216 Mo. 436 | Mo. | 1909
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, sentencing the defendant to the penitentiary for burglary in the
As the information is challenged, we reproduce the substance thereof, to-wit: “That Gilbert Bailey and Clarence Moss, on the twenty-first day of December, 1907, at the city of St. Louis, into a certain store, shop and building of Louis Haas there situate and being, feloniously and burglariously, forcibly did break and enter, with intent then and there, and thereby feloniously and burglariously to steal, take and carry away certain goods, wares, merchandise, other valuable things, and personal property in the said store, shop and building, then and there kept and deposited, and in said store, shop and building two ‘ cravenette ’ overcoats, two pairs of trousers, four pairs men’s kid gloves, and one silk muffler, all of the value of twenty dollars, of the goods, wares, merchandise, other valuable things and personal property of the said Louis Haas in the said store, shop1 and building then and there being found, then and there feloniously and burglariously did steal, take and carry away, with the intent then and there to deprive the owner of the use thereof and to convert the same to his own use; against the peace and dignity of the State. ’ ’
The defendants were duly ¿rraigned on the 22d of January, 1908, and each pleaded not guilty. The case was then continued to the February term, and on the 4th of February, 1908, a severance was granted, and the defendant Gilbert Bailey withdrew his plea. of not guilty and pleaded guilty of burglary in the second degree and sentence thereon was deferred. On the 5th of February, the defendant Moss was put upon his trial and found guilty as above stated.
The evidence on the part of the State tended to prove that Louis Haas on the 20th and 21st days of December, 1907, was engaged in business at number
Officer Matthews, who arrested the defendant, testified that the defendant stated that he had been all the night before upstairs near the place of his arrest, with Ida Smith. When asked if he had been with Gilbert Bailey the night before, he first said no^ and then said yes, that he had been with Gilbert Bailey in a saloon at 1415 Chestnut until nine o’clock in the evening, when he then went to Ida Smith’s house 1334 upstairs, that he then came down into the saloon with Bailey where he stayed until the saloon closed at one o’clock; that he then left the saloon and went east on Chestnut to 14th street where he left Bailey, went across to Chestnut where he stayed the remainder of the night with Ida Smith with whom he had been living for several years.
The defendant testified in his own behalf that on the night of December 20th he went to bed at the rooms of Ida Smith, about nine o’clock; that about eleven o’clock he got up and went to a lunch stand where he remained about ten or fifteen minutes and then went back to bed, where he remained the balance of the night. On cross-examination he stated that he had known officer Shenck about eight or nine years.
Ida Smith corroborated the defendant as to his being at her house with her on the night in question.
Gilbert Bailey testified as witness for defendant that the defendant was not with him on the night of
The court instructed the jury as to what constituted burglary in the second degree and as to grand larceny; and instructed the jury that they could fiad the defendant guilty of both offenses, or acquit him of one and find him guilty of tbe other, or acquit him of both. The court also instructed tbe jury on presumption arising from tbe recent possession of stolen property, also on alibi, presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt, and tbe credibility of witnesses. No exceptions whatever were taken or saved to the instructions of tbe court and of course they are not for review on this appeal.
I. Tbe defendant assails tbe information as insufficient for the reason as be alleges that it does not allege tbe manner of tbe breaking. Tbe indictment in this case was evidently framed to state tbe offense under section 1886, Revised Statutes 1899', and it states every material fact required by that section to constitute burglary in tbe second degree. Unlike section 1880, tbe statute does not attempt or define what kind of breaking shall be necessary to constitute tbe offense. It is purely a statutory offense and we think the indictment is entirely sufficient. A similar indictment in all respects was held sufficient by this court in State v. Watson, 141 Mo. 338, and we see no reason for departing from tbe conclusion we reached in that case.
II. As to tbe objection to tbe evidence of tbe officer Sbenck as to what O’Brien said, it is clear that it was wholly immaterial, and could not have bad any effect upon tbe verdict of tbe jury. Certainly this cause should not be reversed on that ground, even if
As to the proposition advanced that the court erred in failing to instruct on petit larceny, inasmuch as the defendant was convicted of both burglary and larceny, and larceny from a burglarized house was grand larceny under our statute, the defendant has no ground of complaint on that score. [State v. Peebles and York, 178 Mo. 475.]
There was ample evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury and we must therefore affirm the judgment, and it is accordingly so ordered.