425 So. 2d 661 | Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 1983
Lead Opinion
The state charged appellee in Count I of an information with leaving the scene of an accident without fulfilling the requirements of section 316.062, Florida Statutes (1980), contrary to section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1980). Pursuant to rule 3.190(c)(4), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellee filed a motion to dismiss Count I of the information. The sworn statements in support of
(a) On September 3, 1981, the Defendant was operating a Honda motorcycle, license number 227825, which contained one passenger, Linda M. Moneymaker. Linda Moneymaker is a friend of the Defendant’s brother who was living in Nokomis, Florida.
(b) The motorcycle was traveling on Albee Road in Nokomis, Florida, and overtook an automobile traveling in the same direction on that road. After passing the automobile, the motorcycle went onto the right shoulder of Albee Road, then veered back into the right lane of Albee Road. The passenger, Linda Moneymaker, was thrown onto the right shoulder of Albee Road. The motorcycle continued through the right lane into the left lane and went onto its side on the left shoulder of Albee Road.
(c) Cornelia Buster of 107A Sunair Terrace, Nokomis, Florida, testified in depositions that she observed the events described in paragraph B and walked up to the scene. At that time she saw Joe Feguer talking to Linda Moneymaker who was on the ground. The Defendant was attempting to pick up Linda Moneymaker at which time Cornelia Buster told him to leave her alone and that she had called an ambulance.
(d) Rudy Rost of 405 West Albee Road, Nokomis, Florida, observed the Defendant run back to Linda Moneymaker [and] attempt to pick her up[.] [H]e also observed that Linda Moneymaker appeared to be limp and that Defendant appeared to drop her. He also observed the Defendant pick up the motorcycle and place it into the back of a red Datsun pickup truck.
(e) All witnesses then observed the Defendant go back across the road, restart the motorcycle, and travel away from the scene.
(f) C.E. Abbott, of the Florida Highway Patrol, was called to Nokomis at approximately 5:50 p.m. on September 3, 1981. When he arrived, an ambulance was on the scene and Linda Moneymaker was inside of the ambulance. He interviewed the above-mentioned persons at the scene and also attempted to speak to Linda Moneymaker at the hospital. He observed that Linda Moneymaker appeared to be intoxicated and that she indicated that she did not know what happened, that she also gave her name and where she lived, and that the person who was driving the motorcycle was a friend of hers named Bob. Officer Abbott also indicated that Linda Moneymaker appeared to be uncooperative; and that she had been unconscious for approximately two hours.
(g) Defendant, Robert L. Murray, called the Florida Highway Patrol approximately a day and a half later to turn himself in. He stated that the motorcycle ran off the edge of the road and overturned and that he himself was in considerable pain from road burns. He also stated to Officer Abbott or someone at the Florida Highway Patrol that he went to Linda Moneymaker, she told him that she was okay and that he could go.
The state filed no traverse or demurrer, averring instead that the undisputed facts as alleged by the appellee did, in fact, establish a prima facie case of guilt against him. The trial court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss and the state appealed. We reverse.
While most of the argument concerns whether or not appellee rendered all assistance necessary or requested by his injured passenger, we feel that even that was likely a jury question. However, we need not reach that question in order to sustain the charge as set forth in Count I of the information. Section 316.062, among other things, requires that the driver of the vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person shall give the information required in the statute and ex-
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I dissent.
I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the charge. The admitted facts do not establish a prima facie case against appel-lee.
The undisputed facts are that appellee took his brother’s girlfriend on a motorcycle ride. Appellee passed an automobile, lost control of the motorcycle, and the passenger was thrown onto the right shoulder of the road, appellee and the motorcycle coming to rest on the left shoulder. Appellee went back to render aid to the injured passenger, but bystanders advised him not to move her and that an ambulance had been called. Appellee was suffering pain caused by “road burns,” and he did not possess a valid driver’s license. When he inquired of the injured passenger, she advised appellee that she was okay and he could go. Appellee took the motorcycle and left the scene. No police officer had arrived on the scene prior to appellee’s departure.
Section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1981), requires the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in personal injury or death to remain at the scene of the accident until the requirements of section 316.062 are fulfilled. Section 316.062 requires the driver to give his name, address, and vehicle registration number to the owner of damaged property or any injured person, and, if requested, exhibit his driver’s license. Further, such information must be given to any police officer at the scene, and the driver is required to render or secure reasonable assistance to the injured person. Finally, if the injured party is not in condition to receive the information and no police officer is on the scene, the driver should report the accident and give the same information to the nearest police authority.
Under section 316.027(2), any person willfully failing to stop or comply with the foregoing requirements is guilty of a felony.
It is well settled that a statute should be construed so that the result is not absurd or unreasonable, but rather to effectuate the obvious purpose and objective of the legislature. E.g., George v. State, 203 So.2d 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Applying this principle to section 316.027, it is apparent that the objective of the legislature in enacting this statute was the protection of persons who suffered personal injury caused by a driver unknown to them who could not be located and held responsible for the injury in the absence of the statute.
Requiring appellee to provide the injured passenger with his name, address, and vehicle registration number is unreasonable in this case. It was neither requested nor required. The passenger was the girlfriend of appellee’s brother, and the passenger knew appellee; therefore, it was unreasonable and unnecessary for appellee to literally provide the specified identifying information. Under these facts, appellee did not willfully fail to comply with the statutory requirements.
Additionally, appellee was in the process of attending to the injured passenger when he was advised an ambulance was on the way. Thus, appellee complied with that
Section 316.062(2) required appellee to “forthwith” report the accident to the nearest police authority only if the injured party was in no condition to receive the specified information and if no police officer was present. Both conditions must be satisfied. Because the injured party possessed sufficient information (as previously discussed), and further, the facts did not demonstrate she was unable to receive it, it was not necessary that appellee report the accident and supply the information, although he actually did so a day and a half later.
Based on the foregoing reasons, I would AFFIRM the trial court’s dismissal of the charge.
