State v. Murphy

imаtely equal the property value of award- ed to Charles.

Therefore, we portion reverse that of the Appeals reversing decision of the Court of regard the trial court with to Charles’ con- tinuing obligation $10,000pay- to make the May ment due 1984. Our decision is based upon award, the true nature of the not the method of par- identification chosen drafting ties in agreement. their 518.64, (1984) Stat. subd. is therefore inapplicable proceeding. to this part Reversed in with instructions for reinstatement of the trial court’s decision directing payment by Charles Ruud. Frederick, Edina, appel- Rebecca H. lant.

Terry Paul, Hegna, respondent. L. St. AMDAHL, Chief Justice. Minnesota, Respondent, STATE of court, Ruud, By order of this Diane M. Coppens, n.k.a. Diane M. has fur obtained portion

ther review of that of the MURPHY, Appellant. Marshall Donald Appeals’ dealing decision with Charles A. No. C0-84-2128. spousal Ruud’s obligation. maintenance majority panel reversed the trial Court of Minnesota. regard, essentially court in this concluding Jan. remarriage that Diane’s terminated obligation $10,000 pay Charles’ to make a according

ment due to the terms of the

judgment May decree on Ruud, (Minn.App.

Ruud v. 372 N.W.2d 851

1985). part We reverse in and reinstate

the decision of the trial court. dissolution, parties

At the time of the

stipulated spousal to an award of mainte- proper-

nance and a distribution of marital electing

ty, to characterize the first two

$10,000 payments annual as maintenance payments

and the final property two stipulation

distribution. The oral tran- prefaced

scribed in the record is with the indicating parties’

comment intention arrangement integral part

that this anwas property

of the total settlement. This in-

terpretation supported by the fact that aggregate payments added to Diane’s

specific property approx- distribution would Jones, Defender,

C. Paul State Public Rademacher, Brian I. Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, appellant. III, Gen., Humphrey, Atty. H. St. Hubert Paul, Johnson, Hennepin Thomas J. Co. Chief, Atty., Bergstrom, Appel- Vernon E. Section, Jennings, late Paul R. Asst. Co. Minneapolis, Atty., respondent. AMDAHL, Chief Justice. September On defendant Mar- Murphy shall Donald was convicted of first degree murder. Essential to the state’s case was evidence of a confession defend- probation ant made to his officer who was supervising defendant connection with an unrelated matter. This confession was subject pretrial litigation of extensive ruling by which included a the United Court that the confession meaning was not within the privilege against compelled self-incrimi- nation under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. appeals

L.Ed.2d 409 Defendant judgment urging: from the of conviction (1) the confession was obtained in violation privilege against compelled of his self-in- crimination under article section 7 of the Constitution; (2) the evidence prove rape required was insufficient to felony murder statute under which convicted; (3) he was the evidence was prove the homicide took insufficient (4) place occurring; “while” the third- refusal to submit the trial court’s were gather unable to enough evidence on degree charge murder as a lesser included offense which to defendant. trial; (5) denied defendant a fair pled defendant guilty to a responded improperly ques-

