STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. RONALD MOEN, Appellant.
(86-C-20504; CA A39495)
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Arguеd and submitted March 31, reversed and remanded June 24, 1987
87 Or App 87 | 738 P.2d 228
David Schuman, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, Salem.
Before Buttler, Presiding Judge, and Warren and Rossman, Judges.
WARREN, J.
Rossman, J., dissenting.
Defendant appeals from a judgment finding him guilty of contempt of court for failure to obey a duly served subpoena.1 Defendant‘s only contention on appeal is that the trial court‘s authority to рunish him for contempt is, under the facts, limited to a fine not exceeding $100. We agree and reverse.
On March 16, 1986, defendant was served a subpoena to appear before a grand jury on March 20. On March 19, 1986, the state obtained a warrant authorizing the search of defendant‘s рerson. On March 20, defendant failed to appear before the grand jury. On that day, an order was issued requiring him to appear and to show cause why he should not be found in contempt of court. A bench warrant was also issued that day for his arrest. He was arrested four days later, and on March 27 he was found to be in contempt of court. Pursuant to
“Every court of justice and every judicial officer has power to punish contempt by fine or imprisonment, or both; but such fine shall not exceеd $300 nor the imprisonment six months, except in the cases mentioned in subsection (2) of this section; and when the contempt is not one of those mentioned in
ORS 33.010(1)(a) and (b), or inORS 1.240(1) , it must appear that the right or remedy of a party to an action, suit or proceeding was defeated or prejudicеd thereby before the contempt can be punished otherwise than by a fine not exceeding $100.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The statute limits the punishment for nondisruptive contempt to a $100 fine, unless the court finds an actual prejudicial effect, “specifically focused on the concrete situation in the particular proceeding.” State ex rel Spencer v. Howe, 281 Or 599, 606, 576 P2d 4 (1978). The state contends that the
The state explains that, as part of its investigation of a double murder, it obtained the search warrant in order to have an expert examine an apparent bite mark on defendant‘s hand. Defendant cоuld not be located, and the state feared that, with the passage of time, the mark would lose its distinctive character. Because the state was aware that defendant had been subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury on March 20, it intended to exеcute the warrant when he appeared. The state contends that defendant‘s failure to appear caused it to expend additional law enforcement resources searching for him. We conclude that that kind of prejudice to the state does not constitute the kind of prejudice required to enhance the punishment under
The state‘s second claimed prejudice is that it was deprived of defendant‘s testimony. This argumеnt was not asserted at the trial court, and for that reason the record is devoid of any specific facts to support it. Consequently, we cannot say that the loss of defendant‘s testimony actually prejudiced the state. To hold otherwise would be to hold that every nonаppearance prejudices a party‘s “right” to the testimony and is ipso facto contempt punishable by imprisonment. See State ex rel Spencer v. Howe, supra, 281 Or at 605. The statute requires a finding of actual prejudice.
The state contends that, even if defendant‘s actions caused prejudice, the statutory requirement that prejudice be shown in order to punish contempt by imprisonment and a fine in excess of $100 is an uncоnstitutional infringement on inherent judicial power to regulate the courts. In State ex rel Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 243 Or 477, 495-96, 407 P2d 250
The court in Lenske went on to state that “it may follow that the legislature has the authority to limit the court‘s power to punish for contempt where the court is a creature of the legislature and not constitutionally established.” 243 Or at 493. We conclude that it does follow. In the absence of a statutory restriction, statutorily created courts havе the same powers as a constitutional court to punish for contempt but, because they are created by the legislature, the legislature may limit the courts’ powers.2 What the dissent says in praise of the role of the circuit court should, of course, be extended to all the courts in the judicial system. It has nothing to do, however, with the constitutional issue with which we are dealing. We conclude that
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
ROSSMAN, J., dissenting.
Because I believe that the provision of
In Stаte ex rel Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 243 Or 477, 495, 407 P2d 250 (1965), cert den 1966, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the provision of
“‘The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administratiоn of justice.‘” 243 Or at 492. (Emphasis supplied.)
