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State v. Morgan
539 N.W.2d 887
Wis.
1995
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*1 Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant, State Defendant-Respondent- T. Michael Morgan, Petitioner. Supreme Court September argument Oral No. 93-2089-CR. 21, 1995. November 1995. Decided 887.) (Also in 539 N.W.2d reported *3 there For the defendant-respondent-petitioner Tyroler, J. were briefs William public state by assistant Rebholz, & Auberry Calvin Malone and defender; argument by Malone, Milwaukee and oral Calvin Malone. plaintiff-appellant argued

For the cause was Marguerite by attorney general, Moeller, M. assistant Doyle, attorney with whom on the brief was James E. general.

Amicus curiae brief was filed Pamela Moors- head, Murray, Adelman, Adelman, and S.C., and Milwaukee for the American Civil Union Liberties Wisconsin Foundation and National Association for the (NAACP). People Advancement of Colored DAY, ROLAND B. C.J. This is a review of an unpublished reversing court decision an County, order of the circuit court for Milwaukee suppressing handgun Franke, Honorable John A. petitioner and cocaine base found on Michael T. Mor- gan (Morgan). Morgan charged carrying weapon, contrary § concealed (1991-92), to Wis. Stat. 941.23 possession armed, of cocaine while con- trary 161.14(7)(a), 161.41(3m), §§ to Wis. Stat. 161.48, (1991-92). Morgan challenged legality 939.63 pat-down produced leading

search that the evidence charges. hearing May At a 1993, the circuit granted suppress the defendant's motion to appeals, unpublished opin- evidence. The court of in an pat- ion, reversed the circuit court. hold We that the Morgan's right down search did not violate under the federal state constitutions to be free from unrea- *4 Accordingly, sonable searches. we affirm the court appeals. following preliminary facts are taken from the

hearing suppression hearing and matter, in this and undisputed. City are of Milwaukee Police Officers (Mulock) Tidquist (Tidquist) Peter Mulock and Brent patrol Officers 1, 1993. a.m. on March at four were squad driving Tidquist near car in a were Mulock and Officer Capitol Milwaukee, area which an Drive "fairly high-crime-rate area." as a Mulock described a whole was not noted that "there Mulock also Officer Mulock Officers at that time. on the street lot of traffic" containing Tidquist three males observed a vehicle and driving alley. turns then made several The car out of an city space another blocks, and entered of a few plates alley. Having license the car's observed lights emergency engaged expired, the officers were stopped squad Officer the vehicle. car and on their Morgan approached and asked the car then Mulock driver) (the Morgan rap- operator's license. for his car's pockets idly some wallet, and searched checked his pockets however, he was unable times; his several Morgan According Mulock, to Officer license. locate the searching license. "appeared for his while nervous" hearing: suppression at the Mulock testified Officer Mulock, has ever Now, not Q: Officer over, I act a little pulled I'm happened, when [sic] anything anymore nervous too. Is this — by the person stopped the usual unusual than police? Yes, it was.

A: I think so. it? Q: was different about What ner- just appeared his face. He A: Just the look on way checking pockets. and the he was vous extremely fast. doing it He was possess Morgan license, discov- which was did fact arrest. incident to in a later search of his wallet ered Morgan step out of Officer Mulock then asked pat-down performed on Mor- vehicle, search the gan. search, Officer In the course of *5 pistol a Mulock discovered loaded .22-caliber in Mor- gan's pocket. placed Morgan coat Officer Mulock under Morgan's arrest conducted a custodial search of (later person pills which discovered certain determined diazepam, antianxiety drug) pipe to be an and a show- ing According traces of cocaine base residue. to Officer testimony, Mulock's in the event that he not had found gun Morgan, placed would officer have Mor- gan squad in the back car while he or Officer Tidquist inquiries conducted various informational through squad operator's radio, car's such as an license check a and criminal record check.

