STATE OF IDAHO, Plаintiff-Respondent, v. QUENTIN NAVA, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 47439
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Opinion Filed: June 11, 2020
Boise, January 2020 Term; Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Canyon County. George A. Southworth, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant Quentin Nava. Brian R. Dickson argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent State of Idaho. Kale D. Gans argued.
_____________________
Quentin Nava appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him for one count of lewd and lascivious conduct and one count of sex abuse. He argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to sever the two counts. Nava argues that the similarities between the two counts did not constitute a common scheme or plan as to justify joinder of the two charges. The Idaho Court of Appeals agreed, and vacated Nava‘s judgment of conviction. The State petitioned for review, which this Court granted. For the reasons set out in this opinion, we affirm Nava‘s judgment of conviction.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State charged Nava with one count of lewd and lascivious conduct and one count of sexual abuse. The charges arose from an approximately two-day period in July 2016 when Nava was staying in the homе of a female friend, her twelve-year-old daughter, who will be referred to by the initials J.R.R., her twelve-year-old niece, who will be referred to by the initials J.L.R., as well as other friends and relatives who were staying at the woman‘s house.
On the first night, purportedly during the early morning hours of July 15, 2016,1 J.R.R.
Following its investigation, the State charged Nava in a single complaint alleging one count of lewd conduct with a minor for the assault against J.R.R. and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen for the assault against J.L.R. A grand jury returned a single indictment that included both charges.
Months later, Nava filed a “Motion to Sever for Improper Joindеr Pursuant to
The district court denied Nava‘s motion to sever the two charges. The district court found that the two counts сontained numerous similarities: (1) the assaults occurred in the same room of the same house; (2) the assaults occurred within a forty-eight hour period; (3) both victims were twelve-year-old girls; (4) they were both initially asleep when the assaults occurred; and (5) Nava had been grooming both girls. Accordingly, the district court found that sufficient similarities existed between the two counts to conclude that joinder was proper.
In analyzing whether Nava would suffer prejudice from the joinder, the district court noted that evidence of the other act, i.e., the assault of one girl, would be admissible at the trial of the assault on the оther girl under
Following a jury trial, Nava was convicted of both counts. Following the jury‘s verdict, Nava admitted to a pair of sentencing enhancements.2 The district court imposed an aggregate sentence of forty years, with eighteen years fixed.
Nava timely appealed. The Court of Appeals heard his appeal in State v. Nava, No. 45463, 2019 WL 2060933 (Idaho Ct. App. May 9, 2019). The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred by denying Nava‘s motion to sever because the similarities between the cases were insufficient to demonstrate a common scheme or plan because the similarities were “unremarkable.” Id. at *4. Further, the Court of Appeals held that the
The State petitioned for review, which this Court granted.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Clarifying Motions to Join or Sever and Standards of Review.
On appeal, Nava argues that there is confusion in this Court‘s case law regarding the applicable standard of review used by an appellate court when reviewing a decision concerning the joinder or severance of charges. To resolve this confusion, Nava contends that district court decisions concerning
decisions require the same basic analysis. Nava argues that applying different standards of review for the two rules gives the State an unfair advantage and allows the State to “manipulate the scope of review” on appeal. Nava bases this argument on the proposition that, to limit the scope of review on appeal, the State could file charges together in its original complaint—as was done here—the propriety of which could only be challenged through an
The State disagrees that there is any confusion in the standard of review. Instead, the State argues that there is one standard for reviewing the propriety of joinder under
1. Idaho law provides two independent grounds to sever charges.
Nava spends significant time in his briefing arguing that rulings on motions filed undеr
Idaho law provides for two independent grounds upon which a defendant may seek to have the charges against him severed.3 Pursuant to
In contrast,
the joinder of those charges prejudiced the defendant. See State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985) (italics added) (“Parties properly joined under
In sum, a defendant may file a motion to sever charges he contends were improperly joined under
2. Propriety of joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is reviewed de novo and prejudicial joinder under I.C.R. 14 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
The standard of review utilized by the appellate courts depends on what type of motion is appealed by the defendant. If the defendant is appealing from a ruling on a motion to sever based on
Nava contends that State v. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho 757, 351 P.3d 1215 (2015), created confusion as to the relevant standard of review. We agree. Orellana-Castro stated,
[w]hen the defendant moves for severance under
Criminal Rule 14 , the alleged prejudice is often that evidence of the defendant‘s conduct which would be admissible in the prosecution of one offense would not be admissible underEvidence Rule 404(b) in the prosecution of the other offense if it were tried separately. In that circumstance, the analysis is the same as to whether the offenses are part оf a common scheme or plan permitting joinder underCriminal Rule 8(a) and whether the defendant would be prejudiced by joinder because the offenses were not part of a common scheme or plan underEvidence Rule 404(b) . Both of those decisions are reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 690, 273 P.3d 1271, 1283 (2012) (admissibility of evidence underEvidence Rule 404(b) ); State v. Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532, 537, 817 P.2d 646, 651 (1991) (denial of motion to sever).
