STATE v. JOHN C. MOBLEY
No. 340
Supreme Court of North Carolina
July 9, 1954
240 N.C. 476
William S. Stewart and Bonner D. Sawyer for Plaintiff, Appellee.
John T. Manning for Defendant, Appellant.
PER CURIAM. The defendant makes no contention that the evidence fails to support the findings of fact. The argument of the defendant that the court erred in awarding to the plaintiff possession of the home owned by them as tenants by the entirety, has been answered adversely to such contention by this Court in Wright v. Wright, 216 N.C. 693, 6 S.E. 2d 555, and upon the authority of that case the judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.
STATE v. JOHN C. MOBLEY.
(Filed 9 July, 1954.)
- Arrest § 2—
A person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest by the use of force, as in self-defense.
- Same—
A person resisting an unlawful arrest may use only such force as reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the unlawful restraint of his liberty, and where he uses excessive force, he may be guilty of assault, or, if death ensues, even of homicide.
- Arrest § 1b—
Under the general common law rule, an arrest may not be made ordinarily without a warrant, and the exceptions to this common law rule are defined and limited entirely by statute in this State.
- Same—
An аrrest without warrant except as authorized by statute is illegal in this State.
- Same—
A peace officer may make an arrest without a warrant if he has reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been committed or a dangerous wound inflicted, and that the suspect is guilty and will escape unless immediately arrested,
G.S. 15-41 . Under this rule it is not required that the offense be committed in the presence of the peace officer or in fact that the offense should have been actually committed if the arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that it has been committed. - Arrest § 1a—
Where a felony actually has been committed in the presence of a private citizen, such private citizen may forthwith arrest without warrant the per-
son he knows to be guilty or the person he has reasonable ground to believe guilty. If it turns out the offense is not a felony, such private person may not justify taking the suspect into custody. G.S. 15-40 . - Arrest § 1a, 1b—
A peace officer or a private citizen on equal terms may arrest without warrant a person whose conduct in his presence amounts to a breach of the peace, or a threat of breach of the peace together with some overt act in attempted execution of the threat such as reasonably justifies a belief that the perpetration of an offense amounting to a breach of the peace is imminent.
G.S. 15-39 . - Same—
The test of the right of a peace officer or private citizen to arrest without warrant under
G.S. 15-39 is not whether the offense be a misdemeanor, but whether arrest is necessary to prevent or suppress a breach of the peace. The statute does not justify arrest when the facts furnish reasonable ground to believe an offense covered by the statute is being committed, but the person making the arrest must determine, at his peril, preliminary to proceeding without warrant, whether an offense arrestable under the statute is being committed. S. v. McNinch, 90 N.C. 695, overruled on this point. - Same—
Mere drunkenness unaccompanied by language or conduct which creates, or is reasonably calculated to create, public excitement or disorder amounting to a breach of the peace, will not justify arrest without warrant under
G.S. 15-39 . - Arrest § 3—
The State‘s evidence tended to show that defendant resisted arrest without warrant by a municipal police officer on a charge of public drunkenness under
G.S. 14-335 . The municipal charter conferred no power on its police officers to arrest without warrant in misdemeanor cases. Held: In the absence of evidence tending to show prima facie facts that defendant‘s conduct at the time amounted to an actual or threatened breach of the peace, the arrest was illegal, and defendant‘s motion to nonsuit on the charge of resisting arrest should have been allowed. - Same—
Where the State‘s evidence fails to show that defendant used excessive force in resisting an illegal arrest, defendant‘s motion to nonsuit on the charge of assaulting the police officer should have been allowed.
- Arrest §§ 1a, 1b—
A nuisance is not per se a breach of the peace, and neither a police officer nor a private citizen may arrest a person without warrant for creating a nuisance which does not amount to a breach or threatened breach of the peace.
- Appeal and Error § 51b—
The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply where it conflicts with a pertinent statutory provision to the contrary.
Same— The doctrine of stare decisis should never be applied to perpetuate palpable error.
BARNHILL, C. J., concurs in result.
PARKER, J., dissenting.
DENNY, J., concurring.
APPEAL by defendant from Rousseau, J., and a jury, at October Term, 1953, of GASTON.