Morgan challenged legality pat-down of the Following suppression hearing, search. the circuit granted Morgan's suppress. court to motion The circuit impermissi- ruled that the search was under Swanson, ble State v. 164 Wis. 2d (1991): N.W.2d 148

Officer Mulock had every [Mor- intention to put gan] into some sort of custody run a check. He was going put to him in the of the using back vehicle his vehicle something booking tentative room, check, run a and then either him in keep custody or release him. I think it's for a officer do that.... I only way by think this frisk flies is custodial search the officer. And while it seems reasonable, Swanson way be it seems to me that the written, deliberate, appears very very it to be careful, very intentional, did, that what this officer at least at time pat yet down not had ripend arrest, I [sic] into an at this have to look not in might the context of what not happened have minutes, in the next min- few not even five or ten moment, period, ute Swanson but under an arrest moment, I don't believe there was *6 Well, least and, therefore, I don't believe that — reasonable, fly.... the search can arguably going I'm to If Mulock had said "What Officer my run a you going the of car. I'm put do is in back that, going I'm your on license and before I do check custody into you. are to be taken going You to search custody," you that searching pursuant I'm and Swanson, at in flies. least I that this then believe dicta, says the officer's problem and addressed determining in the plan irrelevant unarticulated custody. of question that, of a in the absence

The circuit held it not on the record," rely and could specific "clear high- in a testimony stop the occurred officer's in the neighborhood determining legality crime addressing In the other factors the officer search. search, the stated: circuit court justifying raised of night While the time of and the nervousness subject are all occupants and number pertinent deciding in whether factors that are down, pat a to conduct the there's sufficient basis they're enough by together And not themselves. really nothing more than routine traf- here there's expired fic who were stop. People stopped and find licenses are often nervous plates can't their I any . and find that there was nervousness .. don't easily fact [Morgan] that was not attributable to the actually The fact he did could not find a license. in on him is not assess- important have license important ing what the officer did but it's assessing what credibility happened here testimony I'm own satisfied based the officer's observing person that fact that what he was was nervously trying up to come with their driver's thinking being there and not able to license it's find it. appeals holding

The court of reversed, permissible totality search because the justified protective of the circumstances search for weapons. appeals The court of held that the circuit erroneously granting court had relied on Swanson in suppress; the defendant's motion to the court of appeals stated that Swanson held a search invalid permissible scope, because it had exceeded its and not suspect because the officer had failed to inform the place suspect squad his intention to in his car. The Morgan court of then held that the search of supported by was including record, articulable facts the "fairly-high-crime-rate area"; Morgan's driving *7 alleys in two approximately a.m.; Morgan's 4:00 nervous and unsuccessful produce efforts driver's license upon request; and Morgan's appar- ent by violation of the traffic driving law without a license. We also note that Officer Mulock and his partner were occupants outnumbered the three of the car.

The court of concluded: "While none of these necessarily justify factors in isolation would a frisk for weapons, although the trial court noted the lack of specific regarding a 'clear and record' whether the area high they provide crime, was one of in combination ample justification."

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Con- §I, stitution and Article 11 of the Wisconsin guarantee right Constitution citizens the free be from "unreasonable court, searches."1 This in constru-

1The Fourth to the Constitution of the United Amendment provides: States

207 ing § Constitution, I, Article 11 of the Wisconsin Supreme consistently Court's the United States follows interpretation v. Bet Amendment. State of the Fourth (1995). terly, 407, 417, 529 N.W.2d 216 191 Wis. 2d granting suppression, Upon this order review of an findings uphold of fact unless trial court's court will weight preponder they against "great and clear are Kiper, 69, 79, 2d v. 193 Wis. ance of the evidence." State (1995) (quoting Richardson, State v. 532 N.W.2d (1990)). How 128, 137, 456 N.W.2d 830 156 Wis. 2d deciding is a ever, whether a search unreasonable question defer law that this court reviews without Betterly, 191 2d at 416- lower courts. Wis. ence to the 17. Guy, pat "frisk," v. down,

A or is a search. State (1992), 311, cert. 86, 93, 492 N.W.2d Wis. 2d (1993) (citing Terry Ohio, denied, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1968)). prohib The Fourth Amendment U.S. 16-17 determining only searches; its unreasonable reasonable, a search is balances whether suspect's against need for the search the invasion of privacy in the search. Id. at 93. Pat-down entailed houses, right people persons, to be secure in their seizures, effects, against papers, searches and unreasonable violated, issue, upon proba- shall but shall not be and no Warrants cause, supported by particularly Oath or affirmation and ble searched, things describing place persons and the or to be to be

