State v. Mohi

Utah, Appellee, STATE of Plaintiff and

v. MOHI,

Asipeli Appellant. Defendant and Utah, Appellee,

STATE of Plaintiff and

Phillip LUNDQUIST, Daniel Defendant Appellant. Utah, Appellee,

STATE of Plaintiff and Rodrigo CHAIDES,

Daniel Defendant Appellant.

Nos. 940200 and 940201.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June

Rehearing Sept. Denied Graham, Gen., Clawson, Atty. Carol

Jan George, Murphy, Attys. Asst. Julie J. Kevin Gen., City, plaintiff. Lake for Salt Ishola, Yengieh, J. Ronald Hakeem Salt City, for Mohi. Lake Anderson, Provo, Lundquist. Linda Means, Provo, H. and Lee Thomas C. Ras- mussen, City, Lake Chaides. Salt DURHAM, Justice: appeals is a consolidation of This case Mohi, Phillip Asipeli Daniel defendants Rodrigo Lundquist, and Daniel Chaides from interlocutory orders of the Third Judicial District and Fourth Judicial Circuit Courts. challenge constitutionality of Defendants (the portions Courts Act of Utah’s Juvenile Act).1 cases, the trial three courts Lundquist and amended was before Chaides were 1. Section 78-3a-25 was after Mohi but findings of fact and conclusions of motions that entered denied defendants’ below the di- upholding the portions of the Act unconsti- law trial courts rule granted Mohi’s court to re- rect-file statutes. This court Defendants ask this tutional. interlocutory petition appeal for an findings and hold un- the trial courts’ verse Act that order. portions prosecutors discretion to file some allow Phillip Lundquist and Daniel directly in against juveniles adult charges Rodrigo Daniel Chaides leaving court while other circuit or district similarly court. accused offenders Lundquist (Lundquist) and Phillip Daniel §Ann. 78-3a-25. See Utah Code (Chaides) joint- Rodrigo were Daniel Chaides information,

ly charged criminal filed 17, 1994, ag- FACTS March with one count each burglary, degree felony; ag- gravated a first Asipeli Mohi felony; gravated robbery, degree a first and 1, September alleges The that on vehicle, State felony. degree of a a second theft (Mohi) 1993, intentionally or Asipeli Mohi Lundquist charged alone was with a fourth Chap- recklessly caused the death of Aaron firearm, count, degree a second theft man with a firearm or facsimile thereof. felony. The information noted State’s identified Mohi as the Several witnesses have penalty intent to seek enhancement on each A criminal infor- person Chapman. who shot aggravated burglary aggravated against September mation was filed Mohi robbery charges for use of a firearm or a 8, 1993, provisions pursuant to the direct-file facsimile of a firearm. 78-3a-25(6)(b). § of Utah Code Ann. Mohi Lundquist initially and Chaides were held 3, 1976, January and was thus was born on However, at a detention center. years eight approximately seventeen following hearing a bond in Fourth Judicial age alleged months of at the time of the Court, Circuit both defendants were sent to crime, major- age short of the four months County than the Utah Jail rather ity. juvenile facility to trial. March await On represented

Mohi has been counsel arguments the circuit court heard re- being charged. since The direct-file statute garding appropriate housing facility for charged provided that juveniles under which Mohi was this hear- as adults. After when an information was filed district or ing, defendants were returned the Utah juvenile, circuit court the defendant County Jail for further detention. guardian representative or his or her appeal Lundquist bring and Chaides could file a “recall motion” with the challenge constitutionality first the days original filing. court within ten amended direct-file statute and second the 78-3a-25(10). § See Utah Code Ann. Nei- county jail placing order them in the rather filed a recall mo- ther Mohi nor his counsel than in a detention center. The tion. provision charge direct-file used to Lund- quist Mohi bound to stand trial and Chaides differs from the earlier was over charge district court. In November and December version of the statute used to Mohi not, in this Mohi filed amended motions and the amended statute did instance, supporting asking hearing regarding court to allow for a recall memoranda jurisdiction. provision propriety Code of adult Lund- rule direct-file Utah § pursuant quist Ann. 78-3a-25 unconstitutional and Chaides raise the same claims re- (due does, process) garding Act as Mohi with additional article sections 7 (uniform laws) arguments deprives operation of of the Utah Con- that the amended statute January process Judge Iwasaki them of due under both the state and stitution. today charged. section was further amended dur- sion. we stress that our decision legislative clarify ing the Juvenile Courts Act in use when the 1995 session. To addresses addressed, being were arrested. We do not treat version is we will refer to these defendants subsequent amendments. 1994 version of the statute as the amended ver- treatment, by eliminating disparate resulting receive federal constitutions one and that section 78-3a-25 group eligible chance for recall that is for rehabilitation in the violates the state constitutional re- juvenile system and another that faces the separation powers. quiring See Utah very sys- different circumstances of the adult Const, V, Lundquist art. and Chaides argue tem. Defendants that no state inter- argue upon by also that the statute relied by allowing est is served such unreasonable county jail trial court to house them the disparity. rather than detention while await- responds arguments State to these trial, 78-3a-30(9), ing Ann. Code by claiming first that defendants have not unconstitutionally vague failing clarify proven applied that the statute is un- proper when it is to be housed way. even-handed Because the statute does with adults. not, State, according to the on its face create ANALYSIS classifications, unreasonable defendants showing should have the burden of I. Standard Review actually specific, afforded like-situated present ques All issues in this case different, more favorable treatment tions of law. We therefore review the trial than that accorded these defendants. Be- courts’ conclusions for correctness. Erick produced, cause no such evidence was Forwarders, Inc., son v. Schenkers Int’l 882 contends, challenge State defendants’ must (Utah 1147, 1994); Pena, P.2d 1148 State v. Furthermore, fail. the State claims that con- (Utah 932, 1994); 869 P.2d 936 v. State Thur trary contentions, to defendants’ in this court man, (Utah 1993). 1256, 846 P.2d 1269-70 (Utah Bell, 1989), State v. 785 P.2d 390 al- ruling constitutionality While on the ready decided that the direct-file statute does statute, we will resolve doubts favor of not violate either the federal or state consti- constitutionality. Society Separationists, tution. Whitehead, (Utah 916, Inc. v. 870 P.2d 920 1993). begin by clarifying scrutiny We the level of deciding used of the Operation II. Laws Uniform question statutes in under the state constitu- provision Defendants attack the direct-file tion. Defendants contend that the statute I, of the Act under article 24 section of the “liberty” touches and concerns a interest and Constitution, states, Utah “All laws of legislature’s therefore the actions must be general a opera- nature shall have uniform reasonable in relation to the state’s need to Const, I, § tion.” art. 24. Defendants contends, enact such statutes. The State contend section 78-3a-25 of the Code however, being tried a is not provision by creating violates a scheme right legis- a constitutional and therefore the persons treats one class of in adopting lature’s actions the ordinance particular differently a crime than another only rationally must be related to the state’s persons charged class of with the same preserving peace. interest crime. Defendants define the different (1) “classes” created the statute as those Clatterbuck, In in re 700 P.2d felony accused of serious who offenses re- (Utah 1076, 1985), juve 1079 held that a we subject jurisdiction juve- main or trial nile’s interest his her forum nile court and those accused of identical a touched and concerned “critical” interest. against prosecutor offenses whom the files a agree that a to be ‘We whether is criminal information circuit or district ‘critically system is a transferred to the adult court, whom a obtains important’ question and that a must arbitrary a criminal indictment. This classi- procedural protec appropriate be afforded reasonably fication scheme is not related to Id. interest, tions when that determination is made.” any argue, state defendants States, 541, (quoting legislation Kent v. United 383 U.S. is devoid of reason for 553, 1045, 1053, permitting identically 16 84 situated 86 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 996 hand, argue, on the other (1966)).2 v. us. Defendants & Blue Shield In Blue Cross (Utah 1989), 634, under the

