STATE OF ARIZONA v. DANNY N. MONTAÑO
Arizona Supreme Court No. CR-99-0439-AP
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
Pimа County Superior Court No. CR-58016; SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
The Honorable Deborah J.S. Ward, Judge Pro Tempore
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
Janet Napolitano, Former Attorney General Phoenix
Terry Goddard, Attorney General
by Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel,
Capital Litigation Section
and Robert L. Ellman
and James P. Beene
and John P. Todd
and Bruce M. Ferg Tucson
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for the State of Arizona
Law Office of Carla G. Ryan Tucson
by Carla G. Ryan
Attorney for Danny N. Montaño
McGREGOR, Vice Chief Justice
¶1 The only issue before us is whether reversible error occurred when a trial judge sentenced Danny N. Montaño to death under a procedure that violated the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002) (Ring II). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article VI, Sectiоn 5.3 of the Arizona Constitution and
I.
¶2 In Ring II, the United States Supreme Court held that Arizona‘s former capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment. Ring II, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S. Ct. at 2443. The Court declared that “[c]аpital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.” Id. at 589, 122 S. Ct. at 2432. The Court reversed our decision in State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267, 25 P.3d 1139 (2001)
¶3 Following the Supreme Court‘s Ring II decision, we consolidated all death penalty cases in which this court had not yet issued a direct appeal mandate to determine whether Ring II requires this court to reverse or vacate the defendants’ death sentences. In State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, ¶ 53, 65 P.3d 915, 936 (2003) (Ring III), we held that we will examine a death sentence imposed under Arizona‘s superseded capital sentencing statutes for harmless error.
II.
¶4 A jury convicted Montaño of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder for the death of Raymond Jackson. Montaño and Jackson were inmates at the Arizona State Prison Cimmaron Unit in Tucson. On August 7, 1995, during an open рod period, Montaño and another inmate, David Jiminez, entered Jackson‘s cell. While Jiminez held him down, Montaño stabbed Jackson 179 times. Jackson died shortly thereafter.2
¶5 After entering judgment, the trial judge conducted a sentencing hearing to determine whether any aggravating or mitigating circumstances existed. See
¶6 Montaño argued that two statutory mitigating circumstances exist, and the judge rejected both as not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Montaño argued that his “capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but nоt so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”
¶7 Montaño sought to prove thirteen non-statutory mitigating circumstances. The trial judge found four proven by a preponderance of the evidence: biographical misfortune-condition of birth, learning disability in mаthematics, polysubstance abuse, and low to borderline I.Q.3 The judge rejected the following: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, lack of effective intervention and treatment, the corrupt and coercive prison reality, the victim, circumstantial evidence, preliminary hearing tеstimony, prison homicide, potential outcome disparity, and the opinions and feelings of others.
¶8 After reviewing the evidence, the judge determined that the four established mitigators were not entitled to any mitigating weight. She found that although Montaño was an alcoholic and drug user as a teenager, his parents worked hard to provide a loving family environment. The judge recognized that his “family worked very hard to provide [him] with a safe and nurturing environment,” and that his “family did everything they could do to try to [deter]
¶9 The judge concluded that none of the mitigating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for leniency and sentenced Montaño to death.
¶10 We affirmed Montañо‘s convictions on direct appeal and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the Sixth Amendment Ring II error was harmless. Montaño, 204 Ariz. at 413, ¶ 85, 65 P.3d at 77. We will find constitutional error harmless if we conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the sentencing outсome. Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 565, ¶¶ 103-04, 65 P.3d at 946. If we conclude that reasonable doubt exists, however, then the error is prejudicial and the case must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing under Arizona‘s amended capital sentencing statutes. Id. at 565, ¶ 102, 65 P.3d at 946.
A.
¶11 Arizona law recognizes two separate prior conviction аggravating circumstances. These aggravators exist when either “[t]he defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable,”
¶12 In Ring III, we held “that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to determine prior convictions under sections 13-703.F.1 and F.2.” 204 Ariz. at 556, ¶ 55, 65 P.3d at 937. Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial judge‘s finding that the prior serious conviction aggravating circumstance exists.
B.
¶13 Arizona law provides for an аggravating circumstance if a person commits first degree murder while “in the custody of . . . the state department of corrections.”