trial court to a charge imprisonment of false in connection jury, depriving tion from the defendant of prosecution with a for criminal sexual con- a fair trial. We affirm. duct unrelated to this matter. He was sentenced to years’ probation On October Sherrie Cole and Mara eventually Widseth appointed as his friend, McGee, her teenagers, Pam both probation officer. ‍‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‍probation The terms of accompanied man, defendant and another included that pursue a course of twenties, both their a bar South House,1 Alpha treatment at report to his Minneapolis. midnight, Cole, McGee, Near directed, officer as she and “be and defendant left the bar and walked to truthful” with her “in all matters.” Fail- away. McGee’s home several blocks Leav- ure to comply with this order could consti- there, ing McGee and Cole grounds tute for probation. revocation of approxi- walked off toward Cole’s house In July Widseth discovered that mately away. 12 blocks defendant had discontinued his course of bridgeworker On November treatment, but after discussing the matter nude, found Cole’s partially decomposed him, with she decided that treatment was body covered with brush on the south bank longer no necessary. September 1981, of the railroad tracks near 29th Street and Alpha an therapist House informed Wid- Minneapolis. Cedar Avenue in South This seth that defendant had during admitted area is located between McGee’s house and therapy that he had committed a and clothing Cole’s house. Cole’s was scat- murder in 1974 charged but was never tered about the area and no identification lack of evidence. After Widseth discussed A pathologist was found. concluded that superior information with her and de- strangulation manual was the cause of termined that she must turn it over to the placed death and ap- time of death at police, she sent a letter to defendant which proximately weeks before the body read, plan “To further discuss a treatment was discovered. He noted several wounds your probation, for the remainder of I am hand, on her left caused a sharp instru- requesting you that upon your contact me ment, he characterized as “defensive receipt [up] of this letter to appoint- set an wounds.” Cole had also been cut on the ment.” chin and forehead jaw and her was frac- Defendant met with Widseth in her pathologist placed tured. The the time of office in September. late She confronted injuries shortly at or before death. A defendant with the information she had sexual assault negative; examination was anger received and he reacted that with presence sperm test for the impossi- therapist had breached his confidence. He ble due to the condition body. calling attorney. said he felt like an Wid- questioned Police officers defendant con- responded seth he would have to deal cerning Cole’s death on three occasions. that outside of the office her and that Although defendant’s roommate had possibility main concern was the that de turned police over con- notebook fendant need further treаtment would be taining Cole’s identification relationship cards which he cause of the between the two attic, found in his and they defendant’s incidents.2 Alpha House is a treatment center for sex testified that he believed he should have an offenders. attorney present. assuming defendant’s Even true, version to be since the confession was not hearing,

