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State v. Mucci
136 A.2d 761
N.J.
1957
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*1 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, JERSEY, OF THE STATE NEW DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, MUCCI, AND v. DOMINICK “ARTIE,” DOE, DEFENDANT. JOHN ALSO KNOWN AS Argued 1957. October 1957 Decided December *3 Mr. Martin the Elughaupt cause for argued appellant. Arnold, Mr. J. William Assistant Prosecutor, the argued Brudniclc, cause for the State. Mr. William G. Special Prosecutor, Assistant Galissi, on the Guy brief W. {Mr. Prosecutor, County attorney).

The of the court‘was delivered opinion by J. defendant was convicted Heher, in by jury the County Court under an Bergen indictment ’returned 14, 1956, June that he “and Doe, charging John also known ‘’Artie,’ as whose name this Grand Jury Unknown,” 27, “on or about 1954 and May from thence continuously 30, 1955, until” Lodi, July of “did Borough commit the crime of in that then conspiracy and there unlaw- they conduct fully conspired the together practice of book- on the results of contests, to making sporting wit, Baseball Games,” aby followed specification of overt acts allegedly done the the object to effect pleaded conspiracy; he 'was sentenced confinement in the State Prison for a minimum term of not less than and years two a maximum term of three and years, not more than a’ fine to-pay $l,'00t>; oL of con- for review the judgment and the appeal np brings the viction, certification, Appellate sua sponte, on our Court. Division Superior 1955, laid to September A indictment found prior of baseball the on the results bookmaking Mucci practice :112~3; thereafter, 2A and in N. 8. violation of J. games made State, an order 14, 1956, the Eebruary pursuant of particulars the furnished a bill motion, accused’s * * * making the “practice by averring bookmaking and and and bets wagers” and taking recording registering of moneys “results and “the paying on the of baseball games” lost on such won thereon and collecting moneys wagers Season in “Major and bets” Baseball during League 1955,” Hackensack, 1954 and both in Lodi years and Tues- Mondays said “on “continuously period,” during Hackensack, “outside premises of each week” in days Street, near the corner of Main 37 Main on Morris Street Street, at at 175 Essex 51 Main and also Street” days and “on the balance of the Street “at 9 Linden Street.” week” Lodi during period accused, March accordance with State’s said, “demand for as is names particulars,” supplied rely, addresses of whom he would some number, 126 in establish his at various presence “to places than the been having other places charged defendant”; scene of acts committed alleged demanded the State names thereupon accused and addresses of all witnesses intended to be called to estab- the places lish “presence” premises designated *4 in the State’s bill the “scene of the of particulars alleged offense”; and the four responded by State such identifying witnesses, and by place name residence. the the

July 29, return of indictment for 1956, following indictment, and relation to that the with accused conspiracy, the identical list “alibi” submitted State the return the earlier and on indictment made given demand for the names and addresses of the witnesses the his the intended at prove State to call “scene” “presence” indictment; offenses this and the alleged State as it had the replied same the earlier inquiry upon indictment.

The accused then moved for a bill of directed particulars the indictment; content of the the motion was conspiracy denied, and leave to was refused. appeal trial;

March 1957 both indictments were moved for and, objection on accused that the notice of trial by had indictment, reference a only to clerical conspiracy inadvertency, on that indictment proceeded alone. The evidence State adduced to show that tending witnesses, accused had with the several three in arranged number, for their and of bets on placing baseball wagers number, 1-3646, a games by calling telephone Gregory and that were had and losses winnings for accountings made payment Said one witness: accordingly. “We week”; would on once straighten out the indi Mondays, $100; vidual wagers telephone $5 varied by accused “would around come and “we Mondays,” would me”; settle either I him would or he would up; pay pay witness would call number and designated telephone odds”; “ask the line, for that means the was the course And baseball season. it was the throughout pattern followed One other witnesses. said that at the outset he did not know with whom was he by telephone, dealing later on “found that name Artie.” accused another witness “a of $100” credit for gave wager all had by telephone. They weekly ing accountings accused, “usually Mondays, occasionally Tuesday”; won one $363. sum witness was His tele largest communicant, said, witness phone particular was not ’defendant: defendant í£has a accent,” the “man foreign on the not.” did telephone witness;

