State v. MoffettState v. Moffett
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- McFarland
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFarland, J.:
This is an appeal by the State pursuant to
Defendant was stopped for speeding on February 16, 1986. A computer check revealed that his driver’s license had been suspended on January 2, 1986. Following the license suspen *407 sion, notice thereof was sent by the Division of Vehicles (Division) to defendant at the address of 514 West Locust, El Dorado, Kansas 67042. This address had been received by the Division from an El Dorado Municipal Court action placing defendant on diversion on a DUI charge. The Division’s computer showed defendant’s address as being Route 1, Rox 45, Peabody, Kansas 66866. A certificate of insurance in the Division’s files showed defendant’s address at 423 South Washington, Apartment 7, El Dorado, Kansas 67042. The letter containing the notice of suspension was returned marked “no such number.” In fact defendant was, at the time the notice was mailed, living at 824 West Locust, El Dorado, Kansas — an address unknown to the Division.
The Division’s chief administrator for Driver’s Licensing and Control testified that where to send a suspension notice presents a continuing problem for the Division in light of our decision in State v. Jones, 231 Kan. 366, 644 P.2d 464 (1982). In Jones this court stated:
“When a driver’s license is revoked or suspended, a copy of the order of revocation or suspension, or a suitable written notice of that action, must be mailed to the last known official address of the licensee. The State is entitled to rely upon its record of all licensees’ addresses, and it is also entitled to rely upon the presumption that letters, sent by ordinary mail postage prepaid, are received by the addressee in the ordinary course of the mails. The use of certified mail, return receipt requested, would be preferable but is not required. Once the State has complied with the mandatory notice requirement ofK.S.A. 8-255(b) by mailing, the presumption of receipt arises and is not rebuttable. Evidence of nonreceipt may, however, be introduced by the accused in mitigation at time of sentencing.
“We hold (1) that the State must send a copy of the order of revocation or suspension or a written notice thereof to the licensee at the last known address according to the divisions records; (2) that when written notice has been mailed, then, after reasonable time for mail delivery has expired, receipt is conclusively presumed; and (3) that in a prosecution underK.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-262, the State need not prove actual receipt of the notice, actual knowledge of the revocation, or specific intent to violate the statute, by the licensee.” (Emphasis supplied.) 231 Kan. at 368.
The opinion uses both “last known official address” and “last known address according to the division’s records” as the proper address to which to send the suspension notification. The Division is uncertain as to how to determine where the notice is to be sent.
*408 “Upon suspending or revoking the license of any person as authorized by this act, the division shall immediately notify the licensee in writing.”
“Notice of change of address or name. Whenever any person, after applying for or receiving a driver’s license shall move from the address named in such application or in the license issued to such person, or when the name of the licensee is changed by marriage or otherwise, such person, within ten (10) days thereafter, shall notify the division in writing of his or her old and new addresses or of such former and new names and of the number of any drivers license then held by such, person.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We believe that the legislature clearly intended, through enactment of
This opinion should be considered as clarifying the quoted language in State v. Jones, 231 Kan. 366.
The appeal is sustained.