2. At the omnibus Widseth testified that during interrogation, obtained a custodial Min- she understood defendant’s statement not as an 1144; Murphy, nesota v. 104 S.Ct. at counsel, request immediate but as a means Murphy, and formal against therapist of recourse for the breach initiated, judicial proceedings had nоt been Defendant, however, of defendant’s confidence. Widseth in Defendant tried to dissuade case to be a Const, him imposing against more treatment on from witness himself.” Minn. maintaining innocence on the false im- provision 7. The is identical art. to the prisonment charge arguing clause in the fifth amend- self-incrimination heavy drug rape-murder arose from his use ment to the United States Constitution. He then which he had since discontinued. Although power this court has the rape-murder in detail. confessed to the provide rights individual under the broader urged defendant to turn himself Widseth permitted than are Constitution police he refused. then but She Constitution, under the United States gave police and de- this information Robins, Pruneyard Shopping Center v. fendant was arrested. 2035, 2040-41, hearing, defendant At the omnibus (1980); Johnson, L.Ed.2d 741 O’Connor suppress moved to evidence of the confes- (Minn.1979), we de ground it was sion on the obtained cline to do so this case. Our first deci violation of his fifth amendment entirely sion in this case was based on our under self-incrimination reading of United States The trial the United States Constitution. construing the federal constitution. cases court denied defendant’s motion but certi- Murphy, 324 N.W.2d at See State important question fied the to this Court primarily relied on Roberts We under Minn.R.Crim.P. 28.03. doubtful States, 552, 100 445 U.S. United the and remanded We reversеd trial court (1980), in the 63 L.Ed.2d 622 Court holding, as a matter of the case for trial declared: law, probation federal constitutional the of- privilege against The Fifth Amendment ficer’s failure to warn defendant of his is not self-incrimination self- questioned rights constitutional before she executing. govern- At least where the him bars the use of his confession at trial. ment has no substantial reason to be- Murphy, v. at 344. State requested lieve that the disclosures are grant- Supreme The United States Court incriminating, the likely to be petition ed the state’s for a writ of certiora- may upon unless it is in- not be relied Murphy, ri and reversed. Minnesota v. timely voked in a fashion. Supreme The held 104 S.Ct. 1136. Court (emphasis at 1363-64 Id. in that the confession was not obtained a added). exception We concluded that “an setting not coercive and was must be made on the facts of this case to meaning within the of the fifth amend- general requiring timely the rule a claim of tried, ment. Id. at 1149. The case was the privilege.” Murphy, 324 the through confession admitted Widseth’s tes- N.W.2d at 344. timony, and defendant was convicted first-degree murder. Defendant jury of Supreme The our decision Court reversed appeals judgment from the entered. probation officer’s and held that “the knowledge bearing and intent have no on challenge primary 1. Defendant’s the оutcome of this case.” Minnesota v. to his is that the evidence of his conviction Court, The Murphy, 104 S.Ct. at 1145. under confession to Widseth is inadmissible clear, therefore, has made as a matter now 7 of the Minnesota Consti section article law, the in- of federal constitutional that properly tution. This issue is before us as knowledge government offi- tent or of prior ruling solely rested on federal our bearing a self-in- cial has no on whether grounds. Murphy, State criminating will be deemed at 345. The Minnesota statement 324 N.W.2d * * provides, person “compelled.” “No shall Constitution (8th Cir.1983); City questioning by Widseth did not violate defend 710 F.2d of Marsyla, right to counsel under either the fifth or Burnsville аnt’s Fitterer, (Minn. 1984). States v. sixth amendments. See United raped since previously alley, We have noted that he raped her. After he her he federal self-incrimination con up. and state stood When up he stood he looked identical, provisions stitutional are a United back her. He at said that she looked so interpretation of the Supreme States Court scared he that then killed her.” lay- To a provision per is of inherently federal person, especially one convicted of a sex-re- suasive, although compelling, force. offense, “rape” lated the word means non- (Minn. Fuller, sexual Ample consensual intеrcourse. evi- 1985). dence corroborates the conclusion that de- raped fendant in fact legal Cole within the question Our thus becomes whether First, meaning of the word. he told Wid- unique relationship probation between raped seth he Cole and then “stood light as seen in er officer Second, up.” all clothing of Cole’s had philosophy of the Minnesota criminal Finally, body been removed. Cole’s re- justice system requires adopt us to a view signs violence, vealed considerable in- contrary expressed by to that the United cluding jaw, lacerations, a fractured facial Supreme very this case. States defensive-tyрes on wounds her hands. conclude that it does not and we thus We interpretation given by hold We note the statute effect at the privi Court of the United time required of Cole’s death a conviction lege against self-incrimination under the first-degree murder for who one “[claus- provision federal constitutional is also being es the of a death human while com- correct statement of the law under article mitting attempting rape or to commit 1, section 7 of the Constitution. sodomy with force or violence.” Minn.Stat. 609.185(2)(1974) added). (emphasis second is that Defendant’s claim clearly supports, very least, evidence was evidence thеre insufficient finding attempted rape. of an wrongfully case and he therefore first-degree felony-murder. convicted Defendant’s third contention is challenge, inter reviewing we must prove that the evidence was insufficient to light the favor pret the evidence in most raping he killed Cole “while” he was her. Parker, 353 the verdict. State v. able (1974). 