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State v. Moore
782 P.2d 497
Utah
1989
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*1 repentance despite and ex- be examined responsibility Utah, Appellee, trust and pungement. Great Plaintiff and STATE in- peace in our officers. Public placed persons so certified terest demands that MOORE, Lonnie L. impeccable qualifications. have and hired Appellant. and scrutiny major of the This well include background. person’s in a events No. 870470. I which have reached conclusions Supreme Court of Utah. opinion interpretation accord with Judge our statute Chief given to Oct. 1989. Depart- Thompson Aldon J. Anderson in Alcohol, Treasury, ment Bureau Firearms, F.Supp. Tobacco and (D.Utah 1982), correctly ob- where he universally did not

served that statute opinion in prior convictions. his

erase case, Judge Anderson observed: explanation legisla- no in the

There is history changes

tive statute, nor have there been

amended

any construing new cases statute. language, especially when con- new light language,

strued of the former place limitation on

seems to the ef- judicial pardon ex- and

fect of in- Though legislative pungement. clear, entirely must

tent is not the court changed

conclude that the statute was purpose, a purpose; and that change, evidently substance judicial limit

was to the effect of Hence, expungement.

pardon and judicial pardon expunge-

since 1980 a

ment under 77-18-2 is section

complete expungement unqualified prior

that erases the conviction suffi- petitioner

ciently Thompson to relieve disabilities.

from his firearms added.)

(Italics By ignoring disregard- significant legislative history, the

ing this in-

majority misconstrues the statute and if had

terprets it as the 1980 amendment made. I would reverse the trial

never been

court. J.,

STEWART, in the concurs HOWE,

dissenting opinion Associate

C.J. *2 Mortensen, Phoenix,

Paul W. for defen- appellant. dant and Wilkinson, Sjogren, David L. Sandra L. City, plaintiff Salt Lake appellee. HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: appeals Defendant Lonnie L. Moore degree felony a first jury conviction for distribution of a controlled substance public value within feet of a violation of Utah Code Ann. 37—8(l)(a)(ii)(Supp.1986) giv- and was § 58— pursuant en an enhanced sentence to Utah 58-37-8(5) process rights his violates due 58-37-8(5)(a)-(d) (Supp.1986) Code fifth and fourteenth may guaranteed years and which not less than five United States Constitu- amendments for life.1 be I, article section 7 of tion and met September On *3 by imposing pen- an enhanced Constitution agent liquor enforcement and law narcotics place alty that take within for violations in Kelley (“agent”) A. defendant’s Don 1,000 equal the feet of a school and violates Moab, in Daniel J. Ward home Utah. the amend- protection clauses of fourteenth informant”) (“confidential them introduced ment the United States and to Constitution infor- present. was The confidential and I, section of the Utah Constitu- article buy defen- to narcotics from mant offered unequal of effect on resi- tion because its dant, it would and stated that defendant towns; (4) dents small and Utah Code of agent and the confidential cost $275. 58-37-8(5)(d) pro- Ann. violates the due § paid that to him. Three informant amount cess and clauses the United States Utah pay- the friends witnessed of defendant’s by precluding Constitutions the defense of attempted evening, defendant ment. That by eliminating lack the knowledge and eighth persons “an purchase from third to requirement proximity the mens rea to methamphetamine for his crystal” of the school and his distribution of narcot- so, to he returned to buyers. Unable do points ics. shall consider these We seri- purchase home. He next endeavored to his atim. He was unsuccessful. then cocaine but agreed he hold suggested and was that overnight try purchase money and to