Id. at 760, 351 P.3d at 1218. This paragraph appears to create a standard of review wholly separate from the general standard of review applied to rulings on motions to sever based on
improper joinder when the claim of joinder is based on the “common scheme or plan” theory. Sеe id. It provides that in the instance that joinder is based on the fact that the charges constitute a common scheme or plan, the ruling is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard because it requires the same analysis as a ruling concerning
We now hold that the standard created in Orellana-Castro is not appropriate. Accordingly, we disavow Orellana-Castro to the extent that it creates a singular standard of review instead of the two standards of review articulated in Field. In Field, we stated,
[w]hether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to
I.C.R. 8 is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. In contrast, an abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a motion to sever joinder pursuant toI.C.R. 14 ; however, that rule presumes joinder was proper in the first place. As we are reviewing the propriety of the initial joinder, we exercise free review.
Field, 144 Idaho at 564–65, 165 P.3d at 278–79 (footnote omitted) (internal citations omitted).
We uphold the standards of review articulated in Field. Therefore, a ruling on a motion under
(1) the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, and convict the defendant of one or both crimes when it would not convict him of either if it could keep the evidence properly segregated; (2) the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses, as where he desires to assert his privilege against self-incrimination with respect to one crime but not the other; or (3) the jury may conclude that the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the othеr because of his criminal disposition.
State v. Williams, 163 Idaho 285, 293, 411 P.3d 1186, 1194 (Ct. App. 2018) (quoting State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 867–68, 664 P.2d 772, 774–75 (1983)). Therefore, combining the analyses for
Consequently, Rules 8 and 14 must be analyzed separately with their proper standards of review. Going forward, this Court will employ the following analysis: This Court will first analyze whether joinder was permissible under
3. Nava primarily argues that joinder was improper pursuant to the language of I.C.R. 8; accordingly, the decision will be rеviewed de novo.
Nava spends significant time in his briefing regarding the application of
B. The district court did not err in denying Nava‘s motion to sever because the two charges contained sufficient common characteristics to constitute a common scheme or plan.
The district court ruled that joinder was proper because the charges shared many common characteristics. The district court stated,
[Nava] is alleged to have inappropriately touched two young girls, both 12 [years] of age, either one or two nights apart in the same room as he was sleeping. I think it was in the living room watching TV. There were other people around.
They‘re connected as to place, same room in the samе house, time, just a day or two apart, victim type, both 12-year-old girls, opportunity. They were both sleeping in the same room the defendant was staying. Evidently they had fallen asleep there. And additionally, . . . it appears that there
was some previous instances of grooming in at least what the victims felt were perhaps inappropriate comments regarding their appearance, on one of them their breasts.
The district court concluded that these similarities were sufficient to find that joinder was proper.
On appeal, Nava argues that the district court erred because the two offenses were not part of a common scheme or plan. Nava argues that this Court and the Court of Appeals have previously rejected joinder under circumstances similar to those found by the district court as “too unremarkable” to constitute a common scheme or plan. The State argues that the similarities found by the district court were sufficient to constitute a common scheme or plan. Further, the State argues that the evidence that Nava engaged in grooming behavior was sufficient to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. However, Nava contends that the “grooming behavior” alleged by the State was not the continued and escalating behavior that this Court typically requires to find a common scheme or plan.
[t]wo or more offenses may be charged on the same complaint, indictment or information if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
charges are based “on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” Id. Here, the State alleges that the two charged offenses constituted a common scheme or plan.
Under the common scheme or plan theory, “at a minimum, there must be evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct has occurred with children in the past.” State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668, 227 P.3d 918, 922 (2010). “The events must be linked by common characteristics that go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts.” Id. (citation omitted). Essentially, “a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other.” Id. (italics in original) (quotation omitted).
There are three Idaho Supreme Court cases relevant to the inquiry into whether various sexual abuse charges are sufficiently similar to constitute evidence of a common scheme or plan. First, in State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 685 P.2d 830 (1984), this Court held that the district court properly joined the charges of sexual abuse. Id. at 93, 685 P.2d at 834. The Court held that the similar facts demonstrated a “common plan, in that Schwartzmiller frequents areas where young boys may be found, befriends boys with no father figure in the home, entices them from their homes, lowers their natural inhibitions through the use of drugs and alcohol, and commits sex acts upon them.” Id.
Then, in Field, this Court held that the facts alleged by the State were insufficient to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. 144 Idaho at 566–67, 165 P.3d at 280–81. The district court granted the State‘s motion to join a charge of lewd conduct against a seven-year-old victim with a charge of sexual battery against a seventeen-year-old victim. Id. at 563–64, 165 P.3d at 277–78. This Court rejected the State‘s argument that the two charges were connected as a common scheme
with ‘innocent’ touching[.]” Id. Consequently, we held there that joinder of the offenses was erroneous. Id. at 566–67, 165 P.3d at 280–81.
