STATE OF OHIO, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. RASHAD M. MUHAMMAD, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. 2014-G-3182
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
December 15, 2014
[Cite as State v. Muhammad, 2014-Ohio-5771.]
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
Criminal Appeal from the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 13 C 000134. Judgment: Affirmed.
Brooke M. Burns and Sheryl A. Trzaska, Assistant State Public Defender, 250 East Broad Street, #1400, Columbus, OH 43215-9308 (For Defendant-Appellant).
OPINION
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Rashad M. Muhammad, entered pleas of guilty to aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. The trial court subsequently sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 12 years imprisonment. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
{¶2} Johnathan and Joshua Moore planned a robbery of the Newbury Pharmacy in Newbury Township, Geauga County, Ohio. They enlisted the assistаnce
{¶3} Upon awakening, Johnathan Moоre provided appellant with a loaded .38 special to use in the robbery. Appellant and Tiggs entered the pharmacy at approximately 9:20 a.m. on July 11, 2013. And, while Tiggs distracted a front pharmacy employee, appellant went to the rear of the pharmacy and confronted the pharmacist with the firearm. Appellant placed the firearm to the pharmacist‘s face and dеmanded all the “controls,” which the pharmacist interpreted to mean all the controlled narcotics. The pharmacist opened a cabinet and placed between 4,000 and 6,000 pills in a bag, and the robbers fled.
{¶4} Appellant and Tiggs were picked up by Johnathon Moore. Traffic was heavy, however, and they had difficulty exiting the parking lot. A witness noticed them leaving and followed them in his black SUV. Appellant advised Moore to stop the vehicle so he could “smoke” the guy that was following them.
{¶5} Meanwhile, Joshua Moore had retrieved $80 from an ATM for appellant and Tiggs to purchase bus tickets back to Michigan. The Moores were subsequently arrested for their role in the robbery. Geauga County law enforcement officers contacted the Michigan State Police, who later apprehended both appellant and Tiggs. The authorities retrieved cell phones, bus tickets, clothing, personal identification, as well as the stolen pills. Geauga County police officers later drove to Detroit, took appellant and Tiggs into custody, and transported them back to Geauga County.
{¶7} On August 19, 2013, the juvenile court held a probable cause hearing, after which it found probable cause to believe appellant committed the offenses charged in the complaint. The court further determined transfer to the court of common pleas was mandatory pursuant to
{¶8} Appellant was subsequеntly indicted by the Geauga County Grand Jury on the following charges: aggravated robbery, in violation of
{¶9} On September 19, 2013, appellant entered pleas of guilty to aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and to improperly handling firearms in a motor
{¶10} Appellant assigns five errors for our review. His first assignment of error provides:
{¶11} “The Geauga County Court of Common Pleas erred when it convicted Rashad Muhammad of imprоperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over that offense.
{¶12} Appellant contends that the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction for the count of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle because that charge was not filed in the initial complaint charging him in the juvenile court. According to appellant, the court of common pleas has jurisdiction over only those charges that were pending at the time of transfer. As a result, he maintains, the charge of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle is void and the conviction must be vacated. We do not agree.
{¶13} Juvenile courts possess exclusive initial subject-matter jurisdiction over any matter involving a juvenile alleged to be delinquent for having committed an act that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult. State v. Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 544 (1998). Before a juvenile may be tried as an adult in a court of common pleas, the
{¶14} In this case, the matter was subject to a mandatory transfer to the court of common pleas pursuant to procedures set forth under the applicable statutes. In particular, the juvenile court found that appellant was alleged to be delinquent, charged with two category-two offenses if committed by an adult (i.e., aggravated robbery and kidnapping); was 17 years old at the time of the act in question; and was alleged to have a firearm on his person during the commission of the act charged. Pursuant to
{¶15} Furthermore,
{¶16} Appellant‘s first assignment of error does not take issue with the propriety of the transfer, only the subsequent indictment that the grand jury returned that included a charge, i.e., improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, not in the original
{¶17}
{¶18} If a child who is charged with an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult * * * is transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant to section
{¶20} “‘The General Assembly hereby declares that its purpose in enacting the language in division (B) of section
{¶21} As a consequence of the foregoing amendments, a transferee court possesses jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal offenses derived from a charged act that was transferred for criminal prosecution under
{¶22} The Eighth Appellate District has specifically addressed the issue when a juvenile defendant can be indicted on charges different from those that were the basis of the transfer. In Fryerson, supra, the juvenile defendant was bound over to the court of common pleas on several charges involving a sрecific victim and occurrence. After being bound over, the defendant was indicted on separate charges involving a different victim and occurrence. The Eighth District held that, because the defendant was not
{¶23} In State v. Bruno, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77202, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 479 (Feb. 8, 2001), the Eighth District again considered the same issue with a different result. In Bruno, the juvenile defendant was bound over to the court of common pleas for murder. The grand jury subsequently indicted the defendant for aggravated murder. On apрeal, the defendant argued the trial court‘s indictment for aggravated murder exceeded the jurisdiction bestowed upon it by the juvenile court. The Eighth District noted “that as long as the indicted offense arose out of the offense that was the basis of the transfer, the juvenile could be indicted on a different offense, but where the juvenile was indicted on offenses that did not arise out of the bound over offenses, thе trial court lacked jurisdiction.” Id. at *6-*7 citing Fryerson, supra. Drawing from the Fryerson holding as well as
{¶24} The issue in the instant matter may be framed accordingly: Did the charge of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle arise out of the offenses that were the basis of the transfer or, alternatively, was the improperly-handling charge derivative of the charged acts at the basis of the transfer?