seized. I, provides: 11 Constitution Article of the Wisconsin § right people SECTION 11 The of the Searches seizures. houses, against persons, papers, and effects to be secure in their violated; and no unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be cause, by upon probable supported shall issue but oath or warrant affirmation, particularly describing-the place to be searched things persons and the or to be seized. 208 justified searches are when an has a officer reasonable suspicion suspect may be armed. Id. at 94. suspicion "spe- officer's reasonable must based be together which, cific and articulable facts taken reasonably rational inferences from those war- facts, rant Richardson, that intrusion." 156 Wis. 2d at 139 21). (quoting Terry, objective: at U.S. The test is [T]he issue is a reasonably whether in prudent man the circumstances be in would warranted the belief safety that his or that of others in . danger. . . determining And in whether the officer acted rea- sonably circumstances, weight such due must be given... specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to from in light draw the facts of his experience. 27).

Guy, (quoting Terry, 172 Wis. 2d at 94 392 U.S. at Finally, the determination of reasonableness is made light totality of the circumstances known searching Richardson, officer. 156 Wis. 2d 139- 40.

Morgan argues con- search by supported ducted Officer Mulock was not giving articulable facts rise to a reasonable belief that Morgan making was armed. We hold that an officer Terry stop reasonably need not that an believe individ- armed; ual rather, the test is whether officer "has suspicion may suspect a be armed." Guy, 30); (citing Terry, 2d at 94 Wis. 392 U.S. at see ("The Terry, also U.S. at 27 officer need not be ."). absolutely certain . that the individual is armed . . totality case, In then, we look to the of the circum- determining stances known to Officer Mulock position reasonably whether an officer in his would *9 might Morgan Richardson, suspect See be armed. (test suspicion for frisk is reasonable 2d at 144 156 Wis. circumstances). totality of under Morgan disre- the court of claims that using findings garded fact the the circuit court's justifying high-crime the area a factor nature of the as However, the circuit the record reveals that search. finding was that the area court did not make a factual high-crime in mak- The circuit court stated not a area. ing ruling: its absolutely police

I think it's for just It's they to where are. not the officers consider as in other parts [sic] in Riverhills it is same rely if Court to But the state wants the town. theory Terry pat justifying area high-crime record down, specific there to be a clear and has made. length issue and reviewed

I've discussed this applicable problems cases reviewed say simply will face if we whenever that we area, right high-crime they in a have are day Maybe age in this frisk. that's reasonable done, to be going going but if it's to be it's have some clear and rules we specific done with which Terry. right Terry have now. We have doesn't don't allow it.... finding that the area

The circuit did not make reading high-crime; instead, it ruled its was not Terry high-crime not of the did allow consideration justifying an area a factor a search. nature of disregarding appeals case not court of this was high- findings considering of fact in circuit court's analysis. appeals, like in its The court of crime area making court, its de novo determination of question search, a of law reasonableness *10 without reviewed deference to the lower courts. Bet terly, 191 Wis. 2d at 416-17. appeals,

Like the court of we find that an officer's perception "high-crime" of an area as be can a factor justifying a search. Professor LaFave notes that "the suspect highly area in which the is found is itself a justifying in search, relevant consideration" a and that frequently the cases "most stress that the observed high-crime Wayne circumstances in occurred a area." 3 (2d 9.3(c), LaFave, § R. Search and Seizure at 456 ed. 1987). In United v. Michelletti, States F.3d 838, 13 844 (5th 1994) (en banc), Cir. denied, cert. 115 S. Ct. 102 (1994), "[The searching officer] the court noted: expressed patrolling high concern he crime suspicious area of town .... The location in which day, among occurs, behavior like the time of the facts generate necessary reasonable inferences as to the police response to the behavior." See United also States (1985) Sharpe, (noting 675, v. 470 U.S. 682 n.3 presence frequented ofvehicles in an area "known be by drug justifying investiga traffickers" was factor stop); Rickus, 360, tive United v. States 737 F.2d 365 (3d 1984) ("The reputation Cir. of an area for criminal activity upon is an fact articulable which officer may legitimately rely."). supreme high-

State courts have also noted the determining legality in crime nature of an area of a (Cal. People 1994), Souza, In search. v. 885 P.2d 982 Supreme the California Court on an relied officer's description high-crime of an area as as a factor upholding Citing Sharpe, a search. U.S. at 470 682-83 "[a]n reputation n.3, activity stated area's for criminal appropriate assessing is an consideration investigative an whether detention is under

