State v. MukhtaarState v. Mukhtaar
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Mullins, Elgo, Beach
The defendant, who had been convicted of the crime of murder in connection with a shooting incident when he was twenty years old, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In his motion, he claimed that his brain had not developed fully at the time of the crime such that he could not comprehend the gravity of his аctions, that his chronological age at the time of the crime was not representative of his mental age, which was not substantially different from that of a juvenile, and that the sentencing judge should have afforded him a competency hearing to determine whether he could stand trial and aid in his own defense. In supрort of his claim, he sought to have the trial court apply the rationale of Miller v. Alabama (567 U.S. 460) and its progeny, which recognize that courts must consider mitigating evidence of youth and immaturity when sentencing juvenile offenders, including the offender‘s chronological age and its hallmark features as mitigating evidence against a severe sentence such as life imprisonment without parole. The defendant also filed a motion to allow an expert psychologist to testify, which the trial court denied. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence was improper: beсause the defendant was twenty years old at the time of the crime, the trial court was not required under Miller necessarily and expressly to take the defendant‘s mental state into consideration at sentencing, and although he claimed that Miller should be extended to apply to an adult defendant whose mental age, at the time of the crime, was not substantially different from that of a juvenile, our law categorically limits review pursuant to Miller and its progeny to cases in which the defendant was under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime; accordingly, the defendant having failed to set forth a colorable claim for relief, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over his motion to correct an illegal sentence, which should have been dismissed rather than denied, and in light of the court‘s lack of jurisdiction, it did not err in precluding the testimony of the defendant‘s expert.
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with the crime of murder, brought to the Superior Cоurt in the judicial district of Fairfield, and tried to the jury before Gormley, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to our Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment; thereafter, the court, Devlin, J., denied the defendant‘s motion to correct an illegal sentence; subsequently, the court, Devlin, J., denied the defendant‘s motion to allow expert testimony, and the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.
BEACH, J. The self-represented defendant, Abdul Mukhtaar, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in (1) denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence and (2) denying his motion to allow an expert witness to testify.1 We disagree.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal.2 On February 14, 1996, the defendant shot and killed Terri Horeglad, who was a passenger in a car that had stopped at the intersection of Fairfield and Iranistan Avenues in Bridgeport. The defendant was twenty years old at the time. He subsequently was arrested, charged and, following a jury trial, convicted of murder in violation of
After argument on May 25, 2016, the trial court, Devlin, J., denied the defendant‘s motion to correct an illegal sentence on the basis that Roper, Graham, and Miller apply only to individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime. The court then denied as moot the defendant‘s motion to allow the expert to testify. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to correct an illegal sentence on the ground that Miller and its progeny apply only to the sentencing of juveniles. The defendant does not dispute that, at least literally, the jurisprudence applies to juveniles. He claims, however, that the rationale underlying the cases is applicable equally to sentencing of adults whose mentalities at the time of the crime were similar to those of juveniles. He asserts that the trial court misconstrued his argument as relying on the precise holding of Miller when it, in fact, was based on the “brain science” underlying that case. At oral argument before this court, the defendant clarified that
We begin with the relevant standard of review and legal principles. “We review the [trial] court‘s denial of [a] defendant‘s motion to correct [an illegal] sentence under the abuse of discretion standard of review. . . . In reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discretion, great weight is given to the trial court‘s decision and every reasonable presumption is given in favor of its correctness. . . . We will reverse the trial court‘s ruling only if it could not reasonably conclude as it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Logan, 160 Conn. App. 282, 287, 125 A.3d 581 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 906, 135 A.3d 279 (2016).
”
In State v. Taylor G., 315 Conn. 734, 110 A.3d 338 (2015), our Supreme Court summarized the holdings in Roper, Graham and Miller. “[A]ll three federal cases rеcognized that, because the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is based on the principle that punishment should be graduated and proportioned to the offender and the offense, courts must consider mitigating evidence of youth and immaturity when sentencing juvenile offenders. Thus, applying this principle, the death penalty is a disproportionate
”Miller logically indicates that, if a sentencing scheme permits the imposition of [a life sentence without parole] on a juvenile homicide offender, the trial court must consider the offender‘s chronological age and its hallmark features as mitigating against such a severe sentence.” (Emphasis in original; internal quоtation marks omitted.) State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 658, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016). “We use the term juvenile offenders to refer to persons who committed a crime when they were younger than eighteen years of age.” Id., 640 n.1; see also State v. Taylor G., supra, 315 Conn. 741 n.7; State v. Logan, supra, 160 Conn. App. 288 n.11.
In the present case, the defendant, then twenty years old, was not a juvenile at the time of the crime. The trial court was therefore not required under Miller necessarily and expressly to take the defendant‘s mental state into consideration at sentencing. See State v. Riley, supra, 315 Conn. 658 (“trial court must consider the offender‘s chronological age and its hallmark features” [emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted]). The defendant contends, however, that his chronologicаl age, at the time of the crime, was not representative of his mental age. In his motion to correct, the defendant asserted that Miller should be extended to apply to adult defendants whose mental age, at the time of the crime, was not substantially different from that of juveniles.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has expressly restricted Miller to apply only to those chronologically under the age of eighteen. See Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 465 (“[w]e therefore hold that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of [eighteen] at the time of their crimes violates the [e]ighth [a]mendment‘s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments” [еmphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Id., 489 (“[b]y requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the
In addition, the “brain science” referenced in Miller, upon which the defendant seeks to rely, also emphasized the differences between juveniles and adults. See Id., 471–72 (“[I]n Graham, we noted that developments in psychology and brain sсience continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds . . . . We reasoned that those findings—of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both lessened a child‘s moral culpability and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development occurs, his deficiencies will be reformed.” [Citation omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).
Our Supreme Court has used the term “juvenile offenders” under Miller to mean those who are under eighteen at the time of the crime. See State v. Taylor G., supra, 315 Conn. 741 n.7; State v. Riley, supra, 315 Conn. 640 n.1. Finally, this court recently held that “[e]xpanding the apрlication of Miller to offenders eighteen years of age or older simply does not comport with existing eighth amendment jurisprudence pertaining to juvenile sentencing.” Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction, 173 Conn. App. 559, 568, 164 A.3d 849, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 906, 170 A.3d 1 (2017).
We emphasize that a Superior Court traditionally loses jurisdiction over a criminal case once the defendant begins serving a sentence; a motion to correct pursuant to
Our law, then, categorically limits review pursuant to Miller and its progeny to cases in which the defendant was under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime. In State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, 810–811, 151 A.3d 345 (2016), our Supreme Court held that the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a motion to correct that did not state a colorable claim for relief. The defendant, in this case, did not set forth a colorable claim for relief. Consequently, pursuant to Delgado, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant‘s motion to correct. Further, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, it did not err in precluding the testimony of the defendant‘s expert.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
As did the trial court, however, we understand the defendant to claim that a competency hearing would have revealed that he qualifies for the sentencing mandates of Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 460. Put another way, we view the defendant‘s somewhat elusive claim to be that his claim of immaturity at the time of the crime makes him eligible to file a motion to correct and a competency hearing would have provided evidence of such immaturity.