The accused did not become hence all this went He undenied. called nine witnesses: one, an employee of testified that telephone company, 1-3646 number “was listed for and telephone Gregory Street, Miss Belli” 9 Linden Lodi, billed to Teresa *5 Street, for 9 Linden “registered” there was another telephone a Belli; Belli, Arthur brother Lodi, in name Arthur in jury before the Teresa, was, seems, witness grand were indictments; there eventuated in these inquiry “trailer witnesses, and residents of a “character” four were Avenue, Lodi, have been at 99 Dell Glen said to parir” the period the accused “actively by operated” throughout “as had who indictment, people covered summoned by counsel, lived there same period,” according during there, actual “to as to presence give testimony accused’s] [the and, their to establish the period combined testimony, he time, indictment, within the covered period there, in Hackensack was to his business attending as charged.” in this

After had been taken testimony regard who was not a resident of the another, latter witnesses for trailer court and who vouched also defendant’s reputation, had said that the time arrived “to' limit county judge since five such witnesses had testimony” and, cumulative testified, more would allowed but two be “as to character and his whereabouts period respect during there trailer would be limitation “as to camp,” yet whereabouts”; his witnesses as to other other limitation “as to at that would office at only being certain apply camp.” times the trailer is now for error,

And this as ruling assigned constituting denial to present accused’s “right testimony of as It is to alibi.” said that he his remaining was “twelve thus witnesses from whose deprived combined could have found the defendant jury at his actually camp in Lodi trailer the time when during had continuously the State claims committed acts of in Hackensack.” bookmaking

I. Randle, It is said'in 128 N. J. argument, citing ¿lie thesis; consistent offered’ *6 that while the court may, exercise of a sound discre- tion, “and with to the proper nature and regard type, cir- cumstances of a ease, limit reasonably the number of witnesses * * * matters, as to collateral such as im- reputation, peachment of witnesses and expert opinion,” it “has no * * * to limit right number of witnesses as to a or facts and fact, circumstances controlling thereon,” bearing Arnold, citing People Ill. 93 N. E. 786 (Sup. Ct. v. Port 1911); Reynolds Jervis Boot & Shoe Factory, 32 Hun 64 Y. Sup. 1884); Ct. (N. Henson & Sons Coal Strickland, Co. v. Ark. 238 W. S. (Sup. 1933), the limitation holding of number of witnesses “on a contested issue” is sustainable when “only it is apparent that a is party with the court and trifling in bad seeking faith to waste its time and obstruct administration of justice, for under no circumstances can it be known judicially that such additional witnesses, evidence or if received, would not have overcome his adversary.”

And Louis, reference made to a ease, St. Memphis & Aubuchon, S. E. Co. v. 199 Mo. 353, R. 97 S. W. A., S.,

9 L. R. N. affirming limitation cannot be where the applied subject of the in quiry elements, of “composed many and one witness might be qualified on one element and another witness another,” or where could turn persuasion upon particular knowledge and testimonial qualifications of a witness or upon cumulation. But the court there of the spoke “crucial point case,” and the “of danger foreclos(ing) of weight the evidence,” and declared that “while we would not want that a say trial must judge supinely indefinitely sit with folded arms to hear a cloud of witnesses out evi spin dence the same there point,” was “no such threatened * * case, abuse in this

By way application principle hand, case at it is v. Port urged, Jervis citing Reynolds Boot & Shoe Factory, that we are supra, not how concerned with “ques tions collateral to facts in issue” but rather the “to all party call his witnesses” -in to the “chief regard here witnesses” “the excluded and that

