State v. MinterState v. Minter
On this appeal defendant, in effect, challenges the refusal of the County Court to declare invalid that portion of his sentence for carnal abuse in excess of five years.
“The courts in sentencing to the reformatory shall not fix or limit the duration of sentence, but the time which any such person shall serve in the reformatory or on parole shall not in any case exceed five years or the maximum term provided by law for the crime for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, if such maximum be less than five years; provided, however, that the court, in its discretion, for good cause shown, may impose a sentence greater than five years, but in no case greater than the maximum provided by law, and the commitment shall specify in every case the maximum of the sentence so imposed. * * *”
The Essex County Probation Department prepared an unusually detailed presentence investigation report for the use of the County Court before the imposition of sentence. The report stated that defendant was “an aggressive and emotionally unstable constitutional defective.” It observed that although this was defendant‘s first conviction as an adult offender, he hаd been in “a load of difficulty as a juvenile,” and the school authorities as well as the law enforcement authorities had had difficulty with him since 1946 when he was 12 years old. “There was a repetitive pattern of aggressive, incorrigible behavior from then on. * * * He is just a mаladjusted constitutional defective who has also been classified as a `pathological liar.‘”
Upon receipt of the probation office report the court referred defendant to the New Jersey Diagnostic Center at Menlo Park fоr further examination. That institution reported that
“This patient, who is of a borderline mental-defective intelligence, appears to be a somewhat violent type of person who in his poor controls could well become dangerous. Diagnostiсally he appears to
be a severe personality disturbance, an antisocial, aggressive reaction type. Considering his poor mentality and the severity of his personality disturbance, we do not feel that he would be amenable of any form оf psychiatric treatment either in an institution or without. Therefore would recommend that he be treated as a straight correctional case.”
Consistent with the requirement of
In bringing his declaratory judgment aсtion by assigned counsel, defendant demanded judgment that the court declare the provision in the sentence with respect to the non-applicability of the statutory five-year maximum term null and void because of failure to meet the requirements of
At the resentence Judge Gaulkin had before him the рresentence investigation and Diagnostic Center report that had been available to Judge Conlon, and made extensive reference to them. Judge Gaulkin had also arranged to have the presentence investigation brought up to date, so thаt he would
Defendant‘s first point is that Judge Gаulkin had no power to impose a new sentence beyond the five-year statutory maximum. He argues that by reason of Judge Conlon‘s failing to fix a maximum sentence and not showing “good cause,” all of the sentence in excess of five years was invalid and therе remained a valid sentence of five years, the maximum period fixed for an indeterminate term under
“* * * Kitt cannot validly contend that the original sentence must be set aside to permit a resentence, while at the same time those provisions of the original sentence providing fоr concurrent, rather than consecutive, terms of imprisonment must be kept alive for his protection.”
The Indeterminate Sentence Act had its origin in L. 1901, c. 104, relating to the New Jersey Reformatory at Rahway, predecessor of the Bordentown Reformatory and established in 1895. Section 9 of that statute prоvided that courts, in sentencing to the reformatory, “shall not fix or limit the duration of sentence, but it shall not in any case exceed the maximum term provided by law for the crime for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, and may be terminated by the managers of the reformatory as herein provided.” A similar provision was included in section 14 of L. 1910, c. 72, relating to the State Reformatory for Women. This language was carried forward into section 317 of L. 1918, c. 147, relating to charitable, correctional, reformatory and penal institutions, boards and commissions, and then into R.S. 30:4-148. It remained without change until the amendment of L. 1951, c. 335, § 1, which for the first time introduced a maximum period of detention and parole of five years. However, the court could, for good cause shown, impose a sentence greater than five years but in no case greater than the maximum рrovided by law, “and the commitment shall specify in every case the maximum of the sentence so imposed.”
The State urges that Judge Conlon‘s failure to specify a maximum was not fatal; that, consistent with the practice existing in the County Courts of this State for over half a century, the sentencing judge clearly intended a maximum sentence not less than the statutory maximum, and therefore the 15-year maximum of
Anticipating the possibility of such a conclusion, the State alternatively argues the applicability of
The rule was considered in State v. Culver, above, where the prosecutor moved to correct illegal sentences and defendant objected, claiming he should be released. Our Supreme Court hеld that the trial court had full power to resentence defendant even after his original sentence had been partially executed. Chief Justice Vanderbilt in that case observed (23 N.J. at page 504) that “the power to punish criminal offenders granted to the County Court by
Defendant claims that the County Court, on resentence, was without sufficient information to “extend” the term of imprisonment — meaning thereby the five-year maximum term for which defendant contends. The very opposite is the fact. Judge Gaulkin was not obliged to sit in the trial, hear the testimony and observe the witnesses, as defendant obliquely suggests. Defendant had been found guilty; all that remained was to sentence him. The resentencing judge, as noted, had before him the detailed probation office report as well as the report of the Diаgnostic Center, originally obtained by Judge Conlon pursuant to
As a second main point on appeal defendant claims the resentence was invalid because “good cause” was not shown for exceeding the normal five-year limitation. The several reports and defendant‘s record fully established “good cause,” as demonstrated by even our brief reference to and quotations from them earlier in this opinion. The statute does not direct that the trial court specifically list the reasons which impelled it, in its discretion, to impose the type of sentence defendant received. It does not appear that there is any obligation to show “good cause” to the prisoner; the statute contemplates that the trial judge is free to impose a greater sentence when good cause is shown to him, presumably by presentence investigation reports. However, we consider it good practice for the sentencing judge to state with reasonable brevity why he is imposing an indeterminate sentence greater than five years, not only for the information of the
Defendant‘s argument that Judge Gaulkin imposed a sentence in excess of the statutory limit is without factual basis. Having been cоnvicted of carnal abuse, defendant is now subject to an indeterminate sentence with a maximum not to exceed 15 years, as provided in
The action taken by Judge Gaulkin and the sentence he imposed are affirmed.