State v. NashState v. Nash
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Michael Nash, appeals his sentence from rape and kidnapping convictions. We affirm.
{¶2} In 2011, Nash was charged with one count of kidnapping with sexual motivation and sexually violent predator specifications; four counts of rape with a sexually violent predator specification; and two counts of gross sexual imposition with sexually violent predator specifications.
{¶3} After plea negotiations with the state, Nash agreed to plead guilty to one count of kidnapping and three counts of rape; the state agreed to nolle all specifications and remaining charges. As part of the plea agreement, Nash agreed to serve at least eight years in prison and further agreed that none of the offenses were allied, and, therefore, none of the convictions would merge for sentencing.
{¶4} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Nash to a total of 15 years in prison as follows: four years on Count 3 (rape), five years on Count 4 (rape), and six years on Count 5 (rape); those charges to run consecutive to each other but concurrent to seven years on Count 1 (kidnapping). The court also classified Nash as a Tier III sexual offender.
{¶5} It is from this sentence that Nash appeals, raising one assignment of error for our review:
I. The trial court abused its discretion under
R.C. 2929.11 and2929.12 when it sentenced Mr. Nash to a term of [12] years in prison.
{¶7} But
{¶8} Subsequent to Foster, the Ohio Supreme Court established a two-step analysis for appellate courts when reviewing a felony sentence:
[f]irst, [the reviewing court] must examine the sentencing court‘s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the trial court‘s decision shall be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 4.
{¶9} For those sentences imposed consecutively, the Court declared the
{¶10} The General Assembly recently amended
{¶11} Nash does not claim his sentence was contrary to law and we find that it was not. Nash‘s sentence was within the statutory guidelines and the trial court indicated that it considered all factors required by law and that prison was consistent with the purposes of
{¶12} We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Nash to 15 years in prison. Nash claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider that he was a first-time offender, suffered from mental illness and depression, and was not likely to reoffend.
{¶13} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that it considered defense counsel‘s sentencing memorandum, the presentence investigation report, a mitigation of penalty report, and the victim impact statement. The trial court acknowledged that Nash had a “very low risk of reoffending.” The trial court further noted that Nash‘s
{¶14} The trial court outlined the facts of the case and stated it was considering the factors set forth in
{¶15} Based on these facts, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Nash to 15 years in prison.
{¶16} The sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶17} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE
PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, A.J., and
JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR