State v. MorrisonState v. Morrison
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Per Curiam
Appellant appeals from the sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to a violation of
On the date of the charged offense, November 14, 1981,
No person shall, nor shall one or more of a group of persons, together, throw or cast the rays of a spotlight, headlight, or other artificial light on any highway, or in any field, pasture, woodland, forest, or prairie, wherein big game may be, or may reasonably be expected to be, while having in his or their possession or under control a firearm or other implement whereby any big game could be killed, unless such firearm or other implement is unloaded and knocked down, or unloaded and enclosed within a carrying case, even though no big game animal is shot at, injured, or killed.
As it read at the time of appellant’s conviction and sentencing,
Any person violating any of the provisions of . . .§ 41-8-17 is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor for each big game animal or any part thereof, taken, caught, killed, sold, offered, or exposed for sale, had in possession or had in possession with intent to sell, shipped by common carrier, or transported to any point inside or outside the state in violation of law....
It was undisputed that appellant had possession of a jackrabbit at the time of the offense. Jackrabbits do not fall within the definition of big game animals set forth in
We agree with appellant that his violation of
The state contends that appellant’s guilty plea waived any right to appeal the trial court’s determination that appellant’s conduct amounted to a class one misdemeanor. The general rule is that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is a waiver by the defendant of any non-jurisdictional defects in the
prior
proceedings against him.
State v. Culton,
273 N.W.2d 200 (S.D.1979);
State v. Jordan,
261 N.W.2d 126 (S.D.1978);
State ex rel. Condon v. Erickson,
85 S.D. 302, 182 N.W.2d 304 (1970);
Application of Dutro,
83 S.D. 168, 156 N.W.2d 771 (1968). We distinguish these authorities from the case at bar on the basis that the alleged error now before us occurred
after
appellant pleaded guilty. After appellant pleaded guilty, the trial court was authorized to impose any lawful sentence.
See State ex rel. Sedam v. Circuit Court,
72 S.D. 494, 36 N.W.2d 672 (1949). We will not extend the rule of waiver to foreclose defendants from challenging unlawful sentences. Indeed, as we recently held in
State v. Tibbetts,
333 N.W.2d 440 (S.D.1983), pursuant to
The sentence is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for resentenc-ing.