issues litigated”; establish testimony tending contribute “were each to testimony all such alibi,” and the “sum total defendant’s sustain evidence” to jury have furnished the would the scene of was not “the that the defendant inference doubt raised reasonable acts, have or might alleged matter.” “collateral not a the defendant’s obviously guilt,” word, “[njecessarily, In a the insistence is within the those periods relate only of each witness could trailer at the that each had been indictment period observation”; the “oppor- make an and in park position neces- an make such observation tunities of each witness to witness because of such with each sarily vary chronologically *7 of time periods factors as hours of employment, variable and house- in the care of children absorbed indoors spent instance, for the for work, from away premises, periods spent the be absurd to assume and would shopping,” “[it] make observa- of each witness to opportunities chronological other witness.” the of every coincided with opportunities tions show the evidence could only But all proffered seeming, the commission of of alleged that during period acts in the of pursuit alleged several overt pleaded in a endeavor, the accused was legiti engaged conspiratorial akin a mode of somewhat proof mate business enterprise, “character,” by way disposition reputation of of evidence Lee, Minn. 407 Ct. v. 22 (Sup. in the State community, and, whatever its worth for other 1876); probative purposes, the essential and rele little virtue as proof it had or no Counsel made it clear quite colloquy vant fact of alibi. was in that the tendered testimonial court than from the witnesses no different that adduced quality vice; and infected with the same and so the called did suffer in the under review. prejudice accused not ruling the accused was at The seems to be because theory elsewhere in a lawful the time undertaking engaged violate the not have participated conspiracy could nor commit the overt acts laid to him in the laws gaming non indictment, an obvious sequitur.

431 The of all evidence from process is an inference one fact to the Evidence always existence another. rela term; tive facts, a relation between two signifies established, probandum” or to be proposition “factum probans,” or material evidencing proposi “factum tion; all evidence must involve an inference some fact to be proposition proved. Wignore Evidence (3d ed), 2, 12, 25, 26, sections 475.

And the literal the term “alibi” meaning “elsewhere; in another Webster’s place.” International Dic tionary 2d ed. The plea of “alibi” is not an affirmative sense, defense in the strict, technical it is defensive The nature. State has the burden of proving accused committed the act; criminal accused offer evidence to show that tending time of alleged commission of act he was elsewhere than charged, at the commission, of its alleged place thus to overcome the case made State. defense of alibi has its evidential efficacy in physical impossibility ac cused’s and where the offered evidence guilt; does meet this standard, the defense of alibi is not sustained. Singh State, 432, v. 35 Ariz. 672, 280 P. 67 A. L. R. 129 Ct. (Sup. State, v. 79 1929); 709, Blackwell 224, Fla. 86 So. 15 A. L. R. v. (Sup. 1920); State Wagner, Iowa 407, 222 N. W. A. (Sup. R. 1928); Denver, Yarber City County 116 Colo. 182 P. 2d 897 Ct. 1947); Brady, Minn. *8 70 N. W. 2d 449 (Sup. 1955); Tomlinson v. United States, D. Ct. App. F. 2d 114 A. R. 1315 D. Ct. certiorari (App. denied 303 U. S. 645, 82

S. Ct. L. Ed. 1107 (1938). B. B. 3:5-9, derived B. from 2:190-7, S. requires accused, on demand State, furnish a bill of par- ticulars the specific place “stating places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time alleged offense,” and names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely alibi”; to “establish such and the State, turn, in made, demand upon obliged give relied to be

names addresses at the accused’s the scene of “presence establish alleged the accused Here, laid to was a conspiracy offense.” Co., R. Pennsylvania offense. Compare continuing L. 550 But we need not 1913). pursue 84 N. J. the inquiry. at the accused’s trailer testimony

The as to the “presence” alibi; in the claimed proof was of little or no value court every day”; there “most “every day”; he was “regularly,” afternoon”; all the afternoon”; afternoon, “Sunday “every “not Sundays”; “rainy days”; “all “every night”; day time”; “not all the “fre- there in morning”; [there] noon”; evening, supper- he “came the early quently week”; time”; Sundays.” “once or “Saturdays twice there on a say day. Hone could that the accused was Indeed, said, interrogation: counsel to such objecting “This witness was not offered on the basis accused] [the of a day. or a 'definitely day part was there every particular and pinpoint par- How can her remember expect me,” reject ticular date reason enough beyond And testimony probative consequence. have more of same. witnesses would come remaining in the of the trailer The accused was not alone operation had court; he an associate ownership manage- attend- ment, daily and there was an office assistant also he was there an ance; never acknowl- during morning, fact. edged counsel, at said that these witnesses were

And one point, used” as “character” witnesses “in addition to “being stating his was the man’s business what this occupation during time.” period of-the within the county

The action judge plainly of reasonable discretion. Counsel was advised that bounds other he was not limited “as to witnesses as to other whereabouts”; the limitation concerned like only at the the accused’s trailer as to accused presence court. the course sustained no thus taken. injury