¶14 Indeed, Montaño conceded the in-custody aggravating circumstance as part of his penalty phase mitigation arguments. In Ring III, we held that “[i]n cases in which a defendant stipulates, confesses or admits to facts sufficient to establish aggravating circumstance, we will regard that factor as established.” 204 Ariz. at 563, ¶ 93, 65 P.3d at 944. Montaño attempted to prove several mitigаting circumstances by relying upon his status as a prisoner. We therefore conclude that the in-custody aggravating circumstance is established beyond a reasonable doubt.
C.
¶15 The State establishes the especially cruel aggravating circumstance if it proves, beyond a reasonаble doubt, that “the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur.” State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 18, 951 P.2d 869, 883 (1997) (citations omitted).
¶16 Jackson was stabbed 179 times. The medical examiner testified that Jackson could have been alive anywhere between one and three minutes or five and ten minutes after the first fatal stab wound, depending upon which wound was inflicted first. According to the medical examiner, Jackson would have suffered
¶17 Testimony elicited during cross-examinatiоn raised the possibility that Jackson fell unconscious after receiving blows from either Montaño or Jiminez before the stabbing began. If that were true, Jackson would have been unconscious before blood loss began.
¶18 The State introduced evidence indicating that screams of pain аnd torture emanated from Jackson‘s cell after Montaño and Jiminez entered. While the testimony suggests that Jackson was conscious during the stabbing, his screams also could indicate his reaction to the fighting taking place beforehand. Given the evidence, we cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that all reasonable juries would find Jackson‘s death especially cruel.
¶19 We conclude that the especially cruel finding is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether Jackson lost consciousness before the stabbings began or thereafter prеsents a question of fact. Cf. State v. Jones, 205 Ariz. 445, ¶ 14, 72 P.3d 1264, 1267 (2003) (holding that a jury could conclude that the victim lost consciousness immediately following the first assault). Montaño is entitled to a jury determination of this issue.
IV.
¶20 To sentence a defendant to death, the trier of fact must not only find, beyond a reasonable doubt, thе existence of one or
¶21 Montaño‘s penalty phase mitigation theory alleged that several factors contributed to his inability to conform his conduct to law on the day of the murder. The defense introduced three expert witnesses claiming that Montaño‘s parents, the educational system, and the state failed to recognize certain problems he encountered while a teenager, such as his alcohol and drug abuse. Additionally, according to the expert testimony, Montaño‘s pаrents were preoccupied with an incident in which his sister was molested by a neighbor, which diverted their attention from his problems. Montaño also alleged that his substance abuse problems contributed to his propensity to commit crimes and that his low I.Q. rendered him unable to understand the legality of his conduct.
¶22 Hector Jose Fernandez Barillas, a clinical psychologist and expert witness for the defense, examined these factors and concluded that they impaired Montaño‘s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct on the day of the murder:
Q. In your report you concluded that reviewing all of this information and testing the defendant, going
over his academic history and his problems that he had when he was younger, that all of this affected his ability to conform his conduct to the law? A. Yes.
Q. Can you -- is this your opinion?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And this would relate to Mr. Montaño‘s inability to conform his conduct to the law at the time of the murder he has been convicted of?
A. Yes.
¶23 If a jury had believed this expert testimony, it could have adopted one or more of Montaño‘s proffered mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that no reasonable jury would have weighed differеntly the established aggravating and mitigating circumstances or determined that the mitigating circumstances were “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.”
V.
¶24 Montaño argues that mitigation evidence presented at the original аggravation/mitigation hearing entitles him to testing for mental retardation under
VI.
¶26 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Montaño‘s death sentence and remand for resentencing under
Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice
CONCURRING:
Rebecca White Berch, Justice
Michael D. Ryan, Justice
¶27 I concur in the result, but dissent from the majority‘s conclusion that harmless error analysis is appropriate where sentencing determinations are made by the trial judge in the absence of the jury. The right to trial by an impartial jury is fundamental. The sentencing phase is, of itself, a life or death matter. Where a judge, not a jury, determines all questions pertaining to sentencing, I believe a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has occurred. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Ring II, the absence of the jury in the sentencing phase of a cаpital trial necessarily amounts to structural error. I would remand the case for resentencing, simply on the basis of the Sixth Amendment violation. See State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. at 565, ¶¶ 105-14, 65 P.3d 915, 946-48 (2003) (Feldman J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Ring III).
Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice