104 Mo. 638 | Mo. | 1891
— The defendant was indicted in the circuit court of Greene county for murder in the first degree, for shooting and killing Miss Julia Patterson, on the fourth of May, 1886. He was convicted of manslaughter in the fourth degree, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $500.
Defendant at the time was a boy about sixteen years old. Miss Patterson was a young lady employed as a domestic in defendant’s father’s family, in Springfield, Missouri, at the time she was killed. The shooting occurred in the evening near sundown, in the house of Dr. Morrison, the ,father of defendant. No one was present in the house at the time but Miss Patterson, the deceased, and defendant.
George Morrison, a cousin of defendant, the only person near enough at the time to hear anything more
The defendant was sworn in his own behalf. He testified substantially the same as others, to the impaired condition of the gun, and its use as a plaything for months in its unloaded, broken and harmless condition; that there had been no ammunition for a long time about the house which could be used in it, even if in repair; that he knew nothing of his brother Douglass having the cartridge which young Thompson
There was evidence of general good character; also evidence that the gun was old and unreliable ; that the-hammer was too short to hit the plunger right; the end of the hammer was broken off. There was no certainty about the gun firing. It was also in evidence that a
There were some statements of defendant to other boys that he did it intentionally ; but one of them was evidently a joke, and the other highly improbable to say the least. The whole case, fairly considered, seems to be another example of the silly and inexcusable habit of pointing guns at people without intending to shoot them, and as usual resulting in death.
All questions of murder in either degree are out of question. The only matter for consideration is the propriety of the verdict for manslaughter, based upon the culpable negligence of defendant and the giving of certain instructions for the state.
The sixth instruction, given by the court at the instance of the state, is as follows: “6. If you find from the evidence that in a room of the dwelling-house of defendant’s father, in the said county of Greene, on or about May If, 1886, the defendant was carelessly handling a loaded shotgun, and that he saw the deceased, Julia Patterson, near him in said dwelling-house, and that, without examining to see whether the gun was loaded or not, he presented or pointed it toward her, and shot her, inflicting on her body a mortal wound as described in the indictment, and that she died of said wound in May, 1886, and if you further believe from the evidence that said shooting was not intentionally done by defendant, but was the result of his negligence in handling the gun, and of a recklessness and carelessness on his part, incompatible with a proper regard for human life, then you will find defendant guilty of manslaughter in the fourth degree under this indictment.”
This instruction was a proper direction to the jury under the facts of this case. It does not, as counsel for defendant seem to think, impose an unlawful burden on defendant. It is a simple declaration of the law that it is culpable, criminal negligence to point a gun at a
Nor did the court commit any error in giving the eighth instruction, in telling the jury they should consider the fact that the defendant was the prisoner on trial in weighing his evidence. State v. Cook, 84 Mo. 40; State v. Young, not reported.
There is nothing in the objection to the ninth instruction. It has been approved time and again in this state. No instruction as to defendant’s good character was asked or given for the state, and the tenth instruction asked by defendant was given just as prayed. We do not see the force of such suggestions in a brief. The thirteenth instruction given by the court on reasonable doubt is one approved by this court in State v. Nueslein, 25 Mo. 111, and more recently in State v. Young.
On the part of the defendant the court submitted to the jury the question of defendant’s culpable negligence in the fullest and fairest manner’. His responsibility was limited to one of his age and discretion; and he was only to be convicted after the jury found him guilty of culpable negligence. We do not see how the trial court could have been any more indulgent than it was. The defendant, has no just ground of exception. The jury were fully justified in finding the verdict they did.
And no error appearing we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Gfreene county.