Criminal prosecution tried on appeal from the Recorder‘s Court of the Town of Dallas upon warrants, consolidated for trial, charging the defendant with (1) public drunkenness, (2) resisting arrest, and (3) simple assault.
Police officers of the Town of Dallas arrested the defendant without warrant for public drunkenness. The defendant, asserting he was not drunk, resisted the arrest. Chief Eidson testified that as he and officer Broome drove up to Brewer‘s Service Station he observed the defendant “wobbling across the driveway. . . . He was drunk. . . . I got out of the car and . . . told him he was under arrest for being drunk. I took hold of his left arm. Mr. Broome got his right arm. We started to the car. He scuffled on around behind the car and . . . hauled off and hit me beside the head and knocked my hat off, and my glasses flew out of my pocket. He started toward Mr. Broome and . . . swung at him and hit him a glancing lick. . . .” The defendant testified, as did a number of bystanders, that he was not intoxicated.
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty of public drunkenness, but guilty of resisting arrest and guilty of simple assault.
From judgment pronounced, imposing penal servitude of nine months, the defendant appealed, assigning errors.
Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorney-General Moody for the State.
R. Gregg Cherry, Ernest R. Warren, and Charles E. Hamilton, Jr., for defendant, appellant.
JOHNSON, J. The offense of resisting arrest, both at common law and under the statute,
True, the right of a person to use force in resisting an illegal arrest is not unlimited. He may use only such force as reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the unlawful restraint of his liberty. S. v. Allen, supra. See also S. v. Glenn, 198 N.C. 79, 150 S.E. 663. And where excessive force is exerted, the person seeking to avoid arrest may be convicted of assault, or even of homicide if death ensues (4 Am. Jur., Arrest, Sec. 92), but in no event may a conviction of the offense of resisting arrest be predicated upon resistance of an unlawful arrest. S. v. Allen, supra; S. v. Belk, supra; Prosser on Torts, p. 165.
This brings us to the pivotal question presented by this appeal: Was the arrest of the defendant lawful or unlawful? Necessarily, the answer is dependent on whether the officers had the right to arrest the defendant without a warrant.
It has always been the general rule of the common law that ordinarily an arrest should not be made without warrant and that, subject to well-defined exceptions, an arrest without warrant is deemed unlawful. 4 Bl. Com. 289 et seq.; 6 C.J.S., Arrest, Sec. 5, p. 578; 5 C.J., p. 395. This foundation principle of the common law, designed and intended to protect the people against the abuses of arbitrary arrests, is of ancient origin. It derives from assurances of Magna Carta and harmonizes with the spirit of our constitutional precepts that the people should be secure in their persons. Nevertheless, to this general rule that no man should be taken into custody of the law without the sanction of a warrant or other judicial authority, the processes of the early English common law, in deference to the requirements of public security, worked out a number of exceptions. These exceptions related in the main to cases involving felonies and suspected felonies and to breaches of the peace. 4 Bl. Com. 292 et seq.; Archbold‘s Criminal P. and P., 28th Edition, p. 1013 et seq.; 4 Am. Jur., Arrest, Sections 22 to 38. Arrest without warrant in felony cases was justified at common law on the theory that dangerous criminals and persons charged with heinous offenses should be incarcerated with all possible haste in the interest of public safety. Whereas, the necessity for prompt on-the-spot action in suppressing and preventing disturbances of the public peace was the factor which justified arrest without warrant in misdemeanor cases involving breaches of the peace. In such cases, with the moving consideration being the immediate preservation of the public peace, rather than the due apprehension of the offender, the theory prevailed that unless the public peace was menaced, the delay incident to obtaining a warrant from a judicial officer would not prejudice the interests of the State in punishing the offender. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790. See also 75 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 485.
It is not necessary for us to deal at length with the refinements of the common law exceptions to the general rule against arrest without warrant. This is so for the reason that in this State the common law exceptions have been enacted or supplanted by statute, so that the power of arrest without warrant is now defined and limited entirely by legislative enactments. And the rule is that where the right and power of arrest without warrant is regulated by statute, an arrest without warrant except as authorized by statute is illegal. Sims v. Smith, 115 Conn. 279, 161 A. 239; S. v. Bradshaw, 53 Mont. 96, 161 P. 710; S. v. De Hart (N. J. C. Pl.), 129 A. 427; Mazzolini v. Gifford, 90 Vt. 352, 98 A. 904; 6 C.J.S., Arrest, Sec. 5, pp. 579 and 580. See also Stearns v. Titus, 193 N.Y. 272, 85 N.E. 1077; Vinson v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 482, 293 S.W. 984; Fitzpatrick v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 385, 275 S.W. 819.