609.185(2) Minn.Stat. Min § 122, (Minn.1984). con N.W.2d 127 If we nesota, felony-murder applicable the rule is * * * “acting that the re jury, clude with due “felony killing where the and the are presumption of and gard the innocence parts one transaction.” of continuous proof necessity overcoming by the it of State, 680, v. N.W.2d Kochevar 281 686 doubt, beyond a could reasonable reason (Minn.1979). case, In this defendant killed ably proven conclude that immediately rape the following Cole con reviewing guilty charged, of the a offense killing ceal his crime. This falls within the its court will not disturb verdict.” v. as the rape same continuous criminal act 48, 52, Norgaard, 272 Minn. 136 N.W.2d scope and falls within of our felo thus the 628, (1965). 632 ny-murder Many statute.3 states have ei rape establishing felony-murder The is ther or abolished the evidence a limited People policy testified that defend rule for reasons. v. Aar substantial. Widseth See on, 672, 45-85, alley at nn. 299 ant told her he forced Cole into an 409 Mich. 699-707 & 304, (1980) knifepoint: that the 312-16 ‍‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‍nn. 45-85 “He said while there in N.W.2d & denied, 935, 326, (Del.1966), recognize felony- jurisdictions 386 U.S. Most the 332 cert. 961, killing (1967); support murder doctrine the view that a 17 L.Ed.2d State v. 87 S.Ct. 807 trying felony escape 155, (1973). one from or conceal a Perry, Mont. P.2d 113 161 505 where no break of there has been in the chain Thus, though felony may underlying the even felony killing events between and the is the may ap complete, felony-murder still the rule scope felony-murder within the the rule. ply. E.g., Lashley, Kan. 664 233 E.g., Bizup People, 150 P.2d v. Colo. 371 Commonwealth, (1983); P.2d Haskell v. 1358 denied, cert. 9 371 (1978). 243 S.E.2d Va. State, (1962); Parson v. A.2d L.Ed.2d 5. Defendant’s final claim is that he thorough discussion (setting forth however, re- has a fair trial because the trial trend). legislature, was denied Our felony- responding question to a scope of the court erred in cently expanded the adding during felonies In its jury several from the deliberations. murder statute statute, instructions, said, Act of trial court “The first-degree murder final the 227, 9, 30, 1981, 1981 Minn.Laws provide c. that whoever April statutes of § 609.185(3) (codified being at Minn.Stat. death of a human causes the while § killing during a (1984)), upgrading committing attempting or to commit from third-to felonies guilty of other is sodomy commission or with force violence Id., 10, 1981 second-degree degree.” murder. in the first The court § of murder (codified at Minn.Stat. Minn.Laws 1010 term After did not define the “while.” 609.19(2) (1984)). holding Today’s con- time, deliberating jury the sent the short intent. legislative clear forms with question asking for а definition of court a objection, the Over defendant’s “while.” challenges the 4. Defendant also jury, the “This means de- court instructed third-degree court’s refusal submit trial part of one continuous fendant’s acts were jury as a lesser-ineluded murder to the act.”4 what, if offense. The determination submitted to any, lesser offenses should be It is well established discretion of jury lies with the sound discretion, judge may, give in his addi trial court, State, 278 trial LaMere v. response jury’s to a instructions in tional (Minn.1979),but where the N.W.2d point question on of law. Minn.R. instruction, it such an evidence warrants 26.03, 19(3). The court has subd. Crim.P. Lee, given. State must be amplify decide whether to the discretion to ap to be (Minn.1979). The test 896, 899 instructions, previous in previous reread provides the evidence plied is whether structions, give response no at all. Id. acquittal an on a rational basis for placed on the trial only real limitation on the charged and a conviction offense may additional instruction court is that the Leinweber, lesser offense. State given in such a manner as to lead not be 120, 125-26 228 N.W.2d supplants wholly that it jury to believe Therefore, (1975). proof the elements corresponding portion original crimes must be differentiate two charge. Chicago, Rock Island Strobel jury may sufficiently dispute so that a Co., 255 Minn. Railroad & Pacific Adams, 295 this distinctiоn. State v. make 204-05, 195, 199 Natu (Minn.1980). preferable it that the court deliver rally, jury argues Defendant original charge, complete and concise but engaged in indecent have found he could confused, instructions jury if a additional Cole, rape, which would with liberties given may clarifying previously those felo third-degree an element constitute justice appropriate since “the interests 609.195(2)(1974). Minn.Stat. ny-murder. jury a full under require that have above, clearly sup noted the evidence As standing and the rules of law of the case finding raped ports a that to the facts under deliberation.” applicable or vio attempted Cole with force 19, Henderson, 16, Minn. Stayberg v. 277 proof offered no lence and defendant 290, (1967). 292 this uncontro- mere sexual contact rebut given in case McDonald, Both instructions verted evidence. See 705, of the law. The 320, 321, correct statements 706 were N.W.2d merely was a clarifica de second instruction (1977). properly denied The trial court practice first. While the better tion of the request. fendant’s quest Defense counsel asserted in originally requested at that time. was an instruction 4. This argument jury closing should define jury that by part instruc- his as a of the final the state however, “during" court, the time." or "at the re- "while" as denied tions. The trial would have been to include clаrifying United States Constitution and could be instruction charge, in the final we do not against used him in a prosecution. criminal believe that the jury instructions to the as Minnesota v. Murphy, 420, 465 U.S. given prejudicial created a error. See S.Ct. (1984). L.Ed.2d 409 Void, 56, Rauk v. 63, 268 Minn. 127 After by remand this court and before trial 687, Even had defense began, Murphy timely suppress moved to argued counsel the effect of the clarifying his probation statements to his officer on instruction, the outcome would have been the basis they were obtained viola- the same. I, tion of article section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution.

