81 Wash. App. 474 | Wash. Ct. App. | 1996
Geoffray Mollichi, a juvenile, pleaded guilty to malicious mischief and taking a motor vehicle without permission. Included in his plea to malicious mischief was the admission that he damaged some roof tiles. Because the restitution order was entered at a separate hearing held after the disposition hearing, Mollichi argues that the order was untimely and void under the Juvenile Justice Act. We hold that the act’s timing language is directory only, and an order entered outside
I
Relying on a literal reading of the juvenile restitution statute, Mollichi argues that the court can only impose restitution at a disposition hearing. The juvenile statute provides:
Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall:
(f) Determine the amount of restitution owing to the victim, if any[.][1 ]
RCW 13.40.190 further requires: "(1) In its dispositional order, the court shall require the respondent to make restitution to any persons who have suffered loss or damage as a result of the offense committed by the respondent.” In juvenile cases the court is required to order restitution where appropriate, unless the offender demonstrates an inability to pay.
In contrast, restitution to victims is not among the stated purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA).
In State v. Krall
The court indicated in Krall that the word "shall” is presumptively mandatory. However, the court also looked at the entire act to see if a contrary legislative intent was apparent.
The Juvenile Justice Act’s directive to determine restitution is in a laundry list of what the court "shall” do at a disposition hearing. In light of the Legislature’s clear expression that providing restitution to victims is one of the overarching purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act, it does not appear that this directive was intended to be a jurisdictional limit on the power to order restitution. Accordingly, we hold that the language is directory and the
II
Mollichi also argues that the court had insufficient evidence to establish the amount of damage to the roof tiles. This argument has no merit. "Evidence of proof of loss is sufficient if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating the loss and does not subject the, trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.”
Affirmed.
Grosse and Webster, JJ., concur.
Reconsideration denied June 5, 1996.
Review granted at 130 Wn.2d 1007 (1996).
RCW 13.40.150(3).
State v. Bennett, 63 Wn. App. 530, 532, 821 P.2d 499 (1991). But see State v. Hunatte, 69 Wn. App. 670, 674, 851 P.2d 694 (1993) (erroneously citing Bennett for the assertion that the decision to impose restitution in juvenile cases is within the discretion of the court).
RCW 13.40.010®(h).
See RCW 9.94A.010.
See State v. Davison, 116 Wn.2d 917, 919, 809 P.2d 1374 (1991); State v. Lewis, 57 Wn. App. 921, 923, 791 P.2d 250 (1990). Contrast RCW 9.94A.1200L7) (requiring, absent extraordinary circumstances, restitution in felony cases when injury or damages result).
125 Wn.2d 146, 149, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994).
Krall, 125 Wn.2d at 148.
See Krall, 125 Wn.2d at 148; Niichel v. Lancaster, 97 Wn.2d 620, 623-24, 647 P.2d 1021 (1982).
State v. Fellers, 37 Wn. App. 613, 619, 683 P.2d 209 (1984).