Our General Assembly of 1868-69 enacted a comprehensive, all-embracing set of rules prescribing and limiting the power of arrеst without warrant. This Act, which may well be called our Code of Arrest Without Warrant, is Chapter 178, Subchapter 1, Session Laws of 1868-69. Its caption reads as follows: “When and by whom arrests may be made without process.” This statute clarifies, in some particulars modifies, and in other ways extends the pre-existing rules of the common law governing arrest without warrant, but in the main the Act is declaratory of the common law. The statute has been preserved and brought forward through successive codifications of our statute law. It is now codified in pertinent parts as
The basic rules governing arrest without warrant as prescribed by the Act of 1869 may be distinguished as they relate to (1) felonies and to (2) misdemeanors. We discuss them in that order:
1. Felonies.—
2. Misdemeanors.—
This brings us to an analysis of the intent and meaning of
In testing the legality of an arrest without warrant by the provisions of
“Generally speaking, any violation of public order or disturbance of the public tranquility by any act or conduct tending to provoke or incite others to violence constitutes a breach of the peace, within the meaning of the rules which authorize an arrest without a warrant for a breach of the peace. . . .”
“A breach of the peace may be occasioned by an affray or assault, by the use of profane and abusive language by one person toward another on a public street and in the presence of others, or by a person needlessly shouting and making a loud noise.”
The Restatement of Torts, Section 116, puts it this way: “A breach of the peace is a public offense done by violence or one causing or likely to cause an immediate disturbance of public order.” See also Prosser on Torts, p. 160; Ballentine‘s Law Dictionary, p. 171; 22 Michigan Law Review, 541, 573.
In applying the statute at hand,
The State, urging that a peace officer may arrest without warrant either when (1) a misdemeanor is actually committed in his presence or (2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a misdemeanor is being committed in his presence, cites some twenty or more cases from other jurisdictions, principally those listed in the footnotes supporting one of the diverse views given in the text statement appearing in 6 C.J.S., Arrest, Sec. 6, p. 585. All the cited cases have been examined. They are distinguishable. In the light of the plain meaning of
While the Act of 1868-69, which supplanted the common law rules of arrest without warrant, remains unchanged in basic principles and as now codified in its various parts—
Chief among the local implementing statutes are numerous municipal charter provisions which confer on peace officers authority to arrest on sight without process any person found violating any municipal ordinance, or in some instances committing any misdemeanor, regardless of whether the offense does or does not amount to a breach of the peace. See Coates, Law of Arrest in North Carolina, 15 N. C. Law Review, 101, where numerous examples of such charter provisions are cited. See also Alexander v. Lindsey, supra.
It is also noted that a number of implementing State-wide statutes have been enacted from time to time conferring on peace officers the power of arrest without warrant in cаses not amounting to a breach of the peace. For example,
We have examined the charter of the Town of Dallas, Chapter 351, Private Laws of 1913. It nowhere purports to confer on the police officers of the town authority to make arrests in misdemeanor cases without warrants in cases not amounting to a breach of the peace. Indeed, no
In the case at hand the evidence on which the State relies fails to show prima facie that the defendant‘s conduct at the time of the arrest amounted either to an actual or threatened breach of the peace within the intent and meaning of
Nor does the evidence in any aspect show that the defendant used excessive force in resisting the illegal arrest. Therefore, the defendant‘s motion for judgment as of nonsuit, both as to the charge of resisting arrest and assault, should have been allowed, and it is so ordered. The judgment below will be vacated and reversed and the motion for nonsuit sustained.