Affirmed. Today majority that, holds the feder- J., WAHL, dissents. al and staue self-incrimination WAHL, Justiсe, dissenting. provisions constitutional being identical, nothing in the philosophy of the Min- The crux appeal of this is whether the justice nesota system regard confession of Murphy Marshall Donald was unique relationship proba- between obtained in privilege violation of his against probation tioner and officer requiring a I, self-incrimination under article result, contrary “the interpretation given section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution. Supreme the United States We decided Court of the Murphy on the basis privilege law, of federal holding constitutional self-incrimination under the federal Murphy’s part provision failure on to claim the is also a privilege against correct self-incrimination when he statement of the law under article 1, questioned by probation section 7 of officer the Minnesota Constitution.” without warnings Majority, Miranda did at 771. I not bar his must respectfully dis- later privilege reliance on the agree. when he prior Our own interpreting cases sought suppression of I, his confession. 324 article section support 7 do not either the (Minn.1982). recog We substance or breadth of holding. such a nized, Supreme Ohio, as had the Court of heavy psychological pressure on I. released offenders inquiries answer The majority opinion, quoting State v. supervising made their officers is suffi Fuller, (Minn.1985), 374 N.W.2d 722 recog cient interrogation to render the inherently nizes authority this court is the final on (citing coercive. Id. at 343 State v. Gal interpretation and enforcement of our state lagher, 38 Ohio St.2d 313 N.E.2d Though constitution. we have on occasion (1974), granted, cert. 420 U.S. found the views of the United States Su 761, remanded, 43 L.Ed.2d preme persuasive, obliged we are not 47 L.Ed.2d on adopt the United remand, Court’s 46 Ohio St.2d 348 N.E.2d 336 construction of a (1976)). pro federal constitutional We relied on the facts that interpreting vision in our own constitution meeting probation with the officer was if language even the of a compulsory, that state constitution Murphy was under cоurt Op al is identical. respond truthfully order to See State v. to his (S.Dak. perman, 247 questions, officer’s N.W.2d 674-75 and that the officer had 1976). Fleming Nordby substantial reason to believe Commentators Murphy’s an- meaning incriminating. swers would be 324 have noted that should N.W.2d “[identical Court, Supreme implied merely at 344. The United not be there is because iden decision, reversing our language.” Fleming Nordby, concluded “since tical & The Murphy revealed incriminating ‘‘Wrapt information Rights: Minnesota Bill in the ” 51, timely asserting Mist, instead of Fifth his Old 7 Ham.L.Rev. 68 Miasmal (1984). ‍‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‍privilege, Stanley Amendment They quote disclosures were Justice Mosk compelled Supreme incriminations” under the of the California Court: 774 long аccepted