the I morning. methamphetamine the next trial, requested At that defendant agent met and the Defendant with given defining following instructions be day ap- at informant the next confidential for value” what is “distribution within home, is in p.m. his which proximately at convicted, the statute under which he was 1,000 central Moab and is located within 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii): section County feet of the Middle School. Grand from the His home is 482 feet inches Instruction No. approach on one and 568 feet middle school voluntary instructed that You are gave the 7 inches on another. Defendant unlawful ob- sharing of an substance (a piece informant a “bindle” confidential a party by from a third narcotics tained envelope) shape in paper folded agent person a who has officer or methamphetamine requested the officer or the substance for obtained (one usage) “line” from the bindle. con- agent party from the third does not provided the line. confidential informant within the stitute “distribution value” they them return Defendant told that could meaning of statute. purchase later and more controlled sub- Subsequently, was stances. defendant Instruction No. tried, and

charged, convicted. you may (1) that before appeal, complains: You are instructed On that the beyond in reasonable doubt error find trial court committed reversible methamphetamine refusing defendant distributed give proposed instructions his value, the defen- you must find that embodying his contention that he distribut- value, simply make an ac- did more than drugs receiving a lesser dant ed without offense; to obtain metham- (2) commodation call the court should have included law, phetamine on of the narcotics offi- found, he behalf as matter of was agent. (3) cer entrapped; Ann. Code 196, 1; 1989 Utah Laws § Laws ch. at the of defen 1986 Utah This statute was effect time 1. 2; illegal § 1. See of narcotics within Utah Laws ch. dant's distribution ch. pertinent public (Supp.1989). school. The feet of 58-37-8 Utah Code have been amended. sections of this statute These to an He instructions were refused the tri- undercover officer. took offi- al court. him cer’s to wait at told $120 apartment defendant’s until he returned. requested in- also his We held that whether the defendant real- stated, given struction No. 3 be “[I]t at profit ized a or not was irrelevant. Id. is a lesser offense to the crime included case, Similarly, 134. instant defen- included in the for a information agreed purchase dant narcotics for $275. commit the crime of distribution of a con- agent’s money, He attempted received the trolled value.” in- substance without This purchase times, given entirety struction several its as the narcotics court’s 6. agent overnight instruction No. told the wait while de- trial, money. fendant retained the At he *4 The court jury also instructed the as to portion testified no the that he retained the definition of “distribute” and “distrib- upon purchase re- $275 the and sale and ute for value.” Instruction No. 5 read: only ceived a line of the as substance In construing interpreting these in- and agreed. Defense counsel’s motion to dis- structions, following definitions shall miss on the basis defendant did not apply: receive value for himself was denied. The actual, A. “To means the distribute” stated, court “I the record he see shows attempted a constructive or transfer of part received and $275.00 of the substance person. controlled to substance another only and he was the one that received it. meaning B. The of the term “distribute any- There’s no record it ever went to for value” to deliver a means controlled body else.” In accord with our holding exchange compensation, substance in Udell, receipt defendant’s of $275 satisfies consideration, value, item of or or a the definition of “distribution for value” promise therefor. regardless profit. of his realization of a While a is defendant entitled to an in- Fixel, 744 P.2d State v. case, theory struction on his or her of the (Utah 1987), we held that evidence was McCumber, State v. 622 P.2d support sufficient to the conviction of the (Utah 1980), he not multiple entitled to distributing defendant for a controlled sub- setting theory. instructions forth the same stance for value where defendant was Miller, (Utah State v. 727 P.2d approached request with to marijua- sell 1986). adequately The court defined distri- police na to an undercover officer: bution for in instruction value No. 5. The quoted agreed, selling court then did need to define what is