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State v. Moore
90 S.W.3d 64
Mo.
2002
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*1 Missouri, Respondent, STATE of MOORE, Appellant.

Charles E.

No. SC 84495. Missouri,

Supreme Court of

En Banc.

Nov.

Rehearing Denied Dec. Galloway, Springfield, Ap-

Bruce H. for pellant. Myers,

T. Brian Risley, Todd D. Darrell Moore, County L. Green Prosecutor’s Of- fice, Springfield, Respondent. WOLFF, Judge. MICHAEL A. Charles E. Moore was convicted of misconduct, third-degree sexual a crime per- when “solicits another committed one conduct son *2 house, his to things these that chance to do in which he knows his circumstances “I know.” T.N.F. likely replied to cause which she don’t request solicitation point. Be- or alarm.” Section 566.095.1 “scared” at this affront said she was restaurant, appeal challenges the statute on told leaving Moore’s Moore fore if infringement face as an unconstitutional her told its he would kill she T.N.F. that speech.2 right on the of free anybody about the conver- her mother or sation. Because the sexual contact that Moore 13-year-old would—if

requested girl two the restaurant Moore returned to statutory sodomy, the re- engaged in—be Moore, she days T.N.F. saw later. When in he occurred circumstances knew quest and and told someone upset afraid became likely alarm. were to cause affront or On at the about the conversation restaurant Moore, age 61, appeal, does chal- Shortly days two earlier. with Moore that his of a 13- lenge fact solicitation thereafter, arrived. After read- police year-old girl to in oral sex did ing Moore his Miranda rights, Officer Cal- cause afiront or alarm. houn, department, Springfield police allegations Moore about the spoke raised with

Though free-speech concerns During that solicited sex from T.N.F. require Moore to be read nar- he statute conversation, is not Moore admitted to Offi- rowly, reading that so narrow as to his criminal that had a conversation relieve Moore of conviction. cer Calhoun he specifically and had with T.N.F. about sex judgment is affirmed. given if ever head asked her “she had Facts eating out.” had she ever been out-eaten Spring- Moore entered a restaurant However, Moore denied that he asked field, Missouri on 2000. A November him to teach her how T.N.F. if she wanted frequent patron of the for restaurant sev- soliciting or perform to oral sex and denied months, affectionately eral Moore was from T.N.F. requesting sex “Grandpa” by employees called and Moore, then arrested Officer Calhoun patrons fellow of the restaurant. One misconduct who was convicted employee 13-year-old girl, such was misdemeanor, in a trial degree, the third T.N.F., family whose owns the restaurant. He sen- jury. -without a was court During on the course a conversation re- years’ probation tenced two and 4, 2000, T.N.F. if November Moore asked See register as a sex offender. quired to dancer, good was a which T.N.F. she section 589.400. yes. answered Moore then told T.N.F. Standing the Constitution- Moore’s go give that she could home him and with Challenge al lap him a dance. Moore T.N.F. if asked sex,” the statute renders argues had had to which T.N.F. Moore she “ever array speech that she had not. Moore fol- criminal a broad answered cites, He constitutionally protected. if up by asking T.N.F. she “ever lowed ACLU, 844, 117 Reno example, T.N.F. gave head or been eaten out.” (1997), head” or S.Ct. interpreted “giving the terms Supreme Court oral sex. which the United States “been eaten out” as references to prohibiting a federal statute would have a struck down Moore told T.N.F. she challenges validity 2. Moore are to Because 1. All references RSMo. statute, appel- this Court has exclusive state Const, V, jurisdiction. art. late Mo. “indecent” “patently offensive” com- constitutionality of section 566.090. The munications on the Internet. If United what the States Court has held that, prohibits speech justiciability sexual con- standards of tent, Article III of the United making such States Constitu a criminal act *3 applicable courts, tion to federal par would violate the First Amendment to the ties cannot standing concede and courts United I, States Constitution and Art. sec. Id,.3 have an obligation satisfy to themselves of8 the Missouri Constitution. parties that the standing; have see Bender Moore raises a First Amendment Dist., v. Williamsport Area School 475 challenge to the statute “on its face.” 534, 541, 1326, U.S. 106 S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d Moore does challenge the statute as it (1986). 501 For purposes, this Court’s conduct, may apply to his own but as it state’s at concession least bolsters Moore’s applies to speech activities of others. argument. FW/PBS, See also Inc. v. Dal Usually, a person standing lacks to attack las, 215, 230-31, 596, 493 U.S. 110 S.Ct. the validity of a grounds statute on of how (1990). 107 L.Ed.2d 603 The state’s con it applies to someone else. United States cession is appropriate light of v. State Raines, 17, 21, v. 519, 362 U.S. 80 S.Ct. 4 406, Carpenter, 736 S.W.2d under which (1960). L.Ed.2d 524 But challenges based Moore would have standing to challenge upon the First Amendment are sometimes the statute on its face. an exception.4 challenge Such a asserts A only statute should fall if it is that, narrowly while a drawn statute could “substantially readily overbroad and not prohibit his activity, challenged reconstructed to avoid privileged activi is so overbroad as to include that is ty.. .[because if substantially it] is not constitutionally protected. See State v. unlikely overbroad [it] to have a drastic (Mo. 406, 736 S.W.2d 407 banc Note, inhibitory impact.” The First 1987), citing Pfister, Dombrowski v. 380 Doctrine, Amendment Overbreadth 83 479, 1116, U.S. 85 S.Ct. 14 22 (1970). 844, 918 The United Harv. L.Rev. (1965). Criminal statutes require particu States Supreme adopted Court posi larly scrutiny, careful and “those that Oklahoma, tion Broadrick v. 413 U.S. make unlawful a substantial amount of 601, 2908, 93 S.Ct. 37 L.Ed.2d 830 constitutionally protected conduct may be where the Court said:“... where conduct held facially invalid even if they also have involved, merely and not speech is we be legitimate application.” City Houston v. lieve that the overbreadth of a statute Hill, 451, 459, 96 only must not be real but substantial as L.Ed.2d 398 well, judged in relation to the statute’s

