State v. MockState v. Mock
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Clifford D. Mock, appeals the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to suppress evidence based on an alleged unconstitutional stop. Appellant also contends he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel in that other issues which would have changed the outcome of his case were not argued in his suppression motion. For the following reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
{¶3} After appellant‘s arrest, Officer Lawrence, now with the help of a backup officer, again approached the SUV where Miss Sopher remained. The officers asked Miss Sopher out of the vehicle. Miss Sopher inquired into the status of appellant. Officer Lawrence explained that appellant had been arrested due to an active warrant. Officer Lawrence then asked whether appellant may have left something in Miss Sopher‘s automobile. Miss Sopher, seemingly surprised at the information involving her former passenger, informed Officer Lawrence she did not know whether appellant had left anything in her vehicle. She informed the officers they were free to check her vehicle. The officers searched her automobile, finding in the backseat a partially opened duffle bag with a clear plastic bag in a twisted knot protruding outward. Officer Lawrence, pushing the bag open, discovered narcotics and drug paraphernalia. The
{¶4} Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. In his motion, appellant did not contest the initial stop. Instead, appellant contended Officer Lawrence had no reason to ask appellant for identification—essentially, that it was an unlawful continued detention unrelated to the purpose of the initial stop (suspicion of driver intoxication). Appellant urged the court to suppress all further evidence and statements from the stop. The trial court held a suppression hearing during which Officer Lawrence testified to the above-framed factual points. Upon consideration, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
{¶5} Appellant now appeals and asserts two assignments of error for consideration by this court. Appellant‘s first assignment of error states:
{¶6} “The trial court erred when it denied the Defendant-Appellant‘s motion to suppress in violation of his due process rights and rights against unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by
{¶8} A motion to suppress evidence “is the proper vehicle for raising constitutional challenges based on the exclusionary rule[.]” State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449 (1995). Pursuant to
{¶9} Failure to abide by
{¶10} Appellant recognizes this point but argues the trial court‘s failure to exclude the evidence on the grounds upon which he now relies is plain error, pursuant to
{¶11} Nonetheless, appellant would not have been able to assert his arguments in the first instance. Though neither party addresses it, the issue of standing is a threshold determination in analyzing whether a defendant‘s constitutional rights were violated. Certainly, appellant has the ability to challenge the seizure of Miss Sopher‘s automobile which restricted his movement as a passenger. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 11th Dist. No. 2011-L-107, 2012-Ohio-2123, ¶18. However, appellant does not demonstrate that he has standing to challenge the constitutionality of Miss Sopher‘s consent to search her automobile. See State v. Jalloh, 2d Dist. No. 24972, 2012-Ohio-5314, ¶31, citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (“a passenger has no standing to challenge the vehicle‘s search if that passenger has no proprietary or possessory interest in the vehicle“). Appellant similarly does not illustrate how he would have
{¶12} Appellant‘s first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶13} Appellant‘s second assignment of error states:
{¶14} “The Defendant-Appellant‘s due process rights and rights to fair trial as guaranteed by the
{¶15} In his second assignment of error, appellant contends he suffered ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his suppression motion did not contain any of the arguments upon which he now relies: i.e., invalid search incident to arrest and involuntary consent. However, as explained above, these grounds, if pursued, would have proved fruitless due to the issue of standing. Pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), we cannot conclude the outcome would have been any different had these issues been raised. Further, on this record, it is equally plausible that trial counsel assessed the strength of the various arguments and tactically
{¶16} Appellant‘s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶17} The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE., J.,
concur.