It is a fiction Froiseth, too self-incrimination. State v. 16 provisions (Gil. 260) (1871).1 textually state constitutions Minn. 296 Not until 1892 Rights identical to the Bill of were in- did the United States Court hold tended provided to mirror their federal counter- the federal protection constitution part. against history grand lesson of is otherwise: jury self-incrimination to wit- the Bill Rights upon Hitchcock, was based nesses. Counselman v. 142 corresponding 547, 195, provisions (1892). of the first 35 L.Ed. 1110 constitutions, state rather than the re- Similarly, Minnesota’s law on waiver of verse. privilege against compelled self-incrimi (quoting Brisendine, Id. at 68-69 People developed nation independently of federal 528, 550, 315, 329, Cal.Rptr. 13 Cаl.3d interpretation. constitutional The state 1099, 1113, (1975)). 531 P.2d privilege against Those first compelled constitutions, I, claimed, state and article section 7 self-incrimination is absolute when Constitution, embody may Falcone, the Minnesota our but be waived. See State v. abiding people 365, belief (1972); as a the state 292 Minn. 195 N.W.2d 572 permitted Ioseu, cannot be 283, to obtain a criminal 220 Minn. 19 N.W.2d by compelled (1945). conviction words from privilege may This be waived mouth of the accused. guaranty,” orally, writing, “This conduct. State v. said, 181, 184, we have zealously Berry, “courts should 298 Minn.