Finally, in Johnson, this Court again held that the facts alleged by the State were insufficient to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. 148 Idaho at 669, 227 P.3d at 923. In that case, Johnson was charged with abusing his young daughter. Id. at 666, 227 P.3d at 920. Although the case involved a determination under
It is a difficult burden for the State to establish that the similarities between two charges demonstrate a common scheme or plan when it comes to sexual abuse crimes. As this Court stated in Grist, 147 Idaho at 55, 205 P.3d at 1191, “[w]e once again caution the trial courts of this state that they must carefully examine evidence offered for the purpose of demоnstrating the existence of a common scheme or plan in order to the [sic] determine whether the requisite relationship exists.”
Here, the State alleged, and the district court found, the following similarities: (1) the assaults occurred in the same room of the same house; (2) the assaults occurred within one or two days of each other; (3) both victims were twelve-year-old girls; (4) they were both asleep when the assaults occurred; (5) there were other young children sleeping in the room at the time; and (6) Nava had been grooming both girls. The district court concluded that these similarities
were sufficient to constitute a common scheme or plan. We agree that these facts present sufficient common characteristics to constitute a common scheme or plan.
Unlike the acts in Field or Johnson in which there were months or years between the assaults, the assaults in this case occurred within one or two days of each other. Additionally, both assaults occurred in the early morning hours. The assaults occurred in the same room of the same house. While it is true that we have previously found the fact of a similar location to be insufficient, the facts of this case present a unique set of circumstances. Here, there wеre several young children sleeping in the room where Nava assaulted the two girls. Nava passed over other children of various ages specifically to target J.R.R. and J.L.R. This would demonstrate a common scheme or plan connecting the two charges.
Further, the State‘s evidence suggests that Nava‘s actions constituted “grooming” behavior. “‘[G]rooming’ is conduct intended to foster trust and remove defenses over time through a pattern of seduction and preparation, resulting in the child being willing and compliant to the defendant‘s sexual abuse.” State v. Coleman, 152 Idaho 872, 877, 276 P.3d 744, 749 (Ct. App. 2012). Here, during the hearing on the motion to sever, the Statе asserted that Nava had been grooming the two girls. First, the State argued that it intended to present evidence that Nava made a number of inappropriate comments regarding the girls’ physical appearances. He started with comments such as telling the girls he thought they looked beautiful. Those comments continued with Nava telling the girls he thought they were attractive. Additionally, the State alleged that Nava would buy the girls drinks from a local coffee shop or treats from the gas station, but would not buy anything for the other children. This evidence suggests that Nava intended to foster trust and lower the girls’ defenses. This type of grooming behavior, paired with the other characteristics, is sufficient to constitute a common scheme or plan.
As a result, the district court did not err in concluding that joinder was proper pursuant to
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nava‘s motion to sever because joinder did not prejudice Nava.
Having found that joinder was proper, we turn to whether the joinder prejudiced Nava as to justify severing the two charges. As noted above, in analyzing whether joinder is prejudicial, Idaho courts have considered three potential sources of prejudice when considering а motion to sever based on
(1) the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, and convict the defendant of one or both crimes when it would not convict him of either if it could keep the evidence properly segregated; (2) the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses, as where he desires to assert his privilege against self-incrimination with respect to one crime but not the other; or (3) the jury may conclude that the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other because of his criminal disposition.
Williams, 163 Idaho at 293, 411 P.3d at 1194 (citation omitted).
Here, the State argues that the joinder of the two charges was nоt prejudicial because the evidence of the assault against one girl would be admissible in the separate trial for the assault of the other girl. Nava additionally asserts that he had a separate defense relating to J.R.R. Nava contends that J.R.R.‘s allegation may have been tainted by hearing the allegation from J.L.R. Each of these arguments will be discussed in turn.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence of the assaults would be admissible in separate trials.
It is well established that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a defendant‘s criminal propensity.
Admissibility of evidence pursuant to
Here, the State asserts that the evidence would have been admissible under
original) (quotation omitted). As established above, the two charges share significant common characteristics that are so related that the charges constitute a common scheme or plan. Therefore, the evidence was relevant for
However, finding the evidence relevant does not end the analysis. Under the second part of the Grist analysis, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188; see also
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that joinder was not prejudicial due to a separate defense for one of the charges.
The district court noted some concern that Nava might have a separate defense as to J.R.R. because she only came forward after hearing abоut allegations from J.L.R. She stated that she originally thought she had been dreaming. The fact a defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses with respect to one charge and not the other charge is a legitimate concern under
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Nava was not prejudiced by the joint trial. There is nothing that would preclude Nava from presenting his defense that J.R.R.‘s allegation may have been tainted by J.L.R. In fact, such a defense logically requires evidence of the other allegation be admitted in order to give context for the defense that the second allegation was tainted. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms Nava‘s judgment of conviction.
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices BRODY, BEVAN and MOELLER CONCUR.