though appellant eligibility, even was not cost of *29 (7) execution; jury Only is upon all of them in his defense. those and method to a life unanimously agree by raised the evi- instructed it must mitigating circumstances Buck, sentence, being told prevented from charged. 670 and is dence should be S.W.2d alive, alone statements say a able doubt and the defendant’s that was bom was material child Morgan v. element. State element of the offense of murder. See State, are not sufficient to establish 417, 433, (1923). 557, (Tenn.Crim. Tenn. 256 S.W. 434 148 Shepherd, 564 v. 862 S.W.2d being” phrase creature in has "reasonable App.1992). application current criminal code. The no to our killing "anoth criminal code defines the 1989 identity also recognize proof of is We that 3. being. include a viable fetus of a human er” to rules, and, governed by evidentiary where the such, (1989). § 39-13-214 As Tenn.Code Ann. already proven, identity further has been victim’s being is no of a reasonable creature therefore, and, proof may inadmis- be cumulative longer necessary. identity, The deceased’s how 403. sible. See Tenn. R. Evid. Indeed, ever, remains a material element. corpus proved beyond must be a reason delicti

903 (8) verdict; Barker the effect of a William M. non-unanimous /s/ Barker, juries William M. fail to courts instruct on mean- Judge circumstances; ing mitigating function (9) deprived making the final is Justice, BIRCH, dissenting. (10) penalty; decision about the death part respectfully I from the must dissent is argument denied the final dur- concerning majority opinion victim (11) sentencing phase; ing the electrocution acknowledge impact I evidence. Because (12) punishment; is cruel unusual Tennessee, 808, 111 Payne 501 U.S. v. appellate process penalty review in death (1991), controls, 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 S.Ct. constitutionally is inadequate. cases majority’s agree I statement with if impact victim evidence is admissible ad- reject- repeatedly These issues have been process of due duced within the constraints Smith, by ed Tennessee courts. See 893 403, however, disagree, I and Tenn. R. Evid. Brimmer, 908; 75; at at S.W.2d 876 S.W.2d majority’s that the victim conclusion Cazes, 253; Smith, 875 at S.W.2d impact used in this case was ad- evidence Black, 1; 166; at 815 S.W.2d at State v. duced within those constraints. (Tenn.1990);

Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589 State v. admissible, legally Although reasons Teel, (Tenn.1990); State v. excluding impact for victim evidence are still (Tenn.1989). Thompson, Particularly compelling my view. trouble- some is This true the issue relevance. is CONCLUSION because the character of the victim and the family may wholly effect on the victim’s be thorough After review of the issues and of the de- unrelated to the blameworthiness us, the record as before mandated Tenn. 496, Maryland, fendant. Booth U.S. (c), 39-13-206(b), §§ Code Ann. 440, 449 96 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. herein, the reasons ap- stated affirm the (1987). Generally, impact victim evidence is pellant’s conviction and sentence of death. unsettling encourages its because use conclude We sentence of death was life quantify the value of the victim’s fashion, imposed arbitrary in an the evi- urges finding murder more supports jury’s finding dence the ag- reprehensible if the victim survived circumstance, gravating and the evidence family bereaved than if the victim had no supports finding jury’s aggrava- family id. at at all. See at S.Ct. ting outweighs any mitigating circumstance 2534, 96 L.Ed.2d Moreover, comparative circumstances. Addressing particular intro- evidence review, proportionality considering both the majority duced in describes the crime circumstances of and the nature of pages impact “clear five of victim evidence as appellant, us convinces that the sentence However, Judge Gary R. and concise.” dispropor- of death is neither excessive nor explained partial dissent from Wade penalty imposed tionate to the in similar below, Appeals’s ruling the Court of Criminal cases.4 Payne impact the victim allowed in Hayes David G. /s/ comprises only a and other Tennessee cases Hayes, David G. testimony. few I therefore view the lines of Judge pro- impact evidence in this case as CONCUR: and, consequently, prone to un- tracted addition, fairly prejudicial. the State’s (See opinion concurring part; dissenting argument impact on the rebuttal was based *30 part) family. In of the victim’s death her Wade, Gary Judge argument, pervasively R. State charac- upheld by higher opinion. 4. No date is set Tenn. death sentence is court execution 39-13-206(a)(l) review, provides §Ann.. for Code auto- supreme will set the court execution Supreme matic review upon the Tennessee Court date. penalty. If affirmance of death ag- as an impact terized the victim Tennessee,

gravating weighed against Appellee, factor to be STATE majority mitigating proof. concedes argument was error but finds that that the PIKE, Appellant. Gail Christa appear the error not to have affected did prejudice. verdict to the defendant’s Tennessee, Supreme Court I,like Wade, Judge conclude that cannot at Knoxville. argument, considered with the State’s 5,Oct. 1998. testimony, lengthy impact did not af- stating, I draw no fect the verdict. so Rehearing Nov. Denied imposed. regarding penalty conclusions only I that a be allowed to find should penalty under the correct sen-

reconsider

tencing guidelines. I remand this case would hearing. sentencing

for new ON PETITION

OPINION

FOR REHEARING rehearing for have been filed on

Petitions of both the Nesbit.

behalf Clarence grant rehearing

The State asks the Court to capital that our review in cases is

and hold only those issues identified

limited 39-13-206(c)(l)(1997 § Ann.

Tenn. Code

Repl.). opinion initial ade- We decline. The

quately this issue. addressed argues opinion of

The defendant only justices four

the Court is invalid because justices

participated in decision. Three quorum may sit as a Court

constitute a judgments. Trust and render valid Radford Co., 126, 137,21 S.W.

Co. v. Lumber 92 Tenn. (1893). justices participated in the Four constituting

decision in this with three majority. judgment is valid. rehearing

Accordingly, petitions the defendant are

filed the State and

denied, equally between the with costs taxed and the defendant. the views ex- Birch adheres to

Justice dissenting opinion. original

pressed in his Drowota, F. III Frank

/s/ Drowota, III, Frank F.

Justice HOLDER, J.,

ANDERSON, C.J., and

concur. Justice,

REID, participating. Special

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Nesbit
Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 28, 1998
Citation: 978 S.W.2d 872
Docket Number: 02S01-9705-CR-00043
Court Abbreviation: Tenn.
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