68 Iowa 116 | Iowa | 1885
II. As to Mitchell, the evidence is entirely different. We think that it justified the jury in finding him guilty. It is contended, to be sure, that the testimony of the complainant was not corroborated. But in our opinion it was. It was shown that the complainant arrived home with marks of violence upon her, and there was evidence to the effect that the man who was with her, who, according to Mitchell’s own testimony, was himself, undertook to account for her injuries by stating that the team ran away, which statement, if made, it appears was false.
YI. Some other errors are assigned which, in view of the length of this opinion, we must be allowed, to dispose of in a brief way. In one instruction the court said: “ It does not follow that you will be required to convict because there is some corroboration of her testimony oaloidated, to connect said defendant with the crime.” It is contended that the court should have used the word “tending” where it used the word “calculated.” But we are unable to see that the use of the word “tending” would have been more favorable to the defendant.
YII. It is claimed that one instruction states the evidence incorrectly. We have read the instruction carefully in connection with the evidence, and have to say that we do not think that there is any substantial inaccuracy.
Y1II. The court in an instruction used the word “ravish” where it is claimed that it should have used the words “ravish and carnally know.” It may be conceded that the word “ravish” is susceptible of a different meaning from the words “ravish and carnally know.” But the connection in which the word “ravish” was used was siicli that we think that the jury could not have been misled.
We have examined the entire record, and see no error except as above pointed out. We think that as to the defendant Loekard the judgment should be reversed, and as to the defendant Mitchell, affirmed.