price, personally and then delivered the purposes not value for of the statute since money contraband and received the at his any distribution did not come within apartment. purport merely He did not the definition of “for value” would be find, direct, and introduce the officer “without value.” drug another dealer. The trial court was Furthermore, requested defendant’s in- required to believe defendant’s claim structions No. 1 No. 2 and were flawed any that he did or not receive benefit they premise because were based on the keep any money he received for acceptance that defendant’s of the $275 making the sale. paid could not be value if he thereafter all Fixel, Similarly, jury 744 P.2d at 1370. buy of that drugs amount out to for the here required was not to believe defen agent. confidential and informant We keep any dant’s claim that he did not of the have defined “distribution for value” to making purchase $275 for nor that the exchange include cash for a controlled compensation “line” agreed. was not regardless substance of whether the defen- Finally, it is clear that profit. Udell, dant realized a defendant’s actions State v. 1986). (Utah case, agency involved a mere P.2d In that more than relation we ship receipt and money affirmed the conviction that his defendant’s of dis- tribution of a controlled substance for val- line constituted value. See v. On tiveros, (Utah 1983). agreed ue. The defendant sell cocaine 674 P.2d 103 stepbrother relationship between II entrapment. stepsister or constitute Next, that the defendant contends case, presented evi- In this entrapment defense evidence establishes dence that the confidential informant law, alleged based on his as a matter of They had mutual he “friends.” were friendship the confidential informant. friends and met at local bars. Defendant jury that defendant was not found helped to have the confidential also claimed 76-2-303(1) entrapped. Utah Code drug withdrawal from his informant with (1978) provides: presented evidence addictions. a law enforce- Entrapment occurs when present that the confidential informant by directed ment officer or only home six or at defendant’s seven acting co-operation with the officer spent night at one at defen- times most and induces the commission of an offense drug party. at His contact dant’s home evidence of the commis- order obtain drug purchas- with defendant consisted of prosecution by creating sion for methods es, and the confidential informant did not risk that the offense would substantial consider himself a “friend.” ready be committed one not otherwise affording merely commit it. Conduct Regardless of defendant’s view of their *5 opportunity an person to commit relationship, friendship con- alone does not entrapment. constitute offense does not entrapment. Taylor stitute Under the standard, pleas despera- no there were of This reviews the evidence and all its Court sympa- appeals primarily tion or based on from it in the reasonable inferences drawn thy friendship, or close nor were there of- jury’s verdict. light most favorable to the money. fers of inordinate sums 60, (Utah Martin, 713 P.2d 61 State v. conduct of the confidential informant was 342, 1986); Booker, 709 P.2d 345 State v. proper governmental authority. use of He 1985). (Utah provided guid- We have some once and met with defendant waited entrapment determine whether has ance to attempted voluntarily defendant to obtain occurred: with due haste. He waited as narcotics desperate pleas Extreme illness or voluntarily tried to obtain co- appeals primarily sympathy, on based so, yet to do .caine a second time. Unable personal friendship, or of- pity, or close keep money the defendant volunteered to money, fers of inordinate sums of are day. overnight purchase to make a the next examples, depending on an evaluation of case, circumstances each what in the evi There was a reasonable basis prohibited police might beyond constitute con- find upon jurors could dence evaluating In the course of con- duct. that the crime was a a reasonable doubt represent- government voluntary duct between the own desire result of defendant’s defendant, and the the transactions ative to commit the crime. The fact and intent offense, up only the the interaction him leading police informant afforded that a defendant, agent the and the opportunity between to commit it does response entrapment. and the to the inducements of v. See State Salm amount 366, (Utah 1980). agent, are all to be considered in on, P.2d 369 612 govern- judging what the effect of the Ill agent’s conduct would be on a

