115 So. 445 | La. | 1928
Defendant was indicted and tried for murder, and was convicted of manslaughter. His appeal presents two bills of exception, both of like tenor, to wit, relating to the admissibility of dying declarations made by the deceased.
And, moreover, it was immaterial that the deceased might have believed that he would survive until next morning, for "it is not necessary to prove expressions implying apprehension of immediate danger, if it be clear that the party does not expect to survivethe injury, which may be collected from the general circumstances of his condition. [Italics ours.]" State v. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 1412, 26 So. 390, 396, citing Wharton's Crim. Ev. § 261; State v. Newhouse, 39 La. Ann. 862, 2 So. 799; State v. Keenan, 38 La. Ann. 660.
We therefore do not understand the expression "If I diebefore," etc., to imply any doubt in the mind of the deceased that he was surely marked for approaching death, but rather that he feared that he might die sooner than the witness and the doctor expected.