3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 297 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1965
Following a trial before a jury, the defendant was found guilty of the crime of evading responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of § 14-224 of the General Statutes, and has appealed. The defendant has assigned six errors, the first of which is directed toward a denial by the court of the defendant’s motion to strike fourteen paragraphs from the finding; four of the claimed errors attack portions of the court’s charge to the jury; and the final assignment alleges error in the court’s failure to rule upon certain exceptions to the
Soon after the court had concluded its instructions and the jury had retired, the presiding judge heard the defendant’s statement and exceptions and then declared the noon recess, announcing that during the lunch hour he would consider two of the points raised hy the defendant and make his decision known at the end of the recess. Seven minutes after the jury had reconvened, they signified that they had reached their verdict, and the court remarked, “I’ll note your exceptions” and proceeded to the verdict. The defendant’s claim appears to be that some ruling was needed by the court other than the mere noting of an exception. No request to charge had been filed. The purpose of the rule pertaining to exceptions to the charge (Practice Book § 249) “is to alert the court to any claims of error while there is still an opportunity for correction, thereby avoiding the economic waste and increased court congestion caused by unnecessary retrials.” Towhill v. Kane, 147 Conn. 191, 193. Further instructions can then be given if the court, in its discretion, deems them necessary. D’Addario v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 142 Conn. 251, 256. The action of the trial judge amounted to a refusal to instruct the jury further, and he did not abuse his discretion in refusing to do so. The exceptions taken by the defendant fully protected his right to pursue his claims of error on appeal, as he has done in his other assignments of error.
In his first assignment the defendant asserts error in the court’s refusal to strike from the finding fourteen of the twenty-three paragraphs containing the state’s offers of evidence and claims of proof. The reason stated is that, although the defendant had complied with the rules in filing a draft finding, the
The defendant has pointed to no authority on the proposition that failure of the state to file a counter-finding requires that the statement of the prosecution’s claims of proof contained in the court’s finding should be stricken. Under the rules for the Supreme Court of Errors, failure or refusal to file a counter-finding may be penalized by the trial court by the imposition of costs not to exceed $25. Practice Book § 615; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 150. No such penalty is provided for in the rules applicable to the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court. Where neither the appellant nor the appellee files a statement of what each offered evidence to prove and claims to have proved, the trial court should either require the parties to comply with the rules or refuse to make a finding, and in the latter case the
The finding, for the purpose of testing the charge and the rulings on the evidence, may be stated
The defendant offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved the following: His car came to an immediate stop after contact with the Miller car. Smith came to the defendant’s car while it was stopped and while the defendant remained seated in it. There was a discussion about settling. The defendant gave Smith his name and spelled it, and his address, and indicated that he could be reached by telephone. Neither Smith nor the defendant asked for or was shown the registration or license of the other. There was no claim of injury to person or property by anyone at the scene of the accident. The defendant did not observe any damage to the Miller car or to any person. Neither the person who had made the left turn nor anyone from the neighborhood was attracted to the scene of the collision. Both cars were operable immediately after the collision. No claim was made of the influence of alcoholic liquor upon any person at the scene of the collision.
The four remaining assignments of error are all directed to the court’s charge to the jury. In the first of these (second assignment of error) the defendant claims error because the court failed to instruct the jury that among the elements of the
In the third assignment the defendant claims error in the following instruction of the court: “So, I charge you as a matter of law that even though this operator [the defendant] had given his name and address, if you found he did give his name and address, that is not sufficient under the statute, but you must further find that he gave his operator’s license and registration number or he would be in violation of the statute.” The defendant argues that the statute requires only identification so that the parties may later find and communicate with each other, and that this was sufficiently accomplished by the defendant. In support of his position the defendant cites State v. Verrill, 120 Me. 41 (1921). The statute there involved (Me. Rev. Stat. c. 26, § 38 [1916], as amended) required only that a person causing injury to person or property “ [make] himself known.” Our statute, § 14-224, is positive, clear, and mandatory in the specific directions it imposes upon a person coming within the scope of its operation. The defendant, who knowingly was involved in an accident which caused injury to the property and person of another, failed to stop and render such
The fourth assignment requires little comment. The court stated that the operator of the Miller car went to the defendant’s car and asked certain information which presumably the state claimed was relevant to the accident, to exchange licenses and registrations, “et cetera.” The presumption as to what conversation took place was a misstatement of the state’s claims of proof. No issue, however, is raised on the ground that this presumption might have been accepted by the jury as a correct reference to a fact. The initial error charged under this assignment is that the court exonerated the driver of the Miller car from the duty of giving his name, address, license and registration numbers as required by the statute. Whatever may have been said concerning this matter in the brief interval when the two operators faced each other is deserving only of casual notice. The significant fact is that in the state’s claims of proof, contained in the finding and supported by the evidence, the defendant sped away and was pursued by the driver of the Miller car in order that this driver, Smith, might ascertain the defendant’s registration number, and Smith reported all these events to the police and also complied with all the other statutory requirements during his appearance at the police station. The other error charged in the same assignment is the court’s
The final assignment relates to the portion of the charge having reference to the three martinis the defendant testified he consumed some time before the accident. This evidence came in without objection, and it was the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to how they were to consider it. The court charged as follows: “Now, on the other hand, the defendant has taken the stand and says that after having gone to church, he stopped at this restaurant and had three martinis and there is an anomalous situation here, because if you find three martinis so stunned his senses that he didn’t know that he was involved in an accident, then, of course, the other part of the statute (knowledge) would fail. But I don’t believe that the defendant has made that claim. But it is for you, an element for you, to consider in the disposition of this case. Now, on the other hand, the operator of an automobile who partakes of alcoholic liquor, the State would have you draw other conclusions, but since the State didn’t make any claim on that, I think the Prosecutor’s words were, ‘I’ll leave it to your conclusion as to what you think in connection with the operator having had drinks
The court’s instruction on the bearing the consumption of liquor might have had on the question of knowledge that the defendant was involved in an accident was substantially correct and, in the absence of any request for a specific charge, was as favorable to the defendant as he was entitled to. The reason for the exception taken by the defendant — that this was the limit to which the jury could go — was not accurate. There was no prosecution on the charge of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and no claim of such operation was made by the state; therefore, no harm to the defendant can be shown on the mere surmise that the fact of such operation entered into the jury’s calculations. The court could have with propriety instructed the jury that if the drinks the defendant testified to rendered him more or less under the influence of liquor they had the right to consider it in connection with the question as to whether, at the time and place of the collision, he was in a condition to observe, remember, and later to recall and report accurately the events as they happened. This would, of course, have a bearing on the credibility to be accorded by the jury to the defendant’s testimony. The casual reference to the prosecutor’s statement affords us no ground for further examination, since the prosecutor’s statement is not before us. While this particular portion of the charge, dealing with consumption of liquor, could have been more precise and provided more definite guidelines for the jury, it does not appear that the defendant was in any way prejudiced. The issues in controversy were clear and easily comprehended; the elements of the offense were adequately stated and analyzed; and
There is no error.
In this opinion Jacobs and Cicala, Js., concurred.
“Sec. 14-224. evading responsibility in operation oe motor vehicles, racing, (a) Each person operating a motor vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident which causes injury, whether or not resulting in death, to any other person or injury or damage to property shall at once stop and render such assistance as may be needed and shall give his name, address and operator’s license and registration number to the person injured or to the owner of the injured or damaged property, or to any officer or witness to the death of any person or to the injury to person or injury or damage to property . . . .”