211 Souza, P.2d at 992. Amendment." 885 Fourth the use of an states endorse decisions several Recent reputation Dean, 645 State v. a factor. See area's (Me. 1994); Fraser, v. 634, Commonwealth A.2d 636 (Mass. 1991); Valentine, v. State 979, 982 573 N.E.2d (N.J. 1994). in this Both State A.2d 513 jurisdictions con- note other LaFave case Professor 9.3(c), supra, § forming LaFave, at 456- to the rule. See (citing, People Cobbin, alia, v. 692 P.2d inter 57 n.194 (Colo. 1984); Freeman, 414 N.E.2d State v. (Pa. (Ohio 1980); Ellis, v. 335 A.2d 512 Commonwealth (R.I. 1975); Super. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138 Ct. State v. (W. 1987)). 1980); Choat, 363 S.E.2d Va. State *11 argues Morgan Morgan was in a that the fact that high-crime supposedly not be sufficient area should high-crime justify search, or residents of areas the all protections Amend- of the Fourth would be denied recognize, People Bower, in as did the court ment. We (Cal. 1979), many persons "are 115, 119 that 597 P.2d 'high rates or that have crime' forced to live in areas play, they shop, work, areas transact come to these spectrum The business, or visit relatives or friends. every day legitimate in so- behavior occurs human high Furthermore, crime areas." Professor called high-crime "simply being in a warns that about LaFave be viewed as a sufficient not of itself ever area should stop." supra, investigative LaFave, an basis to make 9.3(c), here, § However, is not the case at 457-58. Mulock, it from the record that Officer because is clear might Morgan making have in a determination that rely solely he armed, on the fact that been did not "fairly Morgan in termed a what the officer observed high-crime-rate Officer Mulock had seen Mor- area." entering alleys rapid gan's leaving in car two Morgan Officer Mulock also knew that was succession. driving expired plates, a car with license and observed Morgan nervously operator's fail to locate his license. Morgan driving lightly-trafficked was four a.m. in a The facts, area. combination of these not the mere fact Morgan "fairly high-crime-rate was in a area," led to the search. 514, 206

In v. Williamson, State 2dWis. N.W.2d (1973), this court found an officer's valid substantially similar facts. As case, the instant stopped suspect's the officer in Williamson car after observing irregular pattern driving, an and the produce driver the car could not a driver's license. stop p.m. occurred at The court held: Given . . . the present, circumstances here day including the time of fact defendant driving was without a driver's license on person, any identification, and without justified officer his precautionary pat- down to determine if the defendant was armed and dangerous. permissible

Id. at 520. The search in Williamson was presence present even without the of a factor high-crime instant case: the area. present

The court of in matter also stop noted the time at which the occurred as a relevant *12 Flynn, In 427, 435, factor. State v. 92 2dWis. 285 (1979), (1980), denied, N.W.2d 710 cert. 449 U.S. 846 suspect activity occurring early this court noted "in the morning justifying stop hours" as a factor a and frisk. jurisdictions day Other have considered the time of forming suspicion, be a factor in an officer's articulable (7th 665, see United Holifield, States v. 956 F.2d 1992) (noting night p.m. Cir. time of a factor —9 —as search). justifying pat-down officer's The United States Long, Michigan Supreme U.S. Court, in (1983), "[t]he late" in noted hour was 1050-51 Finally, weapons. upholding Terry Profes- a search for day of one of "several includes the time sor LaFave individually justify factors, none which would other stopping investigation, are which nonetheless for together suspicious properly cir- other considered grounds determining are whether there cumstances 9.3(c), supra, § LaFave, at 454. for such a seizure." brief may night the time be We hold that a.m.— —four determining legality of the considered in Morgan. search argues

Morgan court of disre- relying garded finding offact the circuit court Morgan's justifying perceived as a factor nervousness However, that the circuit the record shows the search. specifically Morgan nervous; the found that was making ruling motion, court, in its on the defendant's Morgan "nervously repeatedly went stated that searching through pockets" for and his while his wallet Nonetheless, the circuit court considered his license. Morgan's light of the fact not unusual nervousness person might expect to be ner- that a in his situation expired plates "People stopped with who were vous: I are often nervous ... don't and can't find their licenses any not that was eas- find that there was ily nervousness he could not find a license." attributable to fact Morgan finding court, then, made a circuit as a nervous, discounted the nervousness fac- but explained justifying might it tor the search be because by Morgan's being not to find license. We note able explanation Morgan's for nervousness that another carrying might been the fact that he was loaded have speak- pistol drug paraphernalia .22-caliber while ing to also that Officer an officer law. We note *13 appeared Morgan Mulock testified that more nervous person stopped police." than the "usual the We con- appeals, court, clude that court and this can use Morgan's nervousness as a factor its de novo deter- legality pat-down mination of the of Officer Mulock's search. present agree