In this case the state concedes that Broadrick, plainly legitimate sweep.” 413 Moore does have standing challenge the U.S. at 93 S.Ct. 2908.

3. The First Amendment to the pairing speech, United States by the freedom of no matter Constitution, applicable made by to the states every per- what means communicated: Amendment, the Fourteenth states: "Con- say, publish, son shall free to write or or gress shall respecting make no law an estab- otherwise communicate whatever he will on religion, lishment prohibiting the free subject, being responsible for all abuses thereof; abridging exercise the freedom of liberty;” of that speech, press; right or of the or the assemble, people peaceably petition and to Nowak, 4. Ronald D. & Rotunda John E. Treatise grievances.” the Government for a redress of (3d Ed.1999), on Law Constitutional sections counterpart Its in the Missouri Constitution 2.13(f)(3) and 20.18. provides: passed "That no law shall be im- to what conduct particular attention Helgoth, 691 with This Court State (Mo. 1985), adopted prohibited. In its banc must know is person S.W.2d 566.095, standard announced statute, pro- entirety, the States Court in Broad- United vides: First, over- rick. this Court said that “the the crime of sexu- 1. A commits person strong breadth doctrine medicine degree if he al in the third misconduct hesitation, employed must be another requests solicits last only Helgoth, then as a resort.” circum- in sexual conduct under Ferber, New York v. (citing S.W.2d re- he that his in which knows stances U.S. *4 likely is cause quests or solicitation (1982)). Second, L.Ed.2d 1113 this Court or alarm. affront of the doc- said function unpro- trine “attenuates as the otherwise in the third de- 2. misconduct Sexual behavior that it forbids the State to tected (Em- a misdemeanor. gree is class C from pure sanction moves toward added.) phasis expres- if conduct and conduct—even words,” Shakespeare “But words are scope within the of otherwise sive—falls did That the yet “I never legitimate valid criminal laws that reflect wrote. hear/ maintaining comprehen- though pierced state interests bruised heart was harmful, constitutionally controls over sive ear.”5