{¶25} Appellant was transferred on charges of aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and felonious assault, each with an accompanying firearm enhancement. The facts
{¶26} The additional crime of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle charged appellant with violating
{¶27} Appellant‘s first assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶28} Appellant‘s second, third, and fourth assignments of error state, respectively:
{¶29} “[2.] The juvenile court erred when it transferred Rashad Muhammad‘s case to criminal court because the mandatory transfer provisions in
{¶30} “[3.] The juvenile court erred when it transferred Rashad Muhammad‘s case to criminal court because the mandatory transfer provisions in
{¶31} “[4.] The juvenile court erred when it transferred Rashad Muhammad‘s case to criminal court because the mandatory transfer provisions in
{¶32} Under these assigned errors, appellant contends the mandatory statutory transfer provisions listed above, violate his constitutional rights to due process of law, equal protection and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We need not reach the merits of these challenges, however, because, by virtue of his plea of guilty, appellant waived the arguments.
{¶33} In State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, the Ohio Supreme Court held “a defendant who * * * voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently enters a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel ‘may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.‘” Id. at ¶78, quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). A defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional
{¶34} The constitutionality of the Revised Code‘s mandatory bind-over provisions does not implicate the court of common pleas’ jurisdiction. State v. Bradford, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013 CA 00124, 2014-Ohio-904, ¶78. Pursuant to
{¶35} In this matter, appellant does not argue his pleas were not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Rather, he asserts the juvenile court should not have transferred his case to the court of common pleas because the transfer statutes upon which it relied do not comport with the Constitution of Ohio or the United States. By entering pleas of guilty to aggravated robbery, with a firearm specification, and improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, however, appellant waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of the mandatory-transfer provisions. State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5280, ¶104 (an appellant waives any complaint regarding constitutional violations not related to the entry of a guilty plea.)
{¶37} Appellant‘s fifth assignment of error provides:
{¶38} “Rashad Muhammad was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 9 and 10.”
{¶39} Under this assignment of error, appellant asserts he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to the court of common pleas’ subject matter jurisdiction as well as when counsel failed to challenge the mandatory transfer based upon constitutional violations. We do not agree.
{¶40} Counsel‘s performance will not be deemed ineffective unless an appellant establishes counsel‘s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and the appellant suffered prejudice. See e.g. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
{¶41} A plea of guilty waives the right to appeal issues of сounsel‘s purported ineffectiveness, unless the alleged ineffective assistance caused the guilty plea to be involuntary. State v. Bennett, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-08-0005, 2008-Ohio-5812, ¶5; see also State v. Miller, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2001-L-210, 2003-Ohio-1205, ¶17. In his brief, appellant has not argued his attorney‘s alleged deficient performance caused his plea not to be entered knowingly, intelligently, or involuntarily. Accordingly, appellant waived his ineffective-assistance claim.
{¶42} Appellant‘s final assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶43} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
COLLEEN MARY O‘TOOLE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with a Concurring/Dissenting Opinion.
STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RASHAD M. MUHAMMAD, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. 2014-G-3182
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
COLLEEN MARY O‘TOOLE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with a Concurring/Dissenting Opinion.
{¶44} I concur with the majority‘s well-reasoned disposition of the second through fifth assignments of error. I respectfully dissent regarding the first, finding the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the charge of improperly hаndling firearms in a motor vehicle. As the majority notes, the Eighth District in Fryerson, supra, determined that the court of common pleas has jurisdiction of crimes not charged in the juvenile court, but which derive from the same criminal acts. In this case, appellant was charged in the juvenile court with delinquencies all stemming from his acts in the pharmacy: aggravated robbery (if committed by an adult); kidnapping (if committed by an adult); and felonious assault (if committed by an adult). These all arose directly from appellant pointing the gun at the pharmacist, and demanding the drugs. As the majority acknowledges, the improperly handling firearms in a vehicle charge, only brought after bindover, stems from appellant‘s possession of the gun on the way to the pharmacy, and during the getaway. It simply does not arise from the same criminal acts forming the basis of the delinquency charges. Fryerson and its progeny do not apply, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction of this charge.
{¶45} I respectfully concur and dissent.