State, spoke we to claims 637 that Bell 779 P.2d scrutiny length the level of Equal at some and that discussed Protection Clause federal challenged article under legislation applied 24 of the claims under article section their held, scrutinizing “In we 24. There yet have to be addressed. Utah Constitution 24, I, § under article legislative measure a that Bell did not agree with defendants We the classification whether we must determine the court. fully resolve all issues now before reasonable, objectives whether aggra- involved a convicted Bell legitimate, and whether legislative action are robbery attempted degree second vated relationship between there is a reasonable majority opinion, I murder. In legislative pur- the classification added) (citations convic- this court set aside the defendant’s (emphasis omit- poses.” Id. degree murder un- ted); Supply attempted v. second Fuel Co. tion of accord Mountain City Corp., 752 P.2d of the stat- felony murder Salt Lake der the Lewis, (Utah 1988); P.2d v. opinion, Malan parts II and III of the Bell ute. (Utah 1984); Gaufin, see also Lee challenge to section 78-3a-25 a constitutional 1993). (Utah The burden of P.2d It critical to was discussed. of the Code however, unconstitutionality, demonstrating note, however, that these sections of the lead Cross, heavy Blue 779 P.2d one. remains majority carry opinion Bell failed 637; City Jordan Utah State West C.J., (Howe, court. Id. at 407 Assoc. (Utah Bd., 767 P.2d Retirement Stewart, J., concurring in concurring; 1988). Therefore, uphold we will the statute Zimmerman, JJ., result; dissent- Durham & demonstrate unless defendants ing). those sections of the lead public protecting interest state’s discussing provision of opinion the direct-file juveniles is not rea- addressing the needs of Courts Act do not consti- the Utah Juvenile sonably course of action related to the state’s Moreover, binding precedent. Bell ana- tute statutory ques- passing provisions the lyzed provisions direct-file under the tion.3 Id. at Equal Protection Clause. federal Thus, ques- n. 23. the state by questions were treated Related by yet not raised defendants have argues tions now in Bell. The that this court by this court.4 now been addressed the issues that are before Bell resolved based, (Utah 1989), Kent, court held that upon in which this the case which Clatterbuck is goes substantially prior on to state: version of the stat- similar place system ute was constitutional under the fourteenth in our of law for [T]here is no reaching conse- a result of such tremendous the United States Constitution.” amendment to quences [trying juveniles adults] without attempt to escalate defendants' bur- The dissent's ceremony hearing, a without effec- proof inappropriate. is den of —without counsel, a tive assistance of without statement above, First, plurality opin- as noted Bell is a It inconceivable that a court of of reason. is Second, ion; precedent. it does not establish proceed justice dealing with adults would It addressed the federal constitution. Bell extraordinaiy It would be if soci- this manner. "holdings,” by majority whether a made no permit- ety's special ... concern for children otherwise, regarding the state con- the court or procedure. We hold that it does not. ted this today. Finally, Kent, raised stitutional issues at 86 S.Ct. at 1053-54. This 383 U.S. clearly protects previously language law of a statute ruled states that the amended version procedural rights juveniles. any upon subject type Yet the dissenters is not of deference from system uphold court, allows would a it in fact be the amend- this because ceremony— "without to make this determination troublesome. ments which render statute hearing, without a statement of without a ... Therefore, brought today against the the claims by position supported That is not reason.” Id. are amended statute under the state constitution precedent. While defendants’ burden is not affected Bell. “heavy,” not made more so indeed is correctly that the burden of lenge similarly if it is found to treat situated by classes when “the law its own terms clas juveniles unreasonably in an different fash- for persons sifies different Id. treatment.” ion. facially that argues The State the statute is Analysis opera under Utah’s uniform “by neutral because does not its own provision requires tion of laws assess two juvenile segregate terms” offenders into “First, equally apply ments. a law must complained disagree. classes of. We Second, persons all within a the statu class. plainly The statute that a amended states tory treat classifications the different juveniles certain will class of be treated ment the classes must based on be (remain juvenile way jurisdiction) one tendency differences that have a reasonable class of while another like-accused objectives to further of the statute.” by Malan, (citations omitted); (singled will be another out treated 693 P.2d at 670 adults). Cross, prosecutors to be tried as See Utah accord Blue 779 P.2d at 637. There 78-3a-25(6)-(7). fore, Although § Code Ann. a we must first determine what classifica tions, any, prosecutor’s triggers assignment by if are decision created the statute. Second, any given to one we must determine differ defendant class or anoth- whether er, statutory dispa contemplates or scheme itself ent classes subclasses are treated Finally, if rately. disparate treatment the two classes. Even Professor Nowak’s subclasses, treatise, State, by or we on exists between classes must relied clarifies opinion 395 n. but P.2d at later asserted Bell’s contains discussion of the Utah Con- stitution, equal protec- claims do not amount to a denial conclusion that the were claims "either constitu- tion under the federal or state invalid under Utah Constitution was there- tion.” Id. at 405. text of the fore mistaken. stance, juvenile court are statutory is a cases tried arrangement considered such proceed- rather criminal considered civil than purposes of consti- statutory classification 78-3a-44(l). § ings. Ann. Utah Code analysis. page the same On tutional an individu- significant has ramifications for language quoted the State takes Moreover, any al’s future criminal record. above, goes that a on to state Nowak facility under juvenile to a committed secure create its face classes which does of Youth Correc- the direction Division during the result in classification nonetheless twenty-one. age tions released must be application the statute those actual 62A-7-108(l). Therefore, §Ann. Utah Code Nowak, the law. empowered administer applies only to indi- because section 78-3a-25 sum, 78- conclude at 600. we older, juve- years of age sixteen or viduals system of classification. does create a 3a-25 statutory left in nile in the class who is Bell, (plurality opin- 400-01 785 P.2d at See juvenile potential system faces a maximum ion) system (discussing the classification years of five or less. sentence 78-3a-25); id. at 408-09 Utah Code Ann. Zimmerman, JJ., (Durham dissenting) & foregoing a dramatic scenario is (discussing the contained in Utah classes facing contrast to that another 78-3a-25). §Ann. Code statutory charged as same class who is is to con adult. “The effect certification ques- the law in We next consider whether every way if proceedings duct “applies equally” within tion to members Strunk, were an adult.” State v. Malan, or 693 P.2d at each class subclass. (Utah 1993). P.2d Aside from that because 670. Defendants contend record, permanent acquiring a criminal for the crimes being tried as adults same are or, potential faces a life sentence peers some of will tried for their death, felony, obviously capital case juveniles, they disparately. The are treated liberty greater deprivation personal much being tried as a State counters that counterpart his than that risked or her “right” anyone per se is not a and that Moreover, juvenile. rather who is tried as a bestowing on some but a benefit juvenile facility, facing than detention at a choosing not to that same benefit on bestow eligible housing in these are offenders others, taking any prison state or other adult facilities. See merely rights away giving but benefits Bell, 78-3a-30(9); Ann. see also Code persons. appropriate We unable to rec- (Durham Zimmerman, JJ., 785 P.2d at 409 & argument concept with the of uni- oncile permits dissenting). the statute operation form of laws because the selection identically juveniles, situated even co- two arbitrary process for treatment beneficial conspirators co-participants the same and standardless. crime, radically penalties to face different agree present with defendants We any statutory consequences without juveniles of Act treats a subclass certain guidelines distinguishing for between them. nonuniformly. in- Juveniles whom unequal to as that amounts treatment or are filed are statu- dictments informations in term has been used the context article torily indistinguishable from those who re- Cross, Blue 779 P.2d at See juvenile By very jurisdiction. main 637; Malan, 670; P.2d at also see Kent statute, they of the of the States, terms accused 541, 554, v. United 86 S.Ct. U.S. age into the same offenses and fall same 1045, 1053-54, (high 16 L.Ed.2d 84 absolutely ranges. nothing There is in the juve lighting significant between differences juveniles identify to tried as proceedings). How nile and adult criminal adults; ever, it describes no distinctive character- finding this alone does not invalidate juveniles apart from in the opera istics to set them principle The of uniform statute. statutory juvenile remain in requires other class who tion of the stat of laws invalidation jurisdiction. critically there are ute if defendants can demonstrate that important in relation disparity differences treatment this is unreasonable juveniles step compared purpose as adults The final those tried statute. therefore, juvenile system. analysis, in- those left For our determine relationship” fy whether there is a “reasonable arbitrary means. The State asserts purpose between the of the Act and problem that this is cured the fact that adopted legislature means prosecutors to enact legitimate often have reasons for Cross, purpose. 637; Blue 779 P.2d at wanting to persons leave eligible for adult Malan, 693 P.2d at 670. prosecution juvenile court. But the stat- ute require prosecutor does not to have Section 78-3a-l of the Code states any reason, legitimate otherwise, sup- purpose of the Act is to port his or her stays decision of who promote public safety and individual ac juvenile jurisdiction and who does not. Le- countability by imposition appropri gitimacy in purpose of the statute cannot persons ate sanctions who have commit up deficiency make for a design. in its Sec- [and]; ted acts in violation of law tion wholly 78-3a-25 is without standards to

