State v. MorrisState v. Morris
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- Before:
- Durham
— At issuе is the proper interpretation of Washington’s intrastate detainers statute,
The Court of Appeals adopted the delivery-to-the-superintendent theory, which resulted in dismissal of a theft charge against the defendant, Clark Morris.
State v. Morris, 74
Wn. App. 293, 873 P.2d 561 (1994). The United States Supreme Court has adopted the receipt-by-the-prosecutor theory for the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), which employs language nearly identical to Washington’s intrastate statute.
Fex v. Michigan,
507 U.S. 43, 122 L. Ed. 2d 406, 113 S. Ct. 1085 (1993). Washington is a signatory to the IAD.
See
The State urges reversal of the Court of Appeals in order to еnsure a uniform measuring event governing the speedy disposition periods for both detainer statutes. 1 We agree, but affirm the dismissal of this case on other grounds.
In November 1990, Clark Morris was charged with first degree theft in Spokane County. In 1991, Morris was incarcerated in the state penitentiary at Walla Walla on unrelated King County charges. On August 5, 1991, Morris filed a request pursuant to
On December 10, Morris filed a motion to dismiss. Morris argued that the time for trial under the intrastate detainers statute had expired. Under
Written notice of the place of the prisoner’s confinement and a request for final disposition of pending charges “shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the superintendent having custody”.
Morris argued to the trial court that the 120-day period commenced when he gave his request to prison officials on August 5. He contended that the period had lapsed, dеpriving the court of jurisdiction and compelling dismissal with prejudice.
See
Morris sought discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, and the trial court entered a stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeals denied review, and the decision became final on March 15, 1992.
On April 7, 1992, the State moved to lift the stay of proceedings. The trial court granted the motion and set trial for April 27. The court set the trial date in reliance on the State’s assurance that April 27 was “the 87th day of a 90-day [criminal rules’ speedy trial] period.” Report of Proceedings, at 32. 3 Although Morris’s counsel signed the new trial date order, he reiterated his position that, if the 120-day period had run, the trial court had no jurisdiction over Morris.
On April 17, Morris brought yet another motion to dismiss. He argued that even if the period of the stay (December 16 to April 7) were excluded, the 120-day period expired on April 12, 1992. The State’s memorandum in response to the motion agreed: “The 120 days since defendant’s request for final disposition expired while the defendant was seeking discretionary review of the [initial] denial of the Motion
Analysis
We will first decide whether the 120-day timе-for-trial period under
The statute directly at issue is Washington’s intrastate detainers act.
Both statutes set up a 2-stage process. First, a prisoner mаkes a request for speedy and final disposition of untried charges. This request “shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the superintendent having custody of him”.
no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an ordеr dismissing the same with prejudice.
The intrastate statute dictates that a prisoner “shall be brought to trial within one hundred twenty days
after he shall have caused to he delivered
to the prosecuting attorney and the superior court” a written request for a speedy disposition of any untried indictment, information, or complaint. (Italics ours.)
The United States Supreme Court recently considered the question of when the IAD’s 180-day period commences. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 122 L. Ed. 2d 406, 113 S. Ct. 1085 (1993). The Court conceded the statutory language supports either the theory that the period commences with delivery of the request by the prisoner to the warden or the theory that it begins only with the actual receipt of the request by the prosecutor and court.
[I]t must be acknowledged that the language will literally bear either interpretation — i.e., that the crucial point is the prisoner’s transmittal of his request, or that it is the рrosecutor’s receipt of the request. One can almost be induced to accept one interpretation or the other on the basis of which words are emphasized: “shall have caused to be delivered” versus “shall have caused to be delivered.”
Fex, 113 S. Ct. at 1089. Nevertheless, the Court examined textual and contextual clues and concluded that the period for trial “does not сommence until the prisoner’s request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer”. Fex, 507 U.S. at 52. The Court noted that actual delivery is a determinate event, whereas when the prisoner “caused” the request to be delivered is less easily determined. Fex, 507 U.S. at 49-51.
The IAD thus provides for documentary evidence of the date on which the request is delivered to the officials of the receiving State, but requires nо record of the date on which it is transmitted to the warden (assuming that is to be considered the act of “causing”). That would be peculiar if the latter rather than the former were the critical date.
Fex, 507 U.S. at 51.
The Court of Appeals found Justice Blackmun’s dissent in
Fex
more persuasive than the majority opinion.