We have not overlooked the decision of this Court in S. v. Freeman, 86 N.C. 683, cited and relied on by the State, wherein peace officers were held justified in making an arrest without warrant for public drunkenness in their presence. The person arrested was found between the hours of ten and eleven o‘clock at night lying helplessly intoxicated upon the sidewalk exposed to public view at a place much frequented in the town of Hendersonville, in violation of a town ordinance making such helpless state of intoxication a nuisance and punishable by fine or imprisonment. The arrest was upheld by the Court, not upon the theory that the prosecutor‘s condition of drunkenness amounted to a breach of the peace, but rather upon the express ground that such drunkenness was an offense “against decency and morality” amounting to a nuisance and therefore arrestable on sight without warrant. It is apparent that the Court in so deciding S. v. Freeman was not advertent to the provisions of Chapter 178, Subchapter 1, Session Laws of 1868-69, and its salutary impact on the law of arrest in this State. This statute is nowhere mentioned in the opinion. Instead, the Court in holding that nuisance, as distinguished from breach of the peace, is sufficient to justify arrest without warrant, cites Archbold‘s Criminal P. and P., *page 26, note 2. This is a standard English treatise on criminal law and procedure, first published in 1822. It has since appeared in numerous editions, the last one available to us being the 28th Edition, published in 1931. It was the 6th Edition published in 1853, with American notes by Wаterman, that was available to the Court when S. v. Freeman was decided in 1882. The Archbold text
Similarly, we treat as unauthoritative the decision in S. v. McNinch, 90 N.C. 695, which contains this statement to which the State directs our attention: “In making an arrest upon personal observation and without warrant, the officer will be excused when no offense has been perpetrated, if the circumstances are such as reasonably warrants the belief that it was (Neal v. Joyner, 89 N.C. 287) and the jury must judge of the reasonableness of the grounds upon which the officer acted.” (Italics added.) In making this pronouncement the Court inadvertently failed to note that
Where there are conflicting decisions the doctrine of stare decisis has no application. Patterson v. McCormick, 177 N.C. 448, 467, 99 S.E. 401. Nor should stare decisis be applied where it conflicts with a pertinent statutory provision to the contrary. 21 C.J.S., Courts, Sec. 187, p. 304. Moreover, where a statute covering the subject matter has been overlooked, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply. 15 C.J. 958. Nor may the court by a line of erroneous decisions overrule a statutory enactment. Patterson v. McCormick, supra, at p. 457. Besides, the doctrine of stare decisis should never be applied to perpetuate palpable error. 21 C.J.S., Courts, Sections 187 and 193.
It is to be kept in mind that the decision in this case is no attempt to provide a code for arrest without warrant, nor do we attempt to close the hiatuses in present arrest procedure. Such matters are not within the province of the Court. Our intent here is to eliminate or minimize the conflicts that have developed in the construction and application of present statutes, to the end that peace officers may know with reasonable exactitude their rights and duties in respect to making arrests without warrant.
In the situation thus presented it is for the Legislature, rather than the Court, to determine whether it has or has not kept pace with the exigencies of the times in its process of conferring on various peace officers from time to time by piecemeal enactments broadened powers of arrest without warrant. In short, since this branch of the law has come to be prescribed and regulated wholly by statute, it is for the Legislature to ponder and decide whether the present statutes meet the minimum requirements of public safety and security, or whether further extensions are necessary; for example, by the enactment of a single State-wide statute authorizing
For constructive criticisms of the present law of arrest see Machen, The Law of Arrest, p. 76 et seq.; 15 N. C. Law Review, p. 101, 103 et seq.; 29 Michigan Law Review, pp. 452 and 453; 28 Virginia Law Review, pp. 331, 332, and 343 et seq. See also 22 Michigan Law Review, p. 541; 48 Harvard Law Review, p. 566.
The judgment below is
Reversed.
BARNHILL, C. J., concurs in result.