433 “Cumulative” is defined as “additional evidence evidence to the same as the same of character support point, J. evidence 87 N. already produced.” State Murphy, 515 & A. not have “an 1915). A does absolute (E. party to force an tribunal an right upon unending unwilling mass of limited superfluous own only judg whim”; ment or for witnesses whatever “upon point any enforced”; a similar rule of it “may limitation may be be define other possible to classes of witnesses any specific down; facts rule of for which a can be laid it possible to sanction a rule general applicable case, circumstances of kind fact any or witness whatsoever”; while court sometimes declares “the qualification of numbers is limiting only proper issues,” collateral the “term upon ‘collateral’ is a much- one; abused it is difficult of definition and should be avoided”;" “moreover, there is reason here for such a rule; restriction of the arise exigency equally upon issue as the reasons part above indicate on Evidence clearly.” Wigmore (3d 1907, sections ed.), States, See 1908. Michelson v. United U. S. 93 L. S. Ed. 168 (1948). exercised,

Care must be avoid an undue intrusion the substantial upon the accused in a criminal case to a trial, fair for the cumulation of testimony in relation to the substantive issues may bear the ultimate quality evidence; (cid:127)and weight calls for the question of a exercise sound discretion in the context of the circum stances case. There particular can be no doubt as confined; thus power, as within reason “right, limits, able to restrict the number of witnesses to be examined as to any one or fact” is point essential due course Lee, justice. C. S. 28 S. E. 2d 402, L. A. R. 1300 1943).

The rule was applied alibi witnesses on the trial of an indictment for robbery. was that on holding assumption witnesses had “testified as fully as it was proposed the non-testifying would testify,” *10 was law that there error as a matter of

could not be said witnesses limitation; that the “number of limiting the special unless in point” permissible on a particular State an abuse discretion. circumstances it constitutes Lamb, 1897). 827 See 141 Mo. W. S. v. 335; L. R. 48 A. L. R. 948. 21 A. Annotations,

II. offered in witnesses Cross examination of State’s revealed that on morning of the proof pleaded conspiracy office in the trial, county of the while together prosecutor’s House, county in the a detec they provided by Court were tive with of their transcript testimony grand a given read and then jury inquiry, they severally its which during discussed; of the and error now on predicated ruling accused to and which denied the access county inspec judge of the for use in the cross-examination transcript tion the witnesses whose was so recorded. testimony

The was then the prosecutor’s possessions transcript among courtroom, and so available. His response to readily if counsel, the demand for on “cross- inspection was examination, intends to use some of evidence from the State, if will offer the same evidence I counsel into will evidence”; the same to into and offer stipulate go overruled counsel’s demand for county finally judge inspec- later “offer” tion also prosecutor’s transcript he asked it.” was “not to offer The ground some after jury testimony years two grand events under inquiry. these witnesses “refreshed their

Conceding recollec- their tion by own reading previously given before Jury,” Grand State nevertheless insists that “witnesses refreshed their having respective recollections testified while on the stand from their memories,” independent “had and so accused to inspect, for right any purpose, used.” memoranda so It is affirmed that none of “required recollection”; refresh his transcript that “it is perfectly court,” for a witness to refresh his recollection out of proper even jury testimony referring grand previously given, but “while an is entitled examine and opponent cross- examine on a memorandum the stand used on witness to refresh his recollection has no such where the witness testified from his recollection while on independent the stand was refreshed although memory prior coming Kwiathowski, court,” the rule of State invoking N. J. A. (E. & also cites 1912). to this Martin, end State v. N. J. L. 139 & A. which (E. relied 62 N. J. upon Myers Weger, L. 432 A. (E. & *11 ; v. 86 1898) State N. L. 525 Dougherty, J. Ct. (Sup. 1915); 38, State v. 36 Or. 58 P. 892 Magers, (Sup. 2d, States, ; Lennon v. F. 1899) United Cir. (8 Paschall, 1927); State 182 Wash. P. 2d 15 all that where the witness’ holding memory had been refreshed reference by to shorthand notes or other before writing stand, witness and “all going upon facts were so revived in his mind that he was and qualified them capacitated testify did so from testify] [and his own and recollection, knowledge independently notes.” v. Magers, State there supra, was no right to the of production for and writing inspection Kwiathowslci, use on cross-examination of the witness. In the old Court of Errors and held that a Appeals witness if he chooses, refresh “may, his out of court memory by a memorandum made himself of and reading by concerning the incident to which he is about to speak on the witness- stand, and the thus will be unimpeachable so far as the manner of his recollection refreshing is con Paschall, cerned.” And in it was said supra, Jones, circumstances, in such citing Commentaries on Evidence ed.), sec. (2d “memoranda used outside of court need court, not be into since brought the witness in theory finally testifies from his own recollection”; it “is not the memorandum which speaks, but the recollection of the witnesses”; if but develops cross-examination “of the witness otherwise, that, outside of court, he has refreshed memorandum such failure to produce memory,