unprotected conduct.” Id. The statute of the statute emphasized As the words issue before Court seems involve clear, a prohibition make this is not mere conduct, which the state can declare both circumstances, go which speech. crime, a to be and words, beyond likely must be to cause clear, make As these cases First “affront” or “alarm.”6 principles always do not re Amendment quire that a statute be struck down even In context in which “affront” though broadly it is drawn. “If the statute 566.095, in section what “alarm” are used may be construed in a manner which fairly are or solici- prohibited requests is sexual application unpro limits its to a ‘core’ of likely knows are tations that defendant may upheld against tected it expression, impolite To be is to cause such reaction. it charge overly broad.” State annoying is insuffi- enough. To be (Blackmar, at 408 S.W.2d “affront or alarm” con- cient. The words also, Houston, J., City dissenting); see offense or a vey, a deliberate respectively, and Rich 482 U.S. at least, danger. At the real emo- feeling of H.Fallon, Jr., Over Making ard Sense of result. tional turmoil must (1991). breadth, L.J. 886-887 Yale or alarm” experiencing “affront While Interpretation The Statute and its verbal can be found after defendant’s occurred, application behavior has interpret properly statute it To idiosyncratic on the depend cannot carefully entirety, read and in its should be I, Othello, respect.” literary For Act scene iii. other 5. Third New International Webster's see, references, is defined as and historical "Alarm” Dictionary Richard Dool- outcome, Swearing, ing, "apprehension unfavorable of an Speech, Blue Streak: Free 1996). (Random House failure, dangerous consequences; an occa- Sexual Harassment apprehension.” Id. at sion of excitement deliberately “a offen- is defined as "Affront” utterance; sive act an offense to one's self- person reaction of the whose sexual favors In sections, two other sex crime have been solicited. legislature What are “likely “circum- chose the words to cause 566.083, affront stances which or alarm:” section he knows” at the time he child, misconduct involving makes which request it occurs “likely to cause person when a exposes person’s geni- affront or alarm?” If this is simply the tals to a years child less than 14 age; way law’s saying should know 566.093, and section sexual misconduct in better, it ascertain, falls to the courts to degree, the second which also involves ex- words, reference to the statute’s what the posing genitals.8 one’s Both of these stat- person should know advance of his con- prohibit utes conduct that is known or duct. “likely alarm,” believed to cause affront or give To precise meaning to what a de- presumably to distinguish a criminal act of “know,” fendant must it is appropriate to exposing oneself from conduct that is acci- refer portions other of the criminal dental, inadvertent, or otherwise done code. An adult presumed to know that without an intent phrase to do harm. The certain behavior is criminal. See section likely “circumstances to cause affront or *5 here, 562.031. Specifically, an here, adult should alarm” in the statute involved 566.095, know having that presents oral sex person different context be- cause the years request less than 14 solicitation or old is a felony-first- in sexual degree conduct involves statutory speech and is sodomy.7 In the circum- inherently behavior, not criminal here, as would stances Moore asked year the 13 old be the case of sexual misconduct with a girl to participate in the crime of statutory exposing child or genitals. one’s sodomy. Regardless of how the conduct is characterized —in this statute “likely to A noncommercial solicitation cause affront or alarm”—an adult is from one adult to another —a circumstance deemed under the law to know that such not in Springfield, unknown Missouri—is likely conduct is to cause such an experi- not a conversation that could constitution- ence. ally be the prohibition. within statute’s 7. Statutory sodomy degree in the first is de- to believe that the likely conduct is to cause fined as person follows: "A commits the affront or to a child alarm less than fourteen statutory sodomy (2) crime of degree years age; Knowingly exposes the first of per- the if he has genitals deviate sexual intercourse with an- son’s to a child less than fourteen person years age other years purpose who is less than óf for arousing fourteen the of or gratifying old.” the person, sexual desire of child; (3) including the or Coerces a child "any "Deviate sexual intercourse” is act in- years age expose less than fourteen of the volving genitals person of one and the genitals purpose arousing child’s for the of or hand, mouth, tongue, or per- anus of another gratifying any person, the sexual desire of or a involving penetration, son sexual act including the child.” slight, however of the male or female sex organ pertinent part by finger, provides: or the The anus of 566.093 "A instrument or object person purpose arousing done for the commits the crime of sexual or miscon- (1) gratifying degree Exposes duct in any person.” the sexual the second if he: desire of genitals his which circumstances in he pertinent part provides: The of 566.083 "A likely knows that his conduct is to cause af- person alarm; commits the crime of sexual miscon- (2) front or or Has sexual contact in involving duct person: a child if the presence persons of a third Knowingly exposes person’s genitals to a under circumstances in which he knows child years age less than fourteen in a likely such conduct to cause affront or manner that would cause a reasonable adult alarm.”