In matter, we with totality that the of the circumstances to known justified pat-down Morgan Mulock Officer a search weapons. for Officer Mulock observed the defendant alleyways a.m., in and driving out of at four in an area high-crime which area, the officer considered a a and in expired car an with license. Officer Mulock observed "appeared failing that the defendant produce nervous" while operator's According license. to Officer testimony suppression hearing, Mulock's later Morgan at the typical person was more nervous than the stopped by police. reasonably prudent A officer in position of Officer Mulock could have concluded Morgan might Terry, be armed. 392 U.S. at 30 (frisk justified police "where a officer observes unu- reasonably sual which leads him conduct conclude light experience persons of his that.. . whom dealing may dangerous"). presently he is armed be facts, We in combination, find these taken were sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to have a reason- suspicion Morgan might able armed, be justified weapons the limited search for which Officer Mulock conducted. urges review,

On this a State us to formulate "bright-line" making justified rule all searches when place suspect squad officer intends to car. simply We decline. This case is resolved settled Fourth Amendment law.

By of the court of the decision Court.—The affirmed. fully (concurring). I concur GESKE, J. P. JANINE legal analysis only in mandate, but also the in not presented writing majority opinion. I am in the solely the dissent. to address concurrence "controlling principles dissent, in As noted firmly applicable are established." to this case law (Dissent 218.) principle include the at These requisite an officer had the determination whether pat-down suspicion to must be conduct totality This court of the circumstances. on the based . . . "all of the circumstances has reiterated that often determining reasona in what was are considered to be procedure particular police State situation." ble 520, 514, 206 613 Williamson, 58 Wis. 2d N.W.2d v. (1973) (quoting 289, 297, Chambers, 55 2d State v. Wis. (1972)). 377 N.W.2d analysis employ common sense its

A court must encounter, officer, the time of the of whether an at entirety justified pat- its a situation which in faced simply pulled cannot be out Individual factors down. Supreme noted, As the Court and discarded one one. "Terry acts, of them a 'series of each even perhaps itself involved separately, which if viewed 'but

innocent' investigation.'" together further taken warranted (1989) (quot- 1, Sokolow, v. 490 U.S. 9-10 United States (1968)). ing Terry Ohio, facts U.S. given upon equal not all inferences relied need be weight totality con- of the circumstances but fronting must at least be considered. the officer hindsight agree

I with the dissent's assertion that constitutionally justify pat- employed to be cannot (Dissent 223.) hindsight down. However, neither can selectively be used to discount facts and circumstances they perceived by were the officer at the time of the totality encounter. The of circumstances must be viewpoint sitting examined not from the of one on a judicial lights bench under the cold white of a safe viewpoint courtroom, but rather from the of a standing "fairly-high- officer he what believes to be a crime" area at 4:00 a.m. next to a car with three men in having split-second it, to make that decision of whether, under circumstances, Mor- gan safety. for the officer's own Did the officer have a *15 suspicion Morgan might be armed under the circumstances? At 4:00 a.m. on March Officer alley, Mullock had observed the car exit an make sev- alley eral turns and then enter another at a time when there was not much traffic on the road. He had expired plates observed a vehicle with which contained Upon stopping Morgan three men. car, the he saw ner- vously despite repeatedly fail to locate a driver's license checking pockets his and wallet. key, any question,

The as with Amendment Fourth Terry, agree is reasonableness. 392 U.S. at 19. I with majority the in our de novo that, review under the presented circumstances to Officer Mullock at the time pat-down, suspicion Morgan may be armed was reasonable.

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Roland Day B. and Justices Donald Steinmetz, W. William A. Bradley join Bablitch, Jon P. Wilcox and Ann Walsh concurring opinion. this (dissenting).