Morris,
at 299.
See Fex,
113 S. Ct. at 1091-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In adopting the dissent’s position, the Court of Appeals stressed that the analysis in
Fex
of the IAD is persuasive but not cоntrolling authority for the interpretation of the similarly worded Washington intrastate detainers statute.
Morris,
at 299.
See also Hoffer v. State,
113 Wn.2d 148, 151, 776 P.2d 963 (1989) (it is well settled that the Supreme Court’s construction of a similarly worded federal statute, although often persuasive, does not control this court’s interpretation of a state statute). The court reasoned that its reading of the statute accorded with the plain meaning of the words and furthered the purpose of the statute.
Morris,
at 297. The court agreed with the dissent in
Fex
that the
Regardless of how convincing one finds the Fex majority, its interpretation now governs the IAD for prisoners subject to the IAD in this state. 4 Prisoners subject to the IAD exist side by side in our state’s prisons with prisoners subject to the Washington intrastate detainers statute. As the State argues, it is unnecessarily confusing to create two different sets of rules governing the commencement of speedy disposition periods for prisoners in the same system.
Consistency seems more desirable here than confusion. There is no utility in creating a potentially confusing situation in which identical statutory language is read two different ways to create two different means of measuring the commencement of the speedy disposition period. Furthermore, a precise measuring event is more desirable than an unvеrifiable or indeterminate one. Of the two different interpretations, the Fex majority adopts the more verifiable and easily ascertained measuring event. Accordingly, we hold that actual receipt by the prosecuting attorney and superior court of the county in which the indictment, information, or complaint is рending commences the 120-day period.
Morris argues that making actual receipt the measuring event creates not one but two triggers, since the statute requires delivery to both the prosecuting attorney and the superior court of the county where the charge is pending.
It appears, however, that the answer to this ambiguity сan be found in “the sense of the matter, and in the import of related provisions”.
Fex,
507 U.S. at 49. The whole thrust of the statute is to ensure that once the period properly commences, the prisoner “shall be brought to trial” within 120 days.
The State seeks guidance on what it perceives to be a further problem. Morris initiated an interlocutory appeal of the trial сourt’s denial of his initial motion to dismiss. The trial court’s decision was stayed pending appeal. The Court of Appeals denied review on March 15,1992, and the State moved to lift the stay of proceedings.
The State argues that when a defendant delays the speedy disposition date by seeking appellate reviеw, the 120-day period should start over at the termination of review. This is not convincing. Any complications caused by discretionary or interlocutory review in this kind of setting can be resolved in the trial court’s discretion. The intrastate detainers statute specifically allows for “any necessary or reasonable cоntinuance” of the 120-day period “for good cause shown”.
In any event, Morris still has not been tried on the pending charge, more than 3 years after his request for speedy disрosition. The resulting delay is more than nine times the length of the 120-day statutory period. Under the circumstances, we dismiss the theft charge with prejudice.
Utter, Dolliver, Smith, Guy, Johnson, Madsen, Alexander, and Talmadge, JJ., concur.
Notes
The period is 120 days for the intrastate statute and 180 days for the IAD.
“(1) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of this state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment, information or complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred twenty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the superior court of the county in which the indictment, information or complaint is pending written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint: PROVIDED, That for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel shall have the right to be present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the superintendent having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the board of prison terms and paroles relating to the prisoner.
“(2) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in subsection (1) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the superintendent having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and superior court by registered mail, return receipt requested.” (Italics ours.)
As the Court of Appeals noted, “Although it is unclear from the rеcord, the ‘90-day period’ probably refers to the speedy trial period of CrR 3.3(c)(1), which is not at issue here. Further, ‘the 87th day’ does not correspond with any significant dates for speedy disposition in this case.” State v. Morris, 74 Wn. App. 293, 295 n.2, 873 P.2d 561 (1994).
As this court has stated, “interpretation of the IAD is a matter of federal law”. State v. Barefield, 110 Wn.2d 728, 732 n.2, 756 P.2d 731 (1988) (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-40, 66 L. Ed. 2d 641, 101 S. Ct. 703 (1981)). We note that one comment in Barefield is contrary to the rule later adopted in Fex. Barefield, at 731 (“The IAD provides that the prisoner must be tried within 180 days of his giving notice to those who have him in custody.” (Italics ours.)).
See Answer to Pet. for Review, at 4 n.2. The exact date the superior court received notice is not clearly evident from the record.