State v. MuhammadState v. Muhammad
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Defendant appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of the first degree murder of Shelby Tripp Leggett. At trial, the evidence tended to show that defendant was a close friend of Amy Jo Nicholson and spent a great deal of time at her home. Amy Nicholson’s teenage daughter, Rebecca Nicholson, and Rebecca’s daughter also lived in Amy Nicholson’s house. Defendant was very protective of Rebecca. Rebecca’s boyfriend, and the father of her child, was Troy Edwards. Edwards had a criminal history and admittedly used crack cocaine.
On the night of 8 February 2005, Edwards’ grandmother, Shelby Leggett, was driving Rebecca and Edwards to Amy Nicholson’s house to leave the baby with Amy and pick up some clothes for Rebecca. When they arrived, defendant was outside drinking. He tried to get Rebecca to speak to him, but she would not. Rebecca got in the back of the car with Edwards, with Leggett driving. Defendant followed them in his car as they left.
Defendant made a series of twenty telephone calls to Rebecca’s cell phone, which she was carrying. According to defendant’s own testimony, he was enraged at the time and wanted to get Rebecca away from Edwards. In one call, defendant said “you need to F-ing call me back right now. Don’t make me kill nobody, all right. Don’t f[ — ]ing make me kill nobody. In a minute I’m going to go inside and shoot somebody. Call me.” In another message, defendant said “I’m going tо F-ing kill everybody in a minute. You need to answer the G D phone or call me back or do something. I’m going to get that
According to defendant’s own testimony, he got out of his car with his gun in hand and walked toward Leggett’s car. He wanted Rebecca to get out of the car and wanted Edwards to see the gun, which defendant thought was empty. Defendant testified that as he walked toward the driver’s side window, he stumbled, caught himself by placing his hand on the car roof, and the gun fired.
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder on the basis of premeditation with deliberation and felony murder. Defendant appeals his conviction.
Defendant raises seven issues on appeal. He first contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss under
As for defendant’s argument that the prosecutor improperly made statements about defendant’s possible presence on the National Terrorist Watch List, in violation of
Defendant next contends that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his pre-trial exercise of his right to remain silent in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Defendant notes “a defendant’s exercise of his constitutionally protected right[] to remain silent... during interrogation mаy not be used against him at trial.”
State v. Elmore,
337 N.C. 789, 792, 448 S.E.2d 501, 502 (1994). Thus, defendant argues that the court’s admission into evidence of a signed waiver of rights form indicating that defendant did not want to speak
By his next argument, defendant contends thе trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and inadmissible evidence about the victim’s good character. Among the evidence that defendant identifies as inadmissible are: (1) testimony evidencing the victim’s Christian faith; (2) a photograph of the victim when she was alive; and (3) the victim’s bloody eyeglasses and other personal effects. Because defendant did not object to this evidence at trial, defendant must show plain error.
Defendant argues that “[e]vidence of the general good character of the deceased is incompetent and thе admission of it constitutes prejudicial error.” State v. King, 26 N.C. App. 86, 87, 214 S.E.2d 597, 597 (1975). Defendant fails to recognize that if evidence is introduced not to show the good character of the victim, but rather for another permissible purpose, then the evidence may be relevant and properly admitted. State v. Alford, 339 N.C. 562, 569, 453 S.E.2d 512, 515 (1995). In the present case, evidence that the victim’s last words were “I’m not sсared of you. I’m a Christian,” were not offered as evidence of the victim’s good character, but rather were offered as circumstantial evidence of defendant’s state of mind when he was approaching the victim. Other evidence of the victim’s good character was echoed by defendant himself and integrated into his defense. While Edwards testified that Leggett “would do anything that you want[ed]. I mean she’d do anything in the world,” defendant himself testified “I can’t imagine anybody would want to hurt her. She’s so sweet.”
As for the other evidence that defendant challenges on appeal, the photograph, the eyeglasses, and key chain, defendant bears the burden of showing that the admission of this physical evidence was plain error. The evidence against defendant was substantial and any prejudice arising from the admission
Defendant’s fourth argument is that the trial court erroneously denied his request for a jury instruction on the defense of accident. Defеndant argues the instruction was timely requested, correct in law, supported by the evidence, and not given in substance. “Where the killing was unintentional and the perpetrator acted without wrongful purpose in the course of a lawful enterprise and without criminal negligence, a homicide will be excused as an accident.” State v. Garrett, 93 N.C. App. 79, 82, 376 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1989). “[I]f request be made fоr a specific instruction, which is correct in itself and supported by evidence, the court must give the instruction at least in substance.” State v. Hooker, 243 N.C. 429, 431, 90 S.E.2d 690, 691 (1956).
