121 A. 277 | Conn. | 1923
There was no error in denying the motions or overruling the demurrer which attacked the sufficiency of the information. The criminal offense of unlawfully neglecting or refusing to support wife or child was created by statute. In this State it is a well-settled general rule that in an information charging such an offense it is sufficient to describe the offense in the words of the statute. If the accused in any such prosecution would insist upon greater particularity, it is for him to show that from the obvious intention of the legislature or because of known principles of law his case falls within some exception to this general rule. Whiting v. State,
The appellant contends that in an information for this crime it must be set forth that the wife or the child is, or is in danger of becoming, a public charge by *119
reason of the neglect or refusal of the accused to support the wife or child; and that the court must instruct the jury, and the jury must find, that the unlawful neglect or refusal of the accused has caused the wife or child to be, or to be in danger of becoming, a public charge. No support for this contention can be found in the terms of our statute. Doubtless it was within the purpose of our legislature to prevent wives and children from becoming charges upon the public, but that result was not the limit of its purpose nor its chief object. The statute it enacted contains no provision that by reason of the neglect or refusal to support his wife or child either of them may be in danger of being a burden upon the public. In this respect it is unlike the statutes of some other States. See Cohen v. Camden,
Turning to the assignments of error which are based upon rulings of the court during the trial, the record reveals that while the accused was under cross-examination on the witness stand, an assistant of the prosecuting attorney declared in the presence of the jury: "He sits there as a perjurer upon that stand." Counsel for the accused thereupon asked the court to declare a mistrial and dismiss the jury. This the court did not do, merely saying to the jury that it was for them to decide, after the evidence was closed, whether a witness was telling the truth or not. The unfairness of this statement by an attorney acting for the State is too apparent to require any comment except such as this court has had occasion to make in State v.Ferrone,
With this conclusion, there is no reason to consider the other assignments of error.
There is error and a new trial is ordered.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.