his the witness.” of credibility go in reason logic case is as compelling But the one the opponent’s is the principle The essence of the other. aids,” false imposition “the risk of against protection on Evi- in his work of Dean Wigmore use the language notes or of inspection section ed.), by dence (3d memory refresh the witness to used writing by to test cross-examination and his revive his recollection just and it of his testimony; trustworthiness so used rule to writings end that the apply to this is thus had refreshment trial as when the the witness before “failure such produce If the he is on the stand. while issue “the on the of be a consideration just memorandum” of witness,” then is not cross-examination credibility measure itself a more certain aided writing the witness be deprived end? should Why opponent the same “theory” the factual basis for means of this testing recollection “independent testimony given [of stand,” whether the and of inquiring while on witness] evidence from recollec- used as apart memorandum being refreshment, or otherwise bears under the pretense tion It of the witness? cannot be credibility recollection revived is itself dixit as to present witness’ ipse here was the fact. And the refreshment had conclusive *12 prior opening the day testimony given, the witnesses them- court, and included discussion among circumstances, the distinction is purely In these selves. that “the in- says public artificial. Professor McCormick in the full disclosure of source of a witness’s terest consideration” than discourag- seems testimony weightier * * file, into the McCormick opponent’s “prying ing 9. section v. Myers Weger, supra. See Evidence^ Trial, Eyre, J., Hardy’s 24 How. Tr. St. Said C. 824 (1794): very reasonable, always speaks usual and when a witness “It is memorandums, opportunity should an the counsel have memorandums, cross-examining looking when he at those witness.”

437 Lee, v. in Henry J., L. C. observed And Ellenborough, Chitty, 2 124 : (1810) memory upon looking far his he can so refresh “If document sufficient; circumstance, and it makes as to recollect a it himself; for it is not written

difference that the memorandum recollection is not the memorandum that is the evidence the witness.” Taverner, 6 P. 281 C. v. case, (1833), Gregory In a later B. laid down thus: Gurney evidence, particular entries “The memorandum itself is not * * * memory.

only are used the witness to refresh already may re- on the entries defendant’s counsel cross-examine they jury may to, if wish those entries ferred and the also see do so.” rule is the same: In this the basic country party opposite the witness in to cross-examine “The is entitled jury, purpose it; may regard not for the be shown to the and it contained, purpose establishing but for the therein of showing the facts memory properly of the wit- it could not refresh 1882), Jeffs, (Sup. v. 132 Mass. 5 Jud. Ct. ness.” Commonwealth Endicott, J. 157 P. v. Rappy, United States Hand, J., And L. said in 2d 964 Cir. : 1946) (2 party an of his witness to “When a uses earlier statement own only recognized memory, as such

refresh the witness’s evidence refreshed; party may put is the so may so, evidence, although side do statement other sponte. Wigmore, apparently jury it, call for sua 3 section 763.” Jackson, 113 Mich. 71 W. 843 Smith v. N. Compare States, 49 F. 2d Luse v. United (Sup. 1897); 357, 193 N. E. Cir. 288 Mass. Rogoff, Shear (9 1931); Exeter, v. Borough Jud. Ct. Miller (Sup. 1934); 366 Pa. 2d 1951). A. the rule of

