{¶ 2} On June 16, 2006, appellant was indicted by the Lake County Grand Jury on three counts: count one, trafficking in cocaine, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} On August 25, 2006, appellant withdrew his former plea of not guilty, and entered an oral and written plea of guilty to an amended version of count one, which reduced the amount of drugs charged to between 500 and 1000 grams of cocaine, and agreed to the forfeiture specification attached to that count. On August 30, 2006, the trial court accepted appellant's guilty plea and entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining two charges and specifications in the indictment.
{¶ 4} A sentencing hearing was scheduled for September 25, 2006. However, appellant failed to appear. He was later apprehended in New York and finally sentenced on April 7, 2008.
{¶ 5} Pursuant to its April 15, 2008 judgment entry, the trial court sentenced appellant to eight years in prison, with forty-five days of credit for time already served. The trial court forfeited the vehicle that appellant was operating at the time of the offense, suspended his driver's license for five years, and notified him that post release control is mandatory for a period of five years. It is from that judgment that appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and makes the following assignment of error: *3
{¶ 6} "The trial court violated appellant's rights to equal protection and due process of law under the
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by sentencing him contrary to R.C.
{¶ 8} Because appellant's two issues are interrelated, we will address them together.
{¶ 9} R.C.
{¶ 10} This court stated in State v. Adams, 11th Dist. No. 2003-L-110,
{¶ 11} "* * * [Although `a trial court is required to engage in the analysis set forth by R.C.
{¶ 12} In State v. Swiderski, 11th Dist. No. 2004-L-112,
{¶ 13} "[W]e agree with appellant that R.C.
{¶ 14} "`We agree with the rationale of the Lyons court, insofar as the trial court must adhere to the statutory mandate to ensure consistency in sentencing. However, *5 we note, as that court did, that the trial court is required to make its sentencing decisions in compliance with the statute, but need not specifically comb the case law in search of similar offenders who have committed similar offenses in order to ascertain the proper sentence to be imposed.' Id.
{¶ 15} "In short, a consistent sentence is not derived from a case-by-case comparison; rather, it is the trial court's proper application of the statutory sentencing guidelines that ensures consistency. * * *." (Parallel citation omitted.)
{¶ 16} In the case at bar, the trial court properly considered the relevant factors of R.C.
{¶ 17} "The Court has also considered the record, oral statements, any victim impact statement, pre-sentence report and/or drug and alcohol evaluation submitted by the Lake County Adult Probation Department of the Court of Common Pleas, as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C.
{¶ 18} "In considering the foregoing, and for the reasons stated in the record, this Court finds that a prison sentence is consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C.
{¶ 19} The trial court made a similar pronouncement at the sentencing hearing. The transcript reveals that the trial court noted that appellant acted for hire, as part of an organized criminal activity, and possessed over three times the amount of cocaine necessary for a first degree felony. The trial court also considered appellant's criminal history and that at the time of the instant offense, he was on probation. The trial court *6 referenced the fact that appellant failed to show up for the first sentencing hearing over a year and a half ago.
{¶ 20} Here, the trial court sentenced appellant to eight years in prison, within the statutory sentencing guidelines. R.C.
{¶ 21} We note that "`there is no requirement that co-defendants receive equal sentences.' State v. Rupert, [11th Dist. No. 2003-L-154,]
{¶ 22} Nothing in the record before this court suggests that the difference in appellant's sentence from that of his co-defendant is a result of anything other than the individualized factors the court applied to appellant. See Martin, supra, at ¶ 40. The trial court properly applied the statutory factors and considerations, thus, ensuring consistency and proportionality.
{¶ 23} For the foregoing reasons, appellant's sole assignment of error is not well-taken. The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. It is the further *7 order of this court that costs are waived since appellant appears from the record to be indigent. The court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, P.J., MARY JANE TRAPP, J., concur.