PARKER, J., dissenting. The State‘s evidence tends to show the following facts. Jesse Broome, a police officer of the Town of Dallas dressed in his uniform with badge and pistol, saw the defendant around 9:30 or 10 p.m. at the Dallas Grill, a public restaurant. The defendant was staggering around drunk, and cursed Broome and the brother of the Chief of Police of Dallas, who was talking to Broome. Broome asked the defendant to hush cursing. The defendant replied if Broome got out of his car, he, the defendant, would cut his head off, and for Broome “to call the County“—manifestly referring to the County Law Enforcement Officers. Broome did not arrest the defendant then, but “called the County” for help. Broome then went to the courthouse, called the Dallas Chief of Police A. R. Eidson, went to Eidson‘s home, picked him up, came back up town, and found the defendant at a service station, a public place. Chief Eidson had on a white shirt and was in civilian clothes, but had his badge on his shirt and a gun. The officers had no warrant. The officers got out of the car, and Chief Eidson told the defendant he was under arrest for being drunk. Chief Eidson took hold of his left arm, Broome his right arm, and started to the car. The defendant scuffled around behind the car, and struck Chief Eidson on the head knocking his hat off. He struck at Chief Eidson “a whole lot.” Broome hit the defendant a glancing blow on the head with a blackjack. The defendant told Chief Eidson to shoot him. (John Puett, a witness for the defendant, testified the defendant raised his shirt, and said to Chief Eidsоn “You yellow bellied s.o.b., let‘s see you put a slug in it.“) The officers then seized the defendant, put him in their car and carried him to the county jail. The “scuffle or pulling” between the officers and the defendant lasted about
The defendant, and one of his witnesses, testified that Chief Eidson told the defendant he was arresting him for being drunk and disorderly. The defendant testified on cross-examination that one time he went before the Town Board to try to make Jesse Broome pay him a debt, and that he had talked to three members of the Board about firing Chief Eidson. The defendant further admitted on cross-examination that he had served a prison sentence for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill; had been convicted of speeding and reckless driving; of violating the prohibition law; of carrying a concealed weapon; and probably convicted of an affray. The defendant testified that he knew Chief Eidson was a police officer of the Town of Dallas when he was arrested.
Whether cursing a police officer or addressing scurrilous words to him constitute a breach of the peace for which an arrest may be made without a warrant depends upon the circumstances involved. Mere impudence will not suffice. Anno. 34 A.L.R. 566; S. v. Moore, 166 N.C. 371, 81 S.E. 693; 4 Am. Jur. Arrest sec. 31; 8 Am. Jur. Breach of Peace sec. 10.
The State‘s evidence shows that the defendant cursed Broome in the presence of others, while Broome was sitting in his car on a public street in the Town of Dallas, threatened immediate force to Broome‘s person if he got out of his car, and then and there cursed Eidson, brother of the town‘s Chief of Police. It is common knowledge such conduct on a public street in the presence of others provokes and incites to immediate violence. If that evidence is accepted as true by the jury, it shows with apodeictic certainty, according to the authorities cited in the majority opinion, that the defеndant committed a breach of the peace in Broome‘s actual presence, for which offense it was Broome‘s duty to arrest the defendant promptly without a warrant.
Did Broome‘s delay in arresting the defendant make the arrest illegal? In my opinion, the answer is No, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as is requisite on a motion for nonsuit.
It is said in 4 Am. Jur., Arrest, sec. 67: “In making an arrest without a warrant for breach of the peace or a misdemeanor, an officer must act promptly at the time of the offense***In order to justify a delay, there should be a continued attempt on the part of the officer or person apprehending the offender to make the arrest; he cannot delay for any purpose which is foreign to the accomplishment of the arrest. If an officer sees an affray and calls other officers to his assistance, the fact that the actual arrest is mаde after the affray is over does not make the arrest without a warrant illegal.***The shortness of the interval does not
In S. v. McClure, 166 N.C. 321, 81 S.E. 458, it is written: “***it is the right of a peace officer to arrest, without warrant, one who assaults him (citing authorities), and the officer did not lose the right in this case because the prisoner had walked off, according to the evidence of one witness, 30 or 40 feet, and to that of another, 50 or 75 yards.”
It is a fair inference from the evidence that Broome knew the defendant had hard feelings against him. The defendant‘s admissions of his criminal record, on cross-examination, did not enlarge Broome‘s authority, and would not justify an illegal arrest. Larson v. Feeney, 196 Mich. 1, 162 N.W. 275, L.R.A. 1917D 694. However, such admissions permit the reasonable inference that Broome knew the defendant was a man of violence. If Broome had attempted immediately to arrest the defendant for the breach of peace committed in his presence, he would have been “rightfully the aggressor.” S. v. Miller, 197 N.C. 445, 149 S.E. 590. It seems to me most probable, in the light of what happened when the arrest was made, if Broome without aid had made the arrest then and there, he would have had to injure the defendant seriously with gun or blackjack to overcome his resistance. It is also probable that under such circumstances Broome would not have succeeded in making the arrest. The State‘s evidence tends to show that Broome‘s delay was due solely to his seeking the aid of an officer, and that he did not in any way desist from that purpose before the arrest. The defendant‘s conduct was not that of a pacific drunk. Such conduct required summary action on Broome‘s part, and had not passed when the arrest was made. The offense and the arrest form part of one transaction. The State‘s evidence does not show how long Broome was gone in his search for aid, but it would not seem to have been over ten or fifteen or twenty minutes at the most. I think the delay was reasonable, and showed sound judgment on Broome‘s part.