69 occur, act, would con- Cal., it to were requested v. Inc. Communications See Sable statutory 2829, 106 first-degree 115, 126, 109 the crime of FCC, stitute Roberts, not (1989); request is sodomy. State This solicitation Cf. 1989). (Mo. A sexual the defen- just banc but conduct that speech, S.W.2d may section 566.095 presumed solicitation violate know the law is dant under where, uses a example, the defendant As con- or alarm. likely to cause affront places per another “purposely threat strued, does challenged section physical apprehension son in of immediate free- guarantee violate the constitutional by section 565.070.1 injury,” proscribed The trial established dom (assault degree), third constitutes experi- in fact year old victim did See harassment under section 565.090. or alarm.” ence “affront (Mo. Koetting, S.W.2d 822 State v. judgment is affirmed. 1981). banc requirement of criminal be- To read a BENTON, LIMBAUGH, C.J., LAURA havior, code, into criminal as defined PRICE, JJ„ STITH, AND DENVIR precise those cir- section 566.095 makes concur. where even most oblivious cumstances know TEITELMAN, solicitor that his conduct J., must in separate dissents In likely to cause affront or alarm. those opinion filed. where the is a misdemean- cases behavior WHITE, J., in opinion of concurs or, 566.095, is a violation of section as TEITELMAN, J. might be considered to be

interpretation reading redundancy legislature’s into the *6 TEITELMAN, Judge, B. RICHARD However, harassing or work. assaultive dissenting. behavior, misdemeanor, though even a respectfully I dissent. significance greater takes on a when as of charged a violation section 566.095 repre- Appellant’s speech was Although violating the conviction of this sec- because hensible, agree principal opinion the I register tion as a requires the defendant to challenge to standing Appellant has sex This offender. See section 589.400.9 an on its face as unconsti- section 566.095 perhaps consequence the most serious to right on free infringement the of tutional of conviction in case. Moore his statute, construed, as the Under this not address majority opinion The does appropriately state in this case assumed limiting a de- pitfalls of construction the victim did showing burden of by the States scribed United “alarm” as experience in fact “affront” or Ohio, 495 in Osborne Court’s decision Moore contemplated by the statute. does U.S. challenge appeal. this fact in this expressed ser- The Osborne Court Conclusion provided had been ious doubt Osborne 122-126, Id. 110 S.Ct. process. due here involve a 61-

The circumstances Court reversed conviction The Osborne year-old requesting or sexu- soliciting man to new trial order “for a girl. a and remanded 13-year-old al from conduct commit, chap- to offense of pro- attempting an pertinent part 589.400 or 9. The of section who, 1, 1979, law register with the chief July ter 566” must "Any person since vides: of, county of- officer of the of been enforcement is hereafter convicted has been or of, pled committing, guilty fender’s residence. guilty found ensure that unconstitutionally Osborne’s conviction stemmed overbroad. The crime finding a proved from that the State had was defined as follows: newly each of the elements” of the con- 1. A person commits the crime 125-126, structed statute. Id. at 110 S.Ct. peace disturbance if: Osborne, As in majority opinion (1) unreasonably knowingly He dis- in this case has construed a statute as per- turbs or alarms another substantially plain different from its lan- by: sons guage. example, For it is not clear that Appellant was tried for crime that in- (c) Threatening to commit a crime cludes the element of a solicitation re- against ... any persons; quest that results “real emotional tur- The Carpenter Court noted that: subject Even if moil.” section 566.095is Although, limiting construction would construction, limiting Appellant should imposition avoid of the facial over- be retried to proves ensure that State conclusion, breadth there is no indication each elements of a reformed section that such a construction would be consis- 566.095. tent with the intent of the legislature. Moreover, inappropriate subject it is fact, In plain language of the statute limiting to a 566.095 construction. contrary. would indicate to the We thus Section should analyzed 566.095 any attempt refrain from to redraft the stringent scrutiny anal statute. ACLU, ysis. Reno v. 521 U.S. (cita- 736 S.W.2d 408 n. 1 138 L.Ed.2d 874 omitted). In tions the context of First (content-based on speech restriction is to challenge, Amendment standard review); stringent be accorded the most application a limiting construction to a Theatres, Inc., City v. Playtime Renton Missouri statute is the extent to which its 41, 46-47, “plain.” language majority Id. The (1986) (restraint L.Ed.2d 29 on opinion analyze this case does not the basis of its content vio presumptively *7 language whether the of section is 566.095 Amendment). lates the First similarly “plain,” but seeks to elevate the opinion’s The majority analysis relies on Judge opinion dissenting of Blaekmar that (State Carpenter, two cases v. 736 S.W.2d applies. no such standard Id. (Mo. 1987); City