guide prosecutors or instruct as to when should or should not use such influential justice, consistent with the ends of strive powers.6 The total absence of such stan- to act the best interests of the children dards makes the unique among Utah statute in all attempt preserve cases and those of all employing any other states strengthen type family possible. ties where prosecution of adult juvenile offenders. It (7).5 3a—1(1), § Ann. Code Defen- 78— is ironic that the Act sets out in thirteen full dants legitimate concede that this is a pur- paragraphs all of the factors that a court pose juvenile enacting courts act. The must certify consider to into the only consideration, then, is whether system, adult § Utah Code Ann. 78-3a- imposed by scheme section 78-3a-25 is rea- 25(2)(a)-(j), guidelines but contains no sonable relation to purpose. this We con- prosecutor who choose for reason or that it clude is not. place reason to into the adult argues The State that the direct- 78-3a-25(6)(b).7 system. Id. file reasonably of the Act is related purpose statute’s stated parties there in these cases have briefed this legitimate is a try need to certain violent length court at on the use of direct-file stat- agree as adults. We with the jurisdictions; utes in other pursuant to rule State’s assertion of but need observe that the Procedure, of the Utah Appellate Rules of specify has failed to which violent both the State and Mohi filed supplemental juveniles require treatment, such instead point. del briefs on parties All contend that egating that discretion to who the use or of discretionary nonuse direct-file guidelines have no as to jurisdictions how is to be schemes in other per- should be Legitimacy exercised. goal justi- cannot question suasive on the of the reasonableness complete 5. For a purposes statement repeats argument by pointing dissent out courts, see Utah Code Ann. a- 78-3 group potential that all within the possible subjects prosecu- direct-file cases are and, therefore, tor discretion because all were power 6. We appropriately note that this vested selection, exposed to the risk of those 78-3a-25(l)(a)(iii), in the courts in section actually chosen for removal have not been treat- impose juvenile allows district courts to sen- differently juvenile sys- ed from those left in the appropriate tences when and allows however, reasoning, justify tem. Such would certify juveniles jurisdiction. courts to Significantly, into adult "separate equal” systems numerous but specifies fairly this section exten- guidelines making long rejected sive impermissible. have been such determinations. as A prosecuted scheme which all Caucasians in one places, In argues several the dissent that the way and all minorities in another could not be I, guarantees by of article section 24 are satisfied justified on the basis that all Caucasians were Utah's direct-file scheme because members of treated alike and all minorities were treated subgroup by each created section 78-3a-25 are Therefore, argument ignores alike. the dissent's is, equally. argues treated That the dissent protection the core of article juveniles prosecuted all who are chosen to be as (such persons similarly situated as all sixteen- and, likewise, juve- adults are treated alike all year-old murder) juveniles accused must be kept juvenile system niles Therefore, are treated alike. treated alike. claims, dispa- the dissent there is no rate treatment of like-situated individuals. The which, par- Summary” together with the Unfortunately, states statute. of Utah’s argument, thir- given oral contended the discretion to State’s reports regarding ties’ impure in contain direct-file jurisdictions are con- teen statutes10 in prosecutors other provisions and that no court has ever ruled flict. on a statute unconstitutional such brief, alleged Mohi opening In his ground. only jurisdictions in the United five Having applicable reviewed acts8 in employ impure direct-file States fifty acts of all and the District courts states as to prosecutors have discretion which Columbia, any published together with juvenile to juveniles to remove from which of such opinions which jurisdiction.9 criminal In his brief and adult treated, we conclude that statutes has been argument, argued that because Mohi oral unique Act is the amount uncir- Utah’s statute has been chal only comparable one prosecutors. to cumscribed discretion grounds, there is lenged jurisdictions, Currently, only eight court from includ- relatively guidance little Utah, provi- response ing employ impure jurisdictions. to this con direct-file other tention, any degree.11 eight, Of supplemental “All- sions to these three the State filed impure types statutory code all three an scheme defines 8. There at least juveniles prosecuted persons Therefore, See that allow to be as sixteen and above as adult. id. schemes schemes, (1) "pure” au- statutorily, direct-file which adults: offenders violent six- juveniles older, tomatically years only certain to the adult send teen old or rather than those system specific basis of and artic- criminal on the prosecutor, by as selected would tried schemes, indicia, (2) "impure” direct-file ulated adults. prosecutor allow a some discretion which least (2) Georgia, (Supp. § Ga.Code Ann. 15-11-5 similarly juveniles to choose situated to which 1994). Georgia The statute allows juvenile jurisdiction into the adult remove deciding juveniles discretion which who (3) schemes, system, hearing Kent and criminal as remove would otherwise be tried adults to into States, from the case of Kent United. taken juvenile system. No is discretion allowed in (1966), 16 L.Ed.2d 84 U.S. S.Ct. determining prosecute which to as jurisdiction which removal from to adult Therefore, Georgia's adults. scheme functions hearing. preceded by judicial Under such is Vermont’s, primarily do New York's and dis- nomenclature, Utah’s scheme would be consid- cussed below. impure. ered Minnesota, 260.131(4) (3) (1994). § Minn.Stat. gives prosecutors only statute the discretion Arkansas, 9. The five states cited Mohi are juvenile jurisdiction,” label a case "extended Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, and Utah. which allows the court to consider both adult comparable penalties. This is not jurisdictions 10. The cited the State thirteen impure Ultimately, the discretion of statute. Colorado, Arkansas, Columbia, are Florida, District court, system which to follow lies with the Louisiana, Michigan, Georgia, Minneso- prosecutor. § with the See Minn.Stat. 260.126 Nebraska, York, Vermont, ta, Utah, New (1984). Wyoming. York, (4) § New N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law 180.75 1993). (McKinney requires juveniles This statute Arkansas, (1) eight jurisdictions are see 11. The years and older sixteen old who are accused of (Michie 1993); (2) § Ark.Code Ann. 9-27-318 tried unless certain crimes to be as adults Colorado, (Supp. § see CoIo.Rev.Stat. 19-2-805 attorney requests district case be tried in 1994); (3) Florida, ch. see Fla.Stat. 39.047 Here, any prosecutor court. discretion (4) Louisiana, (1993); see La.Child.Code Ann. selecting juveniles limited remain in 1994); (5) (Supp. Michigan, art. 305 see Mich. court; family there is discretion as Nebraska, (1993); (6) § Comp.Laws see 600.606 place which adult to Moreover, into the scheme. 43-247, Utah, (1988); (7) §§ Neb.Rev.Stat. -276 is not clear that a court would be (Supp.1994); § see Code Ann. 78-3a-25 accept prosecutor’s bound recommendation 14-6-203(f) Wyo.Stat. Wyoming, and (1994). see even this limited instance. employed also free considering today. we are statutes remaining statutes characterized five (5) Vermont, Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. discretionary, we the State consider to (1991). schemes, Georgia’s statutes, York's Like New pure be either Kent certification can prosecutors Vermont’s statute allows to se- quickly eight distinguished be from the other be lect certain cases which would otherwise tried statutes listed above: Columbia, (1)District juvenile § 16- in adult court to be tried in court. This D.C.Code Ann. scheme, 2301(3) (Supp.1989). We do we note is further limited not consider this which

1001 statutory guidelines help pros- adopted impure Louisiana provide direct- before words, juvenile system. upheld determine whether or adult file In Gachot ecutor other Therefore, jurisdiction constitutionality prior proper.12 would be scheme that Utah, only states, including prosecutor five there are did allow discretion. granted “unguided” prosecutors which are at 272-73. Defendants all concede that So.2d states, juvenile In one of five Colo- regarding discretion. these Utah’s scheme transfer rado, statutory prerequisites narrow the field would be rendered constitutional if the ele potential prosecutor who face prosecutor ment of were discretion removed. example, prerequisite For one is Therefore, discretion. support does not case only juveniles may prior with records be discretionary contention that Utah’s State’s jurisdiction. to adult See removed Colo.Rev. scheme is constitutional. Therefore, (Supp.1994). § 19-2-805 Stat. State, Chapman The State also cites v. actuality, only there are three states with (1989), persuasive Ga. 385 S.E.2d 661 substantially schemes similar Utah’s.13 authority. However, Chapman addresses argument, In oral the State claimed that primarily separation-of-powers question. any jurisdiction “no court in had other ever Id. 385 It guid- S.E.2d 663. offers little any provisions ruled of the direct-file uncon- questions operation ance on the of uniform any grounds.” Close stitutional examina- process and due before us. now Further- reveals, however, tion statement is more, Georgia’s currently vests adult appears.14 initially not as forceful as it jurisdiction criminal courts with over an enu- offenders, merated class indicated, absent jurisdic As there are seven leeway discretionary prosecutor. for the prosecu tions in addition to allow Utah that (1994). Therefore, §Ann. 15-11-5 Ga.Code jurisdictions juve tors discretion to select Georgia’s scheme is now similar to Ver- nile offenders. In two states has the mont’s, prosecutor gen- wherein discretion is been these statutes di Louisiana, erally deciding rectly limited to which tested.15 constitutionali cases to re- usually ty persuasive move to and is not was tested a case cited as court Gachot, authority by State, deciding allowed in cases to remove — denied, jurisdiction. Therefore, (La.Ct.App.1992), Georgia cert. So.2d 269 adult -, squarely U.S. S.Ct. 126 L.Ed.2d 429 cases do not consider a scheme (1993). However, contrary allowing scope the State’s of discretion available representations, support prosecutors Gachot offers under Utah’s Juvenile Courts position its was the case decided Act.16 precluding prosecutors removing ju- prose- even violent more discretion from the hands of its juvenile system, following back into the veniles does not cutors criticism that the scheme em- prosecutors ployed allow of where to file excessive discretion. See Don- Frazier, charges against Bishop violent offenders and is na M. & E. Charles Transfer inapplicable today. Study discussion therefore to our Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Waiver, Analysis Prosecutorial 1991 Notre

