786 N.E.2d 911 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2003
{¶ 2} Defendant-Appellant, Mack Mullins ("Appellant"), appeals his conviction and sentence by the Henry County Common Pleas Court for two counts of third-degree gross sexual imposition, violations of R.C.
{¶ 3} Facts and procedural posture pertinent to the issues raised on appeal are as follows. On December 8, 1999, Appellant was indicted on two counts of gross sexual imposition for actions involving a child under the age of thirteen, felonies of the third degree. After his initial appearance before the trial court, Appellant was released on his own recognizance. Thereafter, Appellant waived the reading of the indictment and entered not guilty pleas to both charges.
{¶ 4} On March 23, 2000, Appellant moved to suppress a confession made to police, claiming that it was not voluntarily given and was illegally obtained in light of the
{¶ 5} Thereafter, on May 16, 2002, Appellant moved to dismiss the charges brought against him, maintaining that his rights to a speedy trial pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 6} Subsequently, Appellant withdrew his previous not guilty pleas and entered pleas of no contest to both charges. Following a June 26, 2002 hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty on both counts of gross sexual imposition and sentenced him to a period of incarceration not less than three years nor more than ten years on both counts to be served concurrently. From this decision, Appellant appeals, asserting a single assignment of error for our consideration.
{¶ 7} Assignment of Error I
{¶ 8} "The trial court committed prejudicial error and abused its discretion in finding that Appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated and overruling Appellant's motion to dismiss."
{¶ 9} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant contends that his speedy trial rights were violated by a period of unnecessary delay following the filing of his motion to suppress. A criminal defendant's fundamental right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the
{¶ 10} Notwithstanding, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 11} When considering the reasonableness of time taken by a trial court to rule on a defense motion, we must take into account the particular circumstances of the case, including the factual and legal complexities involved and the time constraints of the particular trial judge's schedule.8 In this case, Appellant's suppression motion was filed on March 23, 2000, and the trial court did not rule on the motion until March 20, 2002, a nearly two-year delay. As noted, a hearing was held on the motion and briefs were filed by the parties in relation thereto. The State argues that there is only one common pleas court judge in Henry County and that the legal and factual issues surrounding the motion were particularly complex; however, we find nothing in the record to support a finding that any of these circumstances caused this inordinately long delay.
{¶ 12} A total of 832 days elapsed between Appellant's arraignment and the filing of his motion to dismiss. Of those days, 635 were apparently devoted to *86
ruling on Appellant's suppression motion. The trial court failed to journalize an explanation for the delay. Accordingly, we find that the trial court's delay in considering Appellant's motion violated his right to a speedy trial.9 Moreover, the trial court erred by failing to grant Appellant's motion to dismiss, as required by R.C.
{¶ 13} Consequently, Appellant's assignment of error is hereby sustained.
{¶ 14} Having found error prejudicial to Appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded. BRYANT, P.J., and SHAW, J., concur.