guard.” Rixon, (1974).2 effective, 180 Minn. A waiver is how (1930). ever, Long 231 N.W. only be- if found to have been made “taking fore the Fifth” voluntarily became a familiar understanding and with a clear phrase, interpret- household possible consequences. court was It Id. must I, ing article section 7 of Minnesota’s con- wholly be made “in a frame mind ‘free ” stitution, in the context of Iosue, whether a crimi- from compulsion.’ sense of quashed nal indictment must be because it 220 Minn. at at 741. Invol testimony untariness, was based on of the accused prevents which effective waiver grand jury state, obtained a proceeding, may with- in this physical result from com out reference to the fifth pulsion, e.g. personal amendment of fear for safety or the federal constitution. In 1871 this compulsion, pоtential court mental as where a against set aside an indictment believing defendant is mistaken in he or subpoened by grand jury and examined she has been immunity assured of for testi as charge against a witness as to a criminal fying grand before the jury. Berry, 298 him. 235; We held an indictment obtained in Minn. at see also Gardiner, these circumstances violated the state con- State v. 88 Minn. 92 N.W. protection against compelled stitutional 529.3 Where an accused is Gardiner, (arti 1. In State we made clear that the nal case to be a witness himself.’ I, guarantee 7)." Rixon, against compelled state constitutional cle 180 Minn. at 231 N.W. (citations omitted). Rixon, incrimination “must receive a liberal construc at 218. the de tion, personal rights may to the end required by subpoena ap fendants had been pear protected." deputies 88 Minn. 92 N.W. before of the State Fire Marshall Furthermore, guar questions implicating that constitutional and answer them in ar only protects person being quashed antee "not from son. This court an indictment based give tending transcription interrogation direct evidence aon of that that had guilt, giving any given establish his grand jury. but also from been circumstance or- link in the chain of evidence may 2. Whether a waiver has been made is a factual tend to convict him of a crime.” Id. By we Berry, considered it "settled law" in the determination. 298 Minn. at grand jury by subpoena state that "where a N.W.2d at 234. compels testify the accused to attend and con cerning necessary his connection with the crime under It is not that the defendant has been waiver, investigation, intentionally ap- an indictment returned such misled to induce a jury against Gardiner, quashed, pears such accused will be be to have been the case in to be thus, guaranty involuntarily cause in violation of our constitutional found to have acted un- law, person compelled any that no ‘shall be in crimi der Minnesota to be unable to make an