mental person. normal Code Ann. Defendant contends 496, (Utah 58-37-8(5)(a)-(d) (Supp.1986)violates his 599 P.2d 503 Taylor, v. State rights in arbitrari- 1979) (footnote omitted). process due In v. substantive State (1) creating 315, (Utah capriciously an irrebutt- Ct.App. ly Wright, 744 P.2d 318-19 wit- that children will be 1987), presumption able the court held that the undercover drug transactions marijuana nesses to or victims purchase of cocaine and officer’s presence or regard the actual while the officer was without from the defendant (2) children, subjecting de- accompanied by stepbrother of another absence town, fendant, to a of a small special a resident capitalize on the defendant did 502 arbi- that the statute

higher culpability increased Defendant contends risk of criminal trarily and an irrebutt- capriciously creates large than the residents of cities. wit- presumption

able that children will be 1 drug nesses to or victims transactions regard presence to the actual without A convicted under subsec His that his absence of children. claim (5)(a) 58-37-8 tion of Utah Code Ann. rights process are violated substantive due degree felony and shall be guilty of a first ground The stat- on this is without merit. imprisoned an enhanced term.2 for presence presume the of chil- ute does not upheld This the discretion of Court has transaction, during drug nor does dren penal- legislature criminal to enhance Instead, require it. envisions statute example, specific conduct. For ties safety plausible risks to the health and consistently habitual criminal statute has participants of children become who challenge. survived constitutional Cf. drug and victims of transactions. Williams, 1368, v. State 773 P.2d 1374 Holland, v. F.2d United States 810 Johnson, v. (Utah 1989); 771 State P.2d denied, 1215, cert. (D.C.Cir.), 1222 481 U.S. 1071, 1989); Stilling, (Utah State 1074 2199, (1987), 95 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 854 (Utah 1989) (the P.2d sentence selling con defendant was convicted criminal should be being a habitual trolled within feet of substances merged underlying with the sentence of public in the District of Columbia. offense to one enhanced substantive create challenged congressional on He statute Bailey, sentence); P.2d grounds, the irra several one of which was Carter, (Utah 1986); P.2d presumption tional and that the irrebutable (Utah 1978). statutes en- Other *6 perpetrator deserving punish greater is of penalties hance for crimes committed while ordinarily ment than tolerated. would be Angus, v. firearms, using 581 P.2d congressional He assailed the determina (Utah 1978) (construing 992 Utah Code 1,000 drugs tion that those who sell within Speer, v. (1953)); Ann. 76-3-203 a commit serious feet of school a more (Utah 1988) (construing 750 P.2d 186 proportionally greater offense and deserve (1978)), 76-3-203 and for in- Code Ann. § drugs out punishment than those who sell Bishop, murder, State v. tentional 753 P.2d 1,000-foot zone. The court held: side 439, 1988) (Utah (construing 460 Utah Code (1978, a of awareness Supp.1987)), It is matter universal 76-3-206 edu- they upheld by government provides this Court. that have been when (5) (b) person Acts A convicted under this Subsec- 2. Prohibited E—Penalties: (a) Notwithstanding provisions (5) degree felony guilty other of a first tion of is section, person this a not authorized under imprisoned for a of not less shall be term any chapter declared this be who commits act penalty years five if the that would oth- than section, 37a, Chapter this unlawful under Sub- established but for this erwise have been Act, 58, Drug Paraphernalia Title Chapter or under degree (5) have first would been a section 58, 37b, Title Imitation Controlled felony. Imposition sen- or execution of the Act, shall, conviction, upon Substances subjected be suspended, shall the tence shall not be nor penalties to the and classifications parole eligible mini- person until the be (5)(b) act set forth in Subsection if the imprisonment this sub- term of under mum committed: been served. section has (i) private elementary public a or or sec- in school; ondary (d) prosecution It a defense to a is not school; (ii) grounds or on the of such mistaken- under subsection the actor (iii) any building, park, portions in those age years ly believed the individual be 18 stadium, grounds other structure or or offense, time of the or was or older at the are, act, being used for an at the time age; true nor unaware of the individual’s by through activity sponsored such or mistakenly actor believed that the location school; as described (iv) where the act occurred was not any within one thousand feet of struc- ture, (5)(a) grounds or was unaware that facility, in in Subsection or included Subsec- (ii), (iii); (5)(a)(i), was as de- tion the act occurred location where (v) years age (5)(a). under 18 scribed in Subsection regardless of where the occurs. act

