11 N.C. App. 389 | N.C. Ct. App. | 1971
Appellant contends that the court erred in its findings entered after voir dire as to whether his confession was voluntary, and in allowing into evidence incriminating statements
“Confessions are either voluntary or involuntary. They are called voluntary when made neither under the influence of hope or fear, but are attributable to that love of truth which predominates in the breast of every man, not operated upon by other motives more powerful with him, and which, it is said, in the perfectly good man cannot be countervailed. These confessions are the highest evidences of truth, even in cases affecting life. But it is said, and said with truth, that confessions induced by hope or extorted by fear are, of all kinds of evidence, the least to be relied on, and are therefore entirely to be- rejected.”
The defendant was in custody and without counsel. He had reason to believe that the officer would act as an intercessor with the court in an effort to get his bond reduced. In fact the officer did attempt to contact a judge and the defendant was so advised. The defendant told the officer he had information that would be of value and was told that such information would be appreciated. Although the officer told the defendant that he knew he could not make any promise, he also told him, “If he gave me any information in solving any cases that I would let it be known.” “ [A] confession obtained by the slightest emotions of hope or fear ought to be rejected.” State v. Roberts, supra. The total circumstances surrounding the defendant’s statement to the officer compel us to hold as a matter of law that it was prompted by an “emotion of hope” and thus was involuntary. State v. Fuqua, supra; State v. Woodruff, 259 N.C. 333, 130 S.E. 2d 641; State v. Gibson, 2 N.C. App. 187, 162 S.E. 2d 627. Its admission in evidence was error. Since there must be a new trial, we do not discuss the other assignments of error brought forward by the defendant.
New trial.