406 banc Houston v. of Carpenter apply The Court’s refusal Hill, 451, 2502, 482 U.S. 107 S.Ct. 96 limiting peace construction to the distur- (1987)), of 398 both which declined guide bance statute should the decision apply A narrowing such constructions.1 language here. The of 566.095 is raises, review of both cases rather than at language similar to the reheves, concerning propriety doubts the plain. is Carpenter, issue in and it no less of such a redraft of section 566.095. by The case principal second cited the In State v. opinion proposition Court held for the that this statute Houston, a disturbing peace City statute was should redrafted is of opinion The majority public policy also refers to law in an inconclusive manner article, Fallon, Jr., journal Making narrowing Richard H. concerns and of both constructions 853, Overbreadth, rulings. Sense 100 Yale L.J. 886- dis- Professor Fallon’s of well-written, journal of 887 The section the law course is well-reasoned and but opinion authority. by majority cited addresses cannot as article it stand

71 offensive patently that is regulate speech City at 107 S.Ct. 2502. In 482 U.S. of standards); community Chap Houston, light of the United States 568, 62 Hampshire, 315 U.S. unconstitutionally v. New linsky found overbroad Court (prohibition inter- L.Ed. 1031 prohibited an ordinance that verbal S.Ct. 86 speech address Id. at must police of officers. of words ruptions fighting utterance, injury unlaw- that, made it inflicts very 2502. The ordinance its S.Ct. assault, or in of any person ful for “to strike an immediate breach or tends to incite Theatres, molest, inter- at oppose, manner abuse peace); Playtime (time, in the execution of his man rupt any policeman 54-55, place or at The duty.” sexually-explicit Id. S.Ct. 2502. upon ner restrictions apply City urged of Houston the Court and de must be content-neutral speech would eliminate limiting constructions that governmental signed to serve substantial at Therefore, overbreadth. Id. ordinance’s interest, sec zoning). such as declined, 2502. The Court hold- unconstitutionally over- an tion 566.095 is susceptible to a ing that a statute protected by of prohibition broad language construction if “its limiting judgment The of the First Amendment. unambiguous. meaning its Its plain and be reversed. the trial court should constitutionality upon cannot ‘turn choice mean-

between one or several alternate ” (cita- Id. at ings.’ omitted).

tions Carpen-

As with the statutes at issue in Houston, City language

ter and plain, meaning its

section 566.095 is and The crime unambiguous. elements KEISKER, al., Appellants, Ellen et are a mere 28 words. The words “soli- and cits,” “affront,” “alarm,” and “requests,” just plain unambiguous and as are as Trinity Insurance Universal “disturbs,” “threatening,” words Company, Respondent, in Carpenter “alarms” at and the issue “molest,” “interrupt” “abuse” words FARMER, al., City Respondents. issue Houston. et Beatrice majority opinion presented has no No. SC 84290. holding Carpen- reason to overturn Missouri, *8 Court plain ter. Because 566.095 En Banc. should scrutinized on unambiguous, it its face for overbreadth. Nov. content-dependent 566.095 is Section Denied Dec. Rehearing regulation pre

regulation Such sumptively violates First Amendment. Theatres, Inc., 475 Playtime

Renton v. 46-47, 89 L.Ed.2d

U.S. It fall does not within

recognized exceptions. Miller v. Califor

nia, 37 L.Ed.2d obscenity must (regulation

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Moore
Court Name: Supreme Court of Missouri
Date Published: Nov 12, 2002
Citation: 90 S.W.3d 64
Docket Number: SC 84495
Court Abbreviation: Mo.
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