503 Florida, 184, McLaughlin 379 189- away U.S. facilities for children cational 222, 90, 283, 287, parental re- 13 L.Ed.2d 226- their homes it assumes 85 S.Ct. Burnison, (1964); States v. sponsibility furnish them an education- 339 United 27 crime as 87, 95, 503, 507-08, al environment as free from 70 94 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. Lewis, reasonably protection make it. Its 675, (1950); it can Malan v. P.2d is most needed within the school Matheson, them 661, (Utah 1984); Baker surroundings. And it proximate and its (Utah 1979). 607 P.2d general understanding that is a matter of All defendants state-wide who distribute villages average in cities and con- our a controlled substance for value within public trolled zones around structures 1,000 public governed feet of a school are feet. usually extend 1000 Absent by susceptible this statute and to its en- protection problem, punish- equal penalties. argue cannot hanced is to be ment allowed statute] [the any any differently that he is treated than under and is well within reviewed similarly who other situated individual broad, unlimited, though discretion drugs proscribed deals within the location. Congress Eighth under the Amendment city. Consequently, in He resides a small degree punishment pro- to fix the yard readily the school be more locat- portion particular crime. to this ed within of his residence and his feet Holland, United States v. 810 F.2d at drug-dealing activities than is the case with omitted). (citation However, drug larger dealers in cities. case, police pow the instant under proximity de- this increased does not make er, legislature the state has taken mea him fendant dissimilar and therefore entitle health, protect public safety, sures to Clearly, he could dissimilar treatment. of children of Utah from the welfare have distributed controlled substances out- potential danger presumed extreme created zone, the defined school whether side drug on or near a when transactions occur unincorporated Moab or the area outside See also United States ground. Further, its limits. defendant has not (2d Cir.1985), Agilar, 779 F.2d similarly drug that a situated dealer shown denied, 475 U.S. cert. 106 S.Ct. dissimilarly treated Moab has been (1986) (the proscription L.Ed.2d 609 “bright line test” defendant. The is based *7 sales within the environs schools is a school, regard- strictly on distance from reducing easy rational means of the risk of population configura- or less of the town’s acquisition by availability that can lead to constitutional. See is tion. a test Such Cunningham, v. children); United States 459, Ogar, 229 N.J.Super. A.2d State v. 551 519, (S.D.N.Y.1985) F.Supp. 615 520-21 1037, (1989). 1042 direct (statute require endanger does in re Nieves, of review this ease v. children); The standard United States ment of v. Bish quires only a rational basis. 1147, (S.D.N.Y.1985) F.Supp. 608 1149 (Utah 1986); United (statute 261, op, valid pre irrebuttable 266 creates 717 P.2d Holland, 1,000 1219; sumption drug v. that offenses within 810 F.2d at States children). 429, Brown, endanger N.J.Super. feet of a school 547 A.2d 227 Rodriguez, 225 State v. 743, (1988); 747 2 966, (1988). 466, A.2d 967-68 N.J.Super. 542 rationally to the le is related The statute Defendant’s contention that protect governmental interest of gitimate protection it equal statute violates because drug-related activity ing from its minors drug in towns differ treats dealers small profound harm to the drug use. The large in cities ently from those is without people young minds and bodies of principle A of both merit. fundamental drug activity, and not from related results equal protection provi and federal state activity, be ade incidentally criminal should persons is that the law should treat sions poten presumed quately prevented. similarly situated in a similar fash who are custom risk that children could become dissimilarly situ tial persons who are ion ground alone dissimilarly. E.g., suppliers is a sufficient ers or ated be treated should 504 culpability.” court rationally legislation. Fur such acts affected support