12.Florida, Nebraska, Wyoming. 281, 289; Pol'y We note Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Fla. questions § dissent (Supp.1994). our inclusion of Flori- Stat. 39.0587 giving guidance prosecu- da in the list of states argues, citing tors. dissent Fla.Stat. Louisiana, Arkansas, Michigan. 13. 39.047, that Florida report procedural recommendations from completely Nor the statement accu- manager case but are nevertheless free to disre- See, Kaiser, e.g., Kelley rate. 992 F.2d report charges gard and file wherever (10th Cir.1993) (finding Oklahoma direct- ignores choose. dissent ulti- Brown, unconstitutional); file Lamb v. mately it is “the court shall receive and [that] Cir.1972) (10th (same); 456 F.2d see also report” [the] "[a]fter and that consider- consider note 19. infra report, ing ... ... determine” court shall suitability nonsuitability” rendering "the 15. Colorado and Louisiana. eligible for adult sanctions. Fla.Stat. 39.059(7)(a)-(c) added). (emphasis cited, reports significant. primarily we We cases are consider these note that other State, noting being It worth that Florida has since indicative of constitutional is also its scheme schemes. These have amended transfer to remove soundness various

1002 statutory Our analyzes use in States. constitu- the United ease that the

The other spec- of People v. end the tionality transfer scheme is scheme at extreme of a (Colo.1982). Thorpe employing prosecutor dis- systems P.2d 935 trum of Thorpe, 641 prosecutors allowed to dispositive, an act that the fact that considered cretion. not While of prosecute class has, to certain present, decide whether undertaken a no other state juveniles or as adults. The as offenders as process arbitrary as and unbridled Utah’s pronouncements: applicable court made two to our significantly conclusion contributes First, that observed the court goes too far. There is no the statute proper place remedy to undesirable was the legislature’s rational connection between Second, reject- Id. at 940. the court laws.17 objective balancing needs of children appellant’s ed claims of unconstitutionali- public and its to protection with decision ty they had failed to demonstrate because deciding discretion allow total in a statutory applied scheme was juve- class potential which members by prosecutors. There- way Id. selective single for adult nile to out treat- offenders fore, specifically hold that the court did opens unguided ment. Such discretion system juvenile charging con- was Colorado’s any criteria for door to abuse without review sound; Thorpe stitutionally it held making. decision insuring or for evenhanded showing met his burden discrimi- had not prevent to No checks exist in this scheme nation, reach would allow court to which singling prosecutor’s such acts out mem- as Thorpe, issue. Id. there- the constitutional groups unpopular bers of certain for harsher fore, us limited value to of its is of because system protect- treatment adult while grapple is- to with failure juveniles ing equally culpable to whom a sues, analysis regard as and we do its particular may some prosecutor feel cultural persuasive. loyalty may or for whom there be broader Furthermore, by public Having sympathy. cited considered authorities Act, explanation parties, plausible we conclude that Utah’s has offered no grants prosecutors totally unguided necessity open-ended for such discretion. deciding which members of the discretion type incorporat of discretion potential actually try as

class of adults, prosecutor unique among currently in ed the Act is unlike traditional statutes Therefore, up now we do the cases issue before us. not need not been discussed either noncomparable distinguish stat further them. hold the utes, statutes, pure as direct-file or because such State, The State also cites Jahnke v. 692 P.2d actually do not the cases discuss constitutional (Wyo.1984), holding filing discretionary 911 as challenges statutory but focus on claims. Nota Jahnke, statute to sev- be constitutional. Wainwright, among is Woodard v. 556 ble these State, by eral additional cases cited was denied, (5th 1977), Cir. cert. 434 U.S. F.2d 781 distinguished by the scenario created 1285, 1088, (1978), 55 98 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 794 Bell, Utah's Bell. See 785 P.2d at 409 statute in which in dictum seems indicate that other n. we further note Jahnke statutes,

jurisdictions upheld discretionary have the statute's failed raise the issue of constitu- 784, considers a nondiscre- id. at but itself tionality to the court. Because this claim trial filing tionary Id. at cases scheme. 785. The appeal, was time on court raised for the first distinguished. can be For in cited Woodard would not consider the merits claim be- States, stance, (4th 334 Cox v. United 473 F.2d cause no error had been shown the trial clear denied, Cir.), 414 U.S. S.Ct. 38 cert. 94 Therefore, application court's of the statute. Parratt, (1973), and Russell v. L.Ed.2d case did the merits of the constitu- not consider (8th Cir.1976), F.2d 1214 both hold Jahnke, P.2d at We tional issues. 927-28. discretionary provisions at issue did not violate unpersuaded its rhetoric. therefore separation powers issue is doctrines. That analysis. inapposite present to our Other cases altered its 17. Colorado has in fact since Congress attorney can vest the also indicate charging The statute now limits the scheme. power general with the decide whether requiring amount prosecute certain adults for violation prerequisites certain before offenders process various federal crimes without a due system. See, Quinones, in the adult Colo.Rev. hearing. e.g., United States (1st Cir.), denied, (Supp.1994). Stat. 19-2-805 cert. U.S. F.2d 1309 Cox, (1975); Thorpe upholds that has since been a statute L.Ed.2d 76 473 F.2d 96 S.Ct. amended. cases are likewise unrelated to 334. These

