State v. NapierState v. Napier
Defendants James Napier and Walter Gatewood were charged with a crime of simple burglary,
On April 17, 1977 the police received a call at about 8:25 p. m. that a burglary was in progress at the Whitney Shop in Gretna. Patrolman Dunn was the first on the scene and when he arrived he spotted Napiеr outside the business. The officer called out to Napier who responded by turning and walking in the other direction, ultimately walking behind a large trailer on the premises. Officer Dunn followed and placed Napier under arrest, read his Miranda rights, and placed the defendant in the police car. Dunn testified that at that point hе went to the building and looked in, spotting another person still inside. He radioed headquarters for additional men and a K-9 unit. Upon arrival the K-9 team entered the building and captured Gatewood, placing him under arrest.
Both Napier and Gatewood gave statements to the police about the burglary. They said they wеre prisoners at the Forest County Prison Farm located in Mississippi and had been sent to Louisiana by Warden Alford of Forest County Prison to steal tools. Defendants explained that the warden was planning to open a shop near the prison where he would repair stolen cars and sell them. The warden, howevеr, needed tools to effectuate this operation. Therefore, he sent prisoners, Napier and Gatewood, to steal what he needed; a practice which, according to the defendants, was not uncommon. The defendants expressed great fear of Warden Alford, who allegedly told them not to return without his tools.
The defendants argue that the officers promised them that neither Napier nor Gatewood would be sent back to Mississippi or prosecuted in Louisiana on burglary charges if they would give a statement describing the illegal activity allegedly occurring in Mississippi. Both defendants gave statements whiсh were introduced at each defendant‘s trial despite defendants’ arguments that the confessions were not voluntary.
In order for a confession to be introduced into evidence the state has the burden of showing affirmatively and beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made freely and voluntаrily and that it was not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises.
Defendant Gatewood actually gave two statements, one on the date of the burglary, April 17th, and another several days later, April 22nd. Only the April 22nd statement was introduced at trial. Although the first statement was not introduced, the defense argues that its illegality taints the voluntariness of the April 22nd statement. The circumstances surrounding the giving of the first statement must be considered in determining the propriety of admitting the second statement at trial.
The story of Gatewood‘s arrest is told differently by him and by the policeman making the arrest. Officer O‘Quain testified that upon entering the Whitney Shop he gave the command for the K-9 Max to seek out and find the person still in the building. Max searched the building and detected that Gatewood had climbed upon the top of the false ceiling and was hiding there between it and the roof. O‘Quain climbed a ladder up to this level. He grаbbed Gatewood as the defendant tried to get away. A scuffle ensued during which punches were exchanged. Then the two men stepped off of the lumber cross pieces and onto the unsupported ceiling. This flimsy ceiling material was unable to hold their weight and both men fell through to the floor. When they fell the dog grabbеd Gatewood by the leg. As Gatewood tried to get away from the dog it became more vicious and bit the defendant on the arms and legs. Officer O‘Quain was somewhat stunned at first from the fall and upon regaining his complete consciousness called the dog off and arrested Gatewood. The defendant had sustained sеveral lacerations and scratches on his arms and legs from the dog and had also sustained a broken nose. He was given first aid treatment by those present and then proceeded to give a statement to police.
Gatewood‘s story of the arrest is very different. According to his version, when O‘Quain climbed the lаdder he pointed his gun at Gatewood who immediately surrendered.
Gatewood went on to say that he was not given any medical treatment and was told that he didn‘t have to make a statement but that his cohorts had already made statements and if Gatewood did not he would be returned to the care of the Mississippi authorities. Defendant argues that because of his fear of Warden Alford and his pain from the injuries he hаd received he gave the statement. Only after this was he taken to the hospital where he received treatment for his wounds.
The state did not seek to introduce Gatewood‘s statement made at the time of the arrest on April 17th. Rather, a statement given by him on April 22nd was introduced. The defense argues that although thе April 22nd statement was taken after Gatewood had been treated for his injuries, it should be held inadmissible because it was tainted by the first allegedly involuntary statement. The first statement was involuntary, according to the defendant, because he was in such pain from his untreated wounds and because Officer Dunn told him that his compаnions had already made statements about the operation in Mississippi and that if he did not do the same, he would be sent back to Mississippi.
Accepting defendant‘s argument that the first statement was not given freely and voluntarily, “the proper inquiry is whether the conditions that [would render] the earlier confession inadmissible сarried over to invalidate the subsequent one.” State v. Welch, 337 So.2d 1114, 1120 (La.1976). See also State v. Young, 344 So.2d 983 (La. 1977). The second statement was given after Gatewood had been treated for his injuries and was no longer in any pain from them. Therefore, the pain he was required to withstand when the first statement was given was not a factor in connection with the second statement.
Thе other factor argued by Gatewood as being an improper inducement to confess is the threat to send him back to Mississippi if he did not give a statement. Such threats or promises may in fact constitute sufficient inducement to confess to affect the admissibility of the statement. See State v. Jackson and Sneed, 381 So.2d 485 (La.1980). In this case, however, Officer Dunn directly controverted the giving of any such assurances to Gatewood in order to induce him to confess. See State v. Bouffanie, supra, at 974; State v. Simmons, 328 So.2d 149 (La.1976). Therefore, the admissibility of the statement ultimately hinges on the credibility of each witness. The trial judge‘s determination of credibility is entitled to great weight and should not be overturned unless unsupported by the evidence. State v. Webb, 364 So.2d 984 (La.1978); State v. Matthews, 354 So.2d 552 (La.1978). Our review of the evidence does not show that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that Gatewood gave the April 22nd statement freely and voluntarily. Any taint occurring as a result of the April 17th statement was attenuated both by time and circumstance so as not to affect the admissibility of the April 22nd statement.
Napier аlso argues that he gave a confession to police only in response to promises that in return for his statement he would not be returned to Mississippi and would not be prosecuted for this burglary or would receive a sentence only for time already served. Napier‘s argument falls, however, with the examinatiоn of the necessary sequence of events. Primarily, it is to be noted again that confessions may not be admitted at trial if they are the result of promises, threats, or inducements. We cannot find any plausible sequence of events in which defendant‘s statement regarding the theft of tools and the reasons for the cоmmission
Napier‘s argument that he confessed only as a result of police promises is unfounded. It is obvious that he must have given a statement before police would have had sufficient knowledge to make promises of the nature alleged by Napier. On this basis we cannot say that the statement was induced by police promises or that it was not freely and voluntarily given.
As an additional assignment of error Gatewood also argues that the twelve year maximum possible penalty for simple burglary and the six year maximum possible penalty for attempted simple burglary are excessive and, therefore, unconstitutional.
A twelve year sentence for simple burglary is not unconstitutionally excessive under either thе cruel or unusual punishment prohibition of the United States Constitution or the specific prohibition against excessive punishment of our Louisiana Constitution. Such a sentence for simple burglary is not so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime charged that it shocks our sense of justice. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2681, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977); State v. Beavers, 382 So.2d 943 (La. 1980). The defеnse has not shown that the legislature stepped outside its broad scope of authority in providing for a possible twelve year prison term. We do not believe that the penalty provision provides for an unconstitutionally excessive sentence considering the severity of the crime of simple burglary, the frequency of its occurrence, and the probability of harm to the victims.
For the above assigned reasons we hold that both the Napier and Gatewood statements were freely and voluntarily given and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. They were, thеrefore, properly admitted into evidence. We also hold that the maximum possible sentence of twelve years imprisonment for simple burglary is not unconstitutionally excessive. Defendants’ convictions and sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.