The defendant knew that Chief Eidson and Broome were police officers of the Town of Dallas. The fact that Chief Eidson, and not Broome, told the defendant he was under arrest is immaterial. In reality Broome, with Eidson‘s aid, made the arrest. Though Eidson said, according to the State‘s evidence, he was arresting the defendant for being drunk—the defendant testified Eidson said he was arresting him for being drunk and disorderly—that does not erase the defendant‘s breach of the peace, if the
“If the official authority of an officer is known to the person who is being arrested, it is not essential that he announce it or make known his intention or purpose before actually apprehending the offender.” 4 Am. Jur., Arrest, Sec. 65.
To resist an officer in the lawful discharge of his duties is made a crime at common law and in all jurisdictions by statute. 39 Am. Jur., Obstructing Justice, Sec. 8; 67 C. J. S., Obstructing Justice, Sec. 5. In Edmund Burke‘s words “obedience to law is what makes government.”
In my opinion the trial court correctly overruled the motions for nonsuit, and I so vote.
I think there are prejudicial errors in the charge for which a new trial should be awarded.
The defendant assigns as error that the Court several times in its charge said the officers would be justified in making the arrest if in the officer‘s own judgment and opinion the defendant was guilty, when the Court should have charged that it was for the jury to say whether or not the officer had reasonable grounds to warrant the arrest. The defendant supports his argument by what this Court said in S. v. McNinch, 90 N.C. 695: “In making an arrest upon personal observation and without warrant, the officer will be excused when no offense has been perpetrated, if the circumstances are such as reasonably warrant the belief that it was (Neal v. Joyner, 89 N.C. 287), and the jury must judge of the reasonableness of the grounds upon which the officer acted.” The majority opinion says this “pronouncement is disapproved and withdrawn, as are similar statements based on like facts in subsequent decisions of the Court. See S. v. Jenkins, 195 N.C. 747, 143 S.E. 538; S. v. Campbell, 182 N.C. 911, 110 S.E. 86; Sigmon v. Shell, 165 N.C. 582, 81 S.E. 739.” To the disapproval of this statement of law, firmly embodied in our decisions, I do not agree.
The majority opinion states: “We think a breach of the peace is threatened within the meaning of the statute (
The majority opinion also says: “to justify an arrest on the ground of necessity in order to ‘suppress’ a breach of the peace, the conduct of the party arrested must amount to an actual breach of the peace in the presence of the officer making the arrest“; and also states: “a person making an arrest under the authority of
To say that an officer making an arrest without a warrant under the provisions of
The excerpt quoted above from S. v. McNinch, supra, is sound law, is followed by us in later decisions, and is apparently supported by the majority of courts elsewhere “dealing with the exact question.”
In Peru v. U. S., 4 Fed. (2d) 881, it is said: “A mere suspicion is not sufficient upon which to base an arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant. U. S. v. Slusser (D.C.), 270 F. 818. In Garske v. U. S., 1 F. (2d) 620, 625, we said: ‘the proper test, supported by the great weight of authority, by which the case should be decided is, were the circumstances presented to the officers through the testimony of their senses sufficient to justify them in a good faith belief that plaintiff in error was in their presence transporting liquor in violation of law***? In other words, was there probable cause for them to so believe, or were the facts sufficient to give rise merely to a suspicion thereof? If the former, the arrest was legal*** If the latter, the arrest was illegal.***‘” It is truе that this case involved the National Prohibition Law, which expressly authorizes summary arrest when any person is found transporting liquor in violation of the act. But it is also true that
This decision is criticized in 75 Penn. Law Review 485 et seq. as follows: “It is difficult to see how the Carroll case can be taken as authority
An article entitled “Arrest without Warrant” in the Wisconsin Law Review (1939) pp. 385, 387 says: “Some jurisdictions hold that the officer must actually know an offense is being committed and would hold him liable in such circumstances. The majority of jurisdictions, however, hold that it is not essential that the officer arresting without a warrant absolutely know that an offense is being committed in his presence, and rule that a bona fide belief on his part that it is being committed is enough.”