to lack of knowl ther, legis the defendant’s that this held that defendant’s contention lack of knowl edge the statute itself and against lation discriminates small-town edge to was not an disingenuous: proximity the school drug providing dealers is leeway drug criminal conduct: greater to the small-town excuse for provide greater would in to dealer turn risk Congress’ easily It concluded here that is small-town children. This Court cannot heightened protecting in children interest city rule that children in the of Moab and the direct from both indirect protected less than in a should be children perils drug amply supports traffic its Thus, city. larger Utah the rational basis showing require decision not passes for this statute muster state-wide. proximity rea school. mens A know that reasonable would IV trafficking stringent drug subject is public regulation seriously it can because contention, that Defendant’s last community’s threaten the health and 58-37-8(5)(d) his Utah Code violates safety, particularly it relates as process rights precludes due because community’s heightened concern for the knowledge defense of lack of about health, safety and its welfare of children. school, proximity of the is without also knowledge And because of [the statute] provides merit. The for strict crim statute law, presumed it is reasonable for liability: inal Congress drug expected to have traffick- (d) prosecution It is not a to a defense proximity ers to ascertain their that the actor mis- under subsection operations schools and remove their takenly that location believed ... these areas or assume the risk their was as de- where act occurred to do so. failure (5)(a) un- scribed in subsection or was the location where the act aware Holland, 810 F.2d at United States described occurred subsection (emphasis added); see also 1223-24 United (5)(a). 791, (2d Ofarril, F.2d 792 States v. 779 Cir.1985) curiam), denied, (per 475 cert. may The fact not have 1231, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 340 penalty of the enhanced for distrib- known Falu, (1986); States v. F.2d United uting controlled with- substances value (2d Cir.1985); Brown, see also State County feet of the Grand Middle N.J.Super. A.2d prox- not have known of the School (1988) (state legislature legitimate had a imity to the of his domicile school is not basis for the termination of reasonable defense. proximity the school’s rea about mens dealing selling convictions of Cases *8 protective purpose shield achieve its 21 drugs under 845a have held U.S.C.A. § from the violent and dan children requirement dispensing the of that with milieu); gerous criminal narcotic pro was a violation of mens rea not due 72, 769, Morales, N.J.Super. 224 539 A.2d comparable is cess. federal statute (statute posses (1987) prohibited 776 Utah’s statute. In United States v. Hol 1,000 within sion controlled substances of (D.C.Cir.), land, 1215, 810 F.2d 1222 cert. property feet did not violate due of school denied, 1057, 2199, 107 95 481 U.S. S.Ct. despite fact that law process rights, the the (1987), upheld 854 the court a stat L.Ed.2d proximity require knowledge did of imposing punishment upon ute enhanced school). distributing those convicted of controlled Congress past, has rendered crimi feet of In the substances within a school. type nal of conduct that reasonable argued that the vio The defendant statute subject stringent know provided person it should is process due en lated because seriously threat public regulation and punishment regard for acts hanced without safety. community’s or Li en health or actor or had a the to whether not the “knew 433, States, 419, 471 U.S. parota probability knowing that v. United reasonable