These serve modify considerations Brooks, 136 N. L. & A. (E. J. bringing *13 different circum under other bear civil procedural policy Cruser, 40 N. J. L. v. stances, in Ellison exemplified Co., & W. Smith George and Decker v. (Sup. have no we (E. practice L. 630 & A. 1916), J.N. Lehigh Valley v. now consider. Goodman occasion See Co., v. A. also State 1911); R. 82 N. J. L. 450 &(E. 1918). 105 A. 71 Zamofsky, need not be one used to revive recollection paper events”; the “instance “drawn about the time of the up most and the which is at once the test of plainest principle or a report common in is that of a deposition practice “Here the was certainly document prior testimony”; observed; near time the events made at or that the witness may orthodox has conceded practice always direct examina- refer to it to refresh his either on memory; cross-examination”; which this tion or on “rulings has refused have influenced more or apparently been been counsel, less when apprehension thereby by 1018) cross-examiner, evade the rule section might (post, which the witness’ statements to contradictory forbids prior be as or that the counsel testimony, introduced independent on a direct examination evade the rule section might (post, one’s own witness his contra- by 902) against impeaching statements,” either the evasion of of which dictory by of refreshment be thwarted pretext may judge. section 761. Wigmore, * * “* affirms, Dean section Wigmore this opportunity inspection opponent guarded so imposition clearly apparent, by cross-examination against based on the further detect paper may circumstances not surface, all that detracts appearing expose Stevenson, from the of testimony,” Sinclair v. weight citing Taverner, 1 & P. 582 C. Palmer Gregory supra; (1824); McLear, & Tr. 149 Sw. Commonwealth v. (1858); States, Jeffs, v. United 19 F. 2d supra; Taylor Cir. (8 States, Little v. United 93 F. 2d 401 1927); (8 Cir. 1938), where an for the agent investigation, testifying prosecu tion, refreshed his memory notes of interviews had *14 disclosure inspection demand for the and on accused, with dismissed, view is “small minority” And the was compelled. led [it],” to support as “no 762, principle section having distinc- the instances, general by “perceiving most away, a paper and record recollection past tion between a that, because recollection, and concluding by reviving present former to the rule originals applies the about producing 760), the section not to latter (ante, section (ante, 749) paper and show the produce it is to unnecessary therefore to the opponent.” should apply the rule

And, it is section urged, trial and for “a consulted refreshment memorandum before for, there court; is the witness into though not brought the risk stimulated, a thus objection yet to memory being just is as great55; and the need of imposition safeguard the court to require “It and feasible for enough simple the end of the sent and before be for exhibited paper the trial.” Kwiat- cited, are own State v. cases con our pro

howshi, latter, the observation that supra, among not there raised. precise point said,

And, it is there “though section finally, evidence, witness5 as may present writing] party [the the same reason of which allows the precaution opponent call examine it section allows [ante, opponent 762] features, attention to its also allows the jury’s end”; if to examine it for the same jurymen, they please, short, “In but not the has opponent, offering party, it"; have see “That right jury offering also party evidence, has not the to treat as paper] reading [the it or it jury, to the is well estab showing handing lished,55 Labow, N. J. citing Springer this, and “That do opponent or that may it, own demand its motion jury equally conceded.”

It without as this goes treatise on evidence saying, suggests, section ruling involves exercise principle a sound discretion serve essential justice against MO to that “overstrict” enforcement not conducive

dogmatic end.

In circumstances, there was and reversible prejudicial error the refusal to allow inspection thus its use cross-examination grand jury witnesses.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Weintraub, C. J. I trial court (concurring). agree restricted the offered to properly purportedly support proof *15 alibi, defendant’s for the offer had this reason probative None could defend- force. witnesses place ant at the trailer of the times the camp any State’s him elsewhere. As I read the placed record, trial stated his did judge ruling apply testimony which would either or fair inference clash with directly us, the State’s case. Even before counsel for defendant was unable to witness he would have say any could produced thus have furthered the inquiry.

But I question wisdom of a broad enunciating principle that one may crime be limited with charged respect to the number of witnesses he may as to fact produce an}^ be, however vital fact even with the caveat majority must opinion “Care be exercised avoid an undue intrusion the substantial accused ain criminal case to fair trial.” I At moment cannot conceive of a situation in which I would of a approve limitation with respect to a substantial fact which asserts concede, or will not and hence I would await a concrete set of facts before venturing agreement or disagree- ment with the abstract proposition. I am sure that in any event situations in which that course would be upheld would be rare. The extremely issue thus seems to me to best; be virtually academic at and if this appraisal correct, adoption of broad proposition, unanchored to lumina- facts, tive is but an invitation to trial error.

