State v. MooreState v. Moore
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Prager
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Prager, J.:
This is a direct appeal from convictions in two criminal cases which were consolidated and tried together. In case No. 78 CR 629, the defendant, Moses Moore, was charged with aggravated robbery (
The events giving rise to the charges were disputed. The State’s evidence showed that on April 1, 1978, the defendant, Moses Moore, knocked on the apartment door of Mark Marion, and asked if Bill McCoy still lived there. When told by Marion that Bill McCoy no longer lived there, Moore asked if he could come in and see a mural which had been painted on one of the apartment walls. Marion admitted Moore into the apartment and
Defendant Moore’s version of the event differed greatly. Moore testified that, upon entering the apartment, Marion requested him to perform a homosexual act with him in consideration of payment of $30. Moore testified the act was attempted but never completed. Marion then went down the hall to the restroom. Moore dressed, took his $30, and left. A determination of the charges in this case depended upon whether the jury believed the testimony of Mark Marion or that of the defendant, Moses Moore.
The facts surrounding case No. 78 CR 1659 are also disputed. It appears that one Bruce Foggs met the defendant Moore in May, 1978, and moved in with him at the latter’s apartment a few weeks later. Apparently Foggs and Moore had some discussion about this case and the need for a witness who would testify that Marion was a homosexual. Such a witness would strengthen the defendant’s position in the trial of case No. 78 CR 629. At the second trial, in proof of the charges in case No. 78 CR 1659, Foggs testified that Moore signed a jail bond for Foggs in exchange for Foggs’ agreement to testify as to Marion’s homosexuality at Moore’s trial. The night before the trial, Foggs had agreed to so testify. Foggs apparently had second thoughts in the matter after discussing the matter with his lawyer and decided that he would not testify on Moore’s behalf. At the second trial, Foggs testified that Moore became angry with him and that Moore refused to return certain clothes that Foggs had left in Moore’s apartment. Foggs also testified that a diamond ring and a G.I. loan check had not been returned by Moore. The retention of this property was the basis for the charge of unlawful deprivation of property.
Moore testified that it was Foggs who volunteered to testify on Moore’s behalf and that Moore at all times told Foggs to either testify truthfully or not to testify at all. Moore further testified that Foggs had requested him to clean the clothing left in Moore’s apartment, and Moore was withholding the clothing only until Foggs paid for the cleaning. As noted above, the jury at the second trial found the defendant Moore guilty on all counts.
“22-3202. Joinder of charges and defendants. (1) Two or more crimes may be charged against a defendant in the same complaint, information or indictment in a separate count for each crime if the crimes charged, . . . are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.”
The defendant contends that the criminal charges contained in the two cases which were consolidated for trial here, are not of the same or similar character nor based on the same act or transaction or connected as part of a common scheme or plan. The State argues that, because the defendant would not have committed the acts giving rise to the corruptly-influencing-a-witness charge but for the aggravated robbery and kidnapping charges, the crimes were necessarily “connected” and properly joined for trial. We have found no Kansas cases exactly in point. However, it should be noted that
The defendant’s second point on the appeal is that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the two charges contained in the second case, 78 CR 1659, because the State failed to introduce evidence showing the venue on the charges was in Sedgwick County. It appears from the record that at no time in the taking of testimony in regard to the charges in the second case did the prosecutor specifically ask any witness if the alleged offenses occurred in Sedgwick County. At the close of the State’s case the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal because the State had failed to prove proper venue. In Kansas, venue of an offense is jurisdictional, but the cases do not require that venue be proved by specific questions and answers that the offense occurred in a particular county. Venue may be established by other competent evidence showing the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the particular court.
State v. Griffin,
210 Kan. 729, 731, 504 P.2d 150 (1972). We have concluded that the State’s evidence in this case was sufficient to establish venue within the guidelines of
State v. Griffin.
In the course of the State’s case, Bruce Foggs, the witness defendant is charged with corruptly influencing, testified that he moved in Moore’s house at 1104 East 9th in Wichita in May, 1978. Foggs testified that Moore discussed Foggs’ false testimony with him while the two were driving “home” from the office of Moore’s
The defendant’s final point is that the trial court erred in limiting the cross-examination of State’s witness, Detective George Anderson. This point pertains only to 78 CR 629 involving the kidnapping and aggravated robbery charges. In substance defendant maintains that the trial court erred in unduly restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Anderson as to Mark Marion’s bias against homosexuals. Detective Anderson interviewed Marion on the date of the robbery. The information defense counsel hoped to elicit from Anderson concerned certain statements by Marion regarding his brother Buddy Marion’s involvement in “rolling queers,” that is, robbing homosexuals. The trial court sustained the objection to this line of questions as immaterial and irrelevant. It should be noted that, in sustaining the objection to this line of questions, the court specifically told defense counsel he could pursue the issue later by recalling Detective Anderson and laying a proper foundation. Defense counsel never took advantage of this suggestion and never recalled Detective Anderson for additional cross-examination. In the course of the trial, the defendant was given full opportunity to cross-examine Mark Marion, the complaining witness, for the purpose of showing his bias and prejudice. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion or committed reversible error in limiting the cross-examination of Detective Anderson under the circumstances.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Fromme, J., not participating.