In my opinion the fact that some of the courts were construing statutes which authorize peace officers to arrest without a warrant for all misdemeanors committed in their presence, and in S. v. McNinch, supra, we were interpreting a statute restricted to riots, routs, affrays or other breach of the peace makes no difference. The rationale of the decisions is identical.
I think that these words in S. v. Hunter, supra, (quoted in S. v. McAfee, supra, and referred to in S. v. Rollins, supra): “but policemen of Asheville must determine, at their peril, preliminary to proceeding without warrant, whether a valid ordinance has been violated within or out of their view,” is in direct conflict with what we had previously said in S. v. McNinch, supra, and what we have repeatedly said later in Perry v. Hurdle, 229 N.C. 216, 49 S.E. 2d 400; Wilson v. Mooresville, 222 N.C. 283, 22 S.E. 2d 907; S. v. Jenkins, 195 N.C. 747, 143 S.E. 538; S. v. Campbell, 182 N.C. 911, 110 S.E. 86; Sigmon v. Shell, 165 N.C. 582, 81 S.E. 739; Brewer v. Wynne, 163 N.C. 319, 79 S.E. 629. Further it seems to be in conflict with the majority of courts elsewhere, which have passed on “the exact question.” In my opinion it is not correct law, and I vote to overrule such statement in the Hunter Case.
Unless our peace officers in arresting without a warrant under
For prejudicial errors in the charge I cast my vote for a new trial.
DENNY, J., concurring: While the majority opinion deals only with the facts as to what occurred at Brewer‘s Service Station, the previous conduct of the defendant at the Dallas Grill, in my opinion, did not justify Chief Eidson in arresting him without a warrant.
When all the evidence adduced in the trial below is considered, it clearly appears that bad blood existed between Broome and the defendant. The evidence most favorable to the State is Broome‘s testimony to the effect that he saw the defendant at the Dallas Grill, that “he was staggering around“; that the defendant cursed him and Arnold Eidson, a brother of the Chief of Police of the Town of Dallas. The evidence also discloses that Arnold Eidson and officer Broome were in Broome‘s car at the time the purported cursing took place. There is in the record, however, no evidence tending to show that the defendant was loud and boisterous or that аny person or persons other than Broome and Eidson heard anything he said. Moreover, the warrant upon which the defendant was tried, which was signed by Broome and Chief Eidson, as complainants, does not charge the defendant with disorderly conduct, but merely of appearing “in public under the influence of intoxicating liquor.”
Furthermore, it is disclosed by the defendant‘s evidence and not denied by the State, that after the defendant left the Dallas Grill he went to Brewer‘s Service Station and was there “about 35 or 40 minutes” before the officers attempted to arrest him. And there is no evidence tending to show any misconduct on the part of the defendant while he was at the filling station prior to the arrival of the officers. I realize that neither the defendant‘s evidence nor the result of the trial on the charge of being drunk is controlling on the legal question presented for review, nevertheless it is significant that a number of the leading citizens of the town of Dallas talked with the defendant while he was at the filling station and were there when he wаs arrested, and these citizens testified unequivocally in the trial below that the defendant was not drunk at the time of his arrest. The jury believed them and found the defendant not guilty of the charge.
If it be conceded that the facts аs related by Broome are true (which were vigorously denied by the defendant), in view of the personal animosity that existed between Broome and the defendant, I have considerable doubt as to whether the conversation or controversy between Broome and the defendant which occurred at the Dallas Grill, constituted a breach of the peace.
SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY AND WILMINGTON RAILWAY BRIDGE COMPANY.
(Filed 9 July, 1954.)
- Railroads § 16; Injunctions § 3—
If a carrier has a contractual right to construct and use a turnout or junction from trackage used by it jointly with another carrier and owned by a separate corporation, and such turnout or junction is the only feasible way for it to serve industries located in the area, equity will grant injunctive relief to preserve such right as being necessary to afford an adequate and complete remedy.
- Appeal and Error § 40d—
Facts admitted by the parties are conclusive.
- Same—
Findings of fact by the trial court under agreement of the parties are conclusive when supported by competent evidence.