1003 Selecting charge great. a fit the cir- kinds too If simply legisla discretion. to is it is the or her eumstanees defendant and his ture’s determination to have all a members of necessary alleged step is a in the chain acts (such group juveniles certain of violent as legal requires It deter prosecution. of a offenders, etc.) repeat guns, those who use on mination the as to adults, tried it is as free to do so.19 Howev likely of an which elements offense can be er, legislature may the not create a scheme Moreover, proved trial. at such discretion is permits which the random unsupervised and public; prose to the also beneficial allows separation juveniles of such violent a all into plea-bargain cutors to with offenders some relatively privileged group on the one hand cases, saving public of crimi expense a relatively group and burdened on the other. However, prosecutions. nal of these none States, Wayte United 598, See v. 470 U.S. accompany to benefits the discretion choose 1524, 608, 1531, 105 S.Ct. 84 L.Ed.2d 547 juveniles prosecute which to rather adult “limited”); (prosecutor discretion is than in court. The elements Bourgeois, United States v. 935, 964 F.2d 938 charging by are determined deci offense (9th Cir.) (prosecutor discretion should sion, it is charging and decision that — denied, “unfettered”), cert. U.S. -, by prosecu protected is traditional notions of 290, (1992); 113 S.Ct. 121 L.Ed.2d 215 Unit Hayes, See Bordenkircher tor discretion. Mastroianni, ed States v. 749 357, 364, 668-69, F.2d 911 434 U.S. 98 S.Ct. 54 (1st (1978) (decisions Cir.1984) (prosecutor L.Ed.2d of whether and discretion limited charges prosecute prose which to are within conceptions justice). fundamental discretion; cutors’ realm made decision operation Utah’s uniform of laws by prosecutors may “arbitrary be based on speaks directly type to the in- discretion classifications”).18 Choosing court to which 78-3a-25, opposed volved as to charges in significant consequences file has traditional to discretion allotted offender, for does statute charge. crime to determine what The chal- what indicate characteristics of offender lenged permits prosecutors scope prosecu that choice. to treat mandate The stereotypes, prejudices, tor of all and biases different accused of offenders the same erim- arena, argues investigate suspects, The dissent crimi- choice of ers scheme to criminal 18. juvenile, long-recognized prosecutor is nal or discretion to choose between the two methods suspects’ discretion. It bases this right assertion on three cases: violated Investigation, re equal In Criminal 7th Dist. Court Case A crucial treatment. difference between CS-1, 1988), (Utah 754 P.2d No. State v. confronting the facts in that case and the facts us Carter, (Utah 1978), 578 P.2d 1275 and State v. today recognized is that defendant has a a a and Garcia, (Utah cases, 1972). 504 P.2d 1015 These "critically important” liberty interest in the sen- however, easily distinguished. tencing phase prosecution, suspect of his but a liberty does a not have interest in which of two proposi- and Garcia both Carter stand for the acceptable investigation in- means is used to crime, any, tion that the decision of if vestigate holding his case. charge person a under a set of facts Investigation bearing re Criminal has no in this Carter, prosecutor. is left P.2d at clearly does case that affect one of the defen- Garcia, 1277; 504 P.2d at 1015-16. liberty recognized dants’ interests. See Clatter- proposition neither case even addresses the buck, 700 P.2d dissent, wit, selecting claimed prosecute whether an individual an adult or as try juveniles can Whether the recognized prosecutor as a discretion. any opportunity adults without for review Both Carter Garcia address discretion in- See, questions. e.g., raise federal constitutional selecting surrounding volved in a crime to fit the Kaiser, (10th 1993). Kelley v. 992 F.2d 1509 Cir. discretion at tak- facts. The issue here involves "Having system, created the court under ing two individuals accused of the same crime Kent, State’s decision to it is the seek to treat choosing prosecute are- them different that, triggers adult as an recognized nas. Such legitimate by has not been of itself hearing." (emphasis Id. at need the cases cited the dissent. Kent, added) 1045); (citing 383 U.S. 86 S.Ct. The dissent’s reliance on In re Investi- Criminal Brown, (10th see also Lamb 456 F.2d gation misplaced. also At was the issue there 1972). portions held Subpoena Cir. Lamb of an Oklahoma Powers Act. charging affording preferential petitioners there claimed that scheme treatment general using grand attorney option had the to one class of over another class jury investigative pow- subpoena scheme or the like-accused unconstitutional. Id. Therefore, Mohi, Thus, differently. the same law Utah Constitution.21 inal offense Lundquist, and Chaides are remanded nonuniformly disparately and operates jurisdictions appropriate juvenile for certifi- In a similarly juveniles. case where situated re- with the proceedings cation consistent charge like-situat- the chooses quirements in 78-3a-25.22 section crimes, the classic suspects different ed with question is which “prosecutorial discretion” Statutory Recall Provisions III. rather how apply offender than law to to an apply the same law already to different offenders. the we have remanded Because Bell, (Durham Zim- at 409 & cases these defendants for certification See 785 P.2d of (“This court, merman, JJ., may no dissenting) is a tradi- there hearings case.”). a use or the ruling Once need for on the ‘prosecutorial discretion’ immediate tional remedy. appropriate a recall How- charged particular lack of an offender ever, likely and subjected this issue is to recur crime, because must be offender challenge Lundquist and Chaides substantially procedures similar and or same provision in amended repeal the recall jeopardy of of exposed to level the same statute, nevertheless consider defendants’ we charged satisfy other offenders so concerning the and use of recall claims need opera- of requirement uniform juvenile jurisdiction procedures to reclaim tion of laws.20 for as adults. minors tried provisions in section We conclude that giving prosecutors individually un- of attacks the recall 78-3a-25 the Code Mohi choose to file Act when he was directed discretion to where of the effective challenges the prosecuted. Specifically, charges against offenders are he certain (1993), of section 78-3a-25 article unconstitutional under express opinion those we no on merits of are which simi- 20. There other circumstances prosecuted and contentions. lar offenses can be jurisdictions. overlapping jur- There is different severability clause which We also note that offenses, for ex- isdiction some misdemeanor previous 78-3a- in the version of section existed 25(11) ample, justice and circuit courts version was removed from the amended § See Ann. 78-5-104. How- courts. ever, Utah Code § 78-3a-25 of the statute. See Code Ann. cases, separate there are some of these Nonetheless, today (Supp.1994). decision our authorizing governmental systems prosecu- parts grant only affects those the statute e.g., permitting prosecu- city ordinances tions— tion of prosecutors to to file choose where municipal code violations circuit court ju- capital felony charges against degree first or county permitting and ordinances enforcement years aged See Utah sixteen or older. veniles justice In those of the same laws in courts. 78-3a-25(6)-(8) (Supp.1994). § Code Ann. cases, governments have defined crimi- different Thus, place provisions leaves our decision ways, entirely nal offenses in similar which is prosecution section 78-3a-25 allow potential important, pen- permissible. More following hear- as adults a certification offenses are identical notwith- alties these 78-3a-25(l)-(5) ing. (Supp.1994). See id. standing jurisdiction adju- are possible jurisdictions The of the two dicated. implies that the first time a 22.The dissent this is concurrent, they are also co- courts under the has been held constitutional is, regardless of That which court tries extensive. protection equal but unconstitu- federal clause case, subject a the defendant will be to substan- operation clause. under the state uniform tional exposed tially similar and to substan- treatment Again, the erroneous this assertion based on tially penalties similar as another like-accused Bell, plurality opinion, "held” a conclusion jurisdiction. defendant tried in a different under the federal statute to be constitutional case, however, singular a state offense be- equal protection even if Bell clause. entirely justiciable punishable in and dif- comes making holding, legal could be read as ways jurisdictions juve- ferent because the ignores previ- observation this court’s dissent’s are not co-extensive. nile district courts protection equal ous that the statements federal operation of laws clause and Utah’s uniform challenged guar- separate independent have also the direct- Defendants clauses contain Lee, See, provisions pro- e.g., state and federal due file under at 577. There- antees. P.2d fore, separation holding powers nothing specious cess and claims. Because about a there is challenged the stat- not have we invalidate the sections of under a state constitution that operation provi- underpinnings corre- laws in the federal constitution’s ute under the uniform constitution, implications sponding provision. we do not reach dissent’s sion state contrary legal no challenges, have basis. defendants’ other constitutional juvenile against quires if a whom a which states that evidence affidavits but request information has filed or subsequent hearing direct criminal been formal for a grand jury indictment returned wishes to persuaded the issue. We are not his or case retained have her ten-day period patently is so offensive that court, petition he or must file a recall she Mohi should be from attempting excused days with the court within ten provisions. comply with its either the information or the indictment. Lundquist and challenge Chaides (1993). 78-3a-25(10) Utah Code Ann. in part ground the amended Act on the petition Ivlohi never a recall with filed the legislature the has provi removed the recall ap- court. While he admits he was inadequate. sion that Mohi claims They was statute, prised argues of the he that he did by argue depriving of hearing them a to comply to with need its terms because he determine whether or adult court patently believed it unconstitutional. The cases, proper would be a for forum their the argues to State Mohi’s failure file a process. amended statute them denies due him petition precludes recall from now at- argument is also merit. without As tacking agree.23 this Act. We (and by parties), stated above as conceded previously have held that before We right have no constitutional to be challenge a can party juveniles. Bell, as tried 785 P.2d at 399. statute, adversely a must he be affected they charged if properly were Hoffman, operation. its 733 State P.2d Lundquist adult court in the place, first and (Utah 1987) (party may challenge 505 process Chaides would have no state due be, challenge if basis would or right hearing to a to they determine whether is, detriment); Smith, applied to his Sims can be retained adults for trial.24 As (Utah 1977) (party P.2d must be states, II opinion of this the state is not adversely acquire affected statute to required give juvenile anyone. to status to standing); see also Alabama Fed’n of However, once the a enacts law McAdory, 450, 461, Labor v. 325 U.S. classifying group juveniles, a certain it 1384, 1389-90, S.Ct. 89 L.Ed. 1725 If, apply uniformly. must that law on the (appellate refrain courts should from decid hand, uniformly other it decides to remove a ing “except par issue with reference to persons category certain class of from the applied”). which ticular facts to it is to be “juvenile offender,” it does not to need allow petitioned Because Mohi never for was persons hearing those a matter. Be recall, therefore never denied he cannot now “right” no to cause have treat claim procedure that the recall him denied ment, ju defendants cannot claim that their process. argues due Mohi that the statute unconstitutionally venile status was removed adequate guidelines instructing lacks for legislature. judges grant as to when recall ten-day filing period is insufficient to IV. Juvenile Detention parties prepare petition. allow time to a For Lundquist argue above, Chaides arguments the reasons his stated lack First, the district court erred when ordered them merit. because his case was never County detained in the Jail by juvenile be while judge, considered court he can awaiting ordering trial rather than their de judge improperly claim that now was Likewise, youth facility. guided. tention correctional he cannot claim that he proper Both petition had time to file a raised the issue of hous insufficient when ing prepare petition Following hearing, no made at the trial court. effort was given request Judge within an Dimick both time or to exten sent back petition question County sion of time. The re- Utah Jail. (discussed Kelley, supra note will We that our decision not leave unan- But F.2d cf. 19). important question swered re- note garding Utah’s Juvenile Courts Act subsequently attacks has been Mohi removed from the Act. may place child in one available ruling complies with the

Judge Dimick’s states, required place Act, “A held for is not child adult facilities but plainly plain under Section 78-3a-25 child detention. The mean- proceedings criminal in adult jail place however, or gives in a other ing language, detained the court adults jail county detention used or option another 78-3a-30(9) Ann. Code crime.” Utah Because adult detention center. defendants however, argue, Defendants (Supp.1994). argument their support have offered should have found trial court history any legislative to indicate that unconstitutionally void section to be statutory language plain meaning of the “may,” focusing on vagueness. By the word effect, argument their should not be the Act claim that this section of defendants fails. gives giving without them courts discretion Finally, argument defendants’ apply on how their necessary guidance By support. claiming legal fails for First, lack disagree. defendants discretion. We question that the statute in is unconstitution why particular sec- fail to demonstrate vague, in of ally read have the burden tion the statute should not be defendants of conjunction purpose coming of the to indicate with the stated forward with evidence Act, § ambiguous Ann. 78-3a-l. See State as Code is so to make statute 1974) (Utah 874, Salas, P.2d 875 guess meaning. in re 520 to its minds as reasonable purpose of (applying general Act to individu- 183, v. P.2d Frampton, 737 191-92 therein).25 note (Utah al contained We Lawson, sections 1987); also Kolender see challenged of the statute subsections 352, 358, 103 1855, 1858-59, 461 U.S. S.Ct. 75 legislature’s for indicate the intent further (1983); Papachristou City L.Ed.2d 903 children the needs of courts balance 162, Jacksonville, 405 U.S. S.Ct. See, e.g., public safety. for the need (1972). 842, 31 Defendants have L.Ed.2d 78-3a-30(8)(b) (Supp. § Ann. Utah Code showing nor neither made such a asserted 1994) “safety” (directing courts to consider any legal justify argument. their support to placing of offenders when “welfare” above, Furthermore, indicated do not we state). custody protect them in perceive any ambiguity the statute. For reasons,