Assuming
arguendo
that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on accident, a trial court’s failure to submit a requested instruction to the jury is harmless unless defendant can show he was prejudiced thereby.
State v. Riddick,
340 N.C. 338, 343, 457 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1995). “A defendant is prejudiced . . . when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial. . . .”
“The defense of accident ‘. . . is not an affirmative defense, but acts to negate the mens rea element of homicide.’ ” State v. Turner, 330 N.C. 249, 262, 410 S.E.2d 847, 854 (1991) (quoting State v. Lytton, 319 N.C. 422, 425-26, 355 S.E.2d 485, 487 (1987)). In the case before us, the jury received instructions on possible lesser included offenses’ of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter in addition to first degree murder. The jury found that all of the elements of first degree murder were met, including the mens rea element. Because the jury was satisfied that defendant had the requisite intent for first degree murder and rejected other possible verdicts, including involuntary manslaughter which requires no intent, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to instruct on accident.
Defendant’s next argument is that the trial court erroneously denied his request for a jury instruction on the defense of diminished capacity by voluntary intoxication. Defendant argues that there was substantial evidence of his intoxication, including testimony that defendant was drinking tequila straight from a one-gallon bottle and also drank three or four beers over a period of about an hour and a half. Defendant contends this evidence was sufficient to warrant an instruction on voluntary intoxication; however:
[I]t is . . . well established that an instruction on voluntary intoxication is not required in every case in which a defendant claims that he killed a person after consuming intoxiсating beverages or controlled substances. In order to support a defense of voluntary intoxication, substantial evidence must be presented to show that at the time of the killing the defendant was so intoxicated that he was utterly incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill. In the absence of evidеnce of intoxication to this degree, the court is not required to charge the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication.
State v.
Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 462, 412 S.E.2d 31, 41 (1992) (internal-citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether evidence was presented that defendant was so drunk that he could not form the intent to kill. Addressing this question in other cases, this Court and our Supreme Court have сonsidered other aspects of defendants’ behavior in order to determine whether a voluntary intoxication instruction is warranted, such as a defendant’s ability to drive and communicate with other people.
See State v. Cheek,
351 N.C. 48, 75-76, 520 S.E.2d 545, 561 (1999);
State v. Watkins,
89 N.C. App. 599, 606, 366 S.E.2d 876, 880 (1988). Defendant in this case was able to do both. Although defendant’s actions indicated that he was intoxicated, “[e]vidence of mere intoxication ... is not sufficient to meet defendant’s burden of production.”
State v. Boyd,
343 N.C. 699,
Defendant next argues that the “short-form” indictment did not charge first degree murder and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgmеnt for first degree murder. The North Carolina Supreme Court “has held for many years that the ‘short-form’ murder indictment under
Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior conviction that occurred more than ten years ago. Defendant argues that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings about the probative value of the conviction and that the conviction was inadmissible because it did not involve dishonesty and was for a different crime than the one charged in the present case. The fact that the conviction was for a crime that did not involve dishonesty and was a different crime from the one charged in this case alone is not dispositive of its admissibility. When more than ten
years have passed after a conviction, evidence of the conviction is inadmissible “unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”
[Appropriate findings should address (a) whether the old convictions involved crimes of dishonesty, (b) whether thе old convictions demonstrated a “continuous pattern of behavior,” and (c) whether the crimes that were the subject of the old convictions were “of a different type from that for which defendant was being tried.”
Id. at 583, 627 S.E.2d at 295 (quoting Hensley, 77 N.C. App. at 195, 334 S.E.2d at 785).
In the present case, the court considered the following facts and circumstances of defendant’s prior conviction: thаt the conviction was a felony conviction from 1993 in New Jersey; that defendant’s status as a convicted felon made it illegal for him to possess the firearm in the present case; that the prior conviction, like the case in question, involved eluding the police; and that the prior conviction was for aggravated assault, manifesting extremе indifference to the value of human life, and recklessly causing serious bodily injury. The court incorporated by reference these facts and circumstances into its findings when it stated “under the facts and circumstances as best we can tell on the face of that record and in the context of this case [the probative value of the conviction] substantially outweigh[s] the prejudicial effect.” With regard to the weight assigned to the facts and circumstances, “[t]he trial court’s ultimate determination is reversible only for a manifest abuse of discretion.” Shelly, 176 N.C. App. at 578, 627 S.E.2d at 292. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior conviction.
Furthermore, although defendant оbjected to the admission of the testimony through his motion
in limine,
he failed to object again to the evidence when it was introduced. “Our Supreme Court has consistently held that ‘[a] motion
in limine
is insufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of evidence if the defendant
No error.
Judges McCULLOUGH and TYSON concur.