State v. MooreState v. Moore
We granted certiorari to clarify, by means of an express holding by this court in a particular case, the cases tо which this court will apply the requirements of the decision in State v. Jones, 404 So.2d 1192 (La.1981).
In the Jones case, this court held that a misdemeanor guilty plea cannot be used аs a basis (1) for actual imprisonment for the currently charged offense, (2) for enhancement of actual imprisonment in a subsequent case, or (3) for conversion of a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony, unless defendant entered the guilty plea voluntarily after being infоrmed of the basic constitutional rights given up by the plea.1 The court further decided to give the newly adopted rule prospeсtive application, in effect decreeing that all future misdemeanor guilty pleas must be entered in accordance with the sрecified requirements in order to be used for the enumerated purposes. However, this court made an exception for сertain “pipeline” cases which were then pending in this court and which had been held for consideration until Jones was rendered.2 The “pipeline” exception to the rule of prospective application was stated in Jones as follows:
“Our decision will be fully applicable to this casе and any other case filed and presently pending in this court involving the issue presented herein. In all other cases, however, we will apply our holding to guilty pleas entered after this decision becomes final.” 404 So.2d at 1196
The Jones decision was rendered on September 10, 1981 and became final on September 24, 1981, when the delay for applying for rehearing expired without an application having been made.
Some confusion has occurred as to the “cases” in which the requirements of Jones are to be applied. The confusion prоbably arises because the Jones issue is being mostly raised in “cases” involving both a currently charged offense and one or more prediсate offenses, so that the court in the currently charged offense is being asked to determine the validity of pleas in the prediсate offenses.
It is the date of entry of the guilty plea in the predicate offense which usually determines the applicability of the Jones requirements. The requirements of Jones are clearly applicable when the guilty plea in the predicatе offense was entered after September 24, 1981 (the date of finality of Jones). On the other hand, the requirements of Jones are usually inapplicable when the guilty plea in the predicate offense was entеred on or before September 24, 1981, the only exception being when the “case” involving the currently charged offense had beеn filed and was pending in this court on September 10, 1981 when Jones was rendered.
In State v. Moore, 408 So.2d 1220 (La. 1982), this court applied the requirements of Jones retroactively to reverse a conviction of third offense driving while intoxicated (DWI-3). In Moore, defendant had entered
The case of State v. Lee, 407 So.2d 1192 (La.1981), presented another “pipeline” exception. After the trial court had sustained defendant‘s motion to quash the bill of information charging DWI-3 on the ground that the 1976 and 1977 predicate pleas were invalid, the state‘s application for certiorari was filеd on November 21, 1980. Although the guilty pleas to the predicate offenses predated Jones, the “case” in the currently charged offensе (although on writs, rather than on appeal) was “presently pending in this court” when Jones was decided on September 10, 1981, and we held that the “сase” was a “pipeline” exception to which the requirements of Jones were applicable in determining the validity of the 1976 and 1977 рleas. See also State v. Stephenson, 412 So.2d 553 (La.1982), which was pending in this court when Jones was decided and which was held to be an exception to the prospective application decreed by Jones.
The present “case” was filed in this court on April 2, 1982, when the state applied for certiorari and complained that the trial court had quashed the indictment (charging defendant with second offense prostitution in violation of
Since the “case” involving the currently charged offense of second offense prostitution was nоt “presently pending in this court” when Jones was rendered on September 10, 1981, and since the guilty plea to the predicate offense of first оffense prostitution was entered before the finality of Jones, the requirements of Jones are not applicable to the determination of the validity of the plea to the predicate offense. The conviction in the predicate offense, which was apparently enterеd with assistance of counsel in compliance with previously existing standards, although not in compliance with the subsequently announcеd requirements of Jones, can therefore be used to convert the status of a second conviction of the same offense into a felony, and the trial judge erred in quashing the indictment.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the motion to quash is overruled. The case is remanded for further proceedings.
DIXON, C. J., concurs with reasons.
WATSON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
DIXON, Chief Justice (concurring).
I respectfully concur.
This opinion represents a clear violation of Boykin v. Alabama, but follows State v. Jones, 404 So.2d 1192 (La.1981). I reluctantly subscribed to State v. Jones in order to assure at least future compliance with Boykin in this state.
WATSON, Justice, concurring.
Although I dissented in State v. Jones, 404 So.2d 1192 (La., 1981), it is now jurisprudential law and I agree that it should be applied only prospеctively.
Therefore, I respectfully concur.