Second, argument foregoing argument defendants’ is based on defendants’ juveniles charged peculiar reading properly of the statute that is not as adults required by plain language. juveniles awaiting its Section 78- must be with while housed 3a-30(9) “may that a child rejected.26 states be detained trial is jail place used for or other detention (emphasis with crime.” Id. adults CONCLUSION added). reading the statute Defendants’ foregoing analysis, we On basis of juvenile judges place offend- would allow 78-3a-25(6)(b) and hold section to violate ers in adult or detention. either I, article 24 of the Utah section Constitution. reading possible by placing ex- Consequently, the orders of the trial courts emphasis “may.” on the word Defen- treme reversed, re- argue that a court herein are and defendants are dants means guidelines adequate create role, for does not our whose This observation undermine court, opinion. though analysis part requires II of this Even of the them to be unlike that 78-3a-l, objectives, Utah Code Ann. the Act's people advocates for the state. subsequent have been read into sections of Act, prosecutors statutorily unguided are still Nonetheless, arguments defendants’ do raise juveniles proper subjects of an adult which judges’ an issue that should be at the forefront of prosecution. We note indi- criminal that Salas making certification Be- minds when decisions. guidelines within the cated that the contained cause as adults will tried be housed exercising discre- section assist courts their convicted, and, with adults if incarcerated Prosecutors, at 875. unlike tion. 520 P.2d adults, particular consider the courts should courts, actors are not disinterested unbiased needs of individual defen- and circumstances prosecutions; process of criminal housing making regarding dants while final de- litigation. represent party in the appropriate jurisdiction. terminations guidance given courts to the needs of balance public safety the need for does not children with Provisions,” jurisdiction IV, part manded to the Recall “Juvenile proceedings. Detention,” for courts certification I strongly disagree with the ma- II, jority’s analysis in part and result “Uni- STEWART, C.J., concurs. Associate Operation II, form Laws.” majority addresses Utah Code Ann. 78-3a- Justice, ZIMMERMAN, concurring: Chief grants prosecutors discretion in ease. I consider this a close There are involving cases offender to file certainly analogies the discretion between ex- charges either criminal in “adult” court1 or a question under ercised the statute action in majority civil court.2 The discretionary routinely per- other decisions holds this section unconstitutional on the ba- prosecutors, mitted as Justice Russon’s dis- interpretation of an sis erroneous uni- balance, per- sent notes. I am operation provision form of laws of article position suaded Justice Durham and of the Utah Constitution. Because Bell, I took State v. P.2d majority’s interpretation oversteps any (Utah 1989), remains sound. The discretion rights boundary reasonable which that granted sufficiently here is broad and unfet- designed protect, I dissent. consequences sufficiently and its tered im- portant accused that it dif- kind, purposes,

fers Utah constitutional I. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION examples upon by relied Justice GENERALLY reason, join majority Russon. For that I today. place To prosecutorial grant- by § ed Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-25 its important majority It is to note proper perspective, important is it to first particular by finds method used the the generally examine breadth of discretion legislature problem to address the prosecutors. to It is well established youth serious offender to be unconstitutional. prosecutor’s a charge to decision or not Today’s decision should not be read in charge an with a individual criminal viola- way minimizing as problems of the violent protected tion traditional notions of youth problems crime. These are real. But prosecutorial discretion. See Bordenkircher problem the mere fact that a real exists does 357, 364, Hayes, 434 U.S. 98 S.Ct. not mean that the constitution’s limitations (1978). 668-69, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 As the Su- government power on how be used can preme Court stated therein: ignored be in the find a rush to solution. During session, legislature the last the en- system, long In prosecutor our as so comprehensive ap- acted a new and more probable has believe that cause to the ac- youth crime,

proach problem of violent cused committed an offense defined upon in which took one it statute, the decision whether or not to categorize itself the crimes that deserve prosecute, charge bring and what file not, response an adult and those that do grand jury, before a generally rests within leaving prose- rather than the matter his discretion. Within limits set Today’s purport cution. decision does legislature’s constitutionally valid defi- address of this new offenses, chargeable nition of “the con- It scheme. treats the old. selectivity scious exercise some en- is not a consti- forcement itself federal RUSSON, Justice, concurring and long tutional violation” as “the so selec- dissenting: deliberately upon tion was based [not] fully race, agree majority’s unjustifiable I such While with standard as reli- III, analysis “Statutory gion, arbitrary and result or other classification.” reference, proceedings ease of All For district and circuit before court are proceedings. civil Utah Code Ann. collectively will See 78-3a- courts be referred to as adult 44(1) (stating ”[p]roceedings in children’s courts. regarded proceedings, cases shall be civil with powers”). exercising equitable the court omitted) added) (footnote manner, prose- cannot review the we (emphasis Id. Boles, against one de- proceed U.S. decision to (quoting Oyler v. cutor’s (1962)). 501, 506, charging him 7 L.Ed.2d under an information S.Ct. fendant charge felony reducing Bell, 785 P.2d 390 Similarly, in State v. to a against the codefendant misdemeanor. (Utah 1989), opinion of this court the lead stated: (footnote omit- Id. 504 P.2d at 1015-16 at recognized long jurisdiction has ted). impor- prosecution and the vital role of (Utah Carter, 578 P.2d 1275 discretion, body the affording that tance of 1978), Ann. this court ruled Utah Code limits, to exercise its permissible within 76-8-1001, grants prosecutor dis- Certainly, compelled ... are function. we charge charge cretion to or not to an offend- preserves as it recognize this discretion criminal, er a habitual is constitutional. separation concept of the constitutional therein, Id. 1277. As the court stated Also, recognized powers. it must every prosecutor in the rests “[Discretion prosecutor disposal has her at his or charge as to whether or not to a viola- case making provid- the criteria such decision selectivity is tion of a criminal statute. Some statute, pur- ed for elsewhere long as always permitted, so the election Act, pose of the Juvenile Courts discriminatorily based classifications duties of his or governing standards race, sex, origin, religion, national etc.” her office. Id. omitted). (footnotes Id. at 404 case, present allega- there In the are in which There are numerous instances arising selective tions of discrimination granted same or substan- Rather, prosecution. sec- defendants attack tially discretion that is at issue in the similar prose- merely gives tion 78-3a-25 example, For case before us. cutors discretion to file either criminal regard alleged to an has the discretion charges in adult or a action in court civil charges, felony criminal act to file or misde- juvenile court, arguing that discretion such charges, charges or meanor no whatsoever. applica- of the constitutes violation uniform fact, prosecutor In can even do so I, 24 tion the laws under article of of section single involving relation criminal act this the Utah Constitution. as instance, person. more than one For assume context, stated “[I]n court has in a similar men, A, C, B, and commit an three showing prose- the absence of some robbery together. long armed A has a histo- classifying persons improperly, the cutor is ry felony of arrests and convictions and is discretionary power of mere existence actually perpetrates B one the offense. who to use not of- select which mechanism does couple has a of misdemeanor convictions and operation provi- uniform of laws A fend the stands while out crime. watch carries I, 24.” In record, sion of article section re Criminal getaway has criminal drives the C no CS-1, car, reluctantly Investigation, 7th Dist. Court No. 754 being into was talked (Utah 1988) comrades, 633, (upholding 658 consti- by the of his P.2d of this crime coercion agrees testify tutionality of alterna- them. I doubt statute which allowed investigation, long proclaim of this would method of criminal members court tive pro- if the “unconstitutional discretion” that alternative method satisfied due cess). felony, allegations A with a B with a misde- case There fact, meanor, nothing at all. and C was before us the discretion at issue Garcia, this court so held State v. 29 Utah practiced discriminatory in a manner. being 52, (1972), 2d P.2d 1015 which stated: Accordingly, 504 prosecutor’s in adult a civil charge file a criminal court or It is function courts not a of the to review discretion, petition prose- is the of court sort the exercise of executive and we traditionally cutorial discretion that has been say prose- that it error for the cannot was permitted.3 cutor in a to treat defendants different position majority opinion materially misrepresents the this issue dissent's on Footnote 18 of