775 may testify, testimony privilege nоt be used the the when excused he or later she procedure prevent criminal against him or her in a wants to use incriminating the knowing, voluntary and intelli- in prosecution. unless this statements a criminal Min gent affirmatively waiver is shown. v. 104 Murphy, nesota S.Ct. at 1143.4 contrast, In approaches the line decisions of the These different —whether Supreme compulsion Court on the presumed, United States loss of lack of is under privilege constitution, federal constitutional the federal or affirm must be shown, the atively self-incrimination ‍‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‍stands for as under this consti state’s compul- proposition that if a witness under tution —are also reflected in different Min testify sion incriminating to makes an dis- nesota and warnings federal rules as to the claiming privilege, closure instead of the rights of constitutional given that must be government having grand the is viewed as not witnesses before a jury. In Min “compelled” nesota, the if grand incrimination. Garner v. jury poten witness is a States, 648, 654-55, defendant, 424 96 prosecutor United U.S. tial the advise must 1178, 1182-83, (1976) prior S.Ct. 47 L.Ed.2d 370 the witness questioning to he or (discussing Kordel, may United v. 397 be implicated by States she testimony the 1, 7-10, 767-69, 763, U.S. 90 25 legal and should seek concerning advice (1970)). compulsion L.Ed.2d 1 to rights. Falcone, Lack 292 Minn. speak presumed 373, is federal under constitu- at 577. Incriminating at grand jury tional law. to testimony may chooses be used the “[I]f witness] [а answer, prosecution his choice is considered to be vol- in only a later criminal trial untary since he to claim privi- was free the where the trial court finds the defendant * * lege v. 104 Murphy, testifying grand was warned before to the voluntarily S.Ct. at 1143. Because failure to claim the jury immunity and waived privilege knowing is considered sufficient in or- testimony might that the lead to dinary prove compulsion, case to no no indictment and be admissible at a subse knowing intelligent or privi- quent waiver criminal trial. Id. at 195 lege contrast, be “Our at By need shown. cases do not N.W.2d in United knowing reflect an uncritical demand for a Washington, States States United intelligent every in Suprеme grand jury waiver situation that a stated person where a has to con- who potential failed invoke a witness is a defendant need protection.” testifying stitutional warned indict Schneckloth not be before Bustamonte, 218, 235, 412 U.S. 93 criminal result S.Ct. ment and conviction could 2041, 2052, (1973). Only incriminating testimony. L.Ed.2d from U.S. 181, 186, 189, 1819-20, where be circumstances can shown which 97 S.Ct. “impermissibly a free to it foreclose choice 52 L.Ed.2d Nor need grand jury knowingly remain silent” is a witness’ failure that a witness to claim shown right voluntarily right effective waiver of the not to be waived the incrimi to Berry, to self-incriminate. 298 Minn. at charge. nate himself a new clear, however, made N.W.2d at 235. We have prosеcutor may that a not use devious to means United identi- 4. The Court has immunity potential waiver of from the obtain a situations which fied certain well-defined grand jury testimony for deny some identifiable factor held to " prosecutor against the later offers as evidence admit, deny, a 'free choice individual Falcone, accused at a criminal trial. Murphy, to refuse answer.’” Minnesota v. Murphy’s at probation murder, at 577. case California, (quoting Lisenha v. 104 S.Ct. officer, questioning him about 280, 292, 62 S.Ct. 86 L.Ed. 314 (1941)). purpose him her for told sole the inter inherently set- These include coercive rogation was to determine further need e.g. interrogation tings, custodial as in Miranda treatment, though previously she had decided Arizona, 384 U.S. supervisor go she with her would (1966), 16 L.Ed.2d 694 or where assertion police conduct, she This information obtained. Gamer, penalized, as in proper probationary pur while U.S. at 96 S.Ct. at poses, legal implications has different with re gard Murphy knowingly issue of whether regarding privilege against compelled questions the self-incrimination. fronted him with his waived er, murder, Garn at 654 n. a Murphy commission of it is clear federal against 96 S.Ct. at 1182 n. 9. Under the privilege have claimed could the constitution, whether, only con the is test compelled under either incrimination the circumstances, sidering totality the of thе the federal or state constitution. See Min free of the can shown to the will witness 1143, 1148; Murphy, at nesota Rogers overborne. v. Rich have been Rixon, Minn. at at 231 N.W. 217- mond, 365 U.S. privilege by 18. He did claim the re summary, under 5 L.Ed.2d fusing probation to answer the officer’s law, compulsion federal must be affirm the questions responded, truthfully but instead law, Minnesota atively proved while under presume, required by probation as his we affirmative is that must be it voluntariness circumstances, were order. Under these ly shown. incriminating compelled for his statements purposes of article section 7? II. Murphy federal law Under case, involving interroga- Murphy’s This by privilege lost his fifth amendment fail by probation and the use of tion his officer ing assert it to and the United Su incriminating there- statements obtained preme has the found circum as the of his criminal indictment from basis were not to overbear stances such as his conviction, cases analogous and is to our will, thereby excusing his failure to free interrogations jury wit- involving grand of law, privilege. the assert Under incriminating the use of state- nesses and however, warning,5 or a with without of therefrom as the basis ments obtained prove Murphy must waived his against indictments those witness- criminal section 7 com article Rixon, analogous where a It is to es. voluntarily, pelled with a self-incrimination transcriptiоn interrogation of an under sub- understanding possible clear of conse fire poena by accused arsonists state of wholly and in a mind quences frame of free deputies to and marshall’s was submitted Berry, of compulsion. from sense by grand jury their crimi- used obtain 184-85, 234; Iosue, Minn. at 214 N.W.2d at 231 N.W. nal indictment. 295-96, Minn. at 19 N.W.2d at 741. Murphy was an order Murphy testified did not feel free to that he probation court to the district meet with his meeting leave when confronted because summoned officer when where she have the conditions that would violated probation was an official him. His officer probation his He testified that he order. of the She had ad- representative court. refusе right did not know he had a him, July letter vised probation questions answer officer’s up an to contact her and set his failure answering an attorney to consult before requested appointment as would result proba He testified his them. that because immediate order for his arrest and a an put tion officer the entire conversation in probation hearing. Like those revocation context of what a future treatment Gardiner, Froiseth, accused witnesses be, plan for him it did not occur to should Rixon, by oath to who were police truth, go him that she would with Murphy under court tell he said. further that he what He stated probation all of offi- order to answer before her setting, had had two officers questions truthfully. In this cer’s police gone had meeting probation offi- and neither ever required with his credibility anything he unexpectedly at she said. cer in her office which by the rights testimony strengthened con- fail warning of his and without warned, though being they interrogated by Even were the fire mar- 5. Before incriminating testimony deputies, based in Rixon were indictments on shall's accused having quashed incriminating questions accused been need not were warned that Minn, compelled. Id. N.W. at be answered. 180 ure of the officer to advise Mur

phy rights against compelled of his incrimi she interroga

nation before conducted the knowing, voluntary, intelligent

tion. A presumed

waiver cannot be and has not affirmatively

been shown in this case.

Murphy’s statements are incrimi-

nations under article section 7 of the

Minnesota Constitution and cannot serve as

the basis of his criminal conviction. ‍‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‍A re ground required

versal on this and the

case remanded a new trial. Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE of Ray DANIELS, Appellant.

Leonard

No. CX-85-249.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Murphy

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Jan 31, 1986

Citation: 380 N.W.2d 766

Docket Number: C0-84-2128

Court Abbreviation: Minn.