It then reasoned that “the legislature cannot unreasonably abridge or destroy the judicial power to punish for contempt because the legislature cannot take away a power which it did not give” and held that the provision of
In sounding a death knell for the doctrine of inherent judicial contempt power, the majority cites the Lenske court‘s qualifying statement that “[i]t may follow,” nevertheless, that the legislature has the authority to limit a court‘s power to punish for contempt when “the court is a creature of the legislature and not constitutionally established.” (Emphasis supplied.) The majority‘s reliance on that statement is misplaced for two reasons. First, there are certаin powers inherent in the circuit courts that the legislature cannot curtail or abolish,
In State ex rel Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Or 413, 255 P2d 1055 (1953), the court held that circuit courts possess the inherent power to provide an accused in a criminal case a fair and impartial trial and that that power could not be limited by legislative enаctment. It quoted with approval the following passage from Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass 162, 94 NE 369, 377 (1911):
“‘Our system of government has created the executive, the legislative and the judicial, as three independent and coordinate departments, and in strong and comprеhensive language has prohibited each from attempting to exercise the functions of either of the others “to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men.” The courts of general jurisdiction under such a Constitution have the inherent power to do whatever may be done under the general principles of jurisprudence to insure to the citizen a fair trial, whenever his life, liberty, property or character is at stake. The possession of such power involves its exercise as a duty whenever public or private interests require.‘” 198 Or at 430. (Emphasis in original.)
Therefore, I do not see the issue as being whether the circuit courts possess inherent powers that may not be limited by statute. They obviously do. The question, rather, is whether the power to punish for contempt is one of the inherent powers of the circuit courts.
I cannot imagine a power more imperative to the effective functioning of the judicial system than the power of courts of general jurisdiction to impose meaningful sanctions for contempt in order to enforce lawful orders and judgments. See State ex rel Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, supra, 243 Or at 494 (quoting State v. Greenwood, 63 NM 156, 315 P2d 223 (1957)). As the one who presides over this state‘s court of general jurisdiction, a circuit judge is the primary protector of a great many individual rights. His or her decisions may have a more profound impact on our personal lives than those of any other government official. A circuit judge is the only judicial officer empowered to sentence a person to confinement in
It is imperative to the effective administration of justice that circuit court orders and decrees, with respect to these and оther functions be obeyed. I believe that a circuit court judge possesses the inherent power to see that they are. Because the power of contempt is the most effective means available to the court for the enforcement of its orders and judgments, it is essential to the orderly administration of justice.2 Without it, a circuit court would be like a schooner attempting an ocean voyage without sails.
The doctrine of separation of powers requires that the court‘s powers of contempt remain inviolate. As in State ex rel Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, supra, we need not decide whether
“The Judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Suprume [sic] Court, Circuits [sic] Courts, and County Courts, which shall be Courts of Record having general jurisdiction, to be defined, limited, and regulated by law in accordance with this constitution.”
Although, as noted,
“The courts, jurisdiction, and judicial system of Oregon, except so far as expressly changed by this amendment, shall remain as at present constituted until otherwise provided by law.”
Under section 2, the legislature may be empowered to abolish the circuit courts in their entirety and establish a new court of general jurisdiction that would be a “creaturе of the legislature.” However, it has not done so. In short, the legislature neither created the circuit courts nor provided them the power to punish for contempt. As the Supreme Court noted in State ex rel Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, supra, it cannot take away a power which it did not give. Because
We should not reverse the circuit court.
Notes
“(1) The following acts or omissions, in respect to a court of justice, or proceedings therein, are contempts of the authority of the court:
“*****
“(j) Disobedience of a subpena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or answer as a witness.”
Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, provides:“The powers of the Government shall be divided into three seperate [sic] departments, the Legislative, the Executive, including the administrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided.”
“The judicial power of the state shall be vested in one supreme court and in such other courts as may from time to time be created by law.”