505 2084, 2092, 434, 444- 105 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d session and distribution of a controlled sub- (1985); Freed, 58-37-8(5) 45 see also United States merely stance. Section enhanc- 601, 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 U.S. S.Ct. penalty aggravating es the when an factor (1971); United States v. International present. require Utah law does not Corp., Minerals & Chemical 402 U.S. aggravating accompanied the element be (1971). 91 S.Ct. 29 L.Ed.2d 178 Fur Therefore, a mens rea. section 58-37- ther, punishment person of a for a crime 8(5)(d), knowledge which eliminates lack of ignorant making when of the facts it so aggravating presence about the factor’s process. does not involve a denial of due penalty, defense for the enhanced does exception The narrow rule is found process. not violate due legislation pas “wholly where criminalized Affirmed. by person sive” conduct who is “unaware any wrongdoing.” Lambert v. Califor HALL, C.J., concurs. nia, 225, 228, 240, 243, 355 U.S. 78 S.Ct. (1957). L.Ed.2d ac Defendant’s ZIMMERMAN, (concurring Justice: tions in the instant case far from were dissenting). “passive.” II, III, I parts concur in and IV of Justice Utah, responsibility In criminal attaches opinion. Howe’s I concur in the result “intentionally, when a acts know I, part join portions but do not in some ingly, recklessly, negligence, with criminal part I.1 specified a mental state otherwise offense, defining in the statute the as the majority opinion Part I of the ad ” requires.... definition of the offense dresses judge give the failure of the trial 76-2-101(1) (Supp.1989). Utah Code § requested defendant’s two instructions on require The law does not that each ele what the terms “distribute” and “distribute correspond ment offense include a mean, concluding for value” that the trial ing culpable Interestingly, mental state. judge adequately jury instructed on defining the former criminal Utah statute theory substance defendant’s when it responsibility required just that. Utah See jury informed that “distribution ... 76-2-101(1) (1978). Code Ann. The stat § without value” was a lesser included of 1983, eliminating ute was amended in majority fense. The then states that to requirement. Compare Utah Code Ann. give requested definitional instructions 76-2-101(1) (1978) with Code Ann. duplicative. disagree. my would be I 76-2-101(1) (Supp.1989). Rarely will the view, judge jury once the trial told political courts disturb branches’ defini convicting had a defendant of it choice of tion of the of a elements crime. United for value” and “distribution “distribution Brewer, (6th 841 F.2d States value,” quite properly ... without should Cir.1988). determining what facts “[I]n meaning jury have informed doubt, proved beyond must be a reasonable reject those It error to terms. legislature’s the state definition of the ele proposed instructions. usually disposi- ments of the offense is Pennsylvania, tive.” McMillan v. conclude, however, I that this do 79, 85, 106 2411, 2415, 91 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. requires error reversal. The instructions (1986); Ohio, 67, 75 see also Martin v. *9 did little more than by offered defendant U.S. 107 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed.2d 267 give explanations for the common sense (1987). value.” Noth terms and “for “distribute” ing was con contained in those instructions ease, In the instant section 58-37- troversial, suggest has not 8(l)(a)(ii) and defendant defines the for which de- offense prosecution’s argument led the charged, requiring fendant was ed that the any- knowing pos- jury conduct an intentional and that these terms meant be believe majority it addresses. 1. Because a of the Court concurs with Court for those issues opinion, represents of the decision DURHAM, JJ., and the offered STEWART thing was in other than what concurring and in the Therefore, concur I conclude instructions. ZIMMERMAN, J. dissenting opinion of was give the instructions the refusal an abuse of discre- error and not harmless Larson, 775 P.2d v.

tion. See State (Utah 1989). from the ma

My point departure court suggestion that the trial

jority is its requested given the two

could not have say majority seems to instructions. GILLMAN, of the Es Trustee Duane H. Udell, our decision that under Corpora America tate of West Credit (Utah 1986), a defendant P.2d Thrift and and America tion West against a distribution-for- cannot defend Loan, Appellant, and Plaintiff all of the charge by showing that value turned over money given to him or her was given drugs that were then

to another for DEPARTMENT FINANCIAL INSTI OF holding purchaser. That is not to the UTAH, the STATE OF TUTIONS OF There, at the defendant was of Udell. Appellee. hold bring under the tempting to himself No. 20515. Ontiveros, P.2d 103 ing of State v. Supreme of Utah. 1983), Court (Utah we held that there where support a convic evidence to sufficient 25, 1989. Oct. value, distributing but that tion for “arranging” a distri evidence did show 674 P.2d at 104.

bution for value. quite different from

facts in Udell were Ontiveros, simply held that

those in and we Udell, there was sufficient evidence jury’s that Udell did

sustain the verdict when he acted as the

distribute for value

seller, money pur took sum

chaser, bought gasoline some out of that drugs, returned with

money, and later there was no uncontested evidence

when drugs paid same amount for the

that he purchaser. charged

as he Ontiveros,

Accordingly, under Udell Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366

as well 1987),

(Utah majority, also cited on a seeking to avoid conviction by showing charge

distribution-for-value guilty only the lesser

that he or she is properly arranging charge quite

included things argue jury to the that one

can arranging crime an

that makes the that the defen- for value is distribution money all the over to another

dant turned something the did drugs, evidence *10 Because compellingly show Udell. true, certainly not error for

this is it is jury. judge to so instruct a

trial

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Moore
Court Name: Utah Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 25, 1989
Citation: 782 P.2d 497
Docket Number: 870470
Court Abbreviation: Utah
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