1009 successfully challenging II. CONSTITUTIONALITY The burden of OF 78-3a-25 appel- SECTION is on lant, heavy and this is a burden one. Blue principle “legislative It basic en- is a State, 634, Blue v. Cross & Shield 779 P.2d pre- a strong are endowed with actments (Utah 1989); City 637 West Jordan v. of sumption validity of not will be declared Bd., 530, Utah State Retirement 767 P.2d 537 unless is no unconstitutional there reasonable 1988). (Utah particu- Defendants’ burden is upon basis can be construed as larly heavy in present case because the conforming requirements.” to constitutional statute at issue here is a later version of the Investigation, In re 7th Criminal Dish Court Bell, one addressed State v. 785 P.2d 390 CS-1, (Utah 1988) 633, No. 754 P.2d 640 (Utah 1989),in which this court held that the State, 805, (citing v. 528 P.2d Greaves 806-07 substantially prior similar version the stat- (Utah 1974)). Thus, evaluating a constitu- ute was constitutional under the Fourteenth statute, challenge tional ato this court will Amendment to the United States Constitu- interpretations construe the statute to avoid Although tion.4 Id. Bell was decided that conflict with relevant constitutional man- state, federal, grounds, dates, long resulting so as the construction inasmuch as the Fourteenth Amendment to does not conflict with the actu- reasonable or I, the United States Constitution and article al legislative purposes statute. Id. 24 of the embody section Utah Constitution Lewis, 661, (citing Malan 693 P.2d n. general principles, the same Greenwood v. (Utah Casarez, 1984); State v. 656 P.2d Lake, City North Salt 817 P.2d (Utah 1982); Draper, Zamora v. (Utah 1991), and article “acts as (Utah 1981)). 635 P.2d As court clause,” protection equal Mag- Utah’s Amax previously Department stated in Stone v. Comm’n, Corp. nesium State Tax (Utah 1977): Registration, 567 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1990), 796 P.2d 1261 n. 23 it is may may [W]hatever be the convic- upon incumbent defendants demonstrate mind, personal tion of or the desires why the result should different under court, thereof, justices or the to determine analysis.5 state constitutional policy, prin- such our commitment judicial restraint, ciple necessary examining step As an initial the consti- system, under desirable our which honors 78-3a-25, tutionality of Utah Code Ann. separation powers the doctrine of necessary proper to determine the level of government. three of our branches There- scrutiny applied reviewing to be stat- fore, province it is not within the argue, majority ute. Defendants upon legislative pre- courts intrude the agrees, that section 78-3a-25 should be re- rogative and declare a statute unconstitu- viewed under intermediate “reasonable- tional unless it is determined to be so scrutiny, of than ness” level rather under the beyond a reasonable doubt. pro- scrutiny minimal or “rational” level of (footnotes omitted); by Id. at 1117 posed accord the State. Inasmuch as section 78- Greaves, scrutiny using higher 528 P.2d at 806-07. 3a-25 withstands the Amendment, by suggesting type prosecuto- view that we this of tion than the Fourteenth court this question. rial discretion as a "choice of arena” has never held a constitutional under statute cursory reading A the dissent our of reveals that protection yet equal analysis federal unconstitu simply view is involved here is discretion I, Moreover, tional under article section decision, general charging sepa- of the not a involving in cases fundamental constitution rate “choice of arena” decision. rights reading al the has issue broader I, See, e.g., article section even arisen. Conde majority correctly points 4. While the the out that (Utah University Hosp., P.2d marin v. II, III, analysis parts IV and of the lead 1989). majority the Neither defendants nor has opinion supported by majority in Bell was a persuasively established that such fundamental court, nonetheless, therein, of the the result that rights Accordingly, at are issue here. it is im passed section 78-3a-25 federal constitutional proper apply the case bar for court a muster, carry majority did a of the court. stringent equal protection analysis more under I, applied article be under Although previously section 24 than would court has stated that I, may provide protec article section 24 the broader federal constitution. Malan, majori- thereby preferred by requirement of misehar- the first review intermediate acterizing supporting view as ty, will to review dissent’s standard be used that ‘separate equal’ systems constitutionality of 78-3a-25 under “numerous but section I, long rejected impermissible.” 24 of Constitution.6 have been as article section the Utah and characterization is incorrect mis- states, “All laws of a Article Obviously, prose- leading. a scheme that general operation.” uniform nature shall have way and all cutes all Caucasians one minori- two By providing, “protects so another would unconstitutional under ties First, must a law types of discrimination. view the dissent’s because the members of a class. persons to all within apply equally offenders, larger group, being are not all Second, statutory classifications scheme, equally. a such all treated Under given the classes must be different treatment subject to minority offenders would be dis- a reasonable on differences that have based prosecu- crimination initial exercise objectives of the tendency to further present torial discretion. Lewis, Malan 693 P.2d statute.” case, allegations raise none of the defendants (Utah 1984) (citations omitted). being prac- prosecutorial requirement first Malan mandates discriminatory in a manner here. ticed persons applied equally to all that the law be requirement of Malan is The second group classes within a certain or class. The statutory classification and the different created section 78-3a-25 include given treatment the classes created therein large group, all who offenders are based on differences that have reason- offenses, but also commit certain enumerated tendency objectives able further (1) criminally subgroups, charged two those requirement statute. Under the second those by information adult court and Malan, questions first two arise. The con- juve- petitions civil against whom are filed cerns whether classification created larger group All court. members of the nile legitimate. This is not at the statute issue subject equally treated because all are present case inasmuch defendants nondiscriminatory initial exercise the same simply concede that could addition, prosecutorial each discretion. filing against mandate direct equally subgroup of each is treated member who commit crimes enumerated therein. subgroup. That to all other members By conceding statutory classifica- such is, each offender who is constitutional, have tion is defendants chosen criminally proceeds has to adult court challenge legitimacy of that not to classi- rights protections all other the same fication. likewise, system; in the adult court petitioned against civilly juvenile who is each question The second concerns whether the proceeds court has the same different treatment the classes created protections who are rights and as others challenged reasonably tends to jurisdiction. Ac- subject court objectives statute. further One Malan n cordingly, section 78-3a-25 satisfies purpose stated Courts Act is Juvenile ap- provisions requirement first because its “public safety promotion of and individual ply equally persons to all the classes within accountability by imposition appropri- created. persons ate sanctions on who have committed majority opinion in 7 of the misre- acts violation of law.” Utah Code Ann. Footnote 78-3a-l(l). proseeu- A presents position concerning gives the dissent’s statute noted, however, 586, 981, (Sup.Ct.1979); right N.Y.S.2d to be treated 416 984 Peo It type Williams, 183, 186, juvenile never ple as a has been considered v. Misc.2d 100 418 right traditionally trig 737, Ct.1979); fundamental which has of gered (County 740 N.Y.S.2d State, Jahnke v. Bell, scrutiny. heightened 785 level of 911, (Wyo.1984); see 692 P.2d 928-29 also (citing Wainwright, 556 P.2d at 399 Woodard v. Cain, 1361, (Fla.1980) State v. 381 So.2d denied, 781, (5th Cir.1977), cert. F.2d (holding juvenile right that a has no offender “to 1285, (1978); U.S. 98 S.Ct. 55 L.Ed.2d specially delinquent juvenile treated as a in Anderson, 76, 79 108 Idaho 700 P.2d State v. offender”). stead of a criminal Mason, (App.1985)); People v. 99 Misc.2d

1QH juvenile plan tors discretion determine which ment’s overall enforcement are readily criminally susceptible to the charged analysis offenders should be in kind of competent the courts are petitioned undertake. adult court and which should be against court serves both the end summary, majority’s In argument er- society protecting goal imposing roneously similarly assumes that situated appropriate sanctions on offenders. people being differently. treated Under Moreover, appropri- the determination of the 78-3a-25, all offenders who charge applicable ate with its sanctions is the commit the offenses enumerated therein are traditionally sort of matter has been left subject to the same initial nondiscriminatory prosecutor’s discretion. Insofar as prosecutorial exercise of discretion as to that, just indistinguish- this statute does it is whether to charges file criminal or a civil type prosecutorial action able other a certain offender. Thus, Accordingly, prosecutorial pro- discretion. the differences in treat- vided for in that statute is not different from ment to classes created section 78- prosecutorial other kinds of discretion. reasonably objec- 3a-25 tend to further the Accordingly, tives of that I section. would majority correctly While the concludes hold that section 78-3a-25 meets Malan’s “[o]nee offender is with a requirements constitutionality. crime, particular that offender must be sub- jected substantially to the same or similar Furthermore, the discretion involved the procedures ... as all other offenders so matter before us does raise the concerns charged,” that is not at issue in this ease. unequal application of the law within a Because specifically per- section 78-3a-25 statutory capricious class or meaningless prosecutor’s decision, charging tains to the distinctions between classes that are raised equal protection concerns raised Malan, in cases such as In Malan. majority are not violated this statute. guest court invalidated an automobile statute which established differences treatment III. OTHER STATES purposes that were unrelated to the chosen, Additionally, majority has statute. This court determined that the re- accepting argument defendants’ and over sulting “crazy quilt” recovery and barred 78-3a-25, turning Utah Code Ann. to de recovery under that statute rendered the accepted every from the wisdom of oth incapable reasonably furthering its er court which has ruled on the issue. Malan, statutory objectives. 693 P.2d at statutes, examining direct-filing their own virtually jurisdiction every courts other here; “crazy quilt” We have no such rath- consistently have held the discretion er, section 78-3a-25 is a well-reasoned effort in prosecutors juve vested to decide give prosecutors necessary the discretion charges against niles to file criminal com bring charge carrying appropriate sanc- See, ports equal protection principles. against juvenile tions offenders. This sort of Bland, e.g., United v. States 472 F.2d 1329 discretion has never been considered vulner- (D.C.Cir.1972); People Thorpe, 641 P.2d equal protection able to facial challenges. (Colo.1982); Wood, In re 236 Mont. Rather, recognized integral it has been as an (1989); 768 P.2d 1370 State ex rel. Coats v. component justice. of our scheme of criminal Rakestraw, (Okla.Crim.App. 610 P.2d 256 Supreme As the United States Court stated 1980). acknowledged As this court States, Wayte 598, 607, v. United 470 U.S. Bell, opinion lead P.2d 390 (1985): 1524, 1530, 105 S.Ct. 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (Utah 1989): largely This broad discretion rests on the jurisdiction long recognized has

