Luсille Mulkey appealed her conviction for arson, enumerating as error the admission of oral testimony by a fire safety specialist describing ignition tests which the expert conductеd several years prior to the date of the alleged crime. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding in the fourth division of its opinion that the state violated OCGA § 17-7-211 (Code Ann. § 27-1303) by failing to provide the defendant with a written report of the tests at least ten days before trial.
Mulkey v. State,
In the course of determining whether Mulkey’s discovery rights were violated the Court of Appeals considered two issues, resolving both in the appellant’s favor. One issue was whether “the fact that no written report was offered by the state in this case...,” exempted the tests from § 17-7-211 (Code Ann. § 27-1303), and the second issue concerned whether the mandate of § 17-7-211 (Code Ann. § 27-1303) extends beyond “scientific tests of material directly involved in the crime charged,” to include “any evidenсe of a scientific test offered by the state in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal____” Mulkey, supra at 630.
1). As to the first issue, we note that
Mulkey
was decided prior to our decision in
Law v. State,
2). The second issue considered by the Court of Appeals — what classes of tests are discoverable pursuant to the statute — is, however, оne of first impression. In its opinion the Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he clear language of the statute provides that any evidence of a scientific test offered by the state in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal is subject to discovery with the accompanying sanction of non-use for failure timely to release the evidence known to the state. We will not invest such clear language with the meaning that it involves only scientific tests of material directly involved in the crime charged.” 167 Ga. App. supra at 630.
We disagree with the court’s interpretation of this statute. The language of the Code provides for discovery of “any written scientific reports . . . which will be introduced in whole or in part against the defendant by the prosecution....” § 17-7-211 (b) (Code Ann. § 27-1303). The central issuе, then, is whether the term “any written scientific reports” includes, as was held by the Court of Appeals, “any evidence of a scientific test offered by the state,” or whether, instead, the legislaturе intended it to have a more narrow scope. In determining this question, “our touchstone is of course the intent of the General Assembly.”
Tabb v. State,
Section 17-7-211 (a) (Code Ann. § 27-1303) defines the term “written scientific reports” as a phrase which “includes, but is not limited to, reports from the Division of Forensic Sciences of the Georgiа Bureau of Investigation; autopsy report by the coroner of a county or by a private pathologist; blood alcohol test results done by a law enforcement agency or a private physician; and similar type reports that would be used as scientific evidence by the prosecution in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal against the defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.) Although this wording is somewhat ambiguous, in that the subsection’s use of the term “and similar type reports” has the effect of leaving the definition of “written scientific report” open-ended, we nevertheless have no difficulty in asсertaining the meaning of the *203 General Assembly.
“It is a well-recognized rule of construction that when a statute or document enumerates by name several particular things, and concludes with a general tеrm of enlargement, this latter term is to be construed as being ejusdem generis with the things specifically named, unless, of course, there is something to show that a wider sense was intended.”
Beavers v. LeSueur,
There remains, however, an additional question of interpretation. The state argues that, in addition to the foregoing limit on the pre-trial availability of scientific reports, the statute shоuld be construed as requiring discovery of reports only if the tests described in the reports were conducted upon tangible evidence directly connected with the crime, that is, evidence which was collected from defendants, victims, or crime scenes. Under this interpretation, even if the fire safety specialist who testified during Mulkey’s trial had performed his comparison tеsts during the course of the investigation of the fires which occurred at Mulkey’s place of business, and even if the tests had been reduced to written reports, the reports nevertheless would nоt have been discoverable, since they would have been performed with mattresses wholly unconnected *204 with Mulkey or the site of the alleged arson. We do not think that such an interpretation accurately reflects the intent of the Assembly.
To start, we acknowledge that it is problematical whether the nature of the three particular items listed in subsection (a) providеs some support for the argument that the subsection evinces a legislative intent to create the limited class of discoverable reports urged by the state. It is clear that autoрsies and blood tests — the second and third particular items listed by the subsection — are usually conducted upon materials collected from defendants and victims; the subject matter of “reрorts from the Division of Forensic Sciences of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation,” although less clear, is arguably part of the same class of evidence, see generally OCGA § 35-3-4 (a) (1) (Code Ann. § 92A-302). Assuming without deciding that the three enumerated types of reports, taken as a whole, do provide some support for the state’s view of the intended scope of discovery mаndated by the statute, that support is, however, more than outweighed by our consideration of other principles of statutory construction.
“In arriving at the intention of the legislature, it is apрropriate for the court to look to the old law and the evil which the legislature sought to correct in enacting the new law and the remedy provided therefor.”
Barton v. Atkinson,
The primary problem which the General Assembly sought to address by enacting § 17-7-211 (Code Ann. § 27-1303) is too obvious to rеquire more than brief mention; clearly, by giving the defendant a pre-trial opportunity to evaluate and verify scientific reports which will be introduced at trial, the discovery statute was intendеd to insure the integrity of those reports, thereby facilitating the truth-seeking function of the trier of fact. From this perspective the distinction urged by the state is unsound. In its place, the most reasonаble interpretation of the statute is that if the state plans to put into evidence the results of comparison tests of material not collected from the defendant, the victim, or thе crime scene, and the tests were performed as part of the investigation of the crime and their results have been reduced to the form of a written report, then the legislative purpose underlying § 17-7-211 (Code Ann. § 27-1303) will be fulfilled by, and indeed requires, placing the relatively small *205 additional burden upon the prosecution to provide the defendant with a copy of that report within the statutory period.
Division Four of the opinion of the Court of Appeals and the
judgment of that court are reversed.