In all other respects I in join the majority opinion. Wachenfeld, J. in Eor the first (dissenting part). time, and in view my we are unnecessarily, deciding important question whether the witnesses produced by a defendant at a criminal trial of his support substantive denial of the made him can be limited charge against number the trial judge.

The facts sub judies do not this provoke The question. Mucci’s given by so-called alibi witnesses was irrelevant. could not They place defendant trailer at the park specific times when the overt acts were committed in allegedly Hackensack. Mucci’s counsel ad- mitted as Nevertheless, much. the majority eschews using the time-honored of lack of ground as the relevancy basis for its decision and holds expansively that: power confined; “There can be no doubt as to the as thus ‘right, limits, within reasonable to restrict the number of witnesses point to be examined as to one fact’ is essential justice.” due course of This promotes simple yet portentous can inquiry: man’s defense on the merits in a criminal trial be restricted in the discretion of the trial judge? majority, substance, says can as a matter of

sheer and expediency convenience. I cannot agree.

It is decided that this matter "calls for the exercise of a sound in discretion the context of the circumstances of the particular case.” This is fundamental to trial any court ruling time and any if anywhere, discretion is involved. The majority not, statement is however, a novel formula which can automatically dissolve the defendant’s right have his witnesses In a heard. particularly sensitive and significant area, lends itself to varying interpretations which will inevitably produce discrimination in treatment. Where does sound discretion -end and violation of consti- tutional guarantees begin? The majority concedes that "the cumulation of relation to the substantive issues may bear upon ultimate and quality weight of * * the evidence *.” a central upon witnesses the number of limitation of

Any to prove defendant’s opportunity issue infringes upon commodity a is too Liberty precious his freedom. right to or man’s hazarded, judgment to one over objection, be of our the cornerstone the trial by jury, hence caprice; bill of rights. than to time be consumed that a little judicial

Better defense which untrammeled principle trespass upon a of our example jurisprudence the shining has been the world. throughout inspiration lofty liberty, me Henry, of Patrick “Give ringing challenge time the corridors of death,” has down winged me give It all the American people. admiration of held the not be whose force should principle a cardinal accentuates susceptible widely phrase aby vague judicial diminished different judges. differing interpretations then —there should be none compromise There was no a in court concepts, day constitutional Under our now. curtail it has not been full day, right means a to anyone. granted authority denying power a vast amount of

There is limit the number of witnesses be a trial court fact, or facts and circumstances a controlling heard as to Arnold, N. E. 248 Ill. v. People thereon. bearing In South Danville Village Ct. 1911). Sup. 786 (Ill. Jacobs, Div. 1891), court said: 42 Ill. App. (App. authorizing court to limit of no rule are aware “We party introduce unless it be some number * * question to the main issue collateral Strickland, & 152 Ark. Sons Coal Co. While Henson L. R. 328 Sup. W. 21 A. (Ark. 238 S. itself in unmistakable language: expressed

court principle of constitutional law that a well-settled “It hearing, everyone person without shall be condemned affecting by process called into court matter who * * *” to be heard. interests has an absolute *17 a linguistic different thought the same Reiterating Aubuchon, Louis, & E. R. Co. v. in S. approach, Memphis St. (Mo. A., S., 426 867, 9 L. R. N. 199 Mo. 97 S. W. said: court, in a reversing judgment, Sup. “* * * any If, then, judge may, trial without cause project arbitrarily shown his will into the number of witnesses entirely may by point case, crucial he token indirectly weight evidence, and thus do what foreclose the directly do, wit, realm interfere where the jury reign supreme.”

I in New regret Jersey “‘right, recognition within limits, reasonable to restrict number of ” an to be examined as to one or fact.’ It point trial a curtailment invasion of right jury; and a court; to a full day trespass upon fundamental any reasonable of what constitutes conception fairness. noted, I in the result.

Other than as here concur Weinteaub, Wacheneeld, J., J., concurring C. result. Weinteaub,

For reversal —Chief Justice Justices Heher, Burling, Wacheneeld, Jacobs and Francis —6. MICKLUS,

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN AN ATTORNEY AT LAW. Argued December 1957 Decided December 1957.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Mucci
Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Date Published: Dec 9, 1957
Citation: 136 A.2d 761
Court Abbreviation: N.J.
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