recognition prosecute that the decision to prosecution impor- vital role of the and the particularly judicial ill-suited to review. discretion, affording body tance of that the case, strength Such factors as the limits, the permissible within to exercise its prosecution’s value, general the deterrence Certainly, compelled, function. we are states, priorities, the Government’s enforcement recognize are our sister to this dis- relationship and the case’s preserves to the Govern- cretion as it the distinguish Also, majority’s attempt to other The separation powers. concept of approaches is also unconvinc- similar prosecutor has states’ recognized that the be must instance, majority tries to dis- ing. For the making such a disposal in or her at his ground that system on the tinguish Florida’s for elsewhere provided criteria the decision guidelines to provides Florida statute statute, the purpose the of the Juvenile to file help prosecutor determine whether Act, governing the standards Courts in or adult court. or her office. duties of his the Flor- persuasive distinction because not a omitted). (footnotes The fact that Id. at 404 only guides case man- actually ida statute codified into the has been this discretion juvenile’s initially case ager reviews who legis- simply underscores at issue statute prosecutor specifically allows the to achieve the lature’s determination manager’s rec- ignore the case discretion cross-cutting pur- multiple and sometimes ch. Fla.Stat. 39.047 ommendation. See system, court which poses (1993). majority correctly Although both rehabilitation concern 39.059, it ch. points out that under Fla.Stat. community, safety offender juve- whether a that determines is the court degree of granted some prosecutor must guilty of a criminal has been found nile who juvenile of- between freedom to differentiate subject to in adult court should be violation fenders. sanctions,” here. that is not issue “adult majority at- persuasive its Nor is the given at present The case concerns discretion statutory scheme tempt distinguish Utah’s stage, punishment at the charging upheld have that of those states which in the case at bar is the stage. At issue majority initially direct-filing The statutes. whether to file criminal discretion decide based on whether the draws a distinction petition in charges in court or a civil adult direct-filing question “pure” is a statute in Florida, cases, And in juvenile court. such “impure” direct-filing statute or an statute Utah, prose- to its grants this discretion like direct-filing pure does not even address mandatory guide- imposing cutors without states, simply stating that systems other for the exercise of that discretion. lines pure In direct- “noncomparable.” majority that Utah’s scheme is states statutes, prosecutorial filing in “un- “arbitrary and results and unbridled” charges deciding what to file: Certain lies discretion” on the circumscribed in an adult criminal charges must be tried However, among the states prosecutor. action, charges tried in a while other must be fifing, statute is one of allow direct the Utah See, e.g., juvenile proceeding. OMa.Stat.Ann. limiting the number of of- the strictest (West 1104.2,1112 Supp.1995). In §§ tit. qualify filing. The for direct fenses essence, system is no different from discretion; prosecutor is not unbridled above, section 78-3a- ours. As noted under types specifically certain enumerated criminally if the elects to eligible filing. Ac- violations are for direct juvenile offender, charge a must comparable other states’ cordingly, it is court; conversely, if the in adult be tried constitu- systems and should likewise be held petition a civil prosecutor decides to file tional. juvenile, proceeds the matter against the

juvenile court. “parade Lastly, majority’s claim that a prosecutors if would ensue were of horribles” Furthermore, impure di- other states provided by this the discretion stat- allowed rect-fifing have found such statutes statutes sup- groundless. is no evidence ute is There example, People be constitutional. For porting majority’s assertion that section (Colo.1982), Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935 the Colo- prosecutors’ singling would lead to 78-3a-25 Supreme concluded circum- rado Court unpopular groups for harsh- out members of present to those in the case stances similar fact, system. In in the adult er treatment challenge although “as-applied” could very argument, same prosecu- if there was selective be sustained single groups for harsher could out certain tion, challenge to its facial constitutional treatment, in reference to could be made system Id. at 940. We direct-filing fails. code. every criminal the state is true in our conclude that same should event, challenged have not defendants case. ground being the statute on the it is manner;

applied discriminatory in a only challenge the statute on its Since face. majority’s go application concerns to the statute, not to its facial constitutionali-

ty, those concerns are irrelevant to the case

at bar. course, say,

This is not to power has unfettered to enact relating prosecutorial

laws discretion. always, very

Prosecutorial discretion is at the

least, subject to review for abuse. The stan- determining

dards for that abuse should be through judiciary’s

filtered reluctance to prosecutorial making.

interfere with decision allegations prosecutorial

Since no of abuse of present have been raised in the

ease, I would hold section 78-3a-25 constitu-

tional under article section 24 of the Utah Accordingly,

Constitution. I dissent from majority’s holding contrary.

IV. CONCLUSION foregoing,

Based on the I concur in sec- III majority

tions and opinion IV the and

dissent from section II.

HOWE, J., concurs in concurring

dissenting RUSSON, opinion of J. LAWSON, minor, By

Brook

Through guard her natural mother and

ian, Cheryl LAWSON, and James and

Cheryl Lawson, individually, Plaintiffs Appellants, TRAPPERS, INC., LAKE

SALT a Utah

corporation, City, and Salt Lake a mu

nicipal corporation, Ap Defendants and

pellees.

No. 940063.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 12, 1995.

Rehearing Sept. Denied 3. The dissent notes opinion plurality on different existence of a based overturning legislation grounds on of constitu- legal arising but from similar facts. theories heavy tionality the dissent is “a one." normally "heavy” goes that this bur- on to state confusingly, opinion lead in Bell 4.Somewhat heavy present "particularly in the case den is specified as based [Bell's] that "we treat claims a later version of the statute at issue is Bell, provisions,” only upon federal constitutional 785 P.2d the one addressed in State begin by addressing any the con We determine whether the had objective article section 24 of the Utah tours of that dis- reasonable warrants the recently We most discussed Constitution. parity. Id. provision in Lee: ' claim, above, as set Defendants out Although provision sometimes that section 78-3a-25 of the es Utah Code to have the and im- thought same effect similarly two tablishes at least classes of legisla- pose legal same standards on (1) situated offenders: sixteen- guaran- equal protection as the tive action seventeen-year-old capi accused of tee found Fourteenth Amendment degree tal or first felonies over whom Constitution, the lan- the United States jurisdiction pur court retains for all history guage provisions of the two are (2) poses, seventeen-year-old sixteen- to different, entirely though and even there capital degree accused of or first important overlap areas of in the con- felonies whom a criminal information cepts provisions, embodied in the two is filed in or circuit district court and over produce legal differences can different con- whom the or circuit district court retains sequences. jurisdiction. responds The State operation Id. at Utah’s uniform laws complained classes of are not created until requirements establishes different proceed decides how a on Equal than the federal does Protection particular ease. con the State important Clause. most of these re- tends, does the statute its face contain quirements, present analysis, for the is the system of classification and classes requirement constitu- “[f]or law to be prosecutor, result are created provision], enough [the tional under it is not statute. it be uniform on What its face. operation critical is of the law be refers us No- The State to John E. A operate uniformly uniform. law does not if al., wak et Constitutional Law 600 similarly ‘persons situated’ are not ‘treated Nowak], support argu [hereinafter Malan, similarly’-” (quoting Id. 693 P.2d prosecutors, statute, ment that not the “cre 669). Hence, challenged direct-file challenged ate” the classes. Professor No- will not survive constitutional chal- wak states that statute creates a series

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Mohi

Court Name: Utah Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 15, 1995

Citation: 901 P.2d 991

Docket Number: 940028, 940200 and 940201

Court Abbreviation: Utah