SHIRLEY ABRAHAMSON, S. J. controlling principles applicable of law to this case are majority opin-

firmly disagree the I established. application principles of to the facts these of ion's validity pat-down frisk. The of a case to.determine validity pat-down of is an law which frisk area of particularly fact sensitive. agree reasons for court's stated

I with the circuit suppressing I that the factors conclude evidence. justify majority upon search relies give the "reasonable not rise to the defendant do required suspicion" armed, was as that the defendant (1968). Consequently, Terry I Ohio, 392 U.S. under of the court the decision would reverse with directions matter to the circuit court remand the suppression order. reinstate its majority opin- particularly by the I am troubled reliance on the fact that the defendant ion's high police stopped "a officer described as in what the high [a] I crime or what would consider crime area por- for his officer failed to state the basis area." The geographic trayal not of the area and did define locality speaking. he about which was majority

Many for its cases cited imprecise sweeping ruling officer's high justify crime can of an area characterization specificity pat-down frisk demanded far more have *16 glean one from the record in case.1 than can (1985) 1 £>ee, 675, 677 Sharpe, U.S. e.g., United States v. 470 suspected drug traf (stop lawful in area under surveillance for (3d Rickus, 360, ficking); v. 737 F.2d 362 Cir. United States (area 1984) stop recently had of been victimized Souza, 982, by burglaries); People 12 v. 885 P.2d 984 unsolved (Cal. 1994) stop (stop lawful when officer described area of burglaries drug "high area "known for activities" crime" area"); recently "in the exact and officer had make two arrests (Me. 1994) 634, Dean, (stop lawful in v. 645 A.2d 634-35 State 218 right concluding I think the circuit court was rely high- that "if the state wants the Court to on a theory justifying Terry pat crime area down, there specific documenting has to abe clear and record" both specific boundaries and the nature of the criminal activity question. in the area in Crime itself is obvi- ously variegated phenomenon. Some effort must be specific type allegedly made to correlate the of crime particular endemic to a area with the officers' suspicion they reasonable that an individual whom intend to search is armed. agree

No such correlation was made here. I "[u]nspecific Professor LaFave's conclusion that asser- problem particular tions that there is a crime in a area given weight, compared should be little at least as particular type more indications that a certain of crimi- suspected prevalent nal conduct of the kind in that area."2 accept majority's designation

Even Iwere to place stop high high area, as a crime "even in possibility any given areas, crime where the indi- significant, Terry requires vidual is armed is suspicion reasonable, individualized before a frisk for weapons Maryland can be Buie, conducted." 494 U.S. (1990). 325, 334-35 n.2 The other factors cited majority reaching its conclusion that the state had requisite suspicion to search the defen- patrolled uninhabited area request at the of its owners because complaints vandalism); Valentine, numerous State v. 636 (N.J. 1994) A.2d (pat-down lawful; 505-06 officer who was personally stop high familiar with area of as a crime area stated area). that he had made more than 100 arrests in the (2d LaFave, Wayne 9.3(c), R. Search and Seizure § 1987). ed. *17 up "reasonable do add to such dant for arms not suspicion." individualized allegedly erratic the defendant's

With reference to during suppres- driving, the the officer conceded hearing no violated traffic that the defendant sion nothing about the defendant's and that ordinances engaged triggered suspicion driving he had that was began trailing activity. Instead, the the officer criminal general of "a sense unease car because defendant's night [he] and the car it was late at that had because finger [his] driving way put [he] couldn't in a that was testimony represents precisely the sort This on." suspicion unparticularized or 'hunch'" "inchoate requi- Terry trigger the to which is insufficient under suspicion is armed. that a defendant site reasonable Terry, in marked Such hunch stands U.S. 27. suspicion triggering facts contrast the by majority, upon case relied the the Williamson driving erratic evinced an obvi- which defendant's police. Williamson, 58 State v. ous effort to evade the (1973). 517-18, 2d 206 N.W.2d Wis. majority's question reliance on the I also description as nervous. of the defendant While officer's opinion majority true, notes, it officer being defendant's more nervous than testified testimony person police, stopped the usual fully he neither sure such indicates that truly fully capable nor difference existed behavioral articulating it what entailed.3

3 Now, Muiock, Q: happened, not ever Officer has over, any pulled I'm I a little nervous too. Is this when act person stopped by thing anymore unusual than the usual — police? Yes, IA: think so. it was.

