State v. MitchellState v. Mitchell
OPINION
The sole issue presented in these appeals is whether
On separate occasions, appellee Mitchell and appellee Williams were arrested in Yuma County during January, 1981 and charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor while their driver’s licenses were revoked. Prior to trial, appellee Mitchell filed a motion
in limine
seeking to suppress the state’s evidence of the revocation of his Wisconsin driver’s license by the State of Wisconsin. A similar motion was made by Williams as to the revocation of his Arkansas license by the State of Arkansas. After these motions were granted, the state moved to dismiss the complaints without prejudice pursuant to
State v. Million,
The state argues that the word “license” as used in
These sentencing provisions, the state contends, reflect a clear legislative intent to enhance punishment to felony status for drivers who have committed acts of such severity that their licenses have been suspended, revoked, or refused, regardless of where that action was taken.
In its
amicus
brief, the Maricopa County Attorney, in support of the state’s position, further argues that because a nonresident is permitted to drive in Arizona without first obtaining an Arizona license (See
Appellees, in support of the trial court’s ruling, rely primarily upon
• “License” means any license, temporary instruction permit or temporary license issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the licensing of persons to operate motor vehicles. (Emphasis added.)
This definition appears in Arizona’s Safety Responsibility, Act and distinguishes “license” from “nonresident operating privilege” defined in
“Nonresident operating privilege” means the privilege conferred upon a nonresident by the laws of this state pertaining to the operation by him of a motor vehicle, or the use of a motor vehicle owned by him in this state.
To resolve this issue, we start with the basic premise that in order for a person to lawfully drive a motor vehicle on the highways of this state that person must have a valid Arizona driver’s license or be exempt from obtaining such a license.
See
At this point, it is clear that the argument presented in the
amicus
brief begs the question. If a nonresident’s drivers license has been suspended, revoked, or refused by the home state rather than Arizona, the nonresident operator is not driving in Arizona under the authority of his nonresident license as claimed in the
amicus
brief, but, in fact, is specifically prohibited from driving in Arizona by the language of
With this premise in mind the definition of “license” as used in
Any person who drives a motor vehicle on a public highway of this state at a time when his privilege so to do is suspended, revoked or refused, is guilty of a misdemeanor.... (Emphasis added.)
We can thus conclude that while the piece of paper designated a “license” may be evidence of the privilege granted by the statutes to drive on the state’s highways, it is the suspension, revocation or refusal of the privilege to drive by the State of Arizona which is the gravamen of the offense. This analysis becomes clearer when applied to the privilege granted to nonresident drivers to operate their vehicles in Arizona.
The privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this state given to a nonresident under this chapter shall be subject to suspension or revocation by the department in like manner and for like cause as an operator’s or chauffeur’s license issued under this chapter may be suspended or revoked. (Emphasis added.)
See also
Under this statute if a nonresident’s privilege to drive had been revoked by the State of Arizona he could be charged with violation of
Based on this analysis, the definition of “license” provided in
We therefore hold that the word “license” as used in
The trial court properly suppressed evidence that another jurisdiction had revoked the driving privileges of appellees driving in their respective home jurisdictions as being immaterial.
NOTE: The Honorable RICHARD M. DAVIS, a Judge pro tempore of a court of record, has been authorized to participate in this matter by the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, pursuant to Arizona Const, art. VI, § 20.
Notes
. All statutes referred to in this opinion are those in effect at the time the offenses were committed.
A person whose operator’s or chauffeur’s license is suspended, revoked, or refused andwho commits the offense of driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs during the period of such suspension, revocation or refusal, or a person who has never applied for or obtained an operator’s or chauffeur’s license who commits a second offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, is guilty of a class 6 felony.
. Former
A.)A.R.S. § 28-692.01(A) provides that a first offense is a class 1 misdemeanor carrying a mandatory one day jail sentence and permits surrender of one’s license in the discretion of the trial judge.
B. )A.R.S. § 28-692.01(B) provides that a second offense shall be treated as a class 1 misdemeanor and, if committed within 24 months of the first offense, carries a mandatory 60 days in jail and mandatory surrender of one’s license.
C. )A.R.S. § 28-692.02 provides that one who drives while his license is suspended, revoked, or refused and when intoxicated is guilty of a class 6 felony.
. The offenses set forth in
. This does not mean that a nonresident driver escapes punishment or the intent of