Q: about What was different it? *18 The circuit court concluded that the defendant's people nervousness was attributable to the fact expired plates who cannot find their licenses "are observing, often nervous." What the officer was nervously person trying stated, circuit "was to up thinking come with their driver's license and it's being there and not able to find it." finding greater This of historical fact is entitled to major deference from this court than it received in the ity opinion. majority opinion states, As the itself when granting suppression, this court reviews an order it uphold findings must they the circuit court's of fact unless against "great weight preponder

are and clear Kiper, 79, ance of the evidence." State v. 193 Wis. 2d 69, (1995) (quoting 532 698 Richardson, N.W.2d State v. (1990)). 128, 137, 156 Wis. 2d 456 N.W.2d 830 supports The evidence in this record the inference expressly which the circuit court drew: that to the lim- ited extent the officer could describe how the average person defendant was "more nervous" than the stopped, description "checking his someone his —of pockets" "extremely suggests no more than the fast" — average person produce nervousness of the unable to requested driver's license a law enforcement officer. majority opinion speculate For the to as it does about possible other reasons for the defendant's nervousness only is not to read into the record facts which are not ignore there, but also to the deferential standard of findings the circuit court's are entitled. review which acknowledge, previously stated, I as this court has concerning quan- that there can be no litmus test necessary tum and nature of information to constitute just appeared A: Just the look on his face. He nervous and extremely way checking pockets. doing it he was He was fast.

221 necessary trigger "specific facts" articulable suspicion" is armed that a defendant the "reasonable Guzy, Terry progeny. required by State v. and its (1987). And I also 676, 663, 2d 407 N.W.2d Wis. individually recognize of factors a concatenation may, particu under innocent behavior consistent with requisite give rise to circumstances, lar facts and Terry requires. suspicion v. Reid which (1980); Georgia, Jackson, 438, 441 State 448 U.S. (1989). 835, 434 2d N.W.2d Wis. individually con- of factors Before a concatenation *19 trigger can reasonable innocent behavior sistent with degree suspicion suspicion, however, of must some specific which, combined, add acts when to the attach suspicion. up Sokolow, United States v. to reasonable (1989). itself, for 1, U.S. 10 Hence Sokolow 490 stop pat-down example, rather than a involved a which respondent pointed to fact that the frisk, the the Court paid plane cost- alias, tickets an for two traveled under ing flight bills, took a a roll of 20-hour $20 with $2100 only stayed in Miami for to Miami from Honolulu but luggage among factors hours, no the and checked respondent triggering suspicion the justifying drug and his brief courier therefore detention. expired case,

But while the defendant's in this stop provided plates him, a reason the officers with to majority upon the war- none of factors relied upholding subsequent frisk. rants night, time of nor undocumented Neither assumption prone unspecified to "area" was that an driving, crime, nor nor the defendant's manner entirely con- understandable nervousness defendant's specifically articulably to and related stituted behavior suspicion a reasonable that the defendant was armed dangerous. and

Consequently, non-specific these and non-individ- up totality ualized factors do not add to the justifying requisite circumstances reasonable sus- picion dangerous. that the defendant was armed and (1981); Cortez, 411, United States v. 449 U.S. 417-18 (1981). plus Texas, Brown v. 443 U.S. Zero zero always equal will zero. To conclude otherwise is to lend significance [which] very to "circumstances describe a large category presumably innocent travelers" and subject "virtually Reid, them to random seizures." U.S. at 438. might try justify

One the officers' in this actions by hindsight. produced case The officers' frisk a loaded gun. hindsight satisfy But does not the federal or state might try justify constitution. One also the officers' prevention actions this case the name of crime police protection. prevention police protec- Crime might by allowing tion well be served law enforcement everyone they stop. officers to frisk But the federal and state do constitutions not allow such frisks. majority opinion, agree

In contrast to the I depiction circuit court's of this case as a routine stop. displayed *20 traffic The defendant no behavior to support might a reasonable belief that he be armed and dangerous. Therefore I conclude that the circuit court suppressed was correct when it the evidence. forth,

For the reasons set I dissent.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Morgan
Court Name: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date Published: Nov 21, 1995
Citation: 539 N.W.2d 887
Docket Number: 93